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Human Security Centre – Written evidence (AFG0019)
Produced by the Human Security Centre
Lead Author: Simon Schofield, Senior Fellow,
In consultation with
Rohullah Yakobi, Associate Fellow
1 Table of Contents
3. What is the Human Security Centre?
4. Geopolitics and National Interests and Agendas
Afghanistan as a terrorist training camp
American Interests and Strategy
Establishing ‘power broker’ credentials
6. Conclusion - Recommendations for British policy towards Afghanistan
And I know too - I know too that there is a wariness. I know that it feels as if we have carried these burdens long enough. But we can only know that there is no choice, because one of two things will happen if we don't lead. Either no one will lead and there will be chaos, or someone will fill the vacuum who does not share our values. ~ Condoleezza Rice, United States Secretary of State (2005-2009), United States National Security Advisor (2001-2005)
2.1 Following the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, there will be a power vacuum which a number of powers will attempt to fill in order to further their own interests and undermine those of their rivals. This document has sought to set out the various interests and strategies that the most prominent regional powers will pursue.
2.2 Due to its geographic proximity, the fact that Pashtun communities straddle the Durand Line, and Islamabad’s strong influence over the Taliban, Pakistan is, and is likely to remain, the single most impactful external power on the affairs of Afghanistan. Whether it seeks to install a friendly Taliban-led Government in Kabul, or prefers a lighter-touch approach of maintaining a frozen conflict in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s primary objective is to oppose New Delhi’s influence and to build ‘strategic depth’ as a bulwark against Indian encirclement. Pakistan sees the balance of its own interests in Afghanistan against those of India in zero-sum terms. Other important goals include preserving the territorial integrity of Pakistan, particularly against Baloch and Pashtun independence movements along the Afghan border, and pursuing economic interests, most notably to secure its energy supplies.
2.3 Iran’s strategy and interests in Afghanistan are ambiguous. However, Tehran will have three options with respect to their relationship with the Taliban. Firstly, Tehran can continue to fund the Taliban in order to fight and overthrow the Kabul Government, which it sees as an American client. Secondly, Tehran can support a political settlement which leads to a more federal Afghanistan, allowing for quasi-autonomous governance along ethnic lines, which would limit Taliban influence to Pashtun areas, and carve out its own sphere of influence in the Hazarajat, Herat, and other Tajik and Persian-speaking communities. Thirdly, Tehran may decide to attempt to maintain a frozen conflict in Afghanistan, which would lead to the attrition of both the Taliban and the Kabul Government, as well as maintaining fertile recruiting grounds to continue to swell the ranks of its volunteer forces, such as the Fatemiyoun Brigade, for which it recruits in Afghanistan and has deployed to fight on its behalf in Syria.
2.4 Iran rejected the Doha Agreement brokered between the United States and the Taliban, stating that it had no legal standing and branding it as an American exercise to ‘legitimize its troops’ presence in Afghanistan’. Given that the new Quds Force commander Ismail Qa’ani has a strong background operating in and around Afghanistan, there is a strong chance that Iran will work to undermine the Doha process set out in the agreement, seeking to inflict political damage on the United States. Iran will have the further choice of whether to pursue stability to prevent potentially large refugee flows and a civil war that could spill over its borders, or to foment instability and reap the benefits of guaranteed flows of water, black market currency, and Shi’a militants. At the time of writing it would appear that Iran is ‘keeping its options open’.
2.5 India currently finds itself with constrained options. Having been pushed out of Chabahar by China, facing airspace bans from Pakistan, and with the requirement for eastern routes to travel through either Pakistani-occupied Kashmir or China, India’s access northwards to Afghanistan and Central Asia is greatly restricted.
2.6 India is likely to step up development support and investment further into humanitarian and infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, and hospitals. This will build its own reputation in Afghanistan and will also burnish the legitimacy of the Kabul Government.
2.7 Diplomatically, India is likely to continue to refuse to recognise or engage with the Taliban and will instead maintain support for and relations with Kabul.
2.8 India’s main security priority will be to prevent Afghanistan becoming a space for anti-India terrorist groups to train and plan attacks. It will work multilaterally with regional powers and global allies where counterterrorism interests align to this end.
2.9 Whilst generally adopting a softer approach than Pakistan, India will keep open the option to fund and arm the Northern Alliance’s successor groups, such as the National Front of Afghanistan and the Basej-e Milli, who have pledged allegiance to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. This will allow for a more militaristic response should the need to escalate arise, without the requirement of deploying Indian troops, which is politically undesirable and logistically difficult in the current situation.
2.10 Irrespective of the winner of the 2020 Presidential election, the United States of America is withdrawing the overwhelming majority of its soldiers from Afghanistan and is likely to maintain a light footprint counterterrorism presence in the country. Whilst America presently has a strong influence in Afghanistan, and is likely to maintain an influence to one degree or another, it is likely this will wane as troop withdrawal progresses.
2.11 The major foreign policy difference between Trump and Biden is their respective approaches to alliances. Trump is pursuing a policy of ‘burden sharing’, wherein America is withdrawing many commitments and encouraging regional allies such as Japan, India, the UK and the EU to take on greater responsibility. Biden has pledged to re-engage with international institutions and appears to want to pursue a continuity of post-9/11 American international leadership as under Presidents Bush Jr. and Obama.
2.12 Should the Taliban fail to adhere to the Doha Agreement, the USA may choose to re-engage militarily in order to preclude future attacks on the American homeland.
2.13 Russia has historically viewed Afghanistan as its strategic southern flank. It considers the country an area in which it must strive to have influence, and a theatre in which to compete against the West, as it did in the Great Game against the British, and as part of the Cold War against the United States and NATO. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s activity in Afghanistan was greatly reduced and it initially supported the Western intervention in 2001 to remove the Taliban, uproot al Qaeda, and prevent Afghanistan from returning to being a safe haven for terrorists. However, since relations between Russia and the West soured greatly as a result of the annexation of Crimea, and as Russia as begun to reassert itself on the world stage, its interests have diverged from those of the West.
2.14 Russia maintains an interest in counterterrorism and in particular seeks to prevent terrorists in Afghanistan working with, joining, or otherwise supporting existing Islamist terror groups in the Caucasus which threaten Russian homeland security. Russian strategy would appear to be aimed at gaining leverage over the Taliban to use them as a dampener on terror groups that may threaten Russia.
2.15 Russia is also interested in using influence over the Taliban as a tool to curb the production and trafficking of drugs, most saliently opium/heroin.
2.16 Russia is employing a sophisticated hybrid warfare strategy to erode Western credibility and reputation in Afghanistan along a number of avenues. Portraying the West as being unable to properly broker peace talks, inept at combating drugs trafficking and production, and incompetent in counterterrorism has opened a large number of ‘narrative fronts’ against the West. Conversely, Russia portrays itself as trying to rescue peace talks when President Trump cancels them, accuses the West of supporting ISIS whilst Russia is defeating them, and invites NATO to join Russian counternarcotic efforts. This gives the impression that Russia is setting the agenda and taking the initiative and, Moscow hopes, makes them indispensable on the world stage.
2.17 China’s three priorities are to maintain their own national security by pursuing robust counterterrorism efforts against Uighur militants based in Afghanistan, to secure political and economic influence and interests through infrastructure development, and to demonstrate its credentials as a regional and global power.
2.18 China’s three priorities are interwoven, its efforts to demonstrate leadership by brokering peace talks are aimed at improving the security situation, which should bolster endeavours to suppress Uighur militants in Badakhshan. Improving security also builds confidence for investors and creates the safe space for more economic development projects.
2.19 China is faced with a ‘chicken and egg’ problem where it comes to balancing economics and security. It is attempting to use economic investment as an incentive for the Taliban to reduce violence, but such investment is undermined by the continuation of violence.
2.20 China will seek to avoid becoming the next major power to enter the ‘graveyard of empires’ and will seek a largely superficial relationship with Kabul and the Taliban in order to pursue its three priorities. Ultimately, China will likely have little interest in the specific outcomes of the peace process, provided that the end result is greater political stability and security.
2.21 There are a number of concerns for Western interests stemming from the Doha Agreement and the Taliban’s behaviour both recently and in the past.
2.22 First and foremost, the Taliban’s obligations have been phrased in vague terms, which allow great scope for interpretation.
2.23 Secondly, there appear to be no mechanisms for monitoring Taliban compliance with the Agreement, nor for enforcing against any breaches.
2.24 The Taliban were clearly negotiating with Russia on agreements to pay bounties to kill American troops in Afghanistan at the same time as they were negotiating the Doha Agreement with the USA. This raises very serious concerns about Taliban intentions, and the degree to which they can be relied on to maintain their commitments in the Agreement[1].
2.25 Further, Section B of Part One of the Agreement reads: “B 1) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from Afghanistan within the remaining nine and a half (9.5) months. 2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases”[2]. This leaves major concerns around the future of counterterrorism, as this requires a minimum amount of personnel on the ground, even for relatively remote operations such as drone reconnaissance and airstrikes. Should the US and its allies have an absolute zero presence of military personnel in Afghanistan, this will greatly hamper counterterrorism efforts and may leave Western powers reliant on the Kabul Government, the Taliban, and regional powers for assistance in this regard.
2.26 The Taliban remains deeply connected to terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in particular al Qaeda and its affiliates. The Haqqani Network, led by Taliban Deputy Emir Sirajuddin Haqqani, also maintains a relationship with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
2.27 Given the currently strengthening relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is likely that the situation in Afghanistan will return to the status quo ante prior to 2001, wherein the Taliban will offer shelter to and cooperation with al Qaeda, which still harbours ambitions to strike the homelands of the United States, United Kingdom, and allies.
2.28 Based on the above analysis, the likely outcome of the Doha Agreement will include most or all of the below:
- Western ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan;
- The Taliban declares the reinstatement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan;
- The Taliban will use loopholes in the Doha Agreement to avoid having to break ties with al Qaeda or expel foreign fighters;
- The Taliban will attack the Kabul Government and any other actors it deems necessary to cement control of the country;
- The Taliban will use the ‘breathing space’ afforded it by the troop withdrawal to consolidate its power base, recruit and train fighters, and to build links with the various jihadist groups present and operating in Afghanistan
2.29 There are a number of key British interests at stake in Afghanistan. These include preserving national security with a continued commitment to counterterrorism and counternarcotics; supporting a strategic ally in the Kabul Government to maintain influence in a key strategic region; supporting the maintenance and expansion of the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and related values to ensure a free Afghan society; continuing to support long-term economic and political development through the delivery of international aid; identifying, opposing, containing, and subverting efforts by hostile powers to expand their interests, and defending the political legacy of the West’s intervention since 2001
2.30 On the assumption that there will be a preference against large-footprint military options, there are a number of actions that can be taken to safeguard the aforementioned British interests.
2.31 The Human Security Centre makes the following recommendations for British policy towards Afghanistan:
- 1. Maintain a limited counterterrorism and intelligence deployment in Afghanistan.
- 2. Build strong relations with the Hazara community and other at-risk minorities.
- 3. Build strong relations with Baloch communities, which inhabit key strategic locations.
- 4. Maintain and, if possible, increase development commitments.
- 5. Maintain diplomatic and political support for the Afghan Government.
- 6. Increase cooperation with India, as the regional power most aligned with the UK’s values interests
- 7. Invest in strategic communications to counter hostile state and non-state informational warfare and to maintain support among Afghan civilians for democracy, the rule of law, and political pluralism.
2.32 To quote former United States Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice: “I know too that there is a wariness. I know that it feels as if we have carried these burdens long enough. But we can only know that there is no choice, because one of two things will happen if we don't lead. Either no one will lead and there will be chaos, or someone will fill the vacuum who does not share our values." Whilst Rice said this to urge more committed American leadership on the world stage in 2012, this applies as much today to the UK and wider West’s interests in Afghanistan. As the West withdraws from Afghanistan, there will be a vacuum created and we will face precisely such a choice as Rice describes. Many of the countries and non-state actors waiting to fill this vacuum are overtly hostile to the UK, its interests, and values and will seek to undo and destroy any achievements made since the 2001 intervention. It is vital that Afghanistan is not forgotten as the UK begins to prioritise other issues, both domestically and abroad. The UK must pursue a coherent strategy that brings military power to bear against terrorist groups aspiring to attack the West; diplomatic power to support and promote a stable, free, and democratic Afghanistan, and full-spectrum capabilities to identify, limit, challenge, and subvert hostile state and non-state activities in Afghanistan which threaten to damage the UK and its interests.
3.1 The Human Security Centre (HSC) is an international, independent, not-for-profit foreign policy think-tank based in London. The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century.
3.2 The HSC adopts and promotes the concept of human security as a central pillar of foreign policy in the twenty-first century and advances the understanding and application of people-centred, multi-sectoral, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented solutions to critical and pervasive human insecurities, building on the human security approach.
3.3 The HSC engages with government agencies, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, private sector businesses, civil society organisations, academics, lawyers, journalists, and security and humanitarian professionals to tackle some of the world’s most difficult problems. The HSC has submitted evidence in the past committees of both the House of Commons and House of Lords, as well as the US Congress, and has also produced two annual reports on freedom of religious belief for the European Parliament.
3.4 To further its aims, it undertakes policy-relevant, analytical and solution-oriented research into critical human insecurities – particularly political repression, human rights violations, mass atrocity crimes, armed conflicts and terrorism – for the public benefit: to educate the general public and other relevant stakeholders, and to inform foreign and security policy.
3.5 It produces a wide range of digital publications (research papers and reports, policy briefings, opinion pieces and news briefs) that cover human security issues across the world. It also regularly offers analysis and commentary to various international media outlets.
3.6 Simon Schofield is a co-founder and Senior Fellow of the Human Security Centre, who has written extensively on issues relating to terrorism, human rights, geopolitics, and weapons of mass destruction. He has acted as a political consultant for a range of prominent news outlets including the BBC and RTE.
3.7 Rohullah Yakobi is an Associate Fellow. Born in Afghanistan, he fled from Taliban persecution, aged 12, and lived in Iran and Pakistan before coming to Britain in November 2004. He is an advocate for democracy and human rights in his native country and the wider region. Drawing on his often traumatic experiences, Rohullah has written extensively on democracy, human rights and terrorism. He has been a strong proponent of active and responsible citizenship, and hence involved in different political and community organisations. He has read Politics, Philosophy and Economics at the Open University. Rohullah is fluent in English, Persian, Pashtu and Hazaragi.
4.1 As one of Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours, Pakistan has a long-shared history with Afghanistan. The border between the two countries was established by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand[3] and is known as the Durand Line. The Durand Line bisects historic Pashtun and Baloch land, leaving ethnic Pashtuns and Baloch[4] people on both sides of the border. No Afghan Government has recognised the Line as the official border between the two countries since Pakistan became an independent country following Indian Partition in 1947. In an interview with the Afghanistan Times, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai said: “[the Durand Line] was not called a border but the term sphere of influence was used. It means sphere of influence between the British India and Afghanistan, not a border”[5]. He further added: “No one will recognize it. It cannot separate the nation. The line has not separated the nation. When we went to the other side of the Durand Line, the people welcomed us as their own brothers. Therefore, it cannot separate us and no one recognizes it. It cannot keep us away from each other[6]”. When asked whether there were any Afghans who would be willing to recognise the Durand Line, Karzai said: “If such a person did come, at that very moment, the people of Afghanistan will kick him out of Afghan Millat [nation][7].”
4.2 There is an expressed desire for either an independent Pashtun state within what is currently Pakistani territory, or otherwise for border adjustments to be made which enable the entirety of the Pashtun/Afghan (the two terms are synonymous ethnographically speaking, although in modern times the latter term refers to a citizen of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) people to be reunified within a singular nation state. Former President Karzai remarked of this: ““From the River Amu [Oxus] to Attock, Afghans live. There are different groups of Afghans. If Afghans living on the other side of the Durand Line decide to have an independent state we will accept it. We shall respect their decision whatever it is[8].”
Following Indian Independence in 1947, the North West Frontier Province, roughly equivalent to today’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province in modern-day Pakistan, was given the option to join either with the newly-created Dominion of India or Dominion of Pakistan. The decision was put to a popular referendum and over 99 per cent of voters supporting joining Pakistan, although this should be caveated that the referendum was boycotted[9] by those who wanted an independent Pashtunistan, such as Abdul Ghaffar Khan, resulting in a turnout of only 51%.
4.3 Since Independence, Pakistan and India have been in conflict and this acts as a prism through which all geopolitical issues are viewed from Islamabad. India and Pakistan are fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan, with both states vying for influence for themselves and their favoured groups in the country at the expense of their opponents[10]. This competition is across the complete spectrum of human activity, including the religious, cultural, military, political, economic, and diplomatic spheres. This proxy war was acknowledged by former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in an interview with the Guardian[11].
