Nicholas Williams, Senior Associate Fellow, European Leadership Network[1] -written evidence (AFG0021)

• UK MOD Policy Adviser to NATO Regional Headquarters South, Kandahar, 2007 – 2008
• NATO Deputy senior Representative, Kabul, 2008 – 2009
• NATO Head of Operations (Afghanistan), International Staff, NATO HQ Brussels, 2009 – 2017
• Policy/Political Adviser, British Forces, Iraq, 2003 - 2005

The following insights and observations are based on almost 10 years of close involvement in Afghanistan, in Kandahar, Kabul and Brussels, and as policy adviser to UK Forces in Basra, Iraq, from 2003 – 2005.

In short, though International and British training efforts in Afghanistan resulted in signs of improvement in Afghan security forces, there were never any indications that the improvements were durable or sustainable.  The mistaking of signs of improvement for evidence of sustainability was the reason for wildly optimistic military assessments of the effectiveness of the international training effort.  In order to avoid Afghanistan descending into ungovernability after US military withdrawal in April 2021, the US will have to maintain - and oversee on the ground - the significant funding of the Afghan security forces which the US, allies and NATO partners currently provide.

1. British Influence in Afghanistan.  British military and diplomatic influence in Afghanistan was at best tactical, never strategic or decisive.  Under the cover of NATO, Afghanistan was an operation driven and resourced by the US, mainly the US Central Command.  In these circumstances, the UK could “nudge but not budge” major decisions, even when it affected its own interests in Helmand (for example the dangerous but futile operation in 2008 to transport a turbine to the Kajaki dam through hostile Taleban controlled territory should have been opposed and refused).  British diplomatic and political influence, such as it was, in Afghanistan resulted from a combination of the competence of the British military, the ability of UK officers to insinuate themselves in all key US areas of interest, and US confidence that the UK would not oppose but assist in accomplishing US objectives.

2. The concept for training the Afghan Security Forces was fundamentally flawed from the outset.  Faced in 2003 with a semblance of peace and then from 2007 with a rapidly growing insurgency, NATO’s training effort focused on building the competence of the security forces from the bottom up.  All recruits were given a basic training of 2 – 3 weeks which instilled basic skills of individual self-defence and the protection of check points.  The Ministry of Defence in Kabul and Afghan military and police command structures were left to their own devices guided by a fast-rotating succession of inexperienced international “mentors”.

The planning and directing competence of the MOD atrophied.  Afghan forces on the ground, particularly in the south and east where the insurgency was most virulent, became adjuncts to the US/ NATO military campaign.  As a result, the Afghan government never had ownership of the campaign; the Ministry of Defence never developed in competence or authority; and the Afghan forces in the field saw never themselves as fighting for Afghanistan, only as bit-part and expendable players in someone else’s war.  The NATO effort did not overcome the failure to instil or demand a sense of ownership from the top.

3. ANA effectiveness.  Despite increased and significant NATO efforts from 2011-2014 to train the Afghan security forces to assume full responsibility for their own security, the end of ISAF at the end of 2014 exposed the extent of Afghan psychological and practical dependence on NATO forces. Afghan leadership, intelligence, planning and logistics were not only deficient, but left to their own devices virtually non-existent.  There was a lack of competence at the top.  Corruption in the army, though less than in the Afghan National Police (because there were fewer opportunities) was rife.  Much weaponry, ammunition and fuel were being sold on the black market.  President Ghani cut fuel supplies to the Afghan National Army (ANA) at the end of 2014 calculating that it would maintain adequate supplies to units in the field, but reduce theft: instead theft continued, and units were left with insufficient supplies.  Senior military appointments in the were secured by bribery, nepotism or political interference.[2]

4. Morale and motivation. Morale was generally low throughout the ANA, except in the specially favoured Special Forces.  The commitment to fight (though not the commitment to draw a salary)  was half-hearted except when preceded and covered by US air power.  Generally, the Afghan population considered the ANA as mercenaries.  There is a residual respect for conscription in Afghanistan as embodying the patriotic duty that a citizen owes to the state.  In return, the state would socialise and educate the raw, mainly village,  recruits teaching basic skills such as reading and writing. When, occasionally, President Karzai, Defence Ministers or other influential Afghans suggested conscription to NATO as a model to be worked towards, Allied military discouraged the idea as impractical and inefficient, not realising that making the ANA in NATO’s image was depriving the Afghans of making it in theirs.

5. Comparisons with Iraq.  Though training efforts in Iraq left much to be desired, the task of reforming and reconstructing an army in Iraq was easier than in Afghanistan.  One obvious difference was that in Afghanistan the army had virtually ceased to exist in 2001 after years of Taleban rule, whereas in Iraq remaining structures and personnel were a base to build on.  Even more significantly, the Iraqis have a horror of chaos and need central authority and structure.  Afghans can cope without central authority, and will show allegiance to whatever effective structure that presents itself locally.  In Afghanistan, authority is negotiable, in Iraq it is essential.

