Written evidence from Compassion in Politics (LAN0018)

What does the current landscape of bodies and processes regulating MPs (including MPs who are also Ministers) look like to the public?

The system is largely impenetrable. By having the processes and rules buried in various documents and constitutional arrangements, the following is especially unclear:

● What standards are expected of whom

● How they are enforced.

This in turn leads to the perception that the rules are designed in order to benefit politicians. For example, our polling shows that just 7% of people think politicians represent them and 4% think they show compassion to the public.[1] This is being partly fed by a system which is seen as self-governing (or, to many voters, self-serving). Without independent oversight, the only conclusion the public can draw is that parliament and government are setting and marking their own homework.

Whilst the history of the standards system in Parliament and Government is piecemeal, does the system have coherence? Are there obvious anomalies?

The main anomalies are:

● Enforcement is dependent on the fluctuating nature of government power. It is possible for a government with a large majority to prevent, for example, censure of a Minister under the Ministerial Code.

● It is similarly dependent on the strength of those charged with upholding standards. A recent trend has seen individuals under investigation seek to undermine the authority of the bodies carrying out the investigation. This was the case with, for example, Owen Patterson, Dominic Raab and Boris Johnson. In such instances the authority of the bodies becomes dependent on whether or not government and parliamentarians provide them with moral support. It would be more reliable if their authority rested in statute.

● The Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests is not, in fact, independent. While it remains the case that the Adviser can only open an investigation into the behaviour of a Minister at the behest of the prime minister and they can only recommend, rather than enforce, censure, their role is significantly diminished and far from independent.

● A piecemeal system has failed to keep up with change. One of the main arguments for a piecemeal and organic system is that it can grow to match changing conditions. The problem is, this hasn’t been the case. A number of changes have occurred since, for example, the last major update to the Cabinet Manual: Brexit, the repeal of the Fixed-Terms Parliament Act, and further devolution, to name just a few.

● Responsibility is opaque. For example, recent investigations into Ministerial conduct have been led by senior civil servants (Sue Gray), a political appointee (Sir Laurie Magnus), and externally appointed lawyers (Adam Tolley KC). This moveable feast means that interpretations of the law lack consistency and that no one individual is being asked to take overall responsibility for understanding and enforcing standards.

● The Nolan Principles rest on a shared political consensus about the need for good behaviour. That consensus has been broken. It would be hard for anyone to argue that a consensus about good behaviour exists currently given the spate of recent scandals - from lobbying, to abuse and bullying, lies and illegal behaviour in Downing Street. That consensus must be rebuilt.

● Not only that, but even when breaches are being investigated, it appears as though there is a lack of agreement on what the rules for conduct are. The length of time it took to investigate Partygate and the fact that there seemed to be a need for an accumulation of wrongdoings before any action was taken - rather than a single instance being enough for action - suggests a lack of assurance about when a breach has occurred.

Is there any scope for simplification or consolidation? What would be the benefits and what would be the risks?

Yes. It could be simplified and consolidated in a number of ways:

● By putting the Nolan Principles and Ministerial Code on a statutory footing. This would give them both increased resilience and visibility, making them easier to enforce. It would also signal to the public that standards matter.

● By creating an independent Ethics Commission to oversee and enforce the different standards. While a top-down reform to the rules themselves might not be straightforward, it would be possible to create an independent and authoritative body

to interpret and enforce them. At a minimum such a body would have to be able to launch investigations of conduct without consent from the prime minister, recommend censure, and develop initiatives for improving standards in parliament.

● By engaging the public in the process of improving standards. This would serve multiple purposes. Firstly, because that is the way things ought to work: MPs are, after all, servants of the public. Our polling found that 70% of the public think they should be involved in some way in determining the rules that govern how politicians behave.[2] Secondly, it could help to increase public engagement and faith in our politics. Thirdly, it would make the system of oversight in parliament more responsive to changing social norms. With the development of new forms of technology and means of communication, it is time to consider how parliament can better serve and represent the public. This process could be achieved through a series of citizens assemblies on the issue of political power and standards, all overseen by the Ethics Commission.

● There is also considerable public appetite for legislation to make deliberate misrepresentations by politicians an offence. Polling by Compassion in Politics and Opinium found that two-thirds (68%) of the public would support a law that brought political misrepresentations in line with the law governing misrepresentations in other areas of working life.[3]

How do political party processes and formal regulatory processes interact? Should there be greater consistency in internal party processes?

Are there ways in which different processes, or the relationship between different bodies, could be streamlined for MPs?

Could the role and remit of different bodies be better explained or promoted?

As detailed above, an act of citizen engagement should be launched to ask people about the standards they expect of those they elect. This would help to increase engagement in politics and make parliament more responsive to changing conditions.

Could there be an easier way for members of the public to make complaints or raise concerns about conduct, where they are not sure which body has oversight?

The rules would need to be clarified first - which could be partly achieved through an education drive but should also, as detailed above, be carried out through a public consultation. This process would help people to better understand the rules and norms expected of politicians.

There could be a one-stop point of contact for members of the public to complain about MPs conduct too, in the same way that the public can lodge complaints to bodies like the Advertising Standards Authority or Ofcom.

In addition, parliament could:

● Hold “values days” where they celebrate a particular Nolan Principle and highlight how MPs are expected to uphold it.

● Timetable an annual debate on political standards and the extent to which they are being enforced.

● Create a single point of contact for the public to make complaints over behaviour.

● Ensure that point of contact can be accessed by various forms of communication.

● Publish a “single source of truth” on the standards expected of MPs and Ministers and how they are enforced.

● Insist that political advertising be governed by the Advertising Standards Authority which governs all other forms of advertising.

Does the Recall of MPs Act 2015, and other legislation relating to the disqualification of Members, operate satisfactorily? How could it be improved?

What can be learned from parallel processes in other parliaments/assemblies within the UK and elsewhere?

December 2023