UK Government – Written Evidence (RUI0012)

EAC inquiry on the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations

UK Government

Written evidence

1.    The Government welcomes the Committee’s timely inquiry on the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations. The Government has compiled responses to the Committee’s call for evidence, organised into five separate sections. We look forward to engaging further with the Committee’s inquiry.

Section 1: Overall foreign and security policy response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The EU’s response

2. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU, its Member States, and European Financial Institutions have offered political, military and economic support to Ukraine totalling around €64bn. We welcome the EU’s ambitious packages of sanctions; its action to decrease dependence on Russian hydrocarbons; its leadership in multilateral fora, including the UN; its generous military assistance, including through the European Peace Facility which now has a financial ceiling of €12bn for donations of equipment and munitions and the military training of 40 000 Ukrainians by the end of 2023; and large-scale fiscal, humanitarian and early recovery packages.

3. The EU has provided very significant financial support to Ukraine and has so far committed €38.8bn to support Ukraine’s economy and early recovery. At the London Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC) in June, President von der Leyen announced a proposal for an additional multi-year facility of up to €50bn for recovery, reconstruction and modernisation over 2024-27. 

4. The EU has also provided support to its Member States who have welcomed large numbers of Ukrainian refugees and provided extensive support to third countries who have suffered the effects of the war, including Moldova.

5. The EU has played a crucial role in supporting Ukrainian exports and thus mitigating the impact of the war on global food security. This includes the EU’s work to establish ‘Solidarity Lanes’ so that Ukraine can export through the Danube ports and overland through neighbouring EU Member States to reach global markets.

Cooperation between the UK, EU and partners

6. The UK and EU’s cooperation over Ukraine has been extensive and productive, covering engagement on all the areas mentioned above: fiscal, recovery, reconstruction, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine, as well as the implementation of unprecedented sanctions against Russia.

7. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion, Western partners, including the UK, EU and US, as well as the wider international community, have been in close and often innovative forms of strategic and operational cooperation. For example, on sanctions, the UK, US and EU have worked together in tight alignment and at high pace to undermine Russia’s war effort, inflict a cost on the Russian economy, and show solidarity and support for Ukraine. This partnership has also been central to our efforts to tackle sanctions circumvention through joint diplomatic outreach to third countries.

8. Working with the EU and other international partners, our coordinated diplomatic engagement and lobbying helped Ukraine to export nearly 33 million tonnes of foodstuffs through the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI).  Since Russia withdrew from the BSGI, the EU has coordinated closely with international partners, including the UN, Turkey, and the UK on efforts to restore the deal and find other means for Ukraine to export its grain.

9. Since the invasion, we have worked closely with DG ECHO and other partners in support of the humanitarian response inside Ukraine and in the neighbouring region where Ukrainian refugees reside, including through regular planning and coordination meetings at both regional and capital level (the latter monthly). We have worked particularly closely with ECHO in preparation for a series of Senior Officials meetings on a range of humanitarian response issues – three of these meetings have been held to date. Our initial tranche of funding from February 2022 until March 2023 included support to refugees in some EU countries, such as Poland and Romania.

10.         The Multi-Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine brings together officials from Ukraine, the EU, G7 countries (including the UK), as well as partners from international financial institutions, to coordinate support for Ukraine’s immediate financing needs and future economic recovery and reconstruction. The Platform is supported by a Secretariat, which has a Brussels office hosted by the European Commission and a Kyiv office hosted by the Government of Ukraine. A UK secondee is currently embedded within the Platform and based in its office in Brussels.

11.         The EU is working with other countries, including the UK and the Government of Ukraine, to develop a ‘Ukraine Plan’ to set out Ukraine’s reform and recovery agenda, which will help donors to prioritise and target their activity.

12.         We have actively participated in the G7+ energy group to coordinate support for repairs to Ukraine’s energy system, following Russian attacks, and keep the lights on during the winter. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference, the UK secured commitment from the G7+ to develop a Clean Energy Partnership to support Ukraine’s long-term recovery and energy transition.

13.         The UK and EU will continue to work together to hold Russia to account through the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group which they founded with the US in May 2022; and as founding members of the Register of Damages, opened at the Council of Europe, which will record damage, loss and injury caused by Russia. 