6. British Chain of Command.  The British chain of command was muddled and competitive.  The NATO chain of command was largely ignored by British commanders in Helmand, except if there were a British General in the position of Commanding Officer, NATO Regional Command South (which had NATO command over the forces in Helmand).  When the author was in RC(South), it seemed that the British Embassy in Kabul, the British General in Kandahar and Permanent Joint Headquarters in in Northwood were all competing to impose their will on British forces in Helmand.

7. British training was effective, but at times too insistent.  British trainers had the reputation, correctly, of being among the most effective among the NATO contingents. Each NATO contingent largely delivered what they were nationally familiar with: there was no NATO approved syllabus, though the US, through leadership of the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTMA) and later Resolute Support Command, tried to impose common minimum standards.  The Italian Carabinieri were probably the most effective trainers, teaching a broad skill set that derived from their military-police background.  They also had an intuitive understanding of how to deal with Afghans. 

It is probably no coincidence that there were almost no incidents of Afghan army attacks (so called “green-on-blue incidents) on their mentors or trainers in the Italian and Spanish sectors, while such attacks were at one point comparatively frequent in the US and British sectors.  The British and US “can-do” spirit is quick to transform itself into a “must-do” military imperative - that is, an insistence that trainees must fulfil training objectives and must do what mentors require (for example frequent patrolling) which Afghans generally resented.

8. English Language.  All military training by international forces was in English, with Afghan interpreters. The British trainers had the advantage of speaking English as a mother tongue. Regrettably, many of them were misunderstood and mistranslated because of their strong regional accents and inability to speak distinctly.  English is an international language.  The British Military should be taught how to speak it clearly.

9. The UK’s NATO messaging.  The UK’s public messaging on its involvement in Afghanistan seemed to downplay the fact that it drew its purpose and legitimacy from a NATO operation authorised under a UN Security Council Resolution.  It focused instead on the successes and setbacks in Helmand province as if that were the extent and limit of British responsibility.  A greater emphasis on the NATO framework could have helped explain to the British public that there were many other countries sharing the burden with us.  When inevitably the security situation deteriorated in Helmand province, an emphasis on the  wider framework and responsibility might also have eased accusations of British failure by explaining the NATO context.

10.        NATO’s Enduring Partnership.  The Enduring Partnership grew out of an earlier initiative called the “Afghanistan Cooperation Programme”.  Both initiatives were driven by the political/civilian side of NATO and aimed to demonstrate to the Afghan Government that NATO’s interest was not confined to ISAF operations and extended to a long-term political partnership promising broader non-operational assistance and capacity building.  Unfortunately, the stated ambition was greater than the sum of the partnership’s disparate parts (the Enduring Partnership consists largely of Building Integrity and political and military dialogue with the NATO chain of command, which do not represent a coherent programme of assistance).

One problem is that NATO as an institution does not have the capacity to build capacity in others: it depends on the volunteered efforts member states to do so.  Another problem was that the allies were too busy in ISAF to devote resources to non-priority and ill-defined NATO programmes in Afghanistan.  If the US leaves Afghanistan in 2021 and Resolute Support ends, perhaps it will be time to re-launch the Enduring Partnership, in some form, as allied spare capacity is released.  However, the appetite for doing anything militarily significant with and in Afghanistan will be minimal if the US leaves - the security situation will be too uncertain.

11.        Post US Withdrawal.  The price that the Talban will exact for a peace deal with the Afghan government will be a significant participation in the Afghan government, including governorships in the south and east and a major share of army and police positions. While such a generous deal will be accepted in the south for the sake of peace, it will inspire resistance in the north. Internally, the security forces will be an arena for a struggle for influence, power and positions among the various and opposing factions that make up Afghan society. The struggle for power and control of the security forces is unlikely to result in renewed conflict in the short term, provided that the generous international funding to the security forces continues.  Internal tensions are more likely to result in acute political instability and the fear of renewed conflict, leading to an increased flow of migrants to Europe.  The Germans are probably right that a continued US/NATO training presence in the country would have been small price to pay to avoid such a scenario.

12.         The importance of continued funding for the Afghan security forces.  In order to stave off a descent into complete chaos,  eventual conflict, and an increased wave of migration, US and NATO funding to the security forces will need to be continued.  Currently, the US spends annually on about $4.5 billion, the rest of NATO about $0.5 billion on sustaining the Afghan security forces.  The continuation of funding at an adequate level (not necessarily at the current level) will be essential if the Afghan Government is to maintain an equilibrium, by means of patronage and clientelism, between rival factions in the security forces.

The US should be the lead player in the funding.  It needs to have leverage to underwrite the peace process that it has brokered.  This would also help ensure a minimum degree of stability that would allow for continued humanitarian and development aid in Afghanistan. The NATO funding should therefore continue after US (and NATO) withdrawal, but be channelled through the US.

Nicholas Williams

Brussels, October 2020

Received 7 October 2020