Written evidence from HM Government (LAN0019)

Government submission of written evidence: Committee on Standards, House of Commons standards landscape

Summary and introduction

1. The Government thanks the Committee on Standards for launching this inquiry and is grateful for the opportunity to engage, both via this submission and in any subsequent evidence sessions.

2. We share the Committee view regarding the complexity of the current system within Parliament and welcome its consideration of how the standards system can be made more accessible and coherent, in a way that recognises the shared responsibility for the welfare of all actors within the system. Whilst there is a high number of bodies and office-holders involved in the parliamentary standards system, each has a necessary and distinct role to play in regulating different aspects of Members' conduct. To further understanding within the parliamentary community and to support users navigating the standards system, the Committee could consider how to better direct users through the different processes involved, for instance through a central landing page.

3. Whilst Ministers abide by the Ministerial Code and are answerable to the Prime Minister, not Parliament, in respect of that code, we appreciate that the standards systems in Parliament, the behavioural codes of the political parties, and the Ministerial Code will often have some cross-over, and we should continue to consider how they interact. The Seven Principles of Public Life[1] continue to offer a conceptual basis of good practice that can be shared between public office-holders, whilst also allowing for context specific rules to be put in place. In addition, the Committee could explore how the current system compares to practices outside of Parliament, such as in the private sector and in other domestic public bodies, and indeed internationally.

4. The Government strongly supports efforts to make Parliament a modern and inclusive organisation. Improvements to schemes such as the Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme (ICGS) should be taken forward with cross-party support, and all efforts should be made to give parliamentarians and the public greater confidence in public standards as a whole. A review of the sanctions available in the parliamentary standards landscape is also warranted, with a view to ensuring outcomes are just as well as fair to all those involved.

Questions

Question 1

What does the current landscape of bodies and processes regulating MPs (including MPs who are also Ministers) look like to the public?

5. As listed in the Committee's call for evidence, there are eight bodies or officeholders that have a direct role in regulating the conduct of MPs.[2] Whilst the number of standards bodies may generate confusion or a sense of opaqueness in the system, the Government acknowledges that this proliferation also maintains a critical independence of functions within the standards landscape. In particular, it is appropriate that the ICGS and the Independent Expert Panel (IEP) operate without any political input or influence. This ensures that sensitive ICGS cases are handled appropriately and that appeals for ICGS and non-ICGS cases are considered in accordance with the principles of natural justice, fairness for all parties, transparency and proportionality.

Standards in Parliament, overseen by the House of Commons

6. The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards monitors the operation of the House of Commons Code of Conduct and Registers, investigating alleged breaches of the 'Rules of Conduct' and 'Guide to the Rules relating to the Conduct of Members' within the Commons Code.[3] Meanwhile, the Committee on Standards oversees the work of the Commissioner, considering any matters the Commissioner brings to their attention and recommending suitable sanctions for decision by the House.[4]

7. Matters of privilege and standards were formerly considered by a single entity – the Committee on Standards and Privileges – but were separated in 2012 into the Committee of Privileges and Committee on Standards in order to allow lay members to sit on the latter.

8. Inside the Chamber, the Speaker and their deputies maintain order during debates and ensure Members observe the House's procedures. In this way, they perform a proactive, day-to-day function in Parliament that is necessarily distinct from the more retrospective, deliberative roles that the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Committee on Standards and Committee of Privileges play in investigating alleged breaches.

9. More widely, the ICGS offers all members of the parliamentary community a means to make complaints outside of the formal proceedings of Parliament, and the Independent Expert Panel – whose membership requires the highest standards impartiality, integrity and objectivity – exists to consider those most serious cases against Members under the ICGS or appeals against decisions by the Committee on Standards in relation to alleged breaches of the Members Code of Conduct. In addition, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) sets MP pay and pensions free of the influence of MPs, and given the conflict of interest inherent to MPs setting their own pay it remains entirely appropriate that IPSA remains a separate entity.

