Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE) and the REDEMOS Project, University of Surrey – Written Evidence (RUI0017)

 

House of Lords European Affairs Committee Evidence - Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU Relations.

Written evidence from the Centre for Britain and Europe (CBE) and the REDEMOS Project, University of Surrey.

 

About the Authors

Dr Laura Chappell is Lecturer in European Politics, Professor Theofanis Exadaktylos is Professor in European Politics, Professor Amelia Hadfield is Dean International, and Head of Department of Politics, and Dr Michael Richter is Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Lecturer, all at the University of Surrey. They have written extensively on a range of topics including EU foreign, security and defence policy, the Eastern Partnership and Ukraine. They are part of REDEMOS: Reconfiguring EU Democracy Support. Towards a Sustained Demos in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood, which is a three-year EU funded project (2023-2025) by the Horizon Programme. They are situated within the Centre for Britain and Europe of the Department of Politics at the University of Surrey. They have previously provided evidence, advice and consultancy to the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Surrey County Council, the European Commission and the European External Action Service, the World Bank, the UK, Greek, and Swedish governments.

 

Scope of the Evidence

The following written evidence focuses on the EU’s foreign and security policy response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the respective roles of the EU, the individual EU Member States and the UK in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and the EU’s role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This aligns with questions (and some sub-questions) from sections 1,3, 4 and 5 on the call for evidence.

 

Summary

 

Evidence

 

The EU’s overall foreign and security policy response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine

 

  1. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine which began on 24 February 2022, the EU has put in place a range of measures. These can be divided into two groups. First, those aimed at Russia and to a lesser extent Belarus. Secondly, those focused on supporting Ukraine both during the conflict and in setting up the post-conflict foundations for reconstruction.

 

  1. In respect to the former, this incorporates eleven packages of sanctions targeting individuals, imports and the exports of certain goods, among others, of crude oil and coal, drone engines and dual use goods, swift bans and other financial restrictions, the closure of EU airspace to Russian aircraft, and the suspension of broadcasting of certain Russian media outlets (Council of the European Union 2023). The visa facilitation agreement between the EU and Russia has also been suspended.

 

  1. In respect of the latter, regarding military support to Ukraine, the EU has deployed the EU military assistance mission to Ukraine (EUMAM) in November 2022, which aims to enhance Ukrainian armed forces military capabilities primarily through training and provided 5.6 billion euros under the European Peace Facility which includes for the provision for military equipment and supplies (Council of the European Union 2023a). The EU is also coordinating civil protection support, has provided 733 million euros in humanitarian assistance and 7.2 billion euros for macro-financial assistance, and allowed for temporary trade liberalisation (Council of the European Union 2023a). The EU and its member states have received Ukrainian refugees through the Temporary Protection Scheme and various national initiatives (Guild and Groenendijk 2023).

 

  1. From a political perspective, the single most important development is that the EU has commenced the process of accession, accepting Ukraine’s application as a candidate country (Council of the European Union 2023b). While the process is still at a very early stage, it does signal an intention by the EU to engage in a more constructive way in incorporating Ukraine within its institutional structures. This demonstrates a departure from the standard accession procedures, which frequently take years to be initiated, involve longer-term negotiations and a specific set of criteria which candidate countries need to satisfy before opening up accession negotiations. In addition, the EU now has a new “Ukraine Facility” of 50 billion euros for providing grants and loans in partnership with the Ukrainian government for reconstruction, recovery and modernisation, supporting the private sector, and providing technical assistance for administrative capacity building and the empowerment of civil society (European Commission 2023a).

 

  1. While this is a noteworthy departure, the question remains as to how sustainable these initiatives will be. No matter the outcome, such a move by the EU signals a trajectory that can extend into the future and represents a first step towards a more coherent policy by the EU towards Ukraine, creating the foundations for a deeper relationship between the two. All this points to a substantive and credible commitment from the EU towards Ukraine (Schimmelfennig 2023, 14). The EU member states have been united in their reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, however this has not been without some differences. Ireland, Austria and Malta used the constructive abstention mechanism in respect to using the European Peace Facility to finance military equipment, which it had not originally been set up to do, indicating that whilst they did not politically support the move, they did not wish to block other states from going ahead (Koenig 2022: 7). More recently Poland has blocked Ukrainian grain exports over concerns regarding this undercutting local Polish producers, with similar arguments from Hungary and Slovakia (Payne and Charlish 2023). Just on 26 October 2023 the newly elected Slovakian government pledged to stop providing military aid to Ukraine (Camut 2023). However, despite these examples, which have also been met with opposition by the majority of EU Member States, the fact that Ukraine has been offered a membership perspective when this previously had been completely off the table, particularly from the perspective of Berlin and Paris (Shumylo 2006), indicates that substantive change in the EU’s relations with Ukraine have taken place and that these changes will be long-lasting.

