International Development Committee:
UK Small Island Developing States Strategy
SIDS, sea-level rise and the preservation of maritime zones
Frances Anggadi, University of Wollongong, Australia[1]
This submission addresses ‘Ocean and Biodiversity’, one of the six key areas of focus identified in the ‘UK Small Island Developing States Strategy 2022 to 2026’.[2] I suggest that the successful implementation of measures under this area of focus will require more than ‘[s]upporting SIDS to grow their maritime economies sustainably while adapting and mitigating climate change’ by way of the new funding streams proposed in the UK SIDS Strategy. I recommend that the United Kingdom should take steps to support the legal preservation of maritime zones notwithstanding the effects of sea-level rise, a key priority for SIDS and crucial for the ongoing security and stability of SIDS’ maritime economies.
a) The UK should support the preservation of maritime zones as an identified oceans priority for SIDS (including all Commonwealth SIDS): Of the 56 Commonwealth countries, 25 are SIDS. As shown in the Annex to this submission, each of those 25 Commonwealth SIDS is either a member of PIF or AOSIS (or both). This means that all Commonwealth SIDS have taken the view that the international law of the sea should be interpreted in accordance with the importance of legal stability, security, certainty and predictability, to provide for the legal preservation of maritime zones. The PIF and AOSIS Declarations should be recognised as a clear statement from the leadership of Commonwealth SIDS articulating the priority of this oceans issue. If the UK aims to support SIDS ‘to grow their maritime economies sustainably while adapting and mitigating climate change’, supporting the stability and security of the legal architecture underpinning those maritime economies should also be a key goal.
b) The UK should join its voice to many others in the international community, to shape the direction of the international law of the sea as a matter of global oceans governance: The PIF and AOSIS declarations frame their positions in terms of ‘the interpretation and application of the [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea][13] in the context of sea-level rise and climate change’:[14] as well as being political declarations, the declarations also convey a legal view about the interpretation of UNCLOS rules. Of course, those rules have much broader significance beyond PIF and AOSIS members (who collectively represent 42 UNCLOS Parties) to having potential legal effect for all 169 UNCLOS Parties. Beyond the PIF and AOSIS membership, certain States Parties (for example, Germany,[15] France,[16] Japan,[17] Greece,[18] Malaysia,[19] Indonesia,[20] Republic of Korea)[21] and non-Parties (for example, United States,[22] Liechtenstein)[23] have voiced support for the preservation of maritime zones. No States have opposed the legal position advanced in the PIF and AOSIS declarations. These views in the international community are evidence that there is growing support for this view in the international community: 51 UNCLOS Parties, together with two non-Parties, represents a significant convergence in views on interpretation of the applicable legal rules. The UK – with an interest in ‘maintaining the integrity of the interpretation and application of UNCLOS’[24] – should consider carefully the evidence that a significant and growing number of States are solidifying a path towards the legal preservation of established maritime zones.
c) The UK should find confidence in the existence of a sound legal basis for the preservation of maritime zones as a matter of international law. The strongest justification for the preservation of maritime zones lies in the convergence of what States say and what States do about the legal stability of maritime zones, that is, by meeting the requirements for subsequent practice establishing the agreement of UNCLOS Parties as to the interpretation of UNCLOS rules.[25] While there is no precise benchmark for determining when these requirements are met, ample evidence is presently available to illuminate the way that States are shaping interpretation of the legal rules on baselines and maritime zones under circumstances of sea-level rise, by what they do (eg domestic actions to stabilise their maritime zones) and what they say (eg that UNCLOS permits the preservation of maritime zones).[26] The preservation of established maritime zones need not be seen as a radical departure from international legal norms, but rather as a step in the law’s orderly evolution by means of a thoroughly conventional toolkit: that of treaty interpretation.
a) CHOGM 2024: The UK should take the opportunity of the 2024 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, to be held for the first time in Samoa (a SIDS from the Blue Pacific),[27] to formalise the UK’s commitment to the preservation of established maritime zones. At that meeting, the UK could explicitly take up the invitation extended by Samoa in 2022, when it explained its view that ‘because it is grounded on an interpretation of the existing law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS, States from outside the Pacific Islands Forum membership are welcome to endorse and apply the approach of the [PIF] Declaration, including those that are not States Parties to UNCLOS’.[28] The 2024 CHOGM meeting also presents an opportunity for the UK to seek to build further support within the Commonwealth.