4.4 Pakistan’s strategy has been to utilise its links with the Pashtuns within their own territory to support the Taliban and other Islamist groups to sow discord and oppose and undermine Indian influence and interests. Pakistan’s ideal outcome is likely to be either a resurgent, but weak and malleable Taliban-led government in Kabul, or otherwise a protracted frozen conflict in Afghanistan, which it can use to its advantage, or, perhaps, some combination of the two. In either event, the central pillar of this strategy is to use the Taliban as a ‘buffer’ against India[12] and to create ‘strategic depth’ to hamper Indian efforts to support independence movements in Balochistan[13].
4.5 As argued by RAND among others[14], Pakistan’s preoccupation with the conflict against India, coupled with the dominance of the military, intelligence, and security forces over the country’s decision-making structures, has led it to pursue a narrowly focused strategy in Afghanistan. With a heavy emphasis on avoiding encirclement by India, Pakistan is not well positioned to build stronger economic or political links with Afghanistan, despite shared history and culture[15]. Presently, RUSI describes the relationship between Pakistan’s military and Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Government as ‘essentially symbiotic’[16].
4.6 Pakistan first supported the Taliban as part of the Mujahedin group, organised to fight against the invading Soviets in the Afghan-Soviet War. After defeating the Soviets, the Mujahedin disbanded and different members and factions went on to form a number of disparate terrorist and/or rebel organisations including, but not limited to:
- al Qaeda (established by Osama Bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam);
- the Afghan Taliban (established by Mullah Omar and supporters);
- the Pakistani Taliban (established by Baitullah Mehsud and Hafiz Gul Bahadur);
- the Haqqani Network (established by Jalaluddin Haqqani),
- and al Qaeda in Mesopotamia/Islamic State (established by Abu Musab al Zarqawi)
4.7 Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the regime of President Mohammed Najibullah in 1992, there was a period of extreme instability. Seeking to fill the vacuum, Pakistan supported the formation of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar. Some, including Aimal Liyan, Deputy Chief of Afghanistan’s Strategic and Scientific Research Centre, have accused Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of planning and carrying out the 1996 assassination of Najibullah, disguising the operation as a Taliban execution[17]. Subsequently the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, fought and won a civil war in Afghanistan, taking power in Kabul on 27th September 1996 until its removal by the US-led intervention of 2001.
4.8 The Pakistani state, and in particular the ISI has embarked on a risky policy of supporting Taliban elements which are pursuing objectives which align with their own strategic interests in Afghanistan, whilst attempting to suppress and destroy the elements which are hostile to Islamabad. This policy has long been referred to as the ‘good Taliban, bad Taliban’ strategy[18]. A 2000 Human Rights Watch reported:
4.9 “Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and ... directly providing combat support.”[19]
4.10 Faqir Hamim Masoom writes in Foreign Policy: “Those casually referred to as the ‘good Taliban’ are a select group of militants, whose objectives largely coincided with those of the Pakistan’s security agenda. Pakistan has long acknowledged influence over the Afghan Taliban leadership, but simultaneously says it does not hold enough leverage to control or dictate their operations. This desire to sway, with a distinct lack of control over select armed actors, has led to myriad problems for Pakistan.”[20] Such issues were most succinctly summarised when then-US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton remarked of Pakistani policy: “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours. Eventually, those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in their backyard.”[21]
4.11 This policy has led to consternation at times in Islamabad, with the Government issuing warnings to the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network that they cannot expect to continue receiving support if they are also to continue collaborating with the Pakistani Taliban[22].
4.12 Perhaps the best example of where the ‘good Taliban, bad Taliban’ strategy has backfired is the 2014 Peshawar Army Public School massacre. This was carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, and coordinated by commanders in Afghanistan. The attack, carried out by a Chechen, three Arabs, and two Afghans[23], killed 149, including 132 school children[24]. In response to this attack, then-Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared that there was now no distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban[25]. Despite this apparent disavowal of the strategy, Pakistani state support for elements associated with the Taliban continues, and the strategy continues to draw criticism[26].
4.13 In response to deteriorating relations between Islamabad and Kabul, amid escalating security tensions, Pakistan, long a host of Afghan refugees, undertook in late 2016 what Human Rights Watch describes as ‘the world’s largest unlawful mass forced return of refugees in recent times’, forcing around 365,000 of Pakistan’s 1.5million Afghan refugees and approximately 200,000 of the estimated 1 million undocumented migrants back across the Durand Line. Public statements by Pakistani officials in 2017 indicated they expected to see the same number again make the journey back into Afghanistan that year[27]. In future, Pakistan is likely to respond in a similar fashion to future events if it deems that Afghans in Pakistan pose a security threat.
4.14 In terms of the forms Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban takes, one of the most salient and impactful one is battlefield personnel. The UN estimated in a report published in May 2020 that: “One Member State reported that the total number of Pakistani nationals fighting with terrorist groups in Afghanistan may be as high as 6,000 to 6,500”[28]. Of course, it should be noted that not all Pakistani nationals in Afghanistan fighting with terrorist groups are necessarily fighting with the Taliban. The Pakistani groups active in Pakistan include Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistani Taliban, or TTP), Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT, responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM).
4.15 The precise balance of which of these groups are in Afghanistan operating on behalf of the Pakistani state and which are there of their own accord is not entirely clear. Whilst TTP is an avowed enemy of the Pakistani state; LeT, formed in Kunar, Afghanistan, receives support, training, and at least occasional direct command from ISI and JeM was established at the behest of the ISI in order carry out attacks against India in Kashmir[29]. As the Long War Journal reports: “While not noted in the U.N. report, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are proxies of the Pakistani state. These two groups are two of the largest Pakistan-backed terror proxies in the region. In addition to executing attacks in Afghanistan, both also conduct terror operations inside of India.”[30] In any event, the UN report indicates that these fighters are embedded with and fighting alongside the Afghan Taliban in their jihad against the Kabul Government.
4.16 As well as assisting with direct combat support, Pakistan is sheltering the Afghan Taliban leadership within its borders, who operate openly and with impunity. In particular, a leadership council, often referred to as the ‘Quetta Shura’ set up shortly after the collapse of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2002, is believed to have been directing the Taliban’s insurgency in the country since its inception, particular in southern Afghanistan[31]. In 2006, British chief of staff for southern Afghanistan Colonel Chris Vernon accused Pakistan of providing sanctuary to the Taliban in the city of Quetta, telling the Guardian: “The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan. It's the major headquarters… they use it to run a series of networks in Afghanistan.”[32]
4.17 In addition to the Quetta Shura, there is a Peshawar Shura, coordinating Taliban operations in the north, east, and centre of Afghanistan. This Shura is believed to be commanded by the leader of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is also the Afghan Taliban’s Deputy Emir[33].
4.18 Thirdly, Pakistan provides direct funding for the Afghan Taliban. Arguably the strongest evidence of this is a report produced by Harvard Fellow Matt Waldman, who interviewed nine Taliban field commanders for a report for the London School of Economics (LSE) in 2010. Waldman suggested that support for the Taliban was ‘official ISI policy’, and his report goes on to detail that the field commanders’ reports were: “were corroborated by former Taliban ministers, a Western analyst and a senior UN official based in Kabul, who said the Taliban largely depend on funding from the ISI and groups in Gulf countries”[34]. In October 2019, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a global watchdog on matters such as terror financing, warned Pakistan that it needed to do more to curb this practice, having only addressed five of the 27 action items identified to tackle terror financing risks. The FATF ruled that Pakistan would remain on its ‘grey list’ of countries of concern, and threatened to place it on the ‘black list’, which includes the worst offenders such as Iran and North Korea[35]. In June 2020 it was confirmed that Pakistan would remain on the ‘grey list’[36].
4.19 Pakistan’s support for the Taliban allows it to shape Pashtun identity through a religious lens. With the dominant narrative being a Sunni jihad to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Pakistan is able to channel the political narrative away from Pashtun nationalism. There is a concern in Pakistan that groups such as the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement’s calls for an independent Pashtunistan on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line would lead to the loss of this territory, and could also set a precedent for an independent Balochistan as well. Pakistan has concerns that India is covertly supporting such movements in order to achieve the fracturing of their rival.
4.20 As mentioned above, Pakistan sponsors a number of militant groups in addition to the Taliban. These serve as proxies under differing degrees of control of Pakistani agents, generally the ISI.
4.21 Afghanistan serves as an ideal training ground for Pakistani terrorist proxies. As well as offering a space in which basic training can be undertaken in a quasi-deniable fashion, it also allows terror proxies intending to carrying out attacks in Jammu and Kashmir against India to experience first-hand combat in the Afghan jihad to re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Terror training camps have been moved from Pakistan to Afghanistan following airstrikes carried out by the Indian Air Force on 26th February 2020 on sites operate by LeT and JeM in Balakot, Pakistan[37], and this ‘Balakot Effect’ is likely to persist as a safeguard against future such airstrikes.
4.22 There are recent claims in Indian media that the Pakistani Special Services Group (SSG), roughly equivalent to the British Special Air Service (SAS) are training terrorist proxies in Afghanistan, although these claims have not been verified[38],[39].
4.23 Further, it is clear that Pakistan has used its role as an American ally in the war against the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda in order to leverage significant aid. Mark Mazzetti in The Atlantic succinctly summarises the situation:
4.24 “George W. Bush’s war cabinet was already jittery about the “nightmare scenario” of the new conflict: violence spilling over into Pakistan, President Pervez Musharraf’s government collapsing, and the country’s nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of Pakistani generals with Taliban sympathies. Musharraf himself spent years masterfully stoking these fears. He often warned American officials that the more he acceded to Washington’s demands, the more his support inside the military would erode and the better the chances would become of the nightmare scenario playing out… the conundrum might have been resolved… had the American military’s tactical failures during the first year not helped Musharraf’s argument that Pakistan was too dangerous to ignore. Intelligence failures and insufficient troops at the battles in Tora Bora and the Shah-i-Kot Valley allowed al-Qaeda fighters to slip over Afghanistan’s eastern border and resettle in Pakistan’s tribal areas and cities. With the arrival of the militants in his country, Musharraf ordered his military intelligence service, the ISI, to work with the CIA to hunt down al-Qaeda’s leaders in Pakistani cities. He also made the case to U.S. officials that, partly thanks to American misadventures, Pakistan now deserved a huge influx of military aid. The arrests in 2002 and 2003 of Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and others reinforced Bush’s view that Pakistan was “with us,” an ally to be trusted.”[40]
4.25 In 2018, the Trump administration suspended $2bn worth of military aid to Pakistan in January[41] and in September confirmed it was cancelling $300m of that aid, citing its support for terrorist organisations as a driving cause[42]. Whilst this did not signal an end to all American military aid to Pakistan, with President Trump approving $125m in technical support for Pakistan’s F-16 fighter jets in July 2019[43], Pakistan has nevertheless sought to diversify its sources of military aid, with Defence Minister Khurram Dastgir Khan describing in January 2018 the need for a ‘regional recalibration of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy’[44].
4.26 Pakistan’s primary ally and international partner is China, with the latter planning to spend $55bn on infrastructure projects in the former[45]. In a September 2020 interview with al Jazeera, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that ‘Pakistan’s economic future is now linked to China’[46]. In the US Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, there is a detailed defence relationship between China and Pakistan set out[47]. This includes the 2015 sale of eight YUAN class submarines, and notes that China exports $8bn in defence equipment to the Indo-Pacific region, primarily Pakistan[48].
4.27 In addition to China, Pakistan has also made contact with Russia, having already bought Russian helicopters. When asked if Islamabad was planning to buy Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, Defence Minister Khan stated “not yet… We have opened a dialogue with Russia, which traditionally we have never had, because we were firmly in the western camp.”[49]
4.28 With these potential new defence partnerships being built between Islamabad and Moscow and Beijing respectively, it is not inconceivable that Pakistan would manipulate events in Afghanistan in order to secure further defence assistance or aid from these countries or other future partners, following the policy Pakistan pursued in its strategic alliance with United States. Both China and Russia have strategic interests in Afghanistan (each discussed later in this document), which could be used by Pakistan to elicit aid.
4.29 As well as the purely negative interest of undermining and opposing Indian economic interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has a number of economic interests it is seeking to advance in the country.
4.30 In particular, Central Asia is a large source of mostly untapped energy resources and Afghanistan is a gateway to Central Asia for two rising powers in need of additional energy: India and China. This offers economic incentives to develop Afghanistan and Pakistan to take advantage of this. Projects such as the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline have begun to capitalise on this, and have pioneered a route for natural resources which avoids both Iran and Russia, known for their political use of strategic energy resources[50].
4.31 Energy security is a vital issue for Pakistan. Whilst the TAPI has contributed to greater energy security, a 2012 report by RAND set out that: “Rapid economic growth has caused demand for energy to rise far more quickly than domestic production; energy shortages, which lead to frequent blackouts, are severe. Pakistan’s federal minister for petroleum and natural resources, Asim Hussain, warned in January 2012 that, unless Pakistan identifies new sources of natural gas quickly, “the whole energy system of the country could collapse.” By 2016, Pakistan is expected to import 48 percent of its natural gas (which makes up nearly half of its energy consumption)[51]. It will continue to be a major strategic interest that there is sufficient energy resources available both to meet current demand, but also to accommodate the economic growth envisioned as a result of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor and wider Belt and Road projects.
4.32 Due to its geographic proximity, the fact that Pashtun communities straddle the Durand Line, and Islamabad’s strong influence over the Taliban, Pakistan is, and is likely to remain, the single most impactful external power on the affairs of Afghanistan. Whether it seeks to install a friendly Taliban-led Government in Kabul, or prefers a lighter-touch approach of maintaining a frozen conflict in Afghanistan, Islamabad’s primary objective is to oppose New Delhi’s influence and to build ‘strategic depth’ as a bulwark against Indian encirclement[52]. Pakistan sees the balance of its own interests in Afghanistan against those of India in zero-sum terms. Other important goals include preserving the territorial integrity of Pakistan, particularly against Baloch and Pashtun independence movements along the Afghan border, and pursuing economic interests, most notably to secure its energy supplies.
4.33 The Afghan Taliban was born out of the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the ensuing political vacuum created on the Red Army’s withdrawal. It arose as a group of clerics that provided Islamic courts to adjudicate disputes between arguing factions of the Mujahedin who were fighting against Soviet Occupation. From there the group evolved into a fighting force, which sought to impose its interpretation of Shariah on the country as a remedy for the political instability following the Soviet withdrawal. The Soviet invasion which ultimately gave rise to the Taliban coincided with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which Ayatollah Khomeini swept to power in Tehran. Since the inception of the Taliban there has been a fierce political and religious rivalry between the Shi’a fundamentalists in the Iranian regime and the fiercely Sunni Taliban.
4.34 In pursuit of this rivalry, and to counterbalance the influence of the Taliban and their Pakistani and Saudi patrons in Afghanistan, Iran supported the Northern Alliance, the non-Pashtun militia coalition which fought a civil war against the Taliban between 1992 and 1996. Austro-Afghan journalist Emran Feroz tweeted a 1993 photo showing Qassem Soleimani, of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance, to mark the Iranian to mark the Major General’s death in January 2020[53].
4.35 In particular, Iran sought to build a Shi’a proxy in Afghanistan, as it has in Lebanon, Iraq, and elsewhere, to advance its interests. It attempted to do this in the mid to late 1980s by building a coalition of militias from the Shi’a Hazara minority, coordinated from Tehran. These attempts did not prove fruitful and Tehran was concerned about a unified Shi’a entity coalescing inside Afghanistan, outside of Iranian direct control and influence. Such a scenario came to pass in 1989 and, after failing to prevent its foundation, Iran decided to support Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, often referred to as simply Hizb-e Wahdat (HeW)). HeW was composed of ethnic Hazaras, who were Shi’a Muslims. HeW formed a militia which fought against the Soviets and alongside the Sunni Mujahedeen, with the aim of creating a federalised state, wherein each ethnic group would have autonomous control over its own territory, but would sit under a federal government on which all groups would be represented. HeW aimed to establish a Hazara governing body in the Hazarajat in Afghanistan’s central highlands on the far western extremes of the Hindu Kush. As Tehran had feared, the regime clashed with HeW. A particular point of clash was the strain of Hazara nationalism that formed the bedrock of HeW ideology, in direct opposition to the pan-Shi’a doctrine espoused by the Khomeinists[54].