10. Finally, the Electoral Commission regulates, among other things, donations and loans to MPs as elected office holders. In doing so, it is rightly accountable to Parliament via the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, guided by a Policy and Strategy Statement ratified by Parliament. It plays a fundamental role in maintaining trust in our democracy and ensuring the integrity of electoral processes.

11. Though numerous, these bodies and officeholders each exist for good reason and must be able to discharge their functions transparently and independently. At the same time, the existing landscape within Parliament remains frustratingly opaque, even to Members, who report feeling the system is not transparent enough. The Committee could consider how to improve coherence of, and accessibility to, the standards system, for the benefit of Members, the wider parliamentary community and the public.

Ministerial standards, overseen by the Government

12. The Cabinet Office does not have a role in regulating the conduct of Ministers. It is the Ministerial Code that sets out the standards of conduct expected of Ministers and how they discharge their duties. The Prime Minister is the ultimate judge of the behaviour expected by a Minister and of the appropriate consequences for a breach of those standards. Ministers only remain in post as long as they retain the confidence of the Prime Minister.

13. The Government maintains the view articulated in its response to the Committee's review of the Code of Conduct last year: that the rules regulating Members and Ministers are necessarily distinct, reflecting the underlying constitutional principle of the separation of powers between the executive and the legislature.[5] Whilst codes of conduct across Parliament and Government do – and should – share values and principles, the Government does not believe that a single set of rules should be imposed across both, and nor would it be appropriate for one single body or office-holder to have the remit to conduct inquiries into alleged breaches across multiple codes of conduct which operate in different contexts. 

Question 2

Whilst the history of the standards system in Parliament and Government is piecemeal, does the system have coherence? Are there obvious anomalies?

14. The Seven Principles of Public Life – or Nolan Principles[6] – remain a unifying element across both legislature and the executive, and indeed across all manner of public offices in this country. In its response to the Committee's 2022 report on the Code of Conduct, the Government reiterated its view that the Principles represent a long-standing and widely understood set of standards, which serve as the basis of ethical standards expected of public office-holders. Indeed, this is why the Government opposed customising the descriptors attached to the Principles to apply specifically to MPs, since to narrow the scope of the Principles in this way risks undermining the force and standing of those Principles across public offices generally.[7]

15. As well as the need to promote coherence and accessibility in the standards system, another anomaly to tackle is a sense of isolation from the system. There must be a sense of care extended to all those who interact with standards regulators; people are too often left feeling that decision-making is too remote and that investigations take too long to conclude.[8] This combines with other deficiencies – such as inadequate mental health support as declared by Members in internal surveys – to create a dispiriting atmosphere for users. Given the impacts that standards investigations can have on all individuals involved, we must ensure that a responsibility to those individuals is embedded throughout the system.

Question 3

Is there any scope for simplification or consolidation? What would be the benefits and what would be the risks?

16. Whilst Parliament needs updating in line with modern workplace standards, we should expect additional procedural complexities given its unique constitutional role. A key risk in any consolidation move is the erosion of the role of independent bodies in considering matters that should not be directly influenced by parliamentarians. IPSA is a key example of this, as are the ICGS and Electoral Commission.

17. As above, the Government would not support efforts to consolidate codes of conduct and organisational oversight across Members and Ministers, given the separation of powers between legislature and executive. This position also ensures the independence of Parliament and its procedures. We note the comments from the Committee on Standards in Public Life on a unified standards or integrity Commission:

The concentration of such power to a body without an elected mandate, and without the checks, balances and accountabilities of elected politicians, seems disproportionate and does not sit well in our democratic system. [...] Each code of conduct exists for a specific purpose, serving a role or process where potential conflicts of interest pose a significant risk. These codes are specific to their context and cannot be easily merged or amalgamated, so a single commission would still have to operate multiple codes, potentially creating as much confusion as it may solve.[9]

18. However, whilst each standards body legitimately has its own remit and distinct processes, this does not mean they should not share principles in their decision-making criteria. We have already mentioned the use of the Seven Principles of Public Life as a set of unifying principles across public office, and the Committee on Standards in Public Life is responsible for promoting adherence to these principles to those working in the public sector.