b) Ongoing engagement with the International Law Commission’s (ILC) study on sea-level rise on international law: In continuing to engage with this process, the UK should consider holistically the evidence of State practice that comes to light, and also continue to take the opportunity to advance and explain the UK’s own position. Notably, the US, like the UK, implements ambulatory baselines as a matter of its own domestic laws; however, in its most recent submission to the ILC, the US has stated its commitment to work with Pacific and other countries ‘toward the goal of lawfully establishing and maintaining baselines and maritime zone limits and will not challenge such baselines and maritime zone limits that are not subsequently updated despite sea-level rise caused by climate change.[29] This might represent a model for developing a calibrated position for the UK that is both reflective of its own domestic position, and supportive of the Commonwealth SIDS’s position on the preservation of maritime zones.[30]
c) Steps to promote broader agreement amongst States as to the preservation of maritime zones. The UK could consider taking steps to galvanise broader support for the preservation of maritime zones amongst LOSC Parties, potentially in the form of an interpretative agreement or declaration,[31] or also amongst the broader international community through other vehicles such as inclusion in the UN General Assembly annual oceans resolution.[32]
7 November 2023
10
Annex
Table of SIDS and Commonwealth, PIF,
AOSIS and COSIS membership[33]
| Commonwealth member[34] | SIDS[35] | PIF member | AOSIS member | COSIS member |
Antigua and Barbuda | ✓ |
| ✓ | ✓ | |
Australia |
| ✓ |
|
| |
Bahamas | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Bangladesh |
|
|
|
| |
Barbados | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Belize | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Botswana |
|
|
|
| |
Brunei |
|
|
|
| |
Cameroon |
|
|
|
| |
Canada |
|
|
|
| |
Cyprus |
|
|
|
| |
Dominica | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Eswatini |
|
|
|
| |
Fiji | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
Gabon |
|
|
|
| |
Gambia |
|
|
|
| |
Ghana |
|
|
|
| |
Grenada | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Guyana | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
India |
|
|
|
| |
Jamaica | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Kenya |
|
|
|
| |
Kiribati | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
Lesotho |
|
|
|
| |
Malawi |
|
|
|
| |
Malaysia |
|
|
|
| |
Maldives | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Malta |
|
|
|
| |
Mauritius | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Mozambique |
|
|
|
| |
Namibia |
|
|
|
| |
Nauru | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
New Zealand |
| ✓ |
|
| |
Nigeria |
|
|
|
| |
Papua New Guinea | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
Pakistan |
|
|
|
| |
Rwanda |
|
|
|
| |
Samoa | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
Seychelles | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Sierra Leone |
|
|
|
| |
Singapore | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Solomon Islands | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
South Africa |
|
|
|
| |
Sri Lanka |
|
|
|
| |
St Kitts and Nevis | ✓ |
| ✓ | ✓ | |
St Lucia | ✓ |
| ✓ | ✓ | |
St Vincent and the Grenadines | ✓ |
| ✓ | ✓ | |
Tanzania |
|
|
|
| |
Togo |
|
|
|
| |
Tonga | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| |
Trinidad and Tobago | ✓ |
| ✓ |
| |
Tuvalu | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
Uganda |
|
|
|
| |
United Kingdom |
|
|
|
| |
Vanuatu | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | |
Zambia |
|
|
|
|
10
[1] Senior Lecturer, Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (fanggadi@uow.edu.au); Visiting Fellow, Australian National University (Centre for International and Public Law, ANU College of Law); Co-chair Oceans and International Environmental Law Interest Group of the Australian and New Zealand Society for International Law. Prior to completing my doctoral research on sea-level rise and maritime zones at the University of Sydney (graduating December 2023), I served at the Australian Government Attorney-General's Department, primarily in the Office of International Law and in 2017-2019 as a legal adviser to the Pacific Maritime Boundaries Project. This submission is offered in a personal capacity and does not reflect the views of any organisation with which I am affiliated.
[2] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-small-island-developing-states-strategy-2022-to-2026/uk-small-island-developing-states-strategy-2022-to-2026#uk-small-island-developing-states-strategy-2022-to-2026 (‘UK SIDS Strategy’).
[3] Submission of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (SIDS0011), International Development Committee Inquiry on the UK Small Island States Strategy.
[4] Usually referred to as the ‘SAMOA Pathway’, discussed in the submission of the Foreign Commonwealth Development Office (SIDS0003), International Development Committee Inquiry on the UK Small Island States Strategy.