4.36 According to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center: “It is in the Herat region that Iran’s influence in Afghanistan is most visible. Until 1857, Herat was considered an “integral part” of Iran and served as the capital of the Persian Empire in the early 15th century. When the British repelled Iranian advances toward Herat, Iran and the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Paris in 1857. Although Iran abandoned its historic claim on Herat, it reserved the right, under Article VII of the treaty, to send forces into Afghanistan “if its frontier is violated.” Since then, Iran has occasionally sought to keep Herat as a buffer zone. For a few years, Ismail Khan, the Tajik governor of Herat, helped Iran realize that goal… In September 1995, Ismail Khan fled to Mashhad, Iran, after the fall of Herat to the Taliban, but he returned with rearmed fighters within a few months. In 1997, he was captured and imprisoned by the Taliban in one of the clashes. After spending three years in captivity, he escaped and fled a third time to Iran. Since then, Khan, who is now minister of water and energy in Afghanistan, has developed and built upon close relations with the clerical regime in Tehran.”[55]
4.37 Following the Taliban victory in the 1992-1996 civil war, the warlord, Islamist militant, and then-Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was forced to flee the country and sought refuge in Iran, which was granted. Hekmatyar was able to continue to operate his network of militants in Afghanistan from Iran, and his treatment by Khamenei Government was often essentially a form of house arrest[56].
4.38 With the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan in 1996, Iran was concerned about the future for the country’s Shi’a minority. Former CIA officer Robert Baer claimed that: “Afghanistan has long been a source of instability and strategic interest for Iran. Under both the shah and Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran demonstrated that it will take almost any measure to keep western Afghanistan out of the hands of its enemies. In 1996, for instance, Iran’s National Security Council voted in an emergency meeting to invade Afghanistan and capture Herat to stop the Taliban from marching on Iran’s border. Ultimately, the Taliban threat subsided and Iran didn’t need to invade, but the vote was evidence of Iran’s commitment to keep that part of Afghanistan at least neutral.”[57]
4.39 Following al Qaeda’s arrival back in Afghanistan in 1996, having left Sudan, Iran assisted them in establishing logistical routes in the Persian Gulf region and provided training. Iran also helped set up al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, their Yemen affiliate, thereby facilitating the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.
4.40 Further, according to senior al Qaeda commander Saif al-Adel, that they had suggested opening guesthouses in Mashhad and Tehran to facilitate travel for recruits traveling to a training camp in Herat ran by Abu Musab al Zarqawi, Emir of al Qaeda in Iraq, which would become Islamic State[58]. Iranian border security personnel were instructed not to stamp the passports of jihadists travelling into Afghanistan this way[59].
4.41 In August 1998, the Taliban were responsible for the murder of 10 Iranian diplomats and an Iranian journalist in the Iranian consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, nearly prompting an Iranian military operation into Afghanistan[60].
4.42 Following the attacks of 11th September 2001, Iran again supported the Northern Alliance. As part of the United States invasion of Afghanistan, Iran coordinated an uprising in Herat, Afghanistan’s third largest city, using its close ties to the Persian-speaking city near to the Iranian border. Special Forces personnel from Iran’s Quds Force fought alongside soldiers from the American Delta Force and the British Special Air Service, as well as Northern Alliance fighters to secure Herat[61].
4.43 Following the December 2001 Battle of Tora Bora, in which NATO forces had failed to kill or capture Osama Bin Laden, he and the leadership of al Qaeda escaped over the border into Pakistan. From there, Bin Laden is believed to have reached out to Hekmatyar’s network to ask for assistance, and he was smuggled with a small party through a circuitous route to Karachi, to await word as to whether his request for safe haven in Iran would be approved.
4.44 According to Mahfouz Ould al-Walid, also known by the kunya Abu Hafs-al Mauritani, a former al Qaeda Shura Council member, Qassem Soleimani personally approved this request in January 2002[62].
4.45 Shortly after this, George W. Bush gave his famous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, detailing Iran’s activities as a state sponsor of terrorism, which largely ended Iran’s cooperation with the USA in Afghanistan.
4.46 Ever since, Iran has pursued a somewhat enigmatic strategy which appears to oppose Afghanistan being dominated by the Taliban in the long-term, but makes use of the Taliban as a cat’s paw with which to attack NATO to oppose a government in Kabul friendly to America and the West.
4.47 Subsequent to the January 2002 break with Washington, Iran has pursued a strategy of attempting to avoid a rabidly anti-Shi’a Government in Kabul on one hand, and an American client Government on the other. This ‘hedging’ strategy has involved utilising the Taliban where necessary to oppose and undermine American efforts in Afghanistan, and supporting and building ties with Hazara communities, based on shared Shi’a religious affiliation, and Tajik communities, based on shared ethno-linguistic and cultural links. These ongoing attempts to build support are not guaranteed to be successful, despite religious ties, Hazaras are the subject of racism in Iran[63],[64],[65].
4.48 Iran is also capitalising on these community ties in order to recruit volunteers to serve as militants in other theatres of combat and to foster economic development to its advantage, as well as to create a security buffer in Herat.
4.49 Further, Iran is attempting to foster ties with the Kabul Government and has reasonable relations with President Ashraf Ghani, despite reservations about alignment with the United States[66]. Indeed, Afghan MPs have criticised Ghani for being ‘soft’ on Iran, in response to allegations that Iranian forces murdered 16 Afghan migrants in two separate incidents in May and June 2020[67].
4.50 Whilst it is pursuing its various interests in Afghanistan, Iran will also be looking for a degree of stability in the country. The Soviet invasion caused three million Afghans to flee across the border into Iran’s east, whilst it was at war with Iraq to its west, which is an experience Iran will not want to see repeated[68].
4.51 Nevertheless, there are benefits to Iran of continued instability, including guaranteeing flows of surface water from the Helmand River into Iran, providing fertile recruiting grounds for Shi’a militias, fostering black market currency exchanges, and having the Taliban and Kabul Governments, neither of which are natural allies of Tehran, attack each other.
4.52 Iran is also conscious of Saudi Arabian and Pakistani support for the Taliban and other Sunni fundamentalist movements in the region, and seeks to limit, challenge, and subvert this influence.
4.53 Iran is one of the largest contributors to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, pledging $560m in 2002, and making further such pledges since[69].
4.54 Iran is pursuing economic interests in Herat, looking to capitalise on share cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical ties with the Province to deepen economic relations and embark on infrastructure projects. Iran aims to become a major trading hub for goods travelling from China, India, and Central Asia, using the port of Chabahar as a major shipping hub. Iran’s project to upgrade a tax-free trade route from Kabul, to Kandahar, to the Afghan-Iranian border crossing of Malik in Afghanistan’s south west, and onward to Chabahar has shortened the route from the Persian Gulf to Afghanistan by 700km. This greatly reduced reliance on the Karachi-Kandahar road, which has presented a challenge to neighbouring Pakistan’s economic interests[70]. This route has been branded a ‘security threat’ by two former Pakistani defence ministers[71]. In June 2020 it was suggested by Iranian energy minister Reza Ardakanian that an Afghan bank was planning to open a branch in Chabahar, which would facilitate better trade between the two nations[72].
4.55 As West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center notes in a March 2010 report: “Today, Herat is one of the most stable and prosperous regions in Afghanistan. It also benefited from the fact that Afghan President Hamid Karzai made Ismail Khan minister of water and energy. A small industrial city has been reconstructed, making it the industrial heartland of the country. Following the completion of a highway from its border with Afghanistan, Tehran financed an extension linking Herat to Afghanistan’s remote northern provinces. In 2009, a plethora of Iranian-built schools, health clinics and business centers around Herat were connected to the Iranian interior due to an $80 million railroad project. Herat’s bazaars are filled with Iranian products, and the presence of the IRGC through the Iranian Consulate is openly visible. In addition, hundreds of trucks cross from Iran to Herat and vice-versa on a daily basis.”[73]
4.56 As Ejaz Ahmad Malikzada of the Afghanistan Institute for Strategic Studies writes: “In a stable Afghanistan, a priority for Tehran should be increasing trade between the two countries. Trade between Iran and Afghanistan is valued between two and three billion dollars annually. Afghanistan is the fourth-largest importer of goods from Iran, which is suffering from crippling U.S. sanctions. Between March and August of 2018, Iran exported over $1.43 billion worth of goods. Iran has a role as a responsible stakeholder in the growth of the Afghan economy. Therefore, the U.S. has exempted Afghanistan from Iran sanctions. The strategic Chabahar port is one way of improving Iranian trade ties with Afghanistan. Chabahar port, which provides Afghanistan access to seaborne trade routes, decreasing Afghanistan’s dependency on Pakistan. Moreover, a renewed water agreement could serve the interests both sides in addressing persistent water shortages while increasing Afghan-Iranian agricultural-based trade.”[74]
4.57 As well as the obvious economic gains this policy is generating, it also offers political and security benefits. As Afghanistan has become increasingly reliant on Iranian development investment and aid, officials have become reluctant to criticise Iranian support for the Taliban. Additionally, as Herat develops economically and its infrastructure improves, this is having a stabilising effect on the security situation.
4.58 Further, Iran is looking to boost energy cooperation with Afghanistan, having signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on reconstructing and repairing transmission infrastructure, constructing a new line through Zaranj in south western Afghanistan near the Iranian border, and extending the contract for electricity exports. The two nations are also exploring the possibility of cooperating on renewable energy projects along the border[75].
4.59 Outside of conventional markets, Iran is also involved in black market currency exchanges. As Malikzada notes: “Iranian engagement with the Taliban facilitates ongoing instability along the Afghanistan-Iran border, which provides an illegal route for Iran to import U.S. dollars from merchants in the Herat and Farah provinces. As the Iranian currency continues to depreciate against the dollar, Tehran’s interest in sustaining this black market source of hard currency will grow.”[76]
4.60 Whilst stability in Afghanistan is broadly in Iran’s interests, instability does ensure Iran’s water supply from the River Helmand. This is because a Government in Kabul is likely to build more dams on the Helmand on the Afghan side of the border if it is able to consolidate power and re-establish control of this part of the country. As Malikzada writes: “Keeping Afghanistan in a perpetual state of instability guarantees the flow of Afghan surface waters to Iran… [e]nsuring the continued flow of surface water from Afghanistan to Iran is a crucial priority for Tehran. The Afghan government recently opened the Salma Dam, which was constructed with financial support from India. Following in dam’s inauguration, Tehran increased support for the Taliban insurgency in provinces of Western Farah and Herat to disrupt any further dam development of dams on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan-Iran border along the Helmand river.”
4.61 “In late 2018, Farah City was overrun by the Taliban—despite public outcry from the local population over Iranian support for the Taliban in Western Farah province, which lies along the Helmand river. A single water agreement exists between Iran and Afghanistan; a 1973 treaty provides Iran with 820 million cubic meters of water annually. Iran has been hit with regular water shortages, leading Tehran to protest plans to construct dams along the Helmand river intended to increase Afghanistan’s agricultural capacity to approximately $20 billion (U.S.).”[77]
4.62 Whilst Iran has suffered water shortages, there has been frustration voiced in Afghanistan, which has one of the lowest water storage capacities in the world[78] with farmers not being allowed to take water from the Helmand to water their crops. Water shortages have caused Afghanistan’s agricultural output to drop precipitously, which has both economic and humanitarian implications for the country[79].
4.63 As part of the effort to oppose the US campaign in Afghanistan, the Iranian Quds Force has supplied the Taliban with explosive formed penetrator (EFP) improvised explosive devices (IEDs[80]), locally referred to as ‘Dragon’ landmines.
4.64 These weapons have killed an estimated 500 American soldiers across both Iraq and Afghanistan[81], and likely a number of other troops from nations contributing to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
4.65 The West Point report articulates: “Unlike ordinary mines that can cause minor damage to military vehicles, a Dragon can completely destroy it. The Taliban have credited Iranian-supplied weapons as being responsible for successful attacks against NATO forces in southern Afghanistan”[82]. Further, a Pentagon spokesman appeared to confirm this in an interview to Wired magazine in January 2009[83].
4.66 Iran also appears to be meeting with, and possibly sheltering, members of the Taliban leadership. When Mullah Akhtar Mansour, then Leader of the Taliban, was killed in Pakistan in a May 2016 drone strike, his Pakistani passport, retrieved from his body, showed that he had just returned from spending two months in Iran[84].
4.67 Arming the Taliban in order to fight NATO forces achieves the twin objectives for Iran of attrit NATO forces semi-deniably and at relatively low cost, whilst also distracting the Taliban’s focus away from the Persian sphere of influence Iran is looking to carve out in western Afghanistan.
4.68 Whilst adopting this strategy in the short-term, it is clear Iran harbours at best ambivalence towards the Taliban as a long-term solution for Afghanistan, given their Sunni fundamentalism and strongly anti-Shi’a ideology. Iran’s foreign minister Javid Zarif declared in January 2019 that “I think it would be impossible to have a future Afghanistan without any role for the Taliban… but we also believe that the Taliban should not have a dominant role in Afghanistan.”[85]
4.69 Despite a torrid history of animosities, engagement with the Taliban has allowed Iran to shape some of the factions within it. The Taliban is not a singular homogenous or monolithic entity. There has recently emerged a Taliban splinter group which appears to have links with and sympathy for Iran, which also opposes the Doha Agreement brokered between the Taliban and the United States[86]. The splinter group, called Hizb-e-Wilayat-e Islami, roughly translated as the Party of Islamic Guardianship[87]. This group is headquartered inside Iran.
4.70 In addition to this newly forming splinter group, there have been suggestions that other prominent Taliban members oppose the Doha Agreement and are potentially either open to or in the process or realigning with Iran. Antonio Giustozzi, a Taliban expert with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, suggested that among dissenting Taliban commanders were Sirajuddin Haqqani (despite his op-ed in the New York Times) and Mullah Qayim Zakir. The US Treasury Department has also suggested that the new splinter group has been joined by members of Feday-e-Mahaz, a hard-line breakaway faction of the Taliban vehemently against rapprochement with Kabul[88]. Feday-e-Mahaz, translated roughly as the Sacrifice Front, or the Suicide Brigade, is responsible for a number of brazen terror attacks, including the murder of British-Swedish journalist Nils Horner, shooting him dead in broad daylight in Kabul[89].
4.71 Iranian influence may be shaping the Taliban away from sectarian violence towards Afghanistan’s Shi’a minorities. Whilst cause and effect is difficult to establish, the Taliban has recruited Mawlawi Mahdi, a Hazara cleric to lead its shadow district government in Balkhab, Sar e-Pul province in northern Afghanistan. This move achieves three key objectives for the Taliban: it bolsters their international reputation and legitimacy as tolerant of minorities, it builds ties with minority communities in the hope of luring their support away from the Kabul Government, and it bolsters its relationship with Iran[90].
4.72 Iran is recruiting Afghan and Pakistan Shi’a volunteers to fight on their behalf in other theatres such as Syria[91]. The so-called ‘Shi’a Liberation Army’ has a separate unit of Afghan militants, referred to as the Fatemiyoun Brigade, and also referred to as ‘Hezbollah Afghanistan’. The Fatemiyoun Brigade comprises an estimated 10,000 – 20,000 fighters, largely Afghan Hazaras[92], although some sources estimate as many as 50,000 Afghans have been deployed to Syria[93],[94]. Fatemiyoun soldiers receive $500 per month in wages and are promised Iranian residency papers in return for their services. More than 600 Afghans have been killed fighting in Syria[95].
4.73 There are fears that as the Syrian War ebbs, that fighters from the Fatemiyoun Brigade are returning to Afghanistan, and could act as Iranian proxies inside the country. Rahmatullah Nabil, former head of Afghanistan’s National Directorate for Security (NDS), estimated in February 2020 that there are between 2,500 and 3,000 Fatemiyoun fighters that have returned from Syria, although at present there is no evidence they pose an immediate threat to Afghan national security or Western interests inside the country.
4.74 Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been the prime driver of Iranian policy in Afghanistan, most notably the Quds Force. The current commander of the Quds Force, Ismail Qa’ani, appointed to replace Qassem Soleimani following his death, played a key role in this and is believed to have been serving a dual role as both a Quds Force operative and Iran’s Deputy Ambassador to Afghanistan as late as 2018[96]. Qa’ani is believed to have been closely involved in the establishment of the Fatemiyoun[97] Brigade and the Zainabiyoun Brigade, its sister organisation comprised of Pakistani Shi’a[98]. The IRGC makes no secret of their association with these two foreign fighter brigades. The IRGC’s air force commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh appeared at a press conference for Iranian state television in front of an array of flags of their proxies, among which were the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun banners[99].
4.75 This activity has caused concern in Islamabad, and was particularly heightened by the arrest of Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) operative Kulbushan Jadhav[100], who appears to have links to Iran, and about whom it is unlikely the Quds Force were unaware[101].
4.76 Given Qa’ani’s experience in operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is likely that the Quds Force will increase its activity in these theatres. This may well lead to increased hostilities between Tehran and Islamabad and their proxies in Afghanistan.
4.77 American General Stanley McChrystal, whilst commander of NATO operations in Afghanistan, described Iran’s role as ‘ambiguous’ and this continues to be the case to some degree[102].
