Henry Jackson Society – Written Evidence (RUI0009)

Call for Evidence on The Implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations

This submission has been prepared by Mr Barak Seener and Mr Marc Sidwell on behalf of the Henry Jackson Society.

 

The Henry Jackson Society is a think tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free. We work across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights – and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

Barak Seener is a Senior Research Fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. Previously, Barak was a Global Intelligence Manager at HSBC and the Middle East Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Barak has lectured at NATO as well as the Royal College for Defence Studies.  He also staged the world’s first, and hugely successful conference in London at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on Palestinian statehood. Prior to joining RUSI, Barak was one of the Henry Jackson Society's founders in Westminster and was the Henry Jackson Society's Greater Middle East Section Director.

Marc Sidwell is the Director of Research at the Henry Jackson Society.

 

 

 

 

 

What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?

1                   The Russian invasion of Ukraine has provided a chance to observe the post-Brexit capability of the UK and EU to work together and confront a shared security issue. There were concerns in the wake of Brexit about both the UK’s capacity to assert an independent foreign policy and to continue to coordinate where necessary with the EU. The Ukraine crisis has on the contrary shown the post-Brexit UK displaying global leadership in the face of Russian aggression, while working pragmatically and effectively both with the US and its EU allies to support Ukraine. It has reaffirmed UK-EU ties and our capacity to work in alliance against a mutual threat. However, the crisis has also at times highlighted the EU’s internal political divisions and revealed variable defence capabilities across the EU’s member states. Such challenges show that the roles of both NATO and the UK in defending Europe continue to be essential, although long-term the EU will need to expand its independent capacity to secure the continent against external threats.

Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?

In what specific ways has the Russian invasion of Ukraine changed the EU’s wider approach to external affairs?

What is your understanding of the concept of EU strategic autonomy and how it has evolved since the Russian invasion of Ukraine? What relevance does this have to the UK’s relationship with the EU?

2               The basis of Europe’s foreign policy is its commitment to the rules-based order. Within that context, Brussels’ aspiration for ‘strategic autonomy’ is not independence, but rather anchored in its commitment to strengthen European resilience by reducing potential disruptions. These could result, for example, from the EU’s reliance on Russia and China for rare earths and energy. Counter-measures to improve resilience include reinforcing its cyber security capabilities along with protecting critical infrastructure and supply chains, including technological supply chains, and also protecting access to energy. As a result, ‘strategic autonomy’ entails the EU integrating its security and in turn promoting interdependence among EU states.

3              This may be hindered as Europe lacks a joint strategic assessment of threats and an inability to pool resources which has undermined its ability to procure weapons to advance its security. As such, despite Russia’s invasion of Ukraine being on Europe’s borders, the EU has been unable to collectively respond to Russian aggression and the crisis has tested the political cohesion of EU member states. Europe is divided between Central Europeans on the one hand, that are more immediately threatened by Russia, and France and Germany, who have been more cautious in their support for Ukraine. President Macron has spoken about the need for future relations with Russia, while Germany required US pressure to send Marder vehicles, the Patriot system and Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine.

4              The Ukraine war has exposed the EU’s ability to mobilise resources along with the capability gaps between the armies of European states. This results from the huge gaps between member states in terms of defence expenditure and stockpiles that require replenishing and upgrading. There appears to be a dissonance between the EU’s aspirations to be a geopolitical actor and its capacity. As a result, the EU does not seem ready to adopt a more assertive foreign policy.

5              Moreover, it has not been the EU as a collective that has contributed to Ukraine, but individual states across Europe that have shouldered the burden of responsibility towards Ukraine. The UK is a case in point. Despite the UK’s Integrated Review prioritising a ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine conflict has increased the UK’s role within NATO as a security provider for Europe.

 

The communiqué issued following the NATO Heads of State and Government summit in July 2023 stated that for “the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies’ fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential” and looked forward to “mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership”. As a non-EU Member of NATO what steps, if any, should the UK take to give effect to this?

6              The inability of the EU to collectively respond to threats has led the EU to continue to rely on NATO and value the US’s leadership in European security, and also the UK’s contribution. There is also a trend of European states increasing their defence expenditure and investment in technological innovation, tilting towards NATO with the recognition that Russia remains a threat. Ironically, other European states that have reduced their defence expenditure are increasingly dependent on NATO. The disparity in defence spending by EU states may be circumvented by the EU Defence Industry Reinforcement (EDIRPA) in which the EU has allocated a budget of €300 million until December 31, 2025 for at least 3 member states to jointly procure defence materials to enhance their interoperability and broader defence capabilities. This also enables them to restock their weapons supplies after having transferred weapons to Ukraine. EDIRPA’s mechanism to include up to 3 member states is reminiscent of the E3 that was constituted in 2003 between the UK, France, and Germany.

