TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE

The following submission represents the views of experts at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI). It brings together the insight of internal experts on UK-EU relations, wider geopolitics, international security, cyber policy and global political leadership on foreign affairs. It also draws on long-standing engagement with external experts, policymakers and other stakeholders.

1. How would you assess the EU’s overall foreign and security policy response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

The EU responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by putting in place unprecedented support measures for Ukraine, as well as sanctions against Russia. In doing so they have showed strong internal unity and coordination at Council, Commission and Parliament level.

Since the start of the war, the EU, its Member States and its financial institutions have made available €40.4 billion to support Ukraine's overall economic, social and financial resilience. This has been in the form of macro-financial assistance, budget support, emergency assistance, crisis response and humanitarian aid.

In addition, military assistance measures total around €25 billion, of which €5.6 billion has been mobilised under the European Peace Facility.

Together with the resources made available to help Member States cater for needs of Ukrainians fleeing the war in the EU, the overall EU support to Ukraine and Ukrainians amounts so far to over €82 billion.

The nature of the EU’s response, both in terms of its scope and speed, has been unprecedented by EU standards. It provides some important lessons for how the EU should respond to future crises of this kind, particularly in terms of decision-making processes.

To what extent does the EU’s response represent a departure from its previous approach to foreign and security policy? Is this likely to be a durable shift?

The EU has shown a deep commitment both in principle and in practice to support Ukraine. The nature of the EU’s response marks a clear departure from its previous decisions on the matter.

The European Peace Facility (EPF), operational since July 2021, finances activities with military implications and supports the armies of partner countries and EU Member States with infrastructure, training and equipment. Responding to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for the first time in its history, the EU mobilized funds for the delivery by Member States of military equipment, including lethal weaponry, to assist a partner country not part of the EU.

Reacting quickly and unanimously to Russia's war on Ukraine the Council has now adopted twelve decisions and provided six tranches of assistance measures (mainly lethal equipment but also non-lethal support) for the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF). The Council's decisions also allowed financing to be used for the maintenance and repair of military equipment already delivered.

The EU has allocated €25 billion to strengthen the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In addition, the EU is supporting Ukraine to ensure full accountability for war crimes and the other serious crimes. By the end of 2023 40,000 Ukrainian soldiers will have been trained as part of the EU military assistance mission and up to €25 million will be spent on mine clearance in Ukraine. The EU Peace Facility has also allowed Ukraine to procure weapons and equipment.

In addition, the EU quickly granted Ukraine (and Moldova) EU membership candidate status, in a move which was not expected by several Member States. This fast decision making has partly been due to the leadership of Commission President von der Leyen.

b. How would you assess the overall state of cooperation between the EU, UK and other partners in relation to Ukraine? Is there a need for cooperation between the EU and the UK to be increased further? If so, in what way?

The UK has played a strong role in cooperating with the EU in Ukraine. There has been a lot of cooperation between UK intelligence services and national EU Member States intelligence services. The UK has been widely covered in the press as a key and trustworthy partner during the different phases of the war.

In the context of Britain’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU there are important lessons learned, and principles drawn, from this period to underpin future ties between both sides.

With a trajectory of both the EU and UK looking to deepen important aspects of the relationship, defence cooperation can be an important foundation to develop and then build on in other policy areas.

A key step in this regard would be looking at the key pillars of the EU and UK’s interactions on Ukraine and turning this into the basis of defence cooperation agreement. We set out more on this further in the submission.

c. What implications, if any, does the EU’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK-EU relationship in foreign, defence and security policy?

Ukraine, but also threats to Moldova and the very volatile situation in the Western Balkans, have underlined the need for a stronger UK-EU relationship.

In the current geopolitical climate it appears deeply unlikely Russia will become less of a threat anytime soon. Proper coordination between the EU and UK in responding to Russia will be vital. This cooperation can then widened to cover other geopolitical threats and opportunities: for instance how best to interact with China.

2. How would you assess coordination and cooperation between the EU, the UK and other partners on the imposition, implementation and enforcement of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and individuals from those countries since the Russian invasion of Ukraine?

The coordination has taken place in an effective way also at bilateral level between the UK and the EU individual Member States.

The scope and scale of the sanctions regime placed on Russia has been more extensive than many- including Russia- expected.

Of course there are areas where these could be strengthened or better enforced, but the overall response by the EU, UK and wider international community has been significant and substantial.

Analysis suggests the sanctions regime is having a degrading effect on Russia, impairing its capability to conduct the war and placing increased pressure on the Kremlin.

3. What implications, if any, do developments in the EU’s defence policy and approach to resilience since the Russian invasion of Ukraine have for the UK?

The EU has shown that it can be a unified and important partner in foreign policy. Cooperating more closely with the UK, given its important position in the wider security alliance, would benefit the EU and closer cooperation not only on deterrence but also on enlargement and reforms in Ukraine would be advantageous for both.

In a complex and fast-changing geopolitical context the UK will only be able to maximise its ability to project and protect its values globally by engaging with the right partners- bilateral, multilateral and institutional. The EU has shown in this regard its capability to act cohesively and decisively and shown what an important partner it is, and can be, for the UK.

Is there a need for greater coordination and cooperation between the EU and the UK on defence policy? If so, what sorts of cooperation should be prioritised?