4.78 Following the agreed withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan, Iran will have three options with respect to their relationship with the Taliban. Firstly, Tehran can continue to fund the Taliban in order to fight and overthrow the Kabul Government, which it sees as an American client. Secondly, Tehran can support a political settlement which leads to a more federal Afghanistan, allowing for quasi-autonomous governance along ethnic lines, which would limit Taliban influence to Pashtun areas, and carve out its own sphere of influence in the Hazarajat, Herat, and other Tajik and Persian-speaking communities. Thirdly, Tehran may decide to attempt to maintain a frozen conflict in Afghanistan, which would lead to the attrition of both the Taliban and the Kabul Government, as well as maintaining fertile recruiting grounds to continue to swell the ranks of its volunteer forces.
4.79 Because Iran’s strategy is somewhat difficult to discern, and holds animus for both major belligerents, it is unclear which of these three options it will prefer, although the author is of the opinion that the second option would involve the lowest cost for a regime which is already engaged in conflicts throughout the region and beyond.
4.80 Iran rejected the Doha Agreement brokered between the United States and the Taliban, stating that it had no legal standing and branding it as an American exercise to ‘legitimize its troops’ presence in Afghanistan’[103]. Given that the new Quds Force commander Ismail Qa’ani has a strong background operating in and around Afghanistan, there is a strong chance that Iran will work to undermine the Doha process set out in the agreement, seeking to inflict political damage on the United States.
4.81 Iran will have the further choice of whether to pursue stability to prevent potentially large refugee flows and a civil war that could spill over its borders, or to foment instability and reap the benefits of guaranteed flows of water, black market currency, and Shi’a militants. At the time of writing it would appear that Iran is ‘keeping its options open’.
4.82 India has a longstanding relationship with Afghanistan, with many Afghans migrating to India during the Mughal period due to political instability.
4.83 As discussed under Pakistan, the Pashtun-majority North West Frontier Province voted in a referendum to join the newly-formed state of Pakistan following the 1947 Partition. Despite this, India held Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as Bacha Khan, a Pashtun sometimes described as the ‘Muslim Gandhi’, who opposed Partition and later campaigned for more Pashtun autonomy within Pakistan, in high regard[104]. Khan had rejected the referendum, stating that it should have had options for either an independent Pashtunistan, or for the North West Frontier Province to join Afghanistan[105].
4.84 After Partition, India enjoyed warm relations with Afghanistan. In 1950 the two nations signed a Treaty of Friendship, with the express aim of: “recognising the ancient ties which have existed between the two countries for centuries and their mutual need for co-operation in strengthening and developing these ties and urged by their mutual desire to establish peace between the two countries with a view to the common benefit of their people and the development of their respective countries” [106].
4.85 Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, India was the only South Asian country to recognise the Soviet client government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Indira Gandhi’s Government supported the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the UN[107].
4.86 India further supported the Soviet-installed regime led by Mohammed Najibullah during the process of Soviet withdrawal, and even argued for a postponement or deceleration of the withdrawal of troops in order to allow Afghanistan to stabilise[108]. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was particularly supportive of Najibullah[109], and the Indian Government sought unsuccessfully to defend him and his regime.
4.87 After the fall of the Najibullah regime, the new Government led by the opposition Mujahedeen eyed India with suspicion, due to their support for their enemy.
4.88 This required a change of policy in New Delhi, and the Rao Government, as former Indian diplomat MK Bhadrakumar recounts, decided that: “One, we should deal with all mujahideen groups without fear or favour and contact should be established with anyone and everyone willing to meet us despite the militancy of their Islamism. Two, we would deal with whosoever was in power in Kabul and focus would be on cultivating a friendly government that was sensitive to India's vital interests and core concerns. Three, dealings would be strictly with the government in Kabul, no matter its proximity with Pakistan or its security agencies. Four, we would neither arm any Afghan group nor ostracise any — not even the Wahhabi group of Ittehad headed by Rasul Sayyaf to which Jalaluddin Haqqani owed allegiance at that time. Five, we would focus on people-to-people relationship, tap into the reservoir of goodwill toward India and meaningfully contribute to Afghanistan's economic welfare within our capabilities and resources (which were limited at that time)”[110]. This policy held until the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan in 1996, which took India by surprise, as they had seen them as a fringe group within the Mujahedeen and underestimated the influence they wielded[111].
4.89 As a result, India supported the Northern Alliance, composed of non-Pashtuns who opposed the Taliban regime. India collaborated with Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who met with the Indian ambassador regularly, discussing the campaign against the Taliban ‘over endless chai and dry fruits’[112]. Author V Sudarshan writes in the Hindu that: “[s]hort of sending heavy equipment, India provided extensive assistance to the Northern Alliance — uniforms, ordnance, mortars, small armaments, refurbished Kalashnikovs seized in Kashmir, combat and winter clothes, packaged food, medicines, and funds through his brother in London, Wali Massoud. Assistance would be delivered circuitously with the help of other countries who helped this outreach.”[113]
4.90 Following the September 11th attacks, India supported the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan. India also pledged $750m in aid to Kabul[114], which has since increased to over $2bn[115]. Given the Taliban’s strategic alliance with Pakistan, India has worked to oppose Taliban influence in Afghanistan ever since and has been a strong supporter of the Kabul Government. Since 2001, India has worked to build numerous projects in Afghanistan to foster cultural, political, and economic ties, including building the Parliament building in Kabul; reconstructing the dam on the Helmand at Salma, now known as the India-Afghan Friendship Dam; the Chimtala power station in Kabul, and the cricket stadium in Kandahar. Smaller aid projects include water reservoirs, public toilets, schools, and facilities[116].
4.91 India enjoys excellent relations with the Kabul Government today. India’s and Afghanistan’s respective Independence Days fall four days apart and on receiving congratulations from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2019, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani responded ‘may our friendship last forever’[117].
4.92 Whilst curbing the influence and undermining the interests of Pakistan and its proxies in Afghanistan is among India’s objectives, New Delhi’s posture is less the hard security policy of the military-dominated Islamabad, and takes a more holistic approach. As well as seeking the upper hand in the ongoing proxy war with Pakistan, India is pursuing a counterterrorism campaign to prevent Afghanistan being used as a base to train anti-India groups; increased access to Central Asia to bolster trade links; improved energy security; to project cultural, military, and economic power into the region, and to demonstrate its credentials as a responsible world power.
4.93 As Harsh V Pant writes: “Afghanistan is a litmus test for [India’s] ascendance as a regional and global power… India’s capacity to deal with instability in its own backyard will in the final analysis determine its rise as a global power of major import.”[118]
4.94 These objectives are being sought largely thoroughly the deployment of various soft power methods, including investing in infrastructure which breaks Pakistan’s firm grim of trade routes into Central Asia, working towards political reconciliation in Afghanistan, and funding humanitarian projects throughout the country.
4.95 The Doha Agreement, brokered between the USA and the Taliban lacks verification or enforcement mechanisms[119]. This means, to quote the Brookings Institute, that: “aspirational Taliban commitments will be impossible to address, and local incidents of violence will be chalked-up to rogue elements of the group”. This has knock-on implications for India, who will not have confidence in the Taliban acting to curb terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.
4.96 With Western troop withdrawals, India may well feel the need to take more robust action to curb the influence of the Taliban, with its ISI links, which is likely to grow to fill the vacuum left by the winding down of Operation Enduring Freedom. In July 2020, Javid Faisal, spokesman for the Afghanistan National Security Council, said that the Taliban were ‘maintaining good relationships’ with regional and international terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, Islamic State, LeT and others. Faisal further added: ““This partnership between these terrorist organizations and the Taliban isn’t just destabilizing Afghanistan or this region, but the entire world,” Faisal said. “They were supposed to cut off their ties to these terrorist groups long ago, they haven’t done yet and they won’t do as they all share the same ideology.”[120]
4.97 New Delhi will be further concerned by terrorist attacks carried out in Afghanistan since the signing of the Doha Agreement, including the March 2020 attack on a Sikh temple in the Shur Bazar district of Kabal, in which Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) militants opened fire killing 25 worshippers[121].
4.98 India is working multilaterally with numerous countries to suppress terrorist movements inside Afghanistan and oppose the Taliban. In 2015, during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the UK, the two countries announced that they were deepening ties by establishing the Defence and International Security Partnership, which would institutionalise joint India-UK working on counterterrorism and related issues[122].
4.99 The UK, France, and the United States co-sponsored a UN resolution to declare Masood Azhar, leader of JeM a ‘global terrorist’ at the ISIL and al Qaeda Sanctions (1267) Committee of the UN Security Council[123].
4.100 Russia and India have held joint counterterrorism drills together, mostly prominently Exercise Indra-2018, held in Uttar Pradesh in October 2018[124]. The two nations have also recently opened up dialogue on issues of shared security interests, including Afghanistan. Given their longstanding mutually supportive relationship, particularly in Afghanistan, there is scope for renewing this alliance. India has also announced its ‘Act Far East’ policy, which involves a $1bn line of credit for investment in Russia. This may elicit reciprocal support from Russia for Indian efforts to oppose the Taliban and curb the terrorist presence in Afghanistan.
4.101 In October 2019, Russia and India issued a joint call for ‘credible, irreversible, verifiable and sustainable’ action against terror groups, stating that their India-Russia joint working group on terrorism had discussed ‘ongoing concerns over terrorism in the South Asia region’, which appears to be a reference to Pakistani state-sponsored terrorism, and is likely to have included discussion of Afghanistan[125].
4.102 India has also undertaken limited cooperation with China to curb terrorism, including establishing a Counterterrorism Dialogue mechanism and a Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism. However, there are tensions between the two over Pakistan. India has long pressed for international groups to take action and for Pakistan to be blacklisted through the FATF and for Pakistan-backed groups such as JeM and LeT to be designated terrorist organisations. China has opposed and blocked these efforts and has preferred to apply direct pressure to Islamabad bilaterally[126]. Escalating tensions between the two powers in other places, such as the skirmishes which have broken out at numerous points along the Sino-Indian border, could further reduce cooperation.
4.103 As noted above, the Indian Government enjoys excellent relations with both Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, and is providing strong support to the Kabul Government in the form of financing, equipment, and training for the Afghanistan Security Forces in order to prevent the Taliban from recapturing control of the country. India has particularly stepped up this activity since the announcement of the withdrawal of US troops[127].
4.104 A 2016 report from the EU Institute for Security Studies in partnership with the Observer Research Foundation and Chatham House highlighted that: “Afghanistan serves as an important example of where India is playing an active role in post-conflict reconstruction and is now moving towards providing equipment and training to the Afghan security forces. Just like in Afghanistan, India and the EU could work together on capacity building, connectivity and trade to support Syria’s security, stability and economic development.”[128]
4.105 Given the Taliban’s relationship with Pakistan, and the fact that it fosters friendly environments to terrorist groups planning attacks against India, India has long held a position of not engaging with the Taliban.
4.106 Thus far, India appears to be holding the line that the Taliban is not a stakeholder with a legitimate right to shape the future of Afghanistan. Tilak Deveshwar, member of the Indian National Security Advisory Board, accused the Taliban of ‘playing good, bad cop’, and denounced attempts to open dialogue with India as undermining the Ghani Government[129]. In India’s statement welcoming the signing of the Doha Agreement, the Taliban is not mentioned by name even once[130],[131].
4.107 India has stressed an ‘Afghan-owned, Afghan-led’ peace process, but has found itself uninvolved in the multilateral processes surrounding the Doha Agreement, which have sought to address Russia, China, Pakistan, and the USA’s interests in Afghanistan. This lack of involvement is as a result of New Delhi’s refusal to meet with the Taliban. India opposed the suggested delay to Afghanistan’s presidential elections, scheduled for 28th September 2019, until the peace process with the Taliban is concluded; and also opposed any proposal for an interim Afghan Government. Whilst neither actually happened, it is not clear that India’s protests had a significant impact on these decisions[132].
4.108 US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad has called for India to play ‘a more active role’ in Afghanistan and urged for them to raise concerns around anti-India terrorism with the Taliban directly, noting that, paradoxically, India has a ‘significant role’ in Afghanistan’s development, but has so far played no role in international peace efforts[133].
4.109 India may decide in the coming months to take up the gauntlet that America has thrown down and to play a more proactive role in Afghanistan’s peace process. However, it is most likely to maintain its policy of not legitimising or acknowledging the Taliban by engaging with them and continuing its strong support for the Kabul Government.
4.110 There have been a number of developments in Kashmir in recent years, most significantly India’s revocation of Kashmir’s special status, breaking it into two provinces, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, in an attempt to integrate it fully with India[134]. Whilst Afghans are generally more sympathetic to India than to Pakistan, this controversial move has created tension between Afghan support for India and solidarity with fellow Muslims. As Prasad and Leung write in Foreign Policy: “Afghans are closely watching the actions of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government in Kashmir and throughout the region. That should be a reality check for New Delhi; its courting of Afghan opinion can only go so far. India may have the funding and power to shape public opinion and support in Afghanistan, but it will take much more to overcome growing mistrust.”[135]
4.111 Given its history of coordinating with Iran to support the Northern Alliance and oppose the Taliban in Herat, there is potential scope for renewed cooperation between New Delhi and Tehran, despite opposing positions on the Doha Agreement.
4.112 Both India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and its Foreign Minister S Jaishankar have met their Iranian counterparts, Amir Hatami and Javad Zarif respectively, in September 2020[136],[137]. Reports suggest the Ministers have discussed regional security issues, including peace in Afghanistan, emphasising a diplomatic, rather than a military solution to the conflict. Other matters discussed included deepening bilateral tied, expanding trade links, and in particular intensifying operations at Chabahar Port.
4.113 Tensions may build between India and Iran which hamper cooperation. In particular, Iran’s support for radical Taliban splinter factions, possible sheltering of Taliban leadership including Mullah Mansour, and insistence that the Taliban should have a role in the future of Afghanistan may well become sources of disharmony between the two nations and may indicate that their interests are too divergent for meaningful security cooperation. Further, whilst Iran is attempting to foster good relations with both India and China, it may not be possible for it to continue this policy and could be forced to choose sides. Should this situation arise, Iran is likely to favour Beijing over New Delhi, given the proposed $400bn strategic and economic cooperation package put forward by China[138].
4.114 India heavily financed the construction of Route 606 in Afghanistan, which connects the Kandahar-Herat highway at Delaraam to Zaranj at the Iranian border[139]. The route also forms part of the North South Transport Corridor (NSTC), linking India to Eurasia.
4.115 In 2016 during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Tehran, India, Iran, and Afghanistan signed a landmark agreement on the Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor[140]. This has helped open up a trade route for India to access Central Asian markets through Chabahar Port and also allows Afghanistan to export products to India and elsewhere without having to use Pakistan-dominated routes. Businesses in landlocked Afghanistan have begun to move their operations from the port of Karachi to Chabahar[141]. Cooperation between India and Iran has, however been complicated and slowed by the ‘maximum pressure’ sanctions regime imposed on Iran by the United States. Despite American reassurances that Chabahar was exempted from sanctions as it was important for economic development in Afghanistan[142], Iran has insisted on awarding the civil works contract for the Chabahar-Zahedan rail link project to Khatam al-Anbiya, one of the IRGC’s main construction companies, which is a subject of secondary sanctions. As such, if India does business with Khatam al-Anbiya, it may find itself subjected to scrutiny, political rebuke, and sanctions[143]. India has asked for Iran to name another entity to undertake the contract to enable construction to continue, but Iran has thus far declined to do so.
4.116 However, this road is a vital strategic piece of infrastructure and it will be important to ensure that it does not fall into Taliban hands, as it did in 2011[144]. Much of the route of the road is either Taliban-held or Taliban-contested territory and this may impact on the reliability of trade routes, particularly if India continues to refuse to recognise the Taliban.
4.117 Chabahar has been the site of fierce economic competition between India and China, especially since the mooted $400bn strategic package became public. India continues to court Iran, particularly around developing trade links at Chabahar. India sees Chabahar as a strategic balance to China’s Gwadar Port based in Pakistani Balochistan and fears that losing Chabahar to China will lead to the balance of power in the Indian Ocean swinging strongly in China’s favour.
4.118 India currently finds itself with constrained options. Having been pushed out of Chabahar by China, facing airspace bans from Pakistan, and with the requirement for eastern routes to travel through either Pakistani-occupied Kashmir or China, India’s access northwards to Afghanistan and Central Asia is greatly restricted.
4.119 India is likely to step up development support and investment further into humanitarian and infrastructure projects such as roads, schools, and hospitals. This will build its own reputation in Afghanistan and will also burnish the legitimacy of the Kabul Government.
4.120 Diplomatically, India is likely to continue to refuse to recognise or engage with the Taliban and will instead maintain support for and relations with Kabul.
4.121 India’s main security priority will be to prevent Afghanistan becoming a space for anti-India terrorist groups to train and plan attacks. It will work multilaterally with regional powers and global allies where counterterrorism interests align to this end.
4.122 Whilst generally adopting a softer approach than Pakistan, India will keep open the option to fund and arm the Northern Alliance’s successor groups, such as the National Front of Afghanistan and the Basej-e Milli, who have pledged allegiance to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. This will allow for a more militaristic response should the need to escalate arise, without the requirement of deploying Indian troops, which is politically undesirable and logistically difficult in the current situation.