[5] See discussion in the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee Inquiry on ‘UNCLOS: the Law of the Sea in the 21st Century’ (2nd Report of Session 2021–22) (‘HL UNCLOS Inquiry Report’), Chapter 4. This issue has also been the subject of extensive academic debate, for a useful reference see ‘Selected bibliography related to the law of the sea aspects of sea-level rise’, Addendum to Additional paper to the first issues paper (2020), by Bogdan Aurescu and Nilüfer Oral, Co-Chairs of the Study Group on sea-level rise in relation to international law (9 June 2023), UN Doc A/CN.4/761/Add.1.
[6] Submission of the PIF to the 72nd session of the International Law Commission (30 December 2019). For a discussion of sea-level rise issues relating to statehood, see submission of Dr Alex Green (SIDS0002), International Development Committee Inquiry on the UK Small Island States Strategy.
[7] HL UNCLOS Inquiry Report, n 5.
[8] Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones in the Face of Climate Change-related Sea-Level Rise, signed 6 August 2021 <https://www.forumsec.org/2021/08/11/declaration-on-preserving-maritime-zones-in-the-face-of-climate-change-related-sea-level-rise/> (‘PIF Declaration’).
[9] Alliance of Small Island States Leaders Declaration 2021, signed 16 September 2021 https://www.aosis.org/launch-of-the-alliance-of-small-island-states-leaders-declaration/. Substantially similar wording on the preservation of maritime zones is also reflected in the Agreement for the establishment of the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law (31 October 2021), which presently has eight signatories (all AOSIS members).
[10] HL UNCLOS Inquiry Report, n 5 [126].
[11] United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Government Response to the United Kingdom House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee Inquiry on ‘UNCLOS: the Law of the Sea in the 21st Century’, 19.
[12] Statement of the United Kingdom, 23rd meeting of the Sixth Committee, 23 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly <https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml>.
[13] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 (entered into force 16 November 1994) ('UNCLOS’).
[14] PIF Declaration, n 8.
[15] Submission of Germany to the 74th session of the International Law Commission (30 June 2022).
[16] Submission of France to the 74th session of the International Law Commission (29 November 2022).
[17] Statement of Japan, 28th meeting of the Sixth Committee, 27 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml.
[18] Greece, Summary Record of the 22nd meeting, 76th session of the UN General Assembly (1 November 2021), UN Doc A/C.6/76/SR.22, [129]-[130].
[19] Statement of Malaysia, 21st plenary meeting of the Sixth Committee, 29 October 2021, 76th session of the UN General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/76/summaries.shtml.
[20] Statement of Indonesia, 27th meeting of the Sixth Committee, 27 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml.
[21] Statement of Republic of Korea, 28th meeting of the Sixth Committee, 27 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml.
[22] Statement of United States, 24th meeting of the Sixth Committee, 24 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml.
[23] Statement of Liechtenstein, 23rd meeting of the Sixth Committee, 23 October 2023, 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/78/summaries.shtml.
[24] United Kingdom, n 12.
[25] For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Frances Anggadi, 'Establishment, Notification, and Maintenance: The Package of State Practice at the Heart of the Pacific Islands Forum Declaration on Preserving Maritime Zones' (2022) 53(1) Ocean Development & International Law 19 and Frances Anggadi, 'What States say and do about legal stability and maritime zones, and why it matters' (2022) 71(4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 767.
[26] For examples of different evidence of State practice, including the diversity of ways in which coastal States implement a more or less stable baseline, see Anggadi, 'What States say and do about legal stability and maritime zones, and why it matters' (n 25).
[27] The Commonwealth, ‘Samoa announces theme for the 2024 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting’ (21 September 2023) <https://thecommonwealth.org/news/samoa-announces-theme-2024-commonwealth-heads-government-meeting>.
[28] Samoa, 28th meeting of the Sixth Committee, 1 November 2022, 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/77/ilc.shtml>.
[29] Submission of the US to the 75th session of the International Law Commission (20 July 2023).
[30] It would also be consistent with the generally accepted diversity of practice on the implementation of normal baselines: see Anggadi, 'What States say and do about legal stability and maritime zones, and why it matters' (n 25).
[31] See submission of Dr Alex Green, n 6, [17].
[32] For example, UN General Assembly, Oceans and the law of the sea (adopted 30 December 2022), UN DOC A/RES/77/248.
[33] Shading indicates Commonwealth members which are also SIDS.
[34] The Commonwealth, ‘Member countries’ https://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries.
[35] United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, ‘List of SIDS’ https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/list-sids.