Question 4

How do political party processes and formal regulatory processes interact? Should there be greater consistency in internal party processes?

19. In the Government’s response in 2018 to the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s review into intimidation in public life, the Government recommended that all political parties should have their own code of conduct. As far as we are aware, all the political parties represented in Parliament now have their own code. This provides a mechanism to address misconduct by elected representatives, party officials or party members. Within Parliament, the Party Whips are also able to remove the Whip from individuals, which provides a further political mechanism to address inappropriate conduct.

20. The Government does not think it appropriate to regulate the internal processes of political parties: they are independent, voluntary sector membership organisations.

Question 5

Are there ways in which different processes, or the relationship between different bodies, could be streamlined for MPs?

21. It may be worth considering whether more needs to be done to explain the distinctions between the different standards bodies. In the first instance, an assessment of the level of knowledge of the system amongst the parliamentary community may help inform efforts to promote awareness of the different bodies, their functions and in what circumstances those bodies can and will act.

22. There are positive indications in this space. The ICGS, for instance, has reported over 90% awareness of its bullying and harassment and its sexual misconduct policies.[10] The provision of comprehensive and easily available resources is also a key factor: the Independent Expert Panel has a clear set of guidance for appellants in Code of Conduct and ICGS cases, and the Standards Committee in devising a Procedural Protocol has also contributed to these excellent resources.

23. The Committee could explore the introduction of a centralised resource or landing page where Members of Parliament, the wider parliamentary community and the public can go to find out how parliamentary standards issues in all their forms are dealt with. This will doubtless be a difficult task, since there are a number of standards bodies involved and complex interactions with key constitutional principles such as parliamentary privilege and the separation of executive and legislature. However, such an exercise would likely go some way towards improving coherence and accessibility in the system.

24. In addition, there are potentially instructive examples of how standards bodies interact with users and streamline the system. The Electoral Commission has a statutory duty to ensure compliance with the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, and one of the ways in which the Commission meets this obligation is by providing advice and guidance to MPs in relation to their responsibilities under that Act. Where possible, organisations and office-holders with a role in regulating MPs in relation to political finance have already found ways to streamline this for MPs. For example, given the overlaps of information, MPs are required to report to the Electoral Commission (under schedules 7 and 7A of PPERA 2000) and the Registrar of Member’s Financial Interests. Rather than requiring MPs to report to both separately, the Electoral Commission obtains information from the Register and/or Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, avoiding duplication. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct (which outlines the requirements for MPs in relation to the registration of financial interests) clearly signposts that members should seek the advice of the Electoral Commission in relation to queries about donations regulated by the 2000 Act.[11] 

Question 6

Could the role and remit of different bodies be better explained or promoted?

25. Some form of enhanced training or awareness campaign by the House could help bridge knowledge gaps in the parliamentary community. The Government notes the recent example of the Standards Committee, having reported on an investigation into an alleged breach of the Code, advising that the Member in question attend a briefing on his obligations under the Code of Conduct with the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.[12]

26. Greater emphasis on informing and training Members before matters come to the point of sanction, even as early as the candidate stage of an MP's career, should avoid Members "inadvertently" breaching the Code. As referred to above, some Members new to their role feel that support is lacking. The results of the latest Members' survey should help identify in what specific areas MPs need more support. The next General Election offers an opportunity for parliamentary authorities to craft an enhanced training offer so that Members feel better prepared to begin their careers fully cognisant of the expectations attendant to their office. This support is particularly important given the incredible volume of work MPs must do as they establish themselves in the House following a General Election.

Question 7

Could there be an easier way for members of the public to make complaints or raise concerns about conduct, where they are not sure which body has oversight?