4.123 The USA saw Afghanistan as vital to the Containment strategy against the USSR and sought to keep Afghanistan outside of the Soviet orbit by fostering warm bilateral relations and making significant development aid available, including infrastructure projects to upgrade roads, schools, and other public facilities, and technical assistance programmes to provide the skills necessary for economic growth. Numerous American politicians made high-profile visits to Afghanistan to bolster the relationship during the Cold War, including then-Vice President Richard Nixon in 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower in 1959, and Vice President Spiro Agnew in 1970.
4.124 In 1965, in order to oppose the Containment policy, the USSR established the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the same year it also established the Communist Party of Cuba. These parties served as vehicles for the spreading of communist ideology in their respective countries.
4.125 In 1978 the PDPA-led and Soviet-backed April Coup took place in Afghanistan, removing the President Mohammed Daoud Khan and murdering him and most of his family in the presidential palace[145]. The PDPA took power and established a communist, pro-Soviet regime, which naturally led to a deterioration of relations between the USA and Afghanistan.
4.126 Relations soured still further followed the death of American Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph ‘Spike’ Dubs on February 14th of 1979, incidentally the same day as the forced takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran, which began the Iran hostage crisis. Dubs was taken hostage on his journey from his residence to the US Embassy in Kabul and held at the Kabul Hotel. His captors were unidentified militants, who are unknown to this day. They made no demands of the USA, speaking only with the PDPA regime. After strong communication from the USA that the matter was to be resolved with peaceful negotiation, the Afghan Government authorised an armed police operation to try to rescue Dubs, during which he was shot in the head and heart[146],[147]. US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski described the debacle as: “a tragic event which involved either Soviet ineptitude or collusion.”
4.127 Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the USA supported diplomatic efforts to secure a Soviet withdrawal[148]. The USA also contributed financially to Pakistan’s refugee programme, which would support around 3.1million refugees by the end of the war in 1989[149]. America also established Operation Cyclone, one of the longest and most expensive covert operations it has ever undertaken, which involved arming, training, and financing the mujahedeen who were fighting against the Soviets[150]. In 1987 the operation was described as ‘the biggest bequest to any Third World insurgency’[151].
4.128 Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, American support for the mujahedeen was discontinued and Afghanistan fell into a period of civil war. The mujahedeen eventually forced the collapse of the Najibullah regime, which had been abandoned by its patron. In 1992, the mujahedeen established a coalition Government following the Peshawar Peace accords. However, before the new Government could officially take office, one mujahedeen faction, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, led by Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, refused to participate in the coalition and invaded Kabul. As such, rather than ending the Afghan Civil War entered a new phase, which ended in 1996 when the Taliban captured Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
4.129 The Taliban regime lasted for five years, until the American-led invasion following the attacks of September 11th 2001. The regime, having refused to give up Osama Bin Laden and al Qaeda, was removed. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 stipulated interim provisions for the governance of Afghanistan, with a presidential election being held in October 2004, won by Hamid Karzai.
4.130 America has worked with the Kabul government ever since to build capacity and resilience, maintain security, fight the Taliban and pursue other war aims and has enjoyed reasonable relations, albeit with peaks and troughs, ever since.
4.131 The specifics of American strategy will be determined by the outcome of the 2020 Presidential election. There are no clear, coherent documents or speeches that set out precisely what American aspirations and strategy should be towards Afghanistan in any particular detail from either candidate. However, irrespective of who holds power following the election, America has some key interests it must pursue. Kori Schake of the American Enterprise Institute has called Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s positions on Afghanistan ‘indistinguishable’[152]. Both candidates have set out a desire to end ‘forever wars’, reflecting the lack of political will and public appetite for extending commitments to foreign engagements such as Afghanistan.
4.132 First and foremost the primary objective of Operation Enduring Freedom, and the driving interest of the West ever since the 2001 intervention, is to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven for terrorists, particularly al Qaeda, planning attacks against the American homeland. Biden coined the term ‘counterterrorism plus’ to describe a policy wherein a ‘light footprint’ counterterrorism force attrits terrorist organisations through the deployment of special operation ‘boots on the ground’ raids and targeted killing[153] of key terrorist figures through the use of armed drone strikes. However, this is likely to be the approach of a second-term Trump administration as well.
4.133 The Trump Administration has pursued a policy of ‘burden sharing’ with its NATO partners, attempting to encourage Europe to increase its defence spending and to take greater responsibility for leadership on issues in Europe and in its ‘back yard’. Consistent with this approach, the Trump Administration has also encouraged India to do more in Afghanistan, as America withdraws[154],[155]. It is unclear whether Biden would follow a similar path, but it would appear inconsistent with some of the other policies he has set out as part of his foreign policy platform, which involves re-engaging with international institutions[156], where Trump appears to be moving in a more isolationist direction.
4.134 The Doha Agreement with the Taliban is unlikely to be adhered to (see Section 5) and there is likely to be increased terrorist activity in Afghanistan as American troop withdrawals create space for them to operate training facilities. If the Waziristan Accord struck between Pakistan and the Islamist groups calling themselves the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan is an instructive example (see Section 5.25 – 5.31), then this may see dramatic increases in terrorist activity and the United States will be faced with a decision as to whether to re-engage militarily and to what degree.
4.135 Irrespective of the winner of the 2020 Presidential election, America is withdrawing the overwhelming majority of its soldiers from Afghanistan and is likely to maintain a light footprint counterterrorism presence in the country.
4.136 The major foreign policy difference between Trump and Biden is their respective approaches to alliances. Trump is pursuing a policy of ‘burden sharing’, wherein America is withdrawing many commitments and encouraging regional allies such as Japan, India, the UK and the EU to take on greater responsibility. Biden has pledged to re-engage with international institutions and appears to want to pursue a continuity of post-9/11 American international leadership as under Presidents Bush Jr. and Obama.
4.137 Should the Taliban fail to adhere to the Doha Agreement, the USA may choose to re-engage militarily in order to preclude future attacks on the American homeland
4.138 Russia and Britain competed fiercely as imperial powers in Afghanistan during the ‘Great Game’ from around 1830 until the signing of the Pamir Boundary Commission protocols in 1895.
4.139 Russia was the first country to recognise Afghanistan’s independence after the Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 and signed a Friendship Treaty with Afghanistan in 1921.
4.140 Shortly after there was conflict between the nations over the island of Uratagai, which resulted in a Treaty wherein the USSR recognised the island as Afghan, but in return imposed a commitment on Afghanistan to restrain cross-border raids by the Basmachi movement. The Saqqawists revoked this Treaty in 1929, resulting in Red Army interventions in both 1929 and 1930 to attack Basmachi positions.
4.141 At the outset of the Cold War, Afghanistan pursued a policy of non-alignment, maintaining relations with both the USA and the USSR. However, on Mohammed Daoud Khan’s election as Prime Minister, Afghanistan sought closer ties with the USSR and the Soviets embarked on a major economic assistance programme. According to the US State Department: “Between 1954 and 1978, Afghanistan received more than $1 billion in Soviet aid, including substantial military assistance”[157].
4.142 Afghanistan also moved further from the USA and closer to the USSR because of tensions with Pakistan over the issue of Pashtunistan. Pakistan signed a military pact with the USA in 1954.
4.143 The 1973 Afghan coup d’état, carried out by Daoud Khan, who had been out of power for ten years, led to the abolition of the Afghan monarchy and the establishment of a new republic, with Khan as its President. Despite his pursuit of closer ties with the USSR as Prime Minister from 1953, Khan sought to rebalance Afghanistan’s relations away from the USSR following the coup.
4.144 In a state visit to Moscow in April 1977, President Daoud Khan was accused by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of softening Afghanistan’s ‘non-alignment’ position, by allowing NATO experts into the country and demanded that they were expelled. Daoud Khan publicly defied and rebuked Brezhnev, supposedly telling him: “we will never allow you to dictate to us how to run our country and whom to employ in Afghanistan. How and where we employ the foreign experts will remain the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan state. Afghanistan shall remain poor, if necessary, but free in its acts and decisions”[158].
4.145 A year later in April 1978 the PDPA carried out its communist, Soviet-backed coup, led by Nur Muhammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal. The April Coup, also known as the Saur Coup, removed Daoud Khan from office and resulted in the murder of him and his family. The new regime was initially led by Taraki, who served as Chairman of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, the new republic’s ruling body, from April 1978 until September 1979. Following a split with Amin, Taraki, who had the Soviets’ backing, tried to remove Amin from office, but was foiled by Amin. In return, Amin carried out a coup against Taraki, which resulted in his being killed[159]. Brezhnev had tried unsuccessfully to prevent Taraki’s murder[160], and the Soviets were shocked by the coup. Soviet politician Anatoly Chernyaev’s claim in his diary that, the day after Taraki’s murder, Brezhnev’s foreign policy aid Andrey Alexandrov-Agentov told Karen Brutents, another soviet apparatchik, that the USSR should send troops to Afghanistan[161].
4.146 Brezhnev himself remarked of the situation: “Events developed so swiftly that essentially there was little opportunity for us, here in Moscow, to somehow interfere in them... Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our positions in Afghanistan and to secure our influence there… We should assume that the Soviet-Afghan relations will not sustain some sort of major changes, and, it seems, will continue in their previous course. Amin will be pushed toward this by the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan government will face for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue to be interested in receiving from the USSR military, economic and other aid, and possibly even in increased amounts… Evidently, Amin will continue to follow at least outwardly the recommendations we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] job will be difficult and delicate”[162].
4.147 In response to the PDPA’s adoption of state atheism including a suite of policies such as demanding beards be cut and banning attendance at mosque and wearing the burqa, armed factions began to rebel against the regime. These factions all held conservative Islamic ideologies and would cooperate to form the Mujahedeen.
4.148 The Taraki Government had signed a 20-year Friendship Treaty with the USSR in December 1978, which included strengthening military ties[163]. However, the Soviets would lose confidence in Amin, seeing him as incompetent and fanatical, having lost control of much of the country. They were also concerned about his foreign policy of rebalancing away from the USSR, including strengthening ties with Iran and Pakistan; meeting with anti-communist insurgent Hekmatyar Gulbuddin, and building links with the USA, although these soured with the death of Spike Dubs.
4.149 In December 1979 the USSR carried out a coup, codenamed Operation Storm-333, against Amin in which he was killed, and replaced him with Babrak Karmal. This was followed by a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in the belief that, as Pakistan was supporting the Mujahedeen, that America likely was as well.
4.150 The Soviets fought a difficult counterinsurgency against Mujahedeen guerrillas who were receiving support from numerous state powers, most prominently the United States. As early as 1983, the Soviets were exploring options for an exit, and had worked with Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq to explore options for restoring deposed monarch Zahir Shah as initially a Government-in-Exile, with a view to installing him as a neutral figure to enable Soviet withdrawal[164].
4.151 Karmal opposed the idea of Soviet withdrawal[165] and in 1986 was deposed by the USSR, now led by Mikhail Gorbachev, and replaced with Mohammad Najibullah, the Director of Afghan Intelligence.
4.152 Further years of stalemate were to follow, with the Soviets failing to pacify the Mujahedeen, leading to the 1988 Geneva Accords, which agreed for Soviet withdrawal from the country[166].
4.153 The Soviets supported the Najibullah regime even after their withdrawal from the country and by 1990 Soviet aid to him was estimated at around $3bn and his military was entirely dependent on Soviet aid to function[167]. although there was and remains a question of between 265 and 417 missing Russian personnel and prisoners of war in Afghanistan, some of whom have not been found. It is believed that whilst some returned, others chose to remain either to avoid being tried for desertion or because they had converted to Islam[168],[169].
4.154 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russia federation, which caused great political upheaval in the early 1990s, Russia would eventually oppose the Taliban and provide support for the Northern Alliance[170]. Russia provided weapons and supplies to the ousted Government from 1996 when the Taliban seized power and following the attacks of September 11th 2001, signed a major arms deal with the Northern Alliance worth between $40m and $70m[171]. Russian and American interests aligned in removing the Taliban regime from power.
4.155 America and Russia’s relationship has long been frosty under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, but reached a new low in 2014 following Russia’s annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. Having reached this low ebb, Russia decided to become more active in Afghanistan to oppose American interests[172].
4.156 Russia is seeking to oppose American and Western interests in Afghanistan as part of wider conflict. They seek a Western withdrawal from the country at as high a price as possible. Russia has believed for some time that the US and its allies do to have the political will to stabilise Afghanistan and have capitalised on the opportunity to play ‘kingmaker while Washington flounders’[173].
4.157 Despite opposing them in the past, Russia is now embracing the Taliban as a ‘hedge’ against other Islamist terror organisations in the country who may harbour anti-Russian sentiment, such as Islamic State, which operates a wilayat, or regional affiliate, organisation in the Caucasus, known as Vilyat Kavkaz. Zamir Kabulov, the Russian envoy to Afghanistan stated “We'd rather fight the Islamists on the Amu Darya than on the Volga”[174]. Russia is prioritising counterterrorism efforts as a major plank of its broader strategy in Afghanistan.
4.158 Russia has sought to re-establish itself in the Middle East and former Soviet sphere of influence and to assert its authority as a global political actor and indispensable stakeholder in any global political crisis. Against the backdrop of its intervention in Syria, support for Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army in Libya, and overtures to Egypt, Russian activities in Afghanistan can be seen as an extension of this strategy.
4.159 Russia is building influence through soft power in Afghanistan, as well as through more military means and has maintained a flexible approach which enables it to align with whichever parties in the country it feel can best advance and maintain its interests.
4.160 Moscow is also concerned about drug smuggling, with a Russian official in 2014 blaming Afghan heroin for 500,000 deaths in Russia[175].
4.161 The annexation of Crimea marked a downward inflection point for US-Russian relations, and then-Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s announcement of the suspension of the Northern Distribution Network, which was providing supplies to US forces in Afghanistan, marked a change in trajectory for Russia from a loose partner of sorts to American efforts in Afghanistan to a firm foe[176].
4.162 The most obvious manifestation of Russian animus towards Western interests is the recent revelation of bounties being paid to the Taliban to kill US and allied military personnel, which is believed to have led to the deaths of American soldiers[177]. This include offers to induce the direct targeting of British troops in Afghanistan[178].
4.163 In particular, Unit 29155 of the GU (also still referred to as the GRU), Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, is believed to be tasked with destabilising Europe and opposing Western interests. Research groups such as Bellingcat have linked the GU with the attempted murder of Sergei Skripal among others[179], and a CIA assessment alleges the unit is responsible for administering the bounty programme[180].
4.164 As discussed later under Section 5, the Taliban were likely negotiating with Russia over payment of bounties at the same time as they were negotiating the Doha Agreement with the USA[181].
4.165 Using its experience in ‘active measures’, Russia is deploying informational warfare against the US and allies. Russian media outlets, such as Sputnik Dari (in Pashto and Dari) are broadcasting anti-American conspiracy theories and disinformation into Afghanistan[182],[183]. In particular, Russian disinformation accuses America of supporting and arming Islamic State in Afghanistan. Other rumours and claims spread by Russian propaganda include accusations that the US is in Afghanistan to mine Uranium, not to fight terrorism; that American soldiers are complicit in the Afghan narcotics trade, and that despite a promised Western troop withdrawal, there remains a neo-colonial agenda which will be carried out at arm’s length by private military companies, who intend to remain as a permanent deniable occupying force. Mohammed Daud Miraki, an Afghan activist, was quoted by Sputnik as saying: “[t]he war in Afghanistan is a milk cow for the U.S. establishment and NATO that they refused to lose”[184].
4.166 Russian security forces killed four Emirs of the al Qaeda affiliate the Caucasus Emirate in three years, eliminating Dokka Umarov in September 2013, Aliskhab Kebekov in April 2015, Magomed Suleimanov in August 2015, and Zalim Shebzukhov in August 2016. It is not known whether what remains of the al Qaeda affiliate has named a successor to Shebzukhov.
4.167 In 2014 there was growing discontent with Kebekov’s leadership and a number of commanders and fighters broke with the Caucasus Emirate and publicly swore fealty to then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi[185]. In June 2015 Islamic State declared the establishment of its own Caucasus affiliate, Vilyat Kavkaz[186]. Since forming, the group has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, including a 2018 shooting that killed five worshippers at a church in Dagestan[187], an explosion on New Year’s Eve 2018 that killed 39 and injured 17 in Magnitogorsk[188], and a June 2019 attack on Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s home in Grozny[189].
4.168 As such, Russia is sensitive to Islamist terrorism and concerned to halt its spread through Central Asia and the Caucasus. In particular Russia is concerned about Islamic State and has claimed that there are twice as many Islamic State fighters in Afghanistan than the US estimates[190]. Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan, Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), is proactively recruiting Central Asian jihadists to its cause, including ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks[191]. Should ISKP establish a major foothold in Afghanistan it could use this as a launching pad for expanding northwards into Central Asia and the Caucasus, and potentially linking up and cooperating with the Caucasian affiliate Vilyat Kavkaz.