14.         We continue to innovate. As an example, the Prime Minister, together with Presidents Ursula von der Leyen and Charles Michel, other G7 Leaders, signed a ‘Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine’ in July 2023, committing to sign agreements with Ukraine on long-term assistance. This commitment has now been signed by 30 states, and will ensure that Ukraine receives the economic, humanitarian, and military support it requires, including to deter and defend against future threats. 

15.         As we look ahead, we expect to maintain our strong engagement with the EU on Ukraine, Russia and related challenges, as well as to work together in multilateral fora, such as the G7, G20 and the European Political Community. 

Section 2: Sanctions coordination in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Sanctions coordination

16.         The Government believes the sanctions introduced by the UK, in coordination with our allies, are working. Our sanctions sent the Russian economy into recession in 2022 and are starving Russia’s military of key Western components and technology, as shown in the data.[1] For example, Russian imports of certain key semiconductors fell by almost two-thirds from February 2022 to May 2023. Russia is resorting to sourcing low quality inputs at a high cost by the transhipment of goods via third countries. Additionally, following implementation of the Oil Price Cap, Russian state revenues have fallen significantly.

17.         Coordination and cooperation with our international partners is critical to maximising the impact of our sanctions. Sanctions are, therefore, a key area of cooperation between the UK, EU and the rest of the G7. Regular coordination has enabled us to impose the biggest package of economic pressure on a major economy in recent memory.

18.         Alongside our partners, we are reinforcing our ability to implement and enforce our sanctions, including through the £50m Economic Deterrence Initiative announced earlier this year.

Sanctions enforcement

19.         The Government agrees that Russian efforts to circumvent our sanctions pose a challenge to their effectiveness, requiring continuous effort to ensure that we close any loopholes, for example, for re-exports of sanctioned products. As a party to several multilateral export control regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, a successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, the UK has deepened cooperation with its partners in the G7, including the EU, to tackle circumvention. We have identified a list of Common High Priority Items – a list of Western goods critical to Russian weapons systems and its military development – and issued guidance on enforcement to businesses in our respective jurisdictions. 

20.         Furthermore, we have delivered joint diplomatic outreach alongside EU and US sanctions envoys to the UAE, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia. This has already yielded tangible results, with several countries introducing concrete measures to reduce the risk of sanctioned goods reaching Russia.

Structures of cooperation

21.         Regular, informal engagement with the EU institutions and Member States enables co-ordination on the adoption of sanctions and designations discussed in the G7, as well as enforcement and anti-circumvention activity. Our attaché network of sanctions professionals based overseas in key EU and G7 posts, including the UK Mission to the EU in Brussels are an important part of this work.

22.         This informal engagement is supplemented by wider cooperation including quarterly senior-official meetings, encompassing the Sanctions Coordinators Forum, attended by all EU Member States and G7 partners; the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs Taskforce; and the G7 Enforcement Coordination Mechanism. We also regularly discuss our trade sanctions response to Russia’s invasion with the EU, alongside the US and Japan.

23.         These formal moments provide strategic direction for working-level engagement and constitute an important structure for enabling the Government to coordinate our approach to imposing sanctions against Russia with our closest allies. For example, we have collectively identified tackling circumvention as a key priority, agreeing to coordinate engagement with a range of third countries to discuss the effective implementation of our sanctions.

24.         The Government does not currently consider it necessary to establish additional structures with the EU on sanctions. The formal engagement described above, combined with regular working-level cooperation between officials and policy experts detailed above, allow for agile and effective coordination which is maximising the impact of our sanctions on Russia. However, owing to the dynamic nature of the situation, we will keep our arrangements under review to ensure we continue to coordinate effectively.

Beyond Ukraine

25.         While ending the war in Ukraine remains our priority, the UK also engages the EU in other areas where sanctions cooperation can serve shared policy goals, such as holding to account those responsible for suppressing human rights in Iran following the death of Masha Amini. The UK, EU and other partners have each designated officials and groups responsible for the repression of protests following Amini’s death, including members of the Morality Police and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

26.         Our discussions with the EU are not limited to focusing on actions against Russia. As with the US and other close partners, we engage the EU to co-ordinate the adoption of sanctions and designations in a range of contexts. This co-operation with international partners has allowed us to ensure maximum impact and develop and implement best practice.