We believe there is an important need for greater coordination and coordination and have submitted evidence to a separate Inquiry setting this out in detail. We envisage this deeper relationship being focussed around: Procurement, Capacity and Research.

https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/122267/pdf/

4. What do you anticipate as being the respective roles of the EU, the individual EU Member States and the UK in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine?

The EU has put in place an ambitious mechanism to coordinate the reconstruction of Ukraine, setting up a new facility to support Ukraine’s coherent and predictable recovery, reconstruction, and modernisation. The facility will work in coordination with the international Multi-Agency Donor Coordination Platform and with private sector, and local authorities. There is still significant scope for strengthened cooperation in order to best match offers of support with Ukraine’s needs.

To what extent should the EU, the individual EU Member States and the UK coordinate their policies in relation to reconstruction? Will this require new cooperation mechanisms to be developed?

The EU has put in place a Multi Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine, sitting within the European Commission. Its aim is to support Ukraine's reconstruction efforts and allow for close coordination among international donors and financial organisations.

Its aim is to ensure enhanced coordination amongst all key players providing short-term financial support but also longer-term assistance for the reconstruction phase. In this way, it builds on the results of the conferences in Lugano, Berlin and Paris to help bridge the gap between needs and resources.

Ukraine’s eventual needs in reconstruction will be vast. The offers of support numerous and wide-ranging. Rebuilding Ukraine is likely to be the biggest reconstruction effort since the end of the Second World War. This will require new and strategic mechanisms for Ukraine to set out its needs and match these with the right offers of support. We have written in more detail on this subject earlier this year: https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/rebuilding-ukraine-finding-right-partners-and-right-plan.

5. Some experts have identified a more “geopolitical” EU that is more assertive in its role as a foreign policy and security actor following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree with this assessment? If so, what implications does it have for the UK?

Commission President von der Leyen has sought to operationalise the concept of the EU as a strategic geopolitical actor since the very beginning of her mandate. The EU’s strong response to Russian aggression in Ukraine has projected the Union as an assertive actor, speaking more often than not with one voice and leading several other international partners.

In addition to Ukraine, in a global context marked not only by renewed great-power competition but by the increasingly intertwined relationship between economic and security policies, many of the EU’s traditional single-market-related policies, such as trade, investment, competition, technology or finance, have become more strategic and security-related. This has encouraged the EU to assert its role as a geopolitical actor in many sectors. This development has represented a crucial evolution that has reshaped the EU foreign policy role.

For the UK this creates a more strategic, coordinated and active foreign policy and security actor on its doorstep. This presents both risks and challenges. As we have set out earlier, there are opportunities for the UK to build on existing developments in EU/UK relations since Ukraine and develop a more comprehensive and codified defence and security relationship. If the UK misses the chance to do so it risks being excluded from growing cooperation within Europe that has a wider reach and capability than the UK does alone.

What is your understanding of the concept of EU strategic autonomy and how it has evolved since the Russian invasion of Ukraine? What relevance does this have to the UK’s relationship with the EU?

The concept encompasses a greater potential for independence, self-reliance and resilience in a wide range of fields, including defence, security and trade, as well as in industrial, digital, economic, migration and health policies.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has given the issue of European strategic autonomy greater urgency and impetus, pushing the European Commission to cut EU dependency on Russian gas by two-thirds in 2022 and setting the intention to end its reliance on Russian supplies of fuel before 2030.

The discussion within the EU on strategic autonomy covers ideas and projects involving deeper integration, solidarity and stronger joint security and defence. The EU’s Strategic Compass, a medium-term defence and security strategy, is being quickly updated to take into account the biggest armed conflict in Europe since World War II.

What implications might possible future developments in the EU, for instance enlargement to include current candidate countries in the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, have for the EU’s approach to external affairs? What impact would these developments have on UK-EU relations?

Enlargement has proved to be one of the most successful tools in promoting political, economic and societal reforms, and in consolidating peace, stability and democracy across the continent. Enlargement policy also enhances the EU’s presence on the global stage. The European Parliament has called on the EU to re-energize the enlargement process both among member states and in applicant countries so that accession negotiations of front runner countries can be concluded by 2030.

Albania and North Macedonia opened accession negotiations in July 2022. In December 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained candidate country status, and Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership. The EU granted candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022.

The candidacy of Ukraine, as well as a wider rethink within the EU about the accession process, may open up new opportunities for the UK to develop and deepen ties with the Union. The Government should stay alive to these unfolding processes with the EU and the possibilities they may provide.

How do you envisage the EU’s approach to foreign and security policy developing in the longer-term, beyond the end of the current conflict?

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has projected the EU as a strong geopolitical actor on the international stage.

Many European countries are significant powers in their own right, and the EU as a whole has the potential to compete more equitably with larger countries like China or the US. But the EU is not a unified nation state and in its current institutional configuration is unlikely to fully realise the type of decisive unity and action it will need. European success on the global stage depends on the success of European integration among Member States, as internal institutional changes within the EU, such as coordinated fiscal and social policies.

The EU is crafting a strategy that stresses its connections with a wide network of countries in order to protect its interests and this is increasingly happening via trade agreements.

This response has been prepared by Antonio Battaglia, Daniel Sleat, Jacob Delorme, Dr Matt Godwin & Dr Melanie Garson.

October 2023