4.169 In late 2017, Russian National Security Advisor Nikolai Patrushev met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to discuss joint counterterrorism operations and foster stronger security ties between Moscow and Kabul[192]. However, having adopted a flexible approach, being willing to work with any groups that further their interests in Afghanistan, Russia has pivoted more towards supporting the Taliban as a ‘hedge’ against terror groups which may be more likely to pose a threat to Russia and its sphere of influence. American General John Nicholson remarked in March 2018 that Russia had smuggled weapons through Tajikistan into Afghanistan to arm the Taliban[193]. This has led to some friction between Moscow and Kabul, with the latter becoming increasingly frustrated with the former. Kabul has become irritated with Moscow’s willingness to hold events without them, and with the openness with which they support the Taliban and insist it must have a role in shaping Afghanistan’s future[194]. Russia has struggled to maintain good relations with Ghani, and would likely have preferred Hanif Atmar to have won the presidential election, although he withdrew from the contest at an early stage. Russia has also previously established ties with Abdullah Abdullah, Kabul’s Chief Executive, who narrowly lost to Ghani in an election the result of which he refused to accept until striking a power-sharing agreement[195].
4.170 Russia is also using its criticisms of ‘double standards’ in American counterterrorism policy[196], as well as spreading conspiracy theories of Western support for Islamic State[197] as an avenue to further erode Western credibility and build the Russian ‘brand’.
4.171 Russia’s foreign policy aims to cast the Kremlin in the role of an international power broker, with enough influence that it cannot be excluded from major international processes. This guarantees Russia a seat at the table to shape the global system.
4.172 In pursuing a strategy of using bounties to induce the Taliban to attack America as it considers its withdrawal, making the process as humiliating and politically painful as possible, Russia is also playing the role of peacemaker, as it has in the past brokering the deal for President Bashar al-Assad of Syria to destroy his chemical weapons stockpile.
4.173 In 2018, Moscow hosted the Taliban and envoys from 11 countries including the United States. In opening the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that he hoped the summit would help facilitate direct talks between the Taliban and Kabul[198].
4.174 In January 2019, Kabulov visited Islamabad to hold talks with senior Pakistani diplomats to coordinate international efforts to broker peace[199]. This was followed in February 2019 by further talks hosted in Moscow between the Taliban and Afghan politicians opposed to current President Ashraf Ghani, including former President Hamid Karzai, who believes Russia has a decisive role to play. This has understandably deepened frustrations among Ghani and his administration and supporters[200].
4.175 In May 2019, Moscow hosted a ceremony to mark 100 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Russia. Representatives of both the Taliban and the Kabul Government were in attendance. In his welcoming remarks, Lavrov said: “we are calling for a total pullout of foreign forces from the country. We are calling on all Afghan sides to start talks as soon as possible involving a broad range of social and political forces”[201].
4.176 In August 2019, a spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry even offered to oversee the implementation of the final deal agreed in the Doha Process, stating that they could serve ‘as a guarantor of the Agreement’[202].
4.177 Russia is also attempting to play a ‘hedge’ game, wherein it fosters support and trust from both the Kabul Government and the Taliban, and is then using these relationships to demonstrate diplomatic clout. In particular, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has tried to frame the Afghan diplomatic process as being facilitated by Russia for the benefit of the US, the Taliban, and Kabul. Kabulov went as far as to say that having the Taliban at the Russian-brokered talks in Moscow could lead to peace talks that would include the United States[203].
4.178 The above-mentioned talks took place in September 2019, after President Trump cancelled planned talks with the Taliban over an attack in Kabul which killed an American soldier and 11 others, for which the Taliban took responsibility. This created an opportunity for Russia, which immediately stepped in in order to establish itself as the power that was attempting to revive the peace process. A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman was quoted as saying: “The Russian side stressed the need to relaunch negotiations between the United States and the Taliban movement… for their part, the Taliban confirmed their willingness to pursue dialogue with Washington”[204].
4.179 Russian policy would appear to connote a view in Moscow that Ghani cannot maintain control of Afghanistan alone following a Western troop withdrawal, and is therefore building ties with Afghan opposition politicians and the Taliban, to ensure that it will have a degree of influence, whichever factions ultimately control the country post-withdrawal.
4.180 Russia is seeking to end its pariah status which has left it excluded by Western powers not by rapprochement, but by establishing itself as indispensable to global affairs.
4.181 Russia is seeking to build influence through a range of political and economic measures.
4.182 In 2017 a delegation of at least 20 Russian businessmen met for the third time with Afghan officials to discuss expanding investment in the country in particular key sectors, including transport, agriculture and manufacturing. Russian businesses already invest in manufacturing and construction, and in 2017 were considering also venturing into the fields of electricity production, railways, and road construction, inter alia. Russo-Afghan trade is worth $200m and increasing[205].
4.183 Despite an enduring reputation in Afghanistan as a country which once invaded and was defeated, some Afghans remain positively disposed towards Russia for their economic development aid. In a 2014 interview with the Washington Post, Afghan National Army (ANA) General Labib Raeed said that Soviet-built accommodation were among the only homes with functioning central heating in Afghanistan[206].
4.184 There remains also a legacy of Soviet-trained officers in the Afghan army, who speak Russian, and the army’s continued use of, and reliance on, Russian weaponry, most symbolically the Kalashnikov assault rifle, speak to last Russian cultural influence in Afghanistan’s elite[207]. Indeed, respect for Russian military capabilities led then-Afghan Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum to visit Russia in 2015 to meet with policymakers including the Kremlin-backed strongman in Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, aiming to secure heavy weapons and helicopter gunships to help Kabul fight the Taliban[208]. Haji Mohammed Mahdiyar, commander of the Marg militia in northern Afghanistan also visited Russia in 2015 to ask for Russian support against ISIS[209].
4.185 Russia is also concerned by the production and trafficking of drugs from Afghanistan to Russia, which are believed to have caused hundreds of thousands of Russian deaths.
4.186 Russian cooperation with the United States on counternarcotic efforts was suspended following the imposition of American sanctions on the head of Russia’s anti-drug agency, Viktor Ivanvov[210]. Russia has been greatly critical of American efforts to curb the drugs trade, citing a 2016 UN report, which estimated a 43% increase of opium production between 2015 and 2016. Russia points to this report as evidence of American policy failure[211]. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) Director General Andrey Kortunov even went so far as to claim that illegal drug trafficking caused by the U.S. war in Afghanistan has killed more Russians than the Soviet Union lost in 1979-88[212].
4.187 As well as raising genuine concerns in Moscow about drugs trafficking, Russian narratives around counternarcotics serve the broader strategy of undermining American and Western interests and reputations in Afghanistan, whilst establishing themselves as a global power-broker that is concerned about the issues that worry other nations.
4.188 Again reframing the issue to emphasise Russian leadership and initiative, Sergei Lavrov called on NATO in 2017 to join Russia’s anti-drug campaign in Afghanistan[213].
4.189 Russia has historically viewed Afghanistan as its strategic southern flank. It considers the country an area in which it must strive to have influence, and a theatre in which to compete against the West, as it did in the Great Game against the British, and as part of the Cold War against the United States and NATO. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s activity in Afghanistan was greatly reduced and it initially supported the Western intervention in 2001 to remove the Taliban, uproot al Qaeda, and prevent Afghanistan from returning to being a safe haven for terrorists. However, since relations between Russia and the West soured greatly as a result of the annexation of Crimea, and as Russia as begun to reassert itself on the world stage, its interests have diverged from those of the West.
4.190 Russia maintains an interest in counterterrorism and in particular seeks to prevent terrorists in Afghanistan working with, joining, or otherwise supporting existing Islamist terror groups in the Caucasus which threaten Russian homeland security. Russian strategy would appear to be aimed at gaining leverage over the Taliban to use them as a dampener on terror groups that may threaten Russia.
4.191 Russia is also interested in using influence over the Taliban as a tool to curb the production and trafficking of drugs, most saliently opium/heroin.
4.192 Russia is employing a sophisticated hybrid warfare strategy to erode Western credibility and reputation in Afghanistan along a number of avenues. Portraying the West as being unable to properly broker peace talks, inept at combating drugs trafficking and production, and incompetent in counterterrorism has opened a large number of ‘narrative fronts’ against the West. Conversely, Russia portrays itself as trying to rescue peace talks when President Trump cancels them, accuses the West of supporting ISIS whilst Russia is defeating them, and invites NATO to join Russian counternarcotic efforts. This gives the impression that Russia is setting the agenda and taking the initiative and, Moscow hopes, makes them indispensable on the world stage.
4.193 As nations which share a direct, if relatively small border of just over 92km, Afghanistan and China have a very long shared history.
4.194 Part of the historical Silk Road passed through China’s Xinjiang and Afghanistan’s Wakhan corridor.
4.195 The People’s Republic of China (PRC), having been proclaimed in 1949, established formal diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Afghanistan in 1955.
4.196 In January 1957 Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and his Deputy He Long visited Afghanistan and met with King Mohammad Zahir Shah and Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, with Daoud Khan reciprocating by visiting Beijing in October 1957, in which he met Mao Zedong among others.
4.197 In November 1963 the two nations signed a Boundary Treaty, which settled the border between Xinjiang and Wakhan.
4.198 The PRC formally condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and did not recognise the new regime Soviet-installed in Kabul led by Babrak Karmal[214]. As the Sino-Soviet Split created a rift in the communist sphere, with the Karmal/Najibullah regimes on the Soviet side, relations between Kabul and Beijing in this period ranged between frosty and hostile.
4.199 In order to remove the pro-Soviet regime, and in order to thwart a threat to its longstanding ally Pakistan, China supported the mujahedeen, offering training, funding, and equipment from 1980[215].
4.200 After the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the USSR, followed by a civil war in Afghanistan, which eventually led to the Taliban seizing power in Kabul, China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Lu Shulin met with Mullah Omar in Kandahar in November 2000[216].
4.201 From the 2001 US-led invasion of Afghanistan, China played a relatively muted role in the country, focusing instead on investing heavily in resource extraction and not involving itself in politics[217].
4.202 Since 2014, however, China has become more involved in the peace-making process, including receiving Taliban delegations to Beijing[218].
4.203 China’s major priorities in Afghanistan are counterterrorism, developing economic interests, and seeking to further build status as a world power which takes responsibility in global affairs.
4.204 In counterterrorism, China is particularly concerned with Uighur Islamist terrorist organisations such as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al Qaeda affiliate. A number of terror attacks have been carried out in China, including the 2014 Kunming Massacre, in which an eight-person team, believed to comprise Uighurs, armed with long knives, entered the Kunming railway station in Yunnan province and killed 31 people including two security guards and injured a further 143 including seven police officers.
4.205 The TIP, or as the Chinese call them, the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM), has fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and also in Syria. Like Russia, China is working with Pakistan and the Taliban as a ‘hedge’ against the TIP, with the aim of using them to curb Uighur extremism which may directed towards the Chinese homeland.
4.206 China is seeking to establish a triangular relationship between Beijing, Kabul, and Islamabad by forming a ‘Pamir Group’, which will extend the current Belt and Road Project and seek to develop trade links along the old Silk Road areas in order to build a new Silk Road. The Belt and Road project is China’s flagship economic development project, which is aimed to foster trade relations as well as political ties to China’s West.
4.207 As the world preeminent rising power, China is seeking to demonstrate that it is a responsible and powerful actor on the world stage, prepared to shoulder the burdens of leadership. As a direct neighbour, Afghanistan poses a challenge to China to prove it can provide leadership and tackle issues ‘in its own back yard’.
4.208 The main terrorist threat to China emanating from Afghanistan is in the form of Uighur Islamists, which Beijing refers to as ETIM, and Western analysts refer to as TIP. This group is an al Qaeda affiliate and is largely based in Badakhshan Provine, especially in the Wakan corridor, which directly borders China’s Xinjiang region.
4.209 In order to counter this threat, China has built relations with its ally Pakistan and with the Taliban, hoping to use them to prevent Afghanistan being used as a safe haven for the TIP, using economic inducements to secure the Taliban’s cooperation.
4.210 The Observer Research Foundation notes: “Reporting for the Washington Times, Bill Gertz confirmed the involvement of Huawei Technologies and Zhongxing Telecom in Afghanistan from 1999 to 2001. Such cooperation was untenable without the involvement of high-level Chinese government approval. Even though the Taliban’s alliance with Al-Qaeda posed serious security threats in light of the insurgency in the Xinjiang region, the Chinese continued its cooperation with the Taliban. Beijing was keen to secure assurances that the Taliban would not support Uighur militants. Additionally, the Chinese provided relentless support to their Pakistani counterparts and, subsequently, their official and unofficial relationships with the Taliban”[219].
4.211 In 2016 China established a ‘security quartet’ comprising China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan, creating a ‘four country mechanism’ to coordinate responses to terrorism. The inaugural meeting of this partnership was chaired by Fang Fenhui, a member of the Chinese Central Military Commission and held in Urumqi, the capital city of Xinjiang province[220]. This somewhat underscores that the main target of this mechanism, at least from Beijing’s perspective, will be Uighur militants. The integrity of this partnership may be tested due to China’s relationships with Pakistan and the Taliban, which will inevitably prove an irritant to President Ghani.
4.212 China is also keen to use the Afghanistan Contact Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to push for regional counterterrorism coordination against groups in Afghanistan[221].
4.213 In order to directly address militant threats emanating from Badakhshan, reports appeared in January 2018 that China had offered to build a military base in the province for the Afghan Government[222], covering all associated costs[223]. According to the Telegraph, the base will host 500 Chinese troops and will primarily be used to train Afghan troops, with a source telling them: “construction of the base has started, and China will send at least one battalion of troops, along with weapons and equipment, to be stationed there and provide training to their Afghan counterparts”[224]. China offered Kabul $70m in military aid between 2016 and 2018[225].
4.214 In addition to the military base, China has provided $85m to Afghanistan to create a mountain brigade for the Afghan National Army (ANA) ‘for the protection of the Badakhshan border’, which will Beijing envisions will assist in preventing cross-border attacks from Uighur militants based in Afghanistan[226].
4.215 China has also induced ally Pakistan into carrying out ‘secret raids’ against Uighur TIP militants in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions[227].
4.216 The Belt and Road Initiative, as originally conceived, largely does not include Afghanistan in its plans[228]. However, it would appear that China is beginning to attempt to integrate Afghanistan into the wider project as its political engagement with the country ramps up.
4.217 In 2010, a geological survey in Afghanistan uncovered mineral deposits worth up to $1tn[229], as Mining.com notes: “The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world. An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys”[230].
4.218 Aiming to build up what the US Department of Energy has described as ‘sizeable stockpiles’ of rare earth elements, China has won exploration rights for copper, oil, coal, and lithium deposits across Afghanistan[231]. There are even suggestions that Beijing won rights to a copper mine in Afghanistan by bribing government officials[232].
4.219 China is also seeking to invest in Afghan infrastructure in order to connect it to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a major part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In trilateral talks in September 2019, it was agreed between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, that the completion of the Kabul-Peshawar highway would ‘automatically connect Kabul to CPEC – the pilot project of a multi-continental connectivity project launched by China called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’[233]. This connectivity will allow China greater economic access to central Asia, and will also leave Afghanistan increasingly reliant on and beholden to Beijing. China has already specifically offered to build a road network in Afghanistan for the Taliban, in return for the Taliban maintaining peace and security, with the promise of potential further investment.
4.220 As the Financial Times reports: “Diplomats from Beijing offered “sizeable investments in energy and infrastructure projects” in the country during talks that have been taking place over the past three months in Beijing, the tribal leaders from Pakistan’s south-western Balochistan province told the Financial Times… Chinese officials have told the Taliban to bring peace [to Afghanistan] and China will invest in roads to begin with,” said one leader… “In future, China also wants to look at energy projects like generating electricity and then transporting oil and gas from central Asia [through Afghanistan]”[234].
4.221 Other strategic infrastructure projects supported by China include the Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which, according to Silk Road Briefing, ‘aims to enhance regional economic cooperation and connectivity between Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, and according to the Chinese and regional governments concerned, will expand economic and cultural links between Europe and Asia’[235].
4.222 China is also considering building a spur from the proposed Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (TAPI) gas pipeline, which is planned to transport 33bn cubic metres of gas each year from the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan[236]. The pipeline is currently being delayed because compulsory purchase laws in Afghanistan have not been signed, making the land assembly project necessary to build pipeline impossible[237].
4.223 China is also a major contributor of aid to Afghanistan. As the Diplomat reports: “In the 2002-13 period Beijing provided just $240 million in aid to Afghanistan. In 2014 alone China gave it $80 million in aid and pledged an additional $240 million over the next three years. In September 2017, China extended $90 million toward development projects in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province alone”[238].
