Forward Strategy Ltd. – Written Evidence (RUI0019)

Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations

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Summary

·                Brexit disrupts UK-EU sanctions unity; evasion through intermediaries increases.

·                Vital to establish a European watchdog for sanction enforcement.

·                UK-EU collaboration essential to track and seal sanction breaches.

·                Engagement with dissidents, like BelPol, enhances sanction violation detection.

·                BelPol findings urge deeper UK-EU intelligence and enforcement action.

·                The Congress of People's Deputies offers new engagement avenues for the UK and the EU.

·                Congress initiatives, like the Peace Act, align with UK-EU values.

·                The UK and the EU can support Congress's legislative efforts for Russia's democratic reforms.

·                Congress's social reform agenda provides common ground for UK-EU sanctions.

·                UK parliamentary engagement with Congress could shape post-war Ukraine aid.

Evidence

1.               The dissolution of collective sanctioning procedures post-Brexit has resulted in an erosion of a cohesive sanctions framework amongst EU member states and the UK, thereby amplifying the risk of sanction circumvention.

2.               The creation of a robust monitoring entity to oversee sanctions compliance and trade activities within Europe is essential to prevent sanction evasion through intermediary firms or third countries. The absence of a consolidated European entity to monitor the trade and re-trade of goods to sanctioned individuals and entities has given rise to a multitude of strategies designed to bypass sanctions, frequently through intermediary firms in nations that have not imposed identical restrictions on Russian and Belarusian bodies as the UK and EU.

3.               It is imperative for the UK Parliament and EU to form a joint task force dedicated to thwarting efforts to evade sanctions, pinpointing the breaches and closing the loopholes.

4.               The UK should take the initiative in fostering collaboration with EU-affiliated non-governmental organisations and investigative bodies from the Russian and Belarusian dissidents and opposition, such as BelPol—a consortium of former Belarusian law enforcement and security officers—that are engaged in detecting entities that contravene the sanctions imposed on commerce with Russia.

5.               Engagements with entities like BelPol[1], which have revealed sanction violations, highlight the need for deeper UK-EU collaboration in intelligence sharing and the enforcement of trade sanctions. BelPol has already allegedly uncovered the operations of Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited, which acted as a conduit in the re-sale of technologically advanced equipment subject to sanctions to AAT “Peleng”[2] and the Minsk Motor Plant, or Minskiy Motornyi Zavod “MMZ” (in Russian), both situated in Belarus.

6.               According to BelPol, “Peleng” is awaiting a consignment from Shenzhen 5G Hi-Tech Innovation Co., Limited as per an order dated 9 August 2023, which includes absolute optical encoders produced by the British firm RENISHAW PLC.

7.               Absolute optical encoders are essential in aviation and defence applications for managing the position of control surfaces, aerials, and other pivotal components.

8.               BelPol alleges that AAT “Peleng” anticipates the receipt of 100 units of encoders type RA26BEA052B10F, priced at 1,244 US dollars each, and 100 units of encoders type RESA30USA052B, at 600 US dollars each, culminating in the acquisition of 184,400 US dollars’ worth of British-manufactured goods that could be utilised in the fabrication and upkeep of Russian military hardware deployed in the war in Ukraine.

9.               BelPol has also alleged that “MMZ” intends to procure thermoplastic machinery and rubber casting injection moulding machines via a Chinese enterprise.

10.  Historical engagement with opposition figures from the Soviet era to the present demonstrates the value of political support for dissidents, which could be a point of convergence for UK-EU diplomatic efforts, emphasising shared values and strategic objectives. The Right Honourable Lady Thatcher, as Prime Minister, notably engaged with Soviet dissidents, such as Natan Sharansky[3] and Yuri Orlov[4]. Although British Prime Ministers in the last three years, including Boris Johnson[5], have held meetings with leaders and members of the Russian and Belarusian opposition such as Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the extent of this engagement has not mirrored the same public and high-profile interest in the daily struggles of the Russian populace by the British political elite.

11.  As the EU extends support to democratic opposition, the UK could strengthen its ties with these groups, proposing new initiatives for democratic advocacy and leveraging these relationships for broader foreign policy goals. The UK should bolster its engagements with democratic opposition groups within the Russian and Belarusian spheres, aiming to surpass the level of support currently extended by the EU. The EU has provided significant assistance to the Belarusian opposition from 2020 to February 2022[6], and has continued its support beyond February 2022, with explicit details of the assistance given during these periods.

12.  Given the complex geopolitical landscape, the discreet support for Russian opposition by the UK and EU might be strategically re-evaluated to balance diplomatic concerns with the benefits of visible solidarity. Both the EU and the UK have not maintained a conspicuous public interaction with Russian opposition figures. This may be attributed to a variety of factors including diplomatic considerations, the complex political landscape, and potential repercussions of overt support.

13.  UK-EU collaboration with democratic opposition movements can serve dual purposes: supporting internal democratic movements and creating a united front in foreign policy towards authoritarian regimes. Identifying and collaborating with opposition factions committed to democratic change in Belarus and Russia is essential for the UK and EU to aid in a strategic partnership. Such alliances not only support Ukraine by redirecting Russian focus to internal dynamics but also contribute to the UK and EU’s goal of fostering democratic governance in neighbouring territories.

14.  Following Russia's full-scale incursion into Ukraine, the EU and UK have intensified their policy of deeper engagement with opposition factions in Russia, Belarus, and within the Russian Federation.

15.  It is critical to recognise groups that act as legitimate voices of the people. For Belarus, the representation is embodied by the Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office. Her assumed victory in the August 2020 presidential elections[7] and the establishment of the United transitional cabinet, deriving its authority from Tsikhanouskaya, affirm her as the voice of the Belarusian populace.