Section 3: Defence cooperation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Defence cooperation as independent partners

27.         As stated in our Integrated Review, the ability to move swiftly and with greater agility, amplifying our strong, independent voice by working with others, will be the determining characteristic of the UK’s foreign policy following our departure from the EU. We have established the International Fund for Ukraine with other European partners and our leading training programme for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Operation INTERFLEX). The UK has moved faster on the provision of long-range air-launched cruise missiles, Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapons and western tanks. To ensure that Ukraine is getting the support it needs, we coordinate our response with international partners - including the EU - through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group.

28.         We are cooperating with the EU on defence where appropriate. For example, the EU consulted the UK closely when designing its military training mission for Ukrainian forces and has embedded a Liaison Officer in Operation INTERFLEX since January 2023.

29.         We have also applied to join the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Military Mobility project, which would better enable the UK to shape relevant EU rules and requirements, including cross-border military transport procedures. We have prioritised other recent engagement on efforts to maintain stability in the Western Balkans and West Africa, and discussed how we can enhance NATO-EU cooperation and strengthen Europe’s defence industrial base for our mutual benefit.

Defence industry

30.         The UK generally welcomes the steps that the EU is taking to strengthen the weapons production capacity of its Member States, including through the €1 billion to support new procurement of ammunition and missiles for Ukraine under the European Peace Facility; the €500m through the Act in Support of Ammunition Production; and the €300m European defence industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act. This is needed to sustain the provision of munitions and equipment to Ukraine, to replenish the stockpiles of partners and allies, and to boost European industrial capacity and resilience for the longer term.  

31.         As the EU’s ambition in this area grows, it is crucial that initiatives do not create barriers to defence cooperation between European allies. This would harm the integrity of Europe’s defence industrial base and run counter to our shared ambitions for a stronger NATO and stronger Europe. Twenty-two EU Member States are NATO Allies and NATO is the bedrock of our collective defence. Multilateral initiatives such as NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP) will go some way to improving the Alliance’s industrial base. These initiatives push for the delivery of aggregated demands to industry, seek to improve standardisation and interchangeability of equipment and munitions, and look to map and address common industrial issues of the participants. Through these measures Allies lower the overall cost of defence production, support industry in developing its capacity and encourage more capable and interoperable solutions.

32.         However, it is essential that EU policies do not hinder coordination and coherence of wider work. Otherwise, competing initiatives risk higher prices and less capable solutions that ultimately weakens European defence. Potential ways to reduce these issues include bringing the EU into DPAP implementation plans early, better coordination between organisations on strategic priorities (chiefly the DPP working with the EU) and securing Allies’ and Member States’ agreement to work on common issues.
     
33.         Moreover, the UK has concerns about possible supply chain competition between European allies, particularly on munitions, due to increased demand for finite sub-components and capabilities. Europe’s defence industrial base capacity is limited and we must work together to boost our collective capacity and to map our shared supply chain challenges. Nations supporting Ukraine need to adopt coherent approaches to the production of munitions to maximise deliveries to Ukraine and strengthen NATO. Without coordination, we risk duplicating effort on some types of stockpiles, creating nugatory excess and competing for scarce sub-components and resources, while continuing to carry gaps in other stockpile types. The Government will share information to boost common understanding, and will continue to raise such issues with the EU bilaterally and through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which coordinates international military aid to Ukraine.  

34.         More broadly, the UK retains concerns around the terms for participation by non-EU ‘third countries’ in EU defence initiatives, which are typically more restrictive than rules for comparable collaborative projects through NATO and other multinational bodies. This is particularly the case for industrial/capability projects involving PESCO, and/or the European Defence Fund. This is because terms state that EU Member States (or EU owned companies) must be able to fully exploit and export the resulting capability without the approval of any third country partner or industry invested in the collaborative programme (the PESCO Military Mobility project that we have applied to join does not involve the development of technology and so does not encounter these issues).

35.         Although primarily intended to stop a third country blocking the further development and export of EU sponsored capabilities, these terms make it unattractive for third countries and their industry to be involved, even on a self-funded basis. While the current sums involved are limited in general defence procurement terms, these rules inevitably curtail the opportunity for the UK to work with European partners on some European collaborative programmes to our greater general benefit.