Despite major investments made, China is concerned about the economic impacts of the poor security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in light of its experience with the abortive copper mine sited at Mes Aynak, which has stalled due to Taliban attacks on the project[239]. China will be aiming to use the leverage it is building over the Taliban, and its endeavours to steward the peace process, to restart these projects.
4.224 China is a rising world power, and its ability to positively influence developments in Afghanistan, China’s ‘back yard’, will burnish their reputation as a regional leader. Failure to do this, on the other hand, will undermine confidence in its ability to responsibly lead and shape developments.
4.225 From early 2015, China has taken an interest in achieving peace in Afghanistan between the Taliban and the Kabul Government when it facilitated talks between the Taliban and Ashraf Ghani’s administration[240].
4.226 Because political stability is vital to the delivery and maintenance of the various Belt and Road/CPEC projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan, China has an interest in a peace process that leads to lasting stability. Li Lifan, a Central Asian affairs expert at the Shanghai Academy of Social Science has suggested that China may choose to use the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a vehicle for driving the peace process following American withdrawal, adding “China could pay a high price if instability continues in Afghanistan’[241].
4.227 In April 2020, following a telephone call between Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Mohammed Hanif Atmar, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying: “As a neighbor and friend of Afghanistan, China respects the Afghan people's choice of their own development path and stands ready to continue to support, mediate, and facilitate the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan and further play its constructive role… China, more than anyone else, wants to see a harmonious Afghanistan-Pakistan relation and will contribute to any effort that helps improve the mutual trust and relations between the two sides”[242].
4.228 China has also offered to broker talks between Islamabad and Kabul in order to bring the three countries closer together. These attempts to form a trilateral ‘Pamir Group’ both demonstrate China’s regional leadership credentials and will also facilitate the Belt and Road Initiative[243]. China recognises that, so long as Pakistan and Afghanistan remain at variance with one another, there would be difficulty in bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table.
4.229 In December 2017, Beijing hosted trilateral talks between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan with a view to facilitating the resolution of ongoing issues between Kabul and Islamabad[244].
4.230 China does not have a negative historical legacy in the country, and is likely to be wary of the lessons of the British, Soviet, and American experiences in Afghanistan. As such, whilst they will maintain high-level strategic interest in facilitating peace, Chinese activities within Afghanistan are likely to be geographically restricted to the Badakhshan region, where it will be focused on degrading TIP and building ANA capacity to prevent cross-border attacks.
4.231 As Pakistan’s closest ally and a major power without a historical legacy of military intervention and occupation in Afghanistan, China will use this status as a competitive advantage in its diplomatic efforts.
4.232 In order to preserve its relationship with Pakistan, China has not used its power to induce Pakistan to curtail its use of terrorist organisations as a foreign policy tool, and is likely to maintain its focus on groups which specifically harbour ambitions of striking the Chinese homeland[245].
4.233 China is pursuing a delicate ‘hedging strategy’ of trying to build relations with both Kabul and the Taliban[246], not unlike it’s ‘balancing act’ approach to the warring factions in Libya[247].
4.234 A December 2019 report from the Pentagon noted: “China believes regional stability will improve its access to trade markets, weaken western regional influence, and counterbalance India’s role and strategic expansion in the region,” the report said. “China is seeking to become more involved in intra-Afghan talks”[248].
4.235 Valey Arya, an Afghan commentator based in London argues that: “The withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan, stability in the country, and a government which is friendly with Pakistan are other foreign policy goals of China”[249].
4.236 China’s three priorities are to maintain their own national security by pursuing robust counterterrorism efforts against Uighur militants based in Afghanistan, to secure political and economic influence and interests through infrastructure development, and to demonstrate its credentials as a regional and global power.
4.237 These three priorities are interwoven, its efforts to demonstrate leadership by brokering peace talks are aimed at improving the security situation, which should bolster endeavours to suppress Uighur militants in Badakhshan. Improving security also builds confidence for investors and creates the safe space for more economic development projects.
4.238 China is faced with a ‘chicken and egg’ problem where it comes to balancing economics and security. It is attempting to use economic investment as an incentive for the Taliban to reduce violence, but such investment is undermined by the continuation of violence.
4.239 China will seek to avoid becoming the next major power to enter the ‘graveyard of empires’ and will seek a largely superficial relationship with Kabul and the Taliban in order to pursue its three priorities. Ultimately, China will likely have little interest in the specific outcomes of the peace process, provided that the end result is greater political stability and security.
5.1 There are a number of concerns for Western interests stemming from the Agreement and the Taliban’s behaviour both recently and in the past.
5.2 First and foremost, the Taliban’s obligations have been phrased in vague terms, which allow great scope for interpretation.
5.3 Secondly, there appear to be no mechanisms for monitoring Taliban compliance with the Agreement, nor for enforcing against any breaches.
5.4 The Taliban were clearly negotiating with Russia on agreements to pay bounties to kill American troops in Afghanistan at the same time as they were negotiating the Doha Agreement with the USA. This raises very serious concerns about Taliban intentions, and the degree to which they can be relied on to maintain their commitments in the Agreement[250].
5.5 Further, Section B of Part One of the Agreement reads: “B 1) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will complete withdrawal of all remaining forces from Afghanistan within the remaining nine and a half (9.5) months. 2) The United States, its allies, and the Coalition will withdraw all their forces from remaining bases”[251]. This leaves major concerns around the future of counterterrorism, as this requires a minimum amount of personnel on the ground, even for relatively remote operations such as drone reconnaissance and airstrikes. Should the US and its allies have an absolute zero presence of military personnel in Afghanistan, this will greatly hamper counterterrorism efforts and may leave Western powers reliant on the Kabul Government, the Taliban, and regional powers for assistance in this regard.
5.6 The Taliban remains deeply connected to terrorist organisations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
5.7 On the death of Mullah Mansour, the Taliban appointed Mullah Haibatullah Akhunzada to lead. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri reaffirmed his support for the Taliban and formerly swore Bay’ah, a formal Islamic oath of allegiance, to Akhunzada, which he accepted. In 2001 Osama Bin Laden said of his Bay’ah to then-Taliban leader Mullah Omar: “My pledge of allegiance to the Emir of the Believers [Mullah Omar] is the great pledge of allegiance, which is mentioned in the chapters of the Koran and the stories of the Sunnah,” bin Laden said in the clip. “Every Muslim should set his mind and heart and pledge allegiance to the Emir of the Believers Mullah Muhammad Omar for this is the great pledge”. Zawahiri confirmed that his pledge to Mullah Haibatullah was on the same basis as Bin Laden’s to Mullah Omar[252]. Despite the Agreement being made in February, and despite what could be a practically simple but politically powerful symbol of the Taliban’s disavowal of al Qaeda, as of September 2020, the bay’ah remains in place.
5.8 The Taliban’s relationship remains strong with al Qaeda, and members of the Haqqani Network even consulted directly and personally with Ayman al-Zawahiri in February 2020, to ask his views on the Doha Agreement[253]. The UN Security Council named Yahya Haqqani as having been the ‘primary Haqqani Network focal point for liaison with Al-Qaida since mid-2009’[254].
5.9 The UN documents that Zawahiri eulogised Sirajuddin’s father and previous leader of the Haqqani Network Jalaluddun Haqqani, who was killed in May 2019[255].
5.10 In addition to maintaining relations with al Qaeda’s central leadership, the group’s local affiliate al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent is also believed by the UN to be being sheltered by the Taliban. In a report from the UNSC’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, it is clearly set out the inseparably close relationship al Qaeda and the Taliban currently enjoy. Whilst it is recommended to read the report in full, salient quotes include:
5.11 “The presence in Afghanistan of Al-Qaida, particularly in the form of Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, was demonstrated most clearly on 22 September when a joint United States-Afghan operation targeted a suspected Taliban and Al-Qaida gathering in the Shabaroz area of Musa Qal‘ah District, Helmand Province. It was later confirmed that the leader of Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Asim Umar, had been killed in the attack, along with several foreign nationals, including the group’s deputy, its “courier” to al-Zawahiri and several foreign female members. Umar and his followers were being sheltered by local Taliban forces, some of whom had also been killed in the raid. Earlier, in June, an Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent commander, Abdul Haseeb al-Khashmiri, had reportedly been killed in another United States-led raid, this time in Ghazni Province. Prior to his death in Helmand, Asim Umar had made an Eid al-Fitr audio address in which he extended his best wishes for Eid and gave “congratulations for these victories to Amir al-Mu’minin, Sheikh Haibatullah Akhundzada”[256].
5.12 “Additional information suggested that discussions were held among senior Haqqani Network figures to form a new joint unit of 2,000 armed fighters in cooperation with and funded by Al-Qaida. The newly established unit would be split into two operational zones with Hafiz Azizuddin Haqqani in overall command and leading forces in the Loya Paktiya area (Khost, Logar, Paktika and Paktiya), while the remaining force would be deployed to Kunar and Nuristan under Shir Khan Manga, the head of intelligence for the Haqqani Network. Separate information provided by another Member State had indicated that Al-Qaida was establishing new training camps in the east of the country. Possibly prompted by the killing of Asim Umar, the Taliban head of intelligence, Mawlawi Hamidullah Akhundzada (not listed), has reportedly instructed Taliban fighters to facilitate the movement of Al-Qaida fighters under the command of Mufti Mahmood (not listed) from the south to the eastern region of Afghanistan.”
5.13 “Some Member States reported that the Taliban appear to have strengthened their relationship with Al-Qaida rather than the opposite. One Member State reported that the regularity of meetings between Al-Qaida seniors and the Taliban “made any notion of a break between the two mere fiction”. The link was described not in simple terms of group-to-group, but rather as “one of deep personal ties (including through marriage) and long-term sense of brotherhood”. Al-Qaida capitalizes on this through its network of mentors and advisers who are embedded with the Taliban, providing advice, guidance and financial support. The Taliban offensive against Ghazni City in August 2018 was a prime example of the effective deployment of Al-Qaida support. Member States observed that while Al-Qaida has a presence beyond Afghanistan, the historical connection between the terrorist group and the country is not lost on a plethora of Al-Qaida-aligned militant groups who have celebrated the agreement as a victory for the Taliban cause, and consequently for the larger global militant cause.
5.14 In June 2020 US General Kenneth McKenzie, Commander of the US Central Command, stated his belief that al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was in eastern Afghanistan, with a very small number of al Qaeda fighters in Nangarhar Province[257].
5.15 The best evidence available suggests that the Taliban is not only unwilling to break its connections with al Qaeda, but is looking to strengthen them further. Additionally, there appears to be such an overlap of personnel between al Qaeda and Taliban, that it is not clear it would be practically possible to sever such connections without also ejecting entire factions of the Taliban from the organisation.
5.16 Al Qaeda has welcomed the Doha Agreement, describing it as a ‘great victory’ for the Taliban over America and its allies and calling on all Afghans and Mujahedeen to bolster the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in a three page statement issued through its media outlet As Sahab[258]. This behaviour from al Qaeda does not indicate that a break in their alliance with the Taliban is imminent.
5.17 Section 2 of Part Two of the Agreement reads: “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban will send a clear message that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its allies have no place in Afghanistan, and will instruct members of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban not to cooperate with groups or individuals threatening the security of the United States and its allies.” Due to its ongoing and strengthening relationship with al Qaeda, the Taliban is and remains in violation of the Agreement and would appear not to have ever been in compliance, nor shown any evidence of moving towards compliance in the near or distant future.
5.18 The Taliban has repeatedly stated since the signing of the Doha Agreement that there are no foreign fighters inside Afghanistan[259]. It is likely that they will continue this denial in order to avoid being held responsible for expelling them. If confronted with incontrovertible evidence, they are likely to obfuscate and use loopholes in the text of Section 2. For example, they may deny that al Qaeda and other groups ‘pose a threat to the security of the United States’, argue that they have sent a message to groups which pose a threat, but that they are not obligated to forcibly remove such groups, or state that they have instructed Taliban members not to cooperate with them.
5.19 The Taliban, and in particular the Haqqani Network also maintain a relationship with Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Islamic State affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In May 2020, Afghan security forces arrested eight militants who were members of a joint Haqqani Network and Islamic State enterprise which was responsible for attacks on Sikh worshippers, and rocket attacks on Ashraf Ghani’s swearing in ceremony and on Bagram airbase[260].
5.20 ISKP is believed by some to be a breakaway faction of the Pakistani Taliban[261]. Masoud Andarabi, acting Afghan Minister of the Interior has alleged that the new leader of ISKP, an Iraqi using the kunya Shabab al-Muhajir, is a member of the Haqqani Network[262] and according to at least one Afghan journalist is a former member of al Qaeda who operated on their behalf in Afghanistan[263].
5.21 Despite some evidence of overlap and cooperation, the Taliban has also moved against ISKP where it has been advantageous to do so, such as the UN notes: “In its tenth report (S/2019/481), the Monitoring Team noted setbacks to ISIL-K that included continued loss of territory and high attrition rates for the senior leadership. Between September and November 2019, those setbacks turned into more existentially threatening blows as ISIL-K was forced out of its traditional stronghold of Nangarhar Province by successive military operations carried out by coordinated Afghan and United States forces. Likely seeing an opportunity to retake key smuggling routes lost to ISIL-K over the previous two years, Taliban forces also joined in the attacks”[264].
5.22 Some media outlets have claimed that Haqqani Network commander and Deputy Taliban Emir Sirajuddin Haqqani opposes, or is at least ambivalent towards the Doha Agreement, despite an op-ed appearing in his name in the New York Times promoting the deal[265]. Haqqani was quoted by Tolo News as saying: “We believe that the talks are the solution, the politics of sharia (Islamic) law is one of the paths of our jihad and struggle, but no one should miscalculate our politics and willingness for talks --- they shouldn’t expect (the Taliban) to abandon jihad and their military capabilities”[266].
5.23 There are further suggestions that ISKP lacks the capabilities to carry out complex attacks on their own, such as the prison breakout orchestrated on August 2nd in Jalalabad[267], without technical assistance. The Afghan Government refers to ISKP as the ‘new face’ of the Haqqani Network and believes that it is the Haqqani Network which is providing the necessary assistance to enable ISKP to carry out attacks.
5.24 Other Islamist terror groups also operate in Afghanistan. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), an al Qaeda affiliate composed largely of Uighurs operate training camps in Afghanistan and are also fighting in Syria[268]. The TIP fought alongside the Taliban in the 2015 Battle of Kunduz[269]. The re-established Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, having broken away from the Islamic State, is also active in Afghanistan[270].
5.25 In order to examine how the Taliban and its associates may respond to the Doha Agreement, it may be instructive to examine the case of the Pakistan’s Waziristan Accord. The Accord was struck to end the Waziristan War between Pakistan’s army and security forces such as the Frontier Corps on one side, and a number of Islamist terrorist organisations including TTP, Jundallah, al Qaeda, and the Afghan Taliban/Haqqani Network on the other[271].
5.26 The truce meeting in which the Waziristan Accord was agreed was attended by Jalaluddin Haqqani, father of Sirajuddin Haqqani, the current Deputy Emir of the Afghan Taliban and commander of the Haqqani Network[272]. At this meeting the al-Rayah, al Qaeda’s black flag was flown[273].
5.27 The Accord insists on referring to the Islamist parties as ‘the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’, irrespective of whether Pakistani forces agreed to recognise it[274].
5.28 The Accord led to reports that the Taliban would promise to expel foreign fighters, however it subsequently transpired that there was a loophole in the Accord which allowed foreign fighters to remain in the area, provided they were ‘peaceful’[275].
5.29 Other conditions stipulated in the Accord are reportedly that the Pakistani military promised not to operate in the Waziristan region, that around 130 terrorists including al Qaeda fighters and commanders were released from Pakistani custody, and that the Taliban agreed to refrain from violence in Pakistan only, leaving them free to continue violence in Afghanistan[276].
5.30 The Long War Journal details the lead up to the Waziristan Accord and the events which followed succinctly: “By 2005, the Pakistani military realized the tribal areas were difficult to tame, and cut peace deals with the various Taliban groups. Al Qaeda quickly declared its Islamic Emirate of Waziristan, and embolden Islamists pushed the boundaries beyond the tribal areas. Maulana Abdul Aziz and his brother Ghazi Abdul Rashid began enforcing sharia law at the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, and the areas surrounding it in Islamabad. The Pakistani military raided the mosque and killed scores of followers. This caused many of the Taliban groups to band together and form the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. Baitullah [Mehsud] was its first emir, and Hakeemullah [Mehsud] was his spokesman. The TTP launched a deadly insurgency that led to the takeover of the tribal areas and what was then known as the Northwest Frontier Province. Hakeemullah was named emir after Baitullah was killed in a drone strike in 2009”[277].