27. As above, a centralised resource, landing page or "signposting" service for the parliamentary standards system could help both the public and parliamentary community navigate that system with greater confidence. The Government notes the ICGS has an expansive landing page with a suite of resources directing users through the correct processes. Integrating these resources with the broader standards landscape could represent a positive step towards greater coherence and accessibility. With a clear indication of the bodies responsible and the processes they must follow, there should be greater confidence for users in how complaints will be handled.

Question 8

Does the Recall of MPs Act 2015, and other legislation relating to the disqualification of Members, operate satisfactorily? How could it be improved?

28. Since 2015, there have been four recall petitions, with a fifth petition currently open in the Wellingborough constituency. Three out of the four concluded recall petitions were successful in that they were validly signed by 10% of the electorate, and by-elections were held. (Peterborough in 2018 and Brecon and Radnorshire in 2019 reached the 10% threshold; North Antrim in 2018 did not. Rutherglen and Hamilton West reached the threshold in July and a by-election took place in October.)

29. These examples suggest that the Recall of MPs Act 2015 is operating as intended, however there remains room for improvement. In its 2019 report on the Act and the administration of Recall petitions, the Electoral Commission identified a number of operational issues. This includes administrative challenges, issues with transparency, the length of recall petitions, and the number of signing stations made available. The Government would support the Committee's consideration of these issues.

30. For its part, the Government has continued to keep the Act under review as the House of Commons Standards system has evolved. In October 2021 the Government brought forward a Standing Order change so that where the Independent Expert Panel (IEP) has recommended a suspension of qualifying duration in ICGS cases, a Recall petition will be triggered. In light of this Standing Order change, the IEP is required to send any report that recommends a sanction that would otherwise engage the Recall Act to the Standards Committee. The Committee would in turn be required, within three sitting days, to make a report to the House recommending an equal suspension to run concurrently, thereby triggering the Recall Act.

31. More widely, the Government has sought to clarify for those involved in the administration of Recall petitions how they ought to operate via the Guidance for Petition Officers[13] issued in 2020. Consequential amendments were also made to the Recall Act made via the Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022 to ensure that as the arrangements for calling elections were changed, there remained provision to prevent or terminate recall petitions close to a general election to avoid redundant by-elections.

32. The Government does not at this stage consider there is a case for making fundamental changes to the Recall of MPs Act, particularly where these would introduce discretionary elements into the Act which could reduce clarity for the electorate.

33. Beyond operational issues with the Recall Act, the Committee may wish to consider the interaction between sanctions in the standards system and the triggering of recall petitions, and consider available punishments in the system more generally. Naturally, there is a need for robust sanctions for Members found to have broken the rules, but this needs to be balanced with the need to show care towards all those who interact with the system. The Committee could consider broadening the sanctions available, learning from modern workplaces and other parliaments across the world. A graduated system of sanctions – as the Government has already adopted in the Ministerial Code – could also be considered. This reform would build on the distinctions drawn between the sanctions recommended by the Commissioner for Standards and the Standards Committee.

Question 9

What can be learned from parallel processes in other parliaments/assemblies within the UK and elsewhere?

34. It is right that Parliament seeks to lead the way as an example to democracies across the world. However, Parliament can still learn from others.

35. A comparative analysis between the standards system in the UK Parliament and those in the devolved administrations and abroad may prove to be instructive. The Committee could engage with their counterparts in the devolved legislatures to identify whether there are examples of best practice that could be tailored and adopted in the UK Parliament. Internationally, there may also be useful comparisons to be made, looking at political systems which are comparable to those in the UK (for example in Commonwealth countries) as well as the approach taken in federal systems of Government. For example, the principles-based Code of Conduct for TDs in Ireland, adopted by the Dáil Éireann in 2002, provides an analogy to the House of Commons Code of Conduct, as does the Code of Official Conduct in the US House of Representatives.

36. As previously mentioned, there may be practices from the modern workplace to emulate in Parliament. This will always, however, need to be considered against core constitutional principles, including the fact of parliamentary privilege and the status of Members as the people's representatives.

December 2023