36.         The implications for UK defence procurement are likely to be limited in the short term. This is because although the initiatives are largely only open to EU Member States and EU based suppliers, EU Member States undertake most of their weapons’ procurement outside EU structures. European Defence procurement and capability development through EU structures is currently low. However, as confidence and familiarity with current EU initiatives grows, and with the potential for further structures and facilities to also emerge, it is expected that more EU Member States will pursue solutions through EU structures. The UK continues to call for European Allies to have fair and reasonable access to EU initiatives and encourages both NATO and the EU to more closely coordinate their respective efforts.

NATO-EU cooperation

37.         The UK is a strong supporter of NATO-EU cooperation across foreign and security policy issues. We continue to support briefings by the NATO International Staff to the EU Political and Security Committee, and by the European External Action Service to the North Atlantic Council.

38.         The communiqué text issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 reflects the agreement by all NATO allies that greater collaboration between NATO and the EU, and the fullest involvement of non-EU allies in EU defence efforts, is essential to Euro-Atlantic security.

39.         We welcome the EU’s continued commitment to cooperate closely with NATO, as set out in its Strategic Compass for Security and Defence; and NATO’s similar commitment in its Strategic Concept. This will be particularly important in supporting resilience, reform and reconstruction in Ukraine. We also welcome the new Joint Declaration on NATO-EU Cooperation, signed in January, and call for its full implementation.

Section 4: Coordination on Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery

Roles of the UK, EU and partners

40.         The EU, EU Member States and the UK all have important roles to play in Ukraine’s early recovery and long-term reconstruction. Ukraine’s reconstruction needs will be immense and will require unprecedented collaboration between governments, the private sector and international institutions. Ukraine will need to attract private investment at scale to rebuild its economy and win the peace, helping us to return to better global economic and security stability. 

41.         The Government welcomes the proposed €50bn package of EU support over the next four years, currently under consideration in the EU, and announced at the UK-hosted URC. This support should act as a significant lever to encourage Ukraine to continue to make progress on reforms, including through the ‘Ukraine Plan’ being developed by the Government of Ukraine as a single, ambitious plan for their reform agenda. The Government is supporting the Government of Ukraine with the development of the Plan, engaging through our membership of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP). 

42.         The UK is helping to drive recovery and reconstruction efforts for Ukraine, mobilising and uniting the international community and the private sector. At the URC, the Prime Minister announced an additional $3bn in loan guarantees for fiscal support, and up to £240m of UK bilateral assistance for Ukraine’s immediate recovery and reconstruction needs for this year. This brings total UK assistance to $5bn, which is helping to safeguard key public services and support Ukraine’s economic stability.

Coordination between partners

43.         Coordination between the EU, EU Member States and the UK on our collective policies towards recovery and reconstruction in Ukraine is essential. The Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform (MDCP) for Ukraine is the principal forum for driving international coordination for Ukraine’s recovery, both immediate financing needs and future economic recovery and reconstruction. The MDCP Steering Committee is comprised of the G7, EU, International Financial Institutions and the Government of Ukraine; and is co-chaired by the US, EU and Ukraine. 

44.         The MDCP has a critical role in coordinating the different recovery initiatives and in ensuring their consistency with Ukraine’s reform ambitions, as well as the conditions for financing and structural support of the major donors. The UK supports the work of the MDCP and has embedded a secondee within the Platform. We coordinate closely with the EU and key Member States, notably Germany, France, and Italy (members of the MDCP), as well as Sweden, Denmark, Poland and the Baltic States.  

Ukraine’s EU candidacy

45.         The UK believes that, as a sovereign and independent country, Ukraine has the right to determine its own future free from outside interference. Ukraine’s goal of EU accession is their sovereign choice. While we recognise that any decisions on EU membership are for the EU and Ukraine to take alone, we welcome the EU’s commitment to Ukraine, including supporting Kyiv to deliver the wide-ranging reforms required to build the country’s long-term stability, prosperity and Euro-Atlantic integration. A secure, prosperous and democratic Ukraine is in the UK’s national interest.