 

The respective roles for the EU, individual EU Member States and the UK in Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction process

 

  1. The baseline scenario for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine assumes a continuation of the involvement of the EU, its Member States and the UK, largely resembling the modus operandi before the war, which relied heavily on the EU and the G7 Ambassador Group, including the UK, in conjunction with international financial institutions (IFIs) to support and sustain reforms in Ukraine. Their key post-war reconstruction role is visible by looking at the so-called Coordination Platform, which has a Steering Committee that consists of “high-level officials from Ukraine, the EU, G7 countries, as well as partners from international financial institutions” (Ukraine Donor Coordination Platform, no date). Hence, the reconstruction process will likely mirror the interaction of the pre-war period. There, ownership for the implementation of reforms and the utilisation of externally provided macro-financial assistance was on the side of Kyiv, but the monitoring process was a joint undertaking between Ukraine and its Western political and financial partners.

 

  1. However, this modus operandi of having high-level politicians overseeing the transferring of financial assistance to Kyiv on the Western side has often led to long-term, development considerations being overshadowed by short-term political considerations, especially geopolitical ones. It is therefore worth considering an a priori mechanism that commits the UK, the EU, and Kyiv’s other key partners to consider primarily long-term development strategies, that is, reconstruction accompanied by a targeted effort to enhance the institutional environment and the administrative capacity in Ukraine. Frequently, this aim finds its way into ex-ante post-war reconstruction strategies of almost every reconstruction process in which the EU has been involved (for instance in Kosovo), but then gets deprioritised by various, political short-term considerations and partial benefit that some private American or European businesses receive from preferential access to key policymakers in a less-than-transparent post-war reconstruction country (e.g. the case of Bechtle in Kosovo, see Brunwasser, 2015). Already now, there are indications that companies used for the reconstruction of Ukrainian cities are to a large extent chosen through uncompetitive or extremely narrowly-focused tenders. As an example, In the case of the ongoing reconstruction of Irpin, investigative journalists reported that almost half of the volume of contracts was given to “companies with ‘a suspicious background’” (Court, 2023). EU and other democratic international actors, such as the UK, should therefore take a much more active role to seize this critical juncture that reconstruction brings and put good governance democracy reforms as their primary considerations not just in word, but also in deed. This will also ensure that a degree of conditionality with dispersing with national and EU taxpayer funding will find appropriate use for the improvement of the democratisation processes in Ukraine.

 

Coordinating policy of reconstruction between the EU, its Member States and the UK and the mechanisms of such coordination

 

  1. Coordinating the reconstruction of Ukraine between the EU, its Member States and the UK will require new cooperation mechanisms and the enhancement of previous coordination channels to reflect the objectives of setting Ukraine back on its feet. The current setting through the Ukraine Donor Coordination Platform just mirrors the previous setting, where high-level political actors make final assessments of reform progress and subsequently take decisions about the conditional transfer of funds based on these assessments. A host of issues not directly related to the good governance of these funds can influence these assessments. As a result, and as it was visible in the pre-war period, Ukraine was in a state of inertia as a hybrid regime environment characterised by relatively high levels of corruption as domestic elites were interested in short-term gains from preferential access to resources. At the same time, European and American actors failed to effectively change the incentive structure for such change to happen. The reason was that these high-level political actors failed to openly and effectively call out significant reform shortcomings due to various, not least geopolitical reasons (see Richter, 2023; Court of Auditors, 2021). In the reconstruction process, such an approach would lead to an outcome in which public funds are not fully utilised, as some will be lost subsequently to corruption; the under-utilisation of the potential of the private sector, as it requires a safe institutional setting to operate; and, the European Union promise to Ukraine’s citizens over the longer-term future remains unfulfilled, boosting Eurosceptic tendencies.

 

  1. Similar crises of the past have led to the development of new International financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. It is therefore recommended setting the foundations for the establishment of a new reconstruction institution that monitors the Ukrainian reconstruction effort and gives binding recommendations for Kyiv, providing binding decisions with respect to the provision of aid (see Richter, 2023a, for further elaboration). The IMF has a similar governance architecture largely led by technical considerations, bringing about a strong leverage effect, as was visible in the pre-war period in Ukraine. However, the mandate of the IMF was very limited and focused mostly on macro-financial issues. Hence, such a new reconstruction institution, equipped with a broader mandate to oversee all types of aid, would gather civil servants from Ukraine’s key financial supporters, including the UK and the EU, as well as from within Ukraine, Covering all cross-cutting issues of reconstruction efforts, it should be led by the key principles for reconstruction outlined in the Lugano Declaration (Ukraine Recovery Conference, 2022). The coordination of aid and the subsequent reform track would happen in a close dialogue with the civil society and political actors, but the coordination institution would keep the final say with their binding recommendations and decisions regarding the further disbursement of aid, effectively changing the incentive structure of Ukrainian policymakers towards conducting far-reaching reforms.

