Written evidence from Prospect and FDA (LAN0016)
Prospect is a trade union representing about 157,000 members working as scientists, engineers, tech experts and other specialists across the public and private sectors. Prospect is proudly politically independent and is not affiliated to any political party.
The FDA is a trade union for managers and professionals in public service, representing more than 22,000 members. Membership includes senior civil servants, government policy advisors, prosecutors, diplomats, tax professionals, economists, solicitors and other professionals working across the government and the NHS.
We are two of the recognised trade unions in Parliament, between us representing hundreds of professional and specialist staff working on the Parliamentary estate, including in the House of Commons, the House of Lords and the Parliamentary Digital Service. We do not represent staff employed directly by MPs though have some members working closely with MPs.
The setting up of the Independent Complaints and Grievance Scheme (ICGS) in July 2018 followed a long campaign by trade unions and House staff for a system for determining complaints of bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct that was fully independent of MPs. Further campaigning resulted in allowing ‘non-recent’ complaints (preceding the 2017 election) in July 2019 and the setting up of an Independent Expert Panel, to hear appeals and determine appropriate sanctions, in June 2020.
The principle of “an entirely independent process, in which MPs will play no part” was a recommendation made by Dame Laura Cox in her October 2018 report on the Bullying and Harassment of House of Commons Staff. The principle has the full support of both the FDA and Prospect and must be retained and protected.
Our concern is that the ICGS/IEP process is insufficiently understood, we suspect, by the majority of people to whom it applies. Therefore, the understanding (by both potential users and by the wider public) of the system is going to be influenced by media coverage of cases which, in a small number of recent ones, has not been positive.
This feeds into what at times seems like Westminster’s default response; to focus blame on the specific policy or process rather than the overall culture.
We would like to put on record that most of the time most Members of the House treat staff with respect and that working relationships between most staff and most Members are harmonious. Cases of bullying, harassment or inappropriate behaviour are a minority. However, when it happens the impact on health and well-being is devastating. In some cases, it can result in dedicated, talented, and hardworking staff leaving their career in Parliament, which can be in nobody’s interest. A series of reports from the Independent Expert Panel upholding complaints of bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct is clear evidence that this remains a significant issue. It has led to several by-elections, and several other MPs having their party’s whip removed.
MPs and Ministers must recognise on a cross party basis their responsibility to build trust and credibility in the institutions they form a part of. In the first instance, this must be based on following the Nolan principles themselves and holding their colleagues to account on the same basis. We suggest below some tangible steps that would help achieve this.
Westminster’s response to emerging issues or scandals—be it second jobs for MPs, expenses or bullying and harassment—has been rarely to adapt an existing body or policy but rather to create an entirely new one, which has created a complex landscape.
There is some legitimacy to this level of complexity, as the nature of complaints is different and thus will require different handling and expertise.
It important that the complaints vehicle is appropriate to the nature of the complaint. The system for determining complaints of bullying, harassment and sexual misconduct by MPs has been designed to be appropriate to that purpose, as it involves two parties (complainant and respondent) and a significant power imbalance. Other breaches of the Code of Conduct do not, justifying a different approach.
From an ICGS perspective, it’s essential that all potential users of the service understand how the process works from start to finish, who is involved in investigations and have a reasonable expectation of timescales and outcomes.
A glaring anomaly is the different way in which ministerial standards are regulated compared to MPs on the Parliamentary estate. We currently have a situation where a minister could face an investigation, and potentially sanctions, under the ICGS for conduct in the House of Commons, but if they repeated that same conduct within their Department, they would face no consequences.
The only way to deal with ministerial misconduct is through the Ministerial Code, of which the Prime Minister is the sole arbiter. The Prime Minister’s Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests can only open an investigation with the approval of the Prime Minister and then, the Prime Minister has sole responsibility for determining sanctions.