5.31 As such it can safely be concluded that the Waziristan Accord was a failure, and set the stage for the creation of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP). This would also prompt Pakistan to undertake the extensive and costly Operation Zarb-e-Azb in order to attempt to quell the Islamists in the Waziristan/Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)/Khyber Pakhtunkwa area[278].
5.32 Whilst it is important to recognise that the Waziristan Accord and the Doha Agreement have been struck in different circumstances, there are some lessons to be learned of what to expect.
5.33 Given the currently strengthening relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, it is likely that the situation in Afghanistan will return to the status quo ante prior to 2001, wherein the Taliban will offer shelter to and cooperation with al Qaeda, which still harbours ambitions to strike the homelands of the United States, United Kingdom, and allies.
5.34 Based on the above analysis, the likely outcome of the Doha Agreement will include most or all of the below:
- Western ISAF forces withdraw from Afghanistan;
- The Taliban declares the reinstatement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan;
- The Taliban will use loopholes in the Doha Agreement to avoid having to break ties with al Qaeda or expel foreign fighters;
- The Taliban will attack the Kabul Government and any other actors it deems necessary to cement control of the country;
- The Taliban will use the ‘breathing space’ afforded it by the troop withdrawal to consolidate its power base, recruit and train fighters, and to build links with the various jihadist groups present and operating in Afghanistan
6.1 There are a number of key British interests at stake in Afghanistan. These include preserving national security with a continued commitment to counterterrorism and counternarcotics; supporting a strategic ally in the Kabul Government to maintain influence in a key strategic region; supporting the maintenance and expansion of the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and related values to ensure a free Afghan society; continuing to support long-term economic and political development through the delivery of international aid; identifying, opposing, containing, and subverting efforts by hostile powers to expand their interests, and defending the political legacy of the West’s intervention since 2001.
6.2 The above is a lengthy list of interests given the current shift in Western governments away from international commitments in the region. The US, UK, and allies currently lack political will and increasingly the military capacity to be able to fully defend, maintain, promote, and expand these interests.
6.3 On the assumption that there will be a preference against large-footprint military options, there are a number of actions that can be taken to safeguard the aforementioned British interests.
6.3.1 Maintain a limited counterterrorism and intelligence deployment in Afghanistan. It will be necessary to ensure that the UK has a capable intelligence collecting operation in the country. Further, it will not be possible to carry out counterterrorism operations such as drone strikes without some ‘boots on the ground’ in order to launch, land, and maintain the UAV platforms. Whether carried out by the US, UK, or others, there will be a need to have a targeted killing capability to eliminate terrorist commanders, financiers, ideologues, technicians and other vital functional nodes in terror networks, particularly those of al Qaeda and affiliates and Islamic State aligned groups. In order to maintain such a capability, it is necessary to have the relevant intelligence infrastructure in place, as well as armed UAV platforms to carry out targeted killing operations.
6.3.2 Build strong relations with the Hazara community and other at-risk minorities. The Taliban has persecuted a number of communities and ethnic groups, particularly the Hazaras, but also Persian-speaking Shi’a communities in Herat and Farah Provinces, Turkic peoples such as the Bayat, and Ismaili communities predominantly based in Badakhshan Province. There is a strong humanitarian risk to these communities in the event of a Taliban escalation following troop withdrawals. Additionally, these groups are based in strategically key locations where British political, economic, and diplomatic influence could be brought to bear against hostile powers, with Herat and Farah bordering Iran, the Bayat and other Turkic communities being based in the north, where Russian interests lie, and the Ismailis in Badakhshan being located near the Chinese border.
6.3.3 Build strong relations with Baloch communities. The areas which once constituted Balochistan, including the Helmand area of Afghanistan, eastern Iran, and western Pakistan, are in key strategic locations. In particular, many of the areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran which are included in China’s Belt and Road Initiative fall into historically Baloch areas, which still have Baloch populations, including Gwadar, Chaman, and Bahramchah. The British have strong and unique historic links to the Baloch dating back to the days of British India and many Baloch are well disposed towards the UK. Further, there is a Baloch diaspora community in the UK, which maintains strong links to Baloch populations in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. This constitutes a further unique competitive advantage which should be leveraged to build British influence and also as a source of information on hostile, particular Chinese, activities in these strategic areas.
6.3.4 Maintain and, if possible, increase development commitments. The various powers vying for influence in Afghanistan are and will continue to use development as a tool for fostering influence in the country. The UK currently spent £155m in 2018/19 and £155m in 2019/20 on development in Afghanistan[279]. Around two thirds of this commitment is the UK contribution to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. This is a reduction from previous commitments, in 2014 the British High Commissioner to India noted a UK commitment to “provide over $300m per year in development assistance until at least 2017 to ensure that progress already made is not lost”[280]. The UK is the second largest aid contributor to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, second only to the USA. Between 2002 and 2017, the US contributed $3.2bn, the UK contributed $1.8bn, the EU was third-highest, spending $891.1m, Germany was fourth-highest spending $835m, and Canada was fifth-highest, spending $763m. It is vital that the UK maintains this position in order to maximise its influence.
6.3.5 Maintain diplomatic and political support for the Afghan Government. The current political situation is precarious, as demonstrated by the difficulties in securing the power-sharing agreement between President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Since the USC Center on Public Diplomacy began to publish annual Soft Power Rankings in 2015, the UK has consistently been ranked either the first or the second most powerful nation in the world in soft power terms[281]. This is a unique competitive advantage and should be deployed in a manner which promotes political and social stability in Afghanistan. The Kabul Government is likely to face difficult problems in the near future and will need support.
6.3.6 Increase cooperation with India. Of the major neighbouring powers, India is the one with whom the UK is most aligned strategically. It is in India’s interests to see that the Taliban is suppressed; terrorist safe havens are destroyed; Afghan economic, civic, and political development is continued, and that democracy and the rule of law is maintained. There is a Joint Working Group for India and the UK to discuss cooperation on Afghanistan, and the UK has deepened its strategic partnership with India in recent years[282]. The Joint Working Group should meet more regularly to ensure coordination and strategic alignment between the UK and India strategies in Afghanistan. In a 2014 speech in New Delhi, Sir James Bevan, then the British High Commissioner to India argued: “Afghanistan matters hugely to both the UK and India, and both of us matter to Afghanistan. That’s why I believe there is scope for the UK and India to work more closely together over the next few years to promote the stable, peaceful, prosperous, democratic Afghanistan we all want to see”[283].
6.3.7 Invest in strategic communications. Hostile powers are conducting informational warfare against the UK and its interests in Afghanistan by eroding credibility, spreading conspiracy theories, and levelling political attacks. It is vital that the UK counters such disinformation campaigns by articulating what has been achieved in Afghanistan, the commitment the UK has to the Afghan people, and what the UK is continuing to do to support the ongoing development of a free, secure, and democratic society. In addition to countering disinformation, it will be important to continue to articulate the importance of democracy, human rights, civil society, inclusive development etc and the benefits they bring to Afghan citizens. In addition to damaging British interests, a collapse of support for these values will likely pose a humanitarian risk to civilian populations as well.
6.4 To quote Condoleezza Rice: “I know too that there is a wariness. I know that it feels as if we have carried these burdens long enough. But we can only know that there is no choice, because one of two things will happen if we don't lead. Either no one will lead and there will be chaos, or someone will fill the vacuum who does not share our values." Whilst Rice said this to urge more committed American leadership on the world stage in 2012, this applies as much today to the UK and wider West’s interests in Afghanistan. As the West withdraws from Afghanistan, there will be a vacuum created and we will face precisely such a choice as Rice describes. Many of the countries and non-state actors waiting to fill this vacuum are overtly hostile to the UK, its interests, and values and will seek to undo and destroy any achievements made since the 2001 intervention. It is vital that Afghanistan is not forgotten as the UK begins to prioritise other issues, both domestically and abroad. The UK must pursue a coherent strategy that brings military power to bear against terrorist groups aspiring to attack the West; diplomatic power to support and promote a stable, free, and democratic Afghanistan, and full-spectrum capabilities to identify, limit, challenge, and subvert hostile state and non-state activities in Afghanistan which threaten to damage the UK and its interests.
Received 30 September 2020
[1] Gohel, Sajjan M, and Bailey, Allison, ‘This Time, Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win’, Foreign Policy, July 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/russia-afghansitan-united-states-bountygate/
[2] ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America’, February 2020, available on: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf
[3] Durand Line Agreement (November 12, 1893) ‘Agreement between Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, G. C. S. I., and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K. C. I. E., C. S. I.’, available on: http://www.khyber.org/history/treaties/durandagreement.shtml
[4] Whilst often referred to as ‘Balochis’, the correct plural for Baloch people is simply ‘Baloch’, ‘Balochi’ is the language they speak.
[5] ‘We will respect Pashtuns’ decision on Pashtunistan: Karzai’, Afghanistan Times, September 2016, available on: http://www.afghanistantimes.af/we-will-respect-pashtuns-decision-on-pashtunistan-karzai/
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid
[8] Ibid
[9] Hamdani, Yasser Latif, ‘Was Jinnah Democratic?’ Daily Times (Pakistan), December 2011, available on: https://dailytimes.com.pk/110699/was-jinnah-democratic-ii/
[10] Putz, Catherine, ‘India and Pakistan’s Proxy War in Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, April 2015, available on: https://www.thediplomat.com/2015/04/india-and-pakistans-proxy-war-in-afghanistan
[11] Boone, Jon ‘Musharraf: Pakistan and India's backing for 'proxies' in Afghanistan must stop’, The Guardian, February 2015, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-india-proxies-afghanistan-ghani-taliban
[12] Noorzai, Roshan, ‘Pakistan Sees Taliban as Buffer to India in Future Afghanistan, Experts Say’, Voice of America, August 2020, available on: https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/pakistan-sees-taliban-buffer-india-future-afghanistan-experts-say
[13] Hanauer, Larry, and Chalk, Peter ‘India and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan’, RAND Corporation, 2012 available on: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf
[14] Ibid
[15] Ibid
[16] Karim, Umer, ‘Imran Khan’s Pakistan and its Strategic Relevance for the UK’, RUSI, August 2020, available on: https://rusi.org/commentary/imran-khan-pakistan-and-strategic-relevance-uk
[17] ‘Researchers Blame Pakistan's ISI For Death Of Ex-President Najibullah’, Tolo News, September 2016, available on: https://tolonews.com/index.php/afghanistan/researchers-blame-pakistans-isi-death-ex-president-najibullah
[18] Masoom, Faqir Hamim, ‘The long-term dangers for Pakistan of believing in ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban’, Foreign Policy, September 2015, available on: https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/29/the-long-term-dangers-for-pakistan-of-believing-in-good-and-bad-taliban/
[19] ‘Pakistan’s Support for the Taliban’, Human Rights Watch, 2000, available on: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/afghan2/Afghan0701-02.htm
[20] Ibid
[21] Lamont, James, ‘Clinton warns Pakistan on militant ‘snakes’, Financial Times, October 2011, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/93147c90-fbc7-11e0-9283-00144feab49a
[22] ‘Pakistan warns Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network’, The News International (Pakistan), April 2014, available on: https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/637370-pakistan-warns-afghan-taliban-and-haqqani-network
[23] Roberts, Rachel, ‘Pakistan: Three years after 140 died in the Peshawar school massacre, what has changed?’, the Independent, December 2017, available on: https://web.archive.org/web/20180304021728/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-shooting-massacre-what-has-changed-happened-three-years-a8113661.html
[24] ‘Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar school attack leaves 141 dead’, BBC News, December 2014, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30491435
[25] ‘No distinction now between good and bad Taliban: Nawaz’, Dawn News, December 2014, available on: https://www.dawn.com/news/1151397
[26] Kattak, Daud, ‘After Quetta Attack, Pakistan’s ‘Good Taliban, Bad Taliban’ Strategy Under Fire’, The Diplomat, August 2016, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/after-quetta-attack-pakistans-good-taliban-bad-taliban-strategy-under-fire/
[27] ‘Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity’, Human Rights Watch, February 2017, available on: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-refugees
[28] ‘Eleventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2501 (2019) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan’, United Nations Security Council, May 2020, available on: https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/415
[29] Rashid, Ahmed, Descent into Chaos (2009, Penguin), pp. 114
[30] Roggio, Bill, ‘U.N.: Thousands of Pakistanis fight in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban’, Long War Journal, June 2020, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/06/u-n-thousands-of-pakistanis-fight-in-afghanistan-alongside-the-taliban.php
[31] Mazol, James, ‘The Quetta Shura Taliban: An Overlooked Problem’, International Affairs Review, November 2009, available on: https://iar-gwu.org/2009/11/24/the-quetta-shura-taliban-an-overlooked-problem/
[32] Walsh, Declan, ‘Pakistan sheltering Taliban, says British officer’ the Guardian, May 2006, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/19/pakistan.alqaida
[33] London, Douglas, ‘Why the Taliban Will Never Agree to a Real Peace Deal’, New York Times, February 2020, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/afghanistan-war-taliban.html
[34] ‘Pakistani agents 'funding and training Afghan Taliban', BBC News, June 2010, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10302946
[35] Findlay, Stephanie, ‘Pakistan warned to curb terrorist financing’, Financial Times, October 2019, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/cb89184c-f196-11e9-ad1e-4367d8281195
[36] ‘Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 30 June 2020’, Financial Action Task Force, June 2020, available on: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/a-c/bahamas/documents/increased-monitoring-june-2020.html
[37] Gupta, Shishir, ‘Pakistani terrorists being trained in Afghanistan after Balakot’, Hindustan Times, July 2019, available on: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pak-terrorists-being-trained-in-afghanistan-after-balakot/story-LScNbk5jsCcZXxEM2HmljM.html
[38] ‘Pakistan Army’s SSG Commandos Training Taliban Militants To Attack Jammu & Kashmir – Media Reports’, EurAsian Times, August 2020, available on: https://eurasiantimes.com/pakistan-armys-ssg-commandos-training-taliban-militants-to-attack-jammu-kashmir-media-reports/
[39] Shukla, Manish, ‘Terrorists trained in Afghanistan by Pakistan Army SSG commandos planning attack in Jammu and Kashmir, reveals intel report’, Zee News, August 2020, available on: https://zeenews.india.com/india/terrorists-trained-in-afghanistan-by-pakistan-army-ssg-commandos-planning-attack-in-jammu-and-kashmir-reveals-intel-report-2301802.html
[40] Mazzetti, Mark, ‘The Devastating Paradox of Pakistan’, The Atlantic, March 2018 issue, available on: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/03/the-pakistan-trap/550895/
[41] Manson, Katrina, ‘US suspends $2bn in security assistance to Pakistan’, Financial Times, January 2018, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/de50b432-f191-11e7-b220-857e26d1aca4
[42] ‘US military to cancel $300m in Pakistan aid over terror groups’, BBC News, September 2018, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45386278
[43] Iqbal, Anwar, ‘US State Dept approves proposed $125m support programme for Pakistan’s F-16s’, Dawn News, July 2019, available on: https://www.dawn.com/news/1496522
[44] Peel, Michael, and Stacey, Kiran, ‘Pakistan turns to Russia and China after US military aid freeze’, Financial Times, January 2018, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/81aea830-0238-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
[45] Ibid
[46] ‘Pakistan's PM: Our economic future is now linked to China’, al Jazeera, September 2020, available on: https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2020/09/pakistan-pm-magic-wand-change-requires-struggle-200902130450559.html
[47] ‘Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, Department of Defense, May 2018, available on: https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF
[48] Ibid
[49] Peel, Michael, and Stacey, Kiran, ‘Pakistan turns to Russia and China after US military aid freeze’, Financial Times, January 2018, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/81aea830-0238-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5
[50] Jamal, Umair, and Bangash, Yaqoob Khan, ‘Understanding Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan’, The News on Sunday (Pakistan), January 2016, available on: https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/560190-understanding-pakistans-strategic-interests-afghanistan
[51] Hanauer, Larry, and Chalk, Peter ‘India and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan’, RAND Corporation, 2012 available on: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf
[52] Mazzetti, Mark, and Khan, Ismail, ‘From the Afghan Peace Deal, a Weak and Pliable Neighbor for Pakistan’, New York Times, March 2020, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/world/asia/afghanistan-pakistan-peace.html
[53] Feroz, Emran, Twitter, January 2020, available on: https://twitter.com/emran_feroz/status/1213121072595382272?lang=en
[54] Ibrahimi, Niamatullah, ‘THE DISSIPATION OF POLITICAL CAPITAL AMONG AFGHANISTAN’S HAZARAS : 2001-2009’, Crisis States Working Paper No. 51, London School of Economics, June 2009, available on: https://www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp51.2-dissipation-of-political-capital.pdf
[55] Gohel, Sajjan M, ‘Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan’, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, March 2010, available on: https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-ambiguous-role-in-afghanistan/
[56] Levy, Adrian, and Scott-Clark, Cathy, The Exile (2017, Bloomsbury), pp. 