46.         The UK has consistently supported Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic pathway. As set out in the UK-Ukraine Strategic Partnership Agreement, we have committed to supporting Ukraine’s continuing political, economic, defence and security reforms, which are aimed at realising Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

47.         We will continue to work with international partners, including the EU, IMF and MDCP, to support progress towards transformational change, which benefits ordinary Ukrainians and improves Ukraine’s attractiveness as an investment destination, providing a transparent, rule of law-based business environment. We strongly welcome Ukraine’s commitment to driving forward these reforms and we will continue to support their efforts in coordination with our EU and other international partners.

Section 5: The EU as a geopolitical actor and the UK-EU relationship

The EU as a geopolitical actor

48.         Like other organisations and countries, the EU has taken unprecedented and decisive steps since Russia’s full-scale invasion to support Ukraine and mitigate the global consequences of the war. Following Russia’s invasion, the EU implemented successive rounds of sanctions packages and military funding in support of Ukraine. The EU has continued to upscale and broaden its support to Ukraine across many areas, whilst working with the UK, the G7, and other partners to build a global coalition of support for Ukraine.

49.         Beyond Ukraine, we recognise and support the EU’s approach in tackling broader geopolitical challenges. On China, we agree on the need to protect national security, align our approach with partners, and engage with China directly. Closer to home, the EU Facilitated Serbia-Kosovo dialogue and EUFOR Op Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina are vital contributions towards peace and stability in the Western Balkans.

50.         Overall, we are supportive of a geopolitically active EU, as a close and likeminded partner and ally in an increasingly contested and volatile international space.

Strategic autonomy

51.         In the EU context, strategic autonomy refers to the bloc’s capacity to act autonomously in areas of strategic importance. We observe this mostly through the EU’s approach to China and economic security, as well as in defence and industrial procurement. While the UK remains supportive of the EU’s approach to secure Europe’s interests, weaken dependencies and de-risk relationships, on matters of defence we continue to encourage the EU to ensure this is done in coordination with NATO and is open to all European nations.

Foreign and security policy cooperation

52.         The UK-EU foreign and security policy relationship encompasses a range of crucial issues and mutual priorities. We share a commitment to upholding values of freedom and democracy, whilst working to ensure international peace and security. This commitment manifests regularly through common perspectives, action and coordination, bilaterally as well as through the G7 and in other multilateral fora, in response to some of the most pressing international challenges.

53.         The UK-EU foreign and security policy relationship incorporates a range of ministerial and senior official contact. The Foreign Secretary speaks regularly with EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs at multilateral fora including the G7 and bilaterally. This summer they have discussed issues including respective responses to the Sudan crisis and approaches to China. In addition, Lord Ahmad attended the EU-hosted Indo-Pacific forum in Stockholm in May 2023. On senior official contact, the FCDO PUS travelled to Brussels to meet with the EEAS Secretary-General in May this year to discuss UK-EU foreign and security policy cooperation.

54.         Cooperation over the Ukraine portfolio was, and continues to be, one of the strongest areas of our foreign and security policy cooperation and generates clear results. Beyond Ukraine, however, the UK works closely with the EU across many other areas of foreign and security policy. The breadth of this engagement reflects our shared agenda encompassing China and the Indo-Pacific, the Western Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, crisis response, counter-disinformation, global food security and many other thematic and geographic interests. This also includes providing mutual consular assistance – for example, during the Sudan evacuations, the UK supported 184 EU nationals on HMG-led evacuation flights and, following the recent coup in Niger, 15 British Nationals were supported on the evacuation flights operated by EU nations.

55.         In addition to cooperation on foreign and security policy, we remain committed to maximising the opportunities presented by the TCA. For example, we are working towards establishing TCA dialogues on counterterrorism and cyber by the end of this year.

56.         The Government considers that our regular consultations with the EU on foreign and security policy have enabled effective cooperation on our top foreign and security policy priorities, including, but not limited to, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. We do not currently consider that bringing these within a formalised structure would lead to more effective coordination. We are focussed on the substance of our cooperation – on what we want to achieve together where our interests align, rather than the form. However, we are always evaluating how we can better deliver our international objectives with our partners and will continue to discuss ways to enhance our cooperation with the EU. 

Received 6 November