16.  The EU and UK's engagement with legitimate opposition representatives like Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya should continue to evolve, reflecting a commitment to democratic processes and the potential for a structured relationship in foreign affairs.

17.  Conversely, the Belarusian opposition's Coordination Council, initially convened by S. Tsikhanouskaya[8], has waned in popularity among Belarusians. Despite recognition from US[9] and EU[10] authorities, it does not accurately represent the Belarusian public nor abide by its foundational charter.

18.  The scrutiny of opposition groups, such as the Belarus Coordination Council, underlines the need for transparent and representative structures in diaspora politics, which the UK and EU can jointly support to enhance democratic governance. Noteworthy are instances where Council members negotiated exchanges for political detainees without transparently disclosing selection criteria, funding sources, or addressing the ethical implications of financing the Lukashenko administration, which supports the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine[11].

19.  Instances of questionable conduct by opposition members prompt a review of how the UK and EU recognise and interact with such groups, affecting their collective stance on foreign policy and security. An episode involving the longstanding Belarus Coordination Council member, Ms Olga Kovalkova, who was shown on Belarusian state TV ostensibly agreeing during a video call with an undercover journalist posing as a representative of an unnamed Russian oligarch, to accept funds in exchange for disrupting the Belarusian opposition, usurping Tsikhanouskaya’s leadership, and promising future control of Belarusian industries post-regime change[12]. The Council has yet to respond to this event publicly, though Ms Kovalkova has acknowledged these dialogues in subsequent media appearances[13].

20.  The Belarus Coordination Council's second iteration followed its restructuring, announced by Ms Tsikhanouskaya in 2022. This revamped Council is not democratically elected and does not mirror the opposition landscape of pre-2020 Belarus. Its makeup was largely determined by members from its first term, including Olga Kovalkova, indicating a continuity that might not reflect current opposition sentiments.

21.  The evolution of the Coordination Council without direct democratic mandates calls into question the EU and UK's endorsement of such bodies and underscores the need for more stringent criteria in supporting opposition groups. Claimed to be a voice for the Belarusian opposition, the Coordination Council's legitimacy is questioned since it lacks publicly elected members, oversight, inclusivity of other civic groups, transparency to media and the Belarusian public, and has anonymity among some of its members. The secretive nature raises concerns over the potential infiltration by Belarusian or Russian authorities.

22.  The emergence of alternative Russian opposition groups deemed legitimate by parts of the international community invites the UK and EU to explore new avenues for engagement and support, aligning their foreign policy goals. Despite the apparent disorganisation of the Russian opposition, there exists a group perceived as legitimate: the Congress of People's Deputies[14]. This includes figures such as Ilya Ponomarev, Andrey Sedelnikov, representatives from the Freedom of Russia Legion and others. This congress acts as a nascent opposition legislature, deliberating on potential policies for a post-government change in Russia.

23.  Legislative efforts by Russian opposition groups in exile could be monitored and possibly supported by the UK and EU as part of a joint strategy to foster democratic reforms in Russia and align their sanctions and foreign policies. The Congress of People's Deputies, an early model for a representative and legislative Russian opposition body in exile, discusses and prepares legislative drafts for the eventual political transition in Russia. Proposals like the Peace Act[15] with Ukraine reflect substantial policy changes that would reshape Russia's military and international posture, that includes the withdrawal of Russian military from Ukraine to the borders of 2013, ending military conscription in Russia, suspending the work of Russian private military companies, limiting the armed forces of Russia to no more than 0.25% of the Russian population, or circa 350,000 people.

24.  The Congress's commitment to end imperialistic practices and to engage equitably with neighbours, as demonstrated on June 1, 2023, in the Resolution on Relations with Russia’s European Neighbours, proposed by Ilya Ponomarev, stating “The Congress of National Deputies declares: the new Russia puts an end to the imperial practices of the past and is ready to build relations with other countries on a fair and equal basis. These principles will be enshrined in law and will guide the activities of the government of the free Russia.”[16], could be indicative of a new paradigm in international relations where the UK and the EU can find common ground for a cohesive approach towards Russia and its neighbours, aligning with the EU's shift in foreign and security policy in response to the invasion of Ukraine.

25.  The work of the Congress reflects an awareness of social issues that align with EU and UK values, offering a platform for coordinated sanctions implementation and enforcement against Russia, insofar as they encourage progress in social reforms. The Congress is concerned not only with broad political reforms but also with immediate social issues, as evident from the proposed legislation concerning gender equality. The name of the proposed act in Russian is “Проект акта о внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации по защите гендерного равенства,”[17] which translates to "Draft Act on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on the Protection of Gender Equality." This demonstrates the Congress's engagement with social issues affecting the Russian populace.

26.  The interaction between UK parliamentary systems and Russian democratic initiatives may serve as a model for future cooperation mechanisms in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. The Congress of People's Deputies serves as a prototype for a parliamentary institution, which could provide a basis for engagement with the British parliamentary system. This interaction could manifest through Select committee hearings on Russian affairs, events of All-Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGs), and other parliamentary activities, including those arranged by individual MPs, to discuss and support Russian democratic initiatives.

27.  The UK should also consider further engagement with the government in exile of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, especially following its recognition by Ukraine's parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, on 18 October 2022[18]. The recent Third Congress of the Peoples of the North Caucasus, held in Brussels on 8 November 2023[19], signifies ongoing efforts and dialogues which the UK might consider aligning with.

28.  The UK needs to reach out to the democratic opposition of Chechnya, recognized by British allies - Ukraine. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, its parliament in exile and its leader, Akhmed Zakaev, continue to support Ukraine in their war effort. The UK has done little to engage with the Chechen opposition, with Akhmed Zakayev not being officially mentioned in parliament since 2012[20], although, taking part in member organised events since then.

Received 9 November