 

  1.    As a result, and departing from current settings, the key decisions with respect to whether reconstruction benchmarks have been met would be coordinated and taken by multinational teams in this new institutional governance, which would include civil servants from Ukraine and the countries at the spotlight of this inquiry. This leads these actors to be solely bound by the long-term development principles elaborated in key reconstruction documents and not guided by short-term political considerations. Although an approach to coordinate efforts through such an institution might sound radical at first, it is in the light of empirical evidence and past reconstruction failures that a new approach might be needed to bring about a positive, long-lasting and sustainable reconstruction outcome. Otherwise, the institutional set-up currently proposed, just mirrors the pre-war coordination approach that brought about largely suboptimal policy results and was not addressing the long-term, credible commitment problem of high-level political actors in Ukraine and in the West.

 

The UK’s approach towards Ukraine’s EU membership candidacy and its implications for the wider reconstruction process

 

  1.            The approach mentioned (points 8-10 above) also brings new opportunities with respect to Ukraine’s potential EU accession, which may become the chosen path of Ukrainian society. This is because there is a significant overlap between the benchmarks of reconstruction and EU accession. This is particularly the case for reforms in the fields of anti-corruption and the rule of law, with both being central to the two processes. By having an independent and transparent assessment of these benchmarks, Ukraine can be held publicly accountable to them dissociated from political considerations. This should significantly increase the motivation Ukrainian policymakers have to deliver on those benchmarks and not seek political backdoor deals. It should also enhance the right of Ukraine to demand from the EU to deliver on its promises should Ukraine meet these benchmarks. Thus far, the EU and Ukraine played mostly a game of pretence, in which Ukraine pretended to be carrying out large-scale reforms in the rule of law sphere and the EU pretended to be seriously monitoring such reforms and calling out their shortcomings. In the end, both actors appeared satisfied with the situation. As Ukrainian elites could abstain from conducting far-stretching reforms and the EU did not have to deliver on the vague integration promises it formally made (see Richter, 2023).

 

  1.            The UK, as a country in Europe with close relations to Kyiv and EU capitals, should support Ukraine’s aspirations but act as an independent arbitrator calling out publicly both sides when blatant occasions of pretence occur. The new framework of EU-Ukraine relations, in which the accession perspective serves as a potentially transformative force should be exploited as it can otherwise help cultivate Eurosceptic tendencies in Ukraine or ‘Euro-fatigue’, as can be seen to some extent in other candidate countries (see for instance the case of Turkey, Mungiu-Pippidi, 2020). The UK can therefore, through its special position play a crucial role to publicly nudge both actors to deliver on the concrete promises made by the EU and Ukraine with respect to the intertwined reconstruction and EU accession process. For this, it needs to position itself as a constructive actor that openly calls out failures to follow through on past “reaffirmations” and “commitments” made by both sides

 

A more “geopolitical” EU with a more assertive foreign and security policy actor? Implications for the UK.

 

  1.            The primary catalyst behind the creation of the EU’s common security and defence policy was to make the EU more militarily capable and thus to act independently when NATO was unwilling or unable to act. However, the EU’s actorness in the foreign and security realm has been marred by a lack of capabilities and the inability of EU member states to find consensus over using force, despite the EU’s expectations of its role in international affairs (Hill 1993; Toje 2008; Chappell, Exadaktylos and Petrov 2018). A number of events have however, acted as catalysts to galvanise the EU and its member states into re-engaging with defence. Therefore, it is important to understand that the EU’s focus on security and defence has been slowly increasing since 2016, and that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is another evolution along this path, albeit with a much greater impact. Key elements enhancing this path include Brexit, the Trump presidency, the international withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as events in Ukraine.

 

  1.            In policy terms, the release of the EU Global Strategy in 2016, which underlined the importance of the EU’s strategic autonomy, is instrumental in setting out the EU’s approach (EEAS 2016).  Following this the EU introduced a range of initiatives relating to defence capability development. Those included the creation of the military planning and conduct capability which provides an operational HQ for non-executive EU operations, the reactivation of permanent structured cooperation in defence (PESCO) to augment EU Member States defence capabilities, the creation of the above-mentioned European Peace Facility, and the creation of the European Defence Fund. However, the majority of EU actions are civilian missions rather than EU military operations, EUMAM being a case in point.

 

  1.            The Strategic Compass was published just after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This included a rapid deployment capacity of 5,000 troops, deployable for a year and based on substantially modified battlegroups (EEAS 2022). However, the Battlegroups have never been deployed despite being at full operational capability since 2007, due to a combination of the lack of political will, the configuration of the Battlegroups (1500 troops are small in size and were deployable for up to 6 months so short in duration), and the cost of deploying them. Whilst the rapid deployment capacity might solve the configuration and potentially the funding issues, although the latter has yet to be rectified, it does not solve the political willingness one (Chappell 2023).