This incoherence can damage confidence in bringing complaints against minister in their capacity as MPs, lead to confusion about how complaints against ministers are handlined and undermine Parliament’s work to improve standards.
To give an entirely hypothetical example, should a minister alleged to have bullied civil servants while on the parliamentary premises be investigated under the ICGS? Or would the preferred route be an investigation under the Ministerial Code? Or both?
The consequences of an ICGS sanction and an IEP recommendation to uphold that sanction for MPs are so potentially vast—both personally and for their constituents—that any process that regulates MPs and has the potential power to sanction or subject them to recall needs to be incredibly thorough, with sufficient opportunity for the MP and the complainant to provide and examine evidence and to appeal.
The legitimate desire to speed up or simplify processes must be seen in that context. The recent ICGS annual report shows that there are a range of factors contributing to delays—including well-being and health issues, but also unavailable and unresponsive users. The average time taken to conclude cases reduced by 26 days to 184 in 2022/23. There are no quick fixes, however, the ICGS team is committed to improving the complaints process and has delivered improvements over the last year. A review of the ICGS later this year I is an opportunity to consider what further improvements can be made.
In addition, there is insufficient clarity as to the read-across between the various policies, as outlined in our response to question 2.
It’s our view that there should be a focus on improving existing policies with better signposting where necessary. Any attempt at consolidation would need to be justified based on the evidence, subject to full consultation to avoid unintended consequences and based on the precautionary principle, levelling up to the policy which provides the highest protection and support for complainants.
The protectionist outlook of political parties in relation to MP investigations arises from a Westminster culture that has been in place for decades, if not centuries. Parties almost inevitably seek, as a first step, to protect themselves from the public fall-out of any investigation and therefore instinctively seek to control any investigation, or knowledge thereof. But in cases of bullying, harassment, or sexual misconduct, this has potentially serious consequences for other members of the parliamentary community and, indeed, constituents of the MP.
We believe that formal protocols between the political parties and Parliament are required to ensure that information necessary to the health and safety of employees, visitors, constituents attending surgeries and, indeed, other MPs, such as that an MP is under investigation by their party for allegations of a sexual or violent nature, is made available to relevant persons within the parliamentary structure to enable proper risk mitigations to take place.
It should be possible to achieve this while recognising that the structure, traditions, and organisation of the main political parties varies enormously.
See answer to question 3. Streamlining must not water down protection for potential victims or the attempt to achieve an appropriate process.
The lack of a public “face” of Parliament to perform this explicatory role is a weakness in our view. There is an understandable reticence to allow parliamentary officials to be put before public scrutiny, but our current unwillingness to do so means that narrative about the House’s processes is driven by media reports, often focussed on those who have been left frustrated by their experience.
Going through a complaints process can be very difficult for all parties involved and users first hand experiences are valid and should be taken on board as feedback. However, it is also important that there are people in Parliament and the House, who understand the intricacies of the scheme, to speak up for the system and set out the work that’s underway to improve it.
Therefore, we would encourage that more consideration be given to “personalising” the House’s corporate response to these matters.
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For more than two years, the trade unions have been pressing for Parliament to adopt a formal mechanism by which MPs arrested on suspicion of a sexual or violent offence would be prevented from accessing the Parliamentary estate and from Parliamentary-funded travel. This, of course, would not in any sense be a sanction or punishment. We believe that such a measure is a necessary, proportionate, and precautionary response—of a type MPs would expect to see in place in employers in their constituencies—to a potentially increased risk.
The House of Commons Commission has made some positive steps in this direction, but there is a growing fear that institutional inertia—as opposed to outright resistance—might delay further progress on this until after the election. This example may seem only tangentially related to this question but it is emblematic of a cultural issue; that only MPs themselves can vote to agree on the means by which MPs can be restrained, investigated or sanctioned, and that progressive steps forward in this area—which may be in the public interest—can be thwarted or delayed by the very people to whom the processes apply.
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November 2023