 

Can the E3 format (UK, France and Germany), established during negotiations relating to Iran, be extended to cover wider policy coordination on foreign affairs and security? What impact does the UK’s status outside of the EU have on its ability to participate in forums of this sort?

7              The E3 served as a form of European leadership within the EU and where finding a common EU policy was difficult, the E3 could spearhead foreign policy vis a vis Iran, the Syrian conflict and the 2019 attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities.

8              The E3 remains a useful forum for the UK to influence EU foreign policy while not being bound by defence and security treaties with the EU. An example of this is the recent coordination of sanctions action over the Iran nuclear deal, as discussed in the Henry Jackson Society’s  paper, Why is the UK Still Party to the Iran Nuclear Deal?. On October 18, the deal’s Transition Day, the E3 was able to conduct concerted action and replace sunsetting UN sanctions with equivalent sanctions via their respective domestic legal systems to maintain pressure on Iran. There are clear tensions in the grouping, although these also exist between France and Germany and the EU as well as with the UK. While the EU has sought to ‘de-risk’ rather than decouple from China by reducing critical dependencies and vulnerabilities of supply chains for semiconductors, and other critical products, France’s President Macron adopted a softer approach towards China. Similarly, whereas the EU has adopted a critical tone on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany has at times sought to maintain a more conciliatory approach towards the Kremlin.

9              The E3 has the capacity to orientate the EU towards NATO. The problem is that while the EU and NATO cooperate on maritime issues, counterterrorism, military mobility, quantum computing, and AI, their cooperation priorities have not been clearly defined. Both NATO’s Strategic Concept that seeks to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation and the EU’s Strategic Compass that aims for enhanced political coordination and interoperability of forces can only realistically occur if the EU increases political coordination among its member states and increases its collective procurement of defence materials while jointly allocating resources. Currently the E3 remains the most viable forum to influence the EU and spearhead its foreign and security policy or adopt either an independent approach to foreign and security policy or complement that of the US.

 

To what extent should the EU, the individual EU Member States and the UK coordinate their policies in relation to the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine? Will this require new cooperation mechanisms to be developed?

10              As discussed in the Henry Jackson Society’s paper, “Winning the Peace”, the EU and the UK must work together alongside the wider West to support the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. Such efforts should be coordinated, not only to ensure that Russia contributes to repairing the devastation caused by its aggression, but also to carefully limit Chinese investment. Bilateral arrangements between China and Ukraine risk creating new threats to Ukraine’s stability while also challenging Western efforts to integrate Ukraine long-term within the EU/NATO security architecture.

 

How would you assess coordination and cooperation between the EU, the UK and other partners on the imposition, implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and individuals from those countries since the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

11              Since the invasion of Ukraine, Hungary has challenged the EU’s efforts to present a united front on sanctions against Russia. Understanding what lies behind these sentiments is vital to achieving coordination in the face of the Russian threat between the UK and the EU. The Henry Jackson Society’s paper, “Why Still Pro-Russian?” offers a detailed analysis of the challenge, not just in Hungary but in Serbia as well. It finds that it would be a mistake to see Hungary as uniformly pro-Russian and that disappointment with the West is as critical as friendly sentiment toward Russia. Such analysis can help us understand how to bring partners on board and maintain coordinated sanctions pressure, especially in the face of Russian efforts to weaken European resolve by aggravating such divisions.

 

 

 

How do you envisage the EU’s approach to foreign and security policy developing in the longer-term, beyond the end of the current conflict?

12              The EU’s reliance on NATO for the provision of European security may not be sustainable, as the US’s long-term strategic priorities lie in the Indo-Pacific. A potential Trump return to the White House could weaken NATO as soon as 2025. Furthermore, the EU may at the same time have to independently contend with conflicts in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood such as in Sahel, Libya, or Yemen.

13              Europe must develop independent capabilities to address threats emanating from its Southern neighbourhood that perceive the EU as increasingly focused on defeating Russia and containing China and who consider sanctions and protectionism as undermining their growth. This will entail EU member states developing and increasingly sharing between themselves intelligence, military capabilities and weapons. 

14              Similarly, in the future, the EU will have to strengthen its industrial policy and production of critical goods to independently contend with the impact of US-China competition in the form of protectionist trade policies that may disrupt supply chains.

 

Received 27 October

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