 

  1.            Whilst there are certainly moves towards making EU Member States more capable, whether these capabilities will be used in the context of EU military operations is debatable. This is reflected in the fact that Member States have different views concerning the use of force, and thus strategic cultures. It is undoubtedly the case that for EU Member States, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks a substantive change in the wider European security environment. However, even where a step change can be seen as with Germany’s ‘Zeitenwende’ (Börzel 2023), which has involved an increasing of the defence budget and sending weapons to a warzone (i.e. Ukraine), there have nonetheless been delays in agreeing to supply some types of weaponry as occurred with the Leopard tanks (Tallis 2023). In sum, the EU’s shift to being more assertive, is not foreseen to have a large impact on the UK in defence terms.

The evolution and definition of EU strategic autonomy since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its relevance to the EU-UK relationship.

 

  1.            This brings about the question of strategic autonomy, which has not been defined by the EU. In an EU context, it can be considered to mean the EU’s ability to create and implement its own decisions and policies, whether independently or with allies, in line with the EU’s norms in the field of security and defence (Jãrvenpää et al, 2019, p1; Helwig and Sinkkonen, 2002, p7). Strategic autonomy is not about placing the EU in opposition to NATO but rather ensuring that the EU is free to choose its own path rather than being forced into a course of action by events and/or other actors. Facilitating the EU’s enactment of its security policies, requires not only the necessary capabilities, but also the political willingness to use them, supported by a common approach towards threat perception, risk and the use of force.

 

  1.            As highlighted in the sections above, whilst movement has been made towards an enhanced role for the EU in security, it falls far short of being strategically autonomous. However, it is important to note that the term European not EU strategic autonomy is usually used. Hence, we can take a broader approach, and take into account European countries capabilities, and their ability to use them, without reliance on the US, including within NATO, although US political support would still be required to facilitate NATO engagement. In this scenario, the UK’s capabilities are of critical importance. Whilst the UK is an Atlanticist country with a close relationship with the US, there may be instances where the UK may want to lead and the US, whilst politically supportive, does not. This also brings up another key point, in that all states have a single set of forces and capabilities to use in EU, NATO, UN and other deployments. Hence, the increasing focus on defence capabilities, may lead to more capable European partners, most of whom are members of both the EU and NATO.

 

  1.                                                                                Considering the above, it is in the interests of the UK to participate in CSDP led initiatives. Currently the UK is part of the PESCO project ‘Military Mobility’, which will enable military personnel and assets to move unhindered within the EU (PESCO n.d.). The UK should keep open the possibility of participating in other PESCO projects, where these facilitate the closure of capability gaps, or it is otherwise in the UK’s interest. The UK does not currently have an Administrative Arrangement (AA) with the European Defence Agency, unlike third countries Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, the US and Ukraine (European Parliament 2022). This is something which the UK should explore, in order to enhance dialogue and cooperation in defence. Access to the European Defence Fund (EDF) is not feasible as the UK is neither a member of the EU nor of the European Economic Area (for example Norway participates in the EDF despite not being an EU member state) (European Commission 2023). As the aim of this rule is partly to ensure that EU strategic security interests are not undermined, the UK could consider whether they could open up discussions with the EU regarding the EDF. Such a scenario, however, is highly dependent on the EU’s willingness to engage in such conversations. Finally, the UK could decide to participate in EU civilian missions/military operations or in the Rapid Deployment Capability, should third countries be accepted in the latter (it is currently possible for third countries to take part in the EU Battlegroups). Again, this would need to be on a case-by-case basis.

 

The implications of enlargement for the EU’s approach to external affairs and its impact on UK-EU relations.

 

  1.            Regarding the impact of further EU enlargement to include the Western Balkans and some Eastern Partnership Countries, the first thing to note is that this process is unlikely to be short. Not only does this relate to these countries ability to meet the political and economic criteria and implement the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law), along with the ending of the war in Ukraine’s case, but the EU itself is not ready for another enlargement of this scale in terms of its own institutional architecture and public mood. Initial discussions on how the EU would need to evolve, have only just begun.

 

  1.            If enlargement takes place, the EU will be a diplomatic actor with higher gravitas on the world stage. It will also provide additional stability to these countries, in terms of security and economic prospects. Geopolitically, the buffer zone between the EU and Russia will cease to exist, with Ukrainian membership. Having a direct and long border with Russia will have security consequences for the EU. Hence, the UK will face a much bigger EU diplomatic voice. It is therefore imperative that the UK is able to work with its European partners in a constructive manner rather than take a misalignment route. As such it is in the UK’s interest to strengthen its ties with the EU and utilise EU structures to entangle its own interests with those of the EU.

 

References

 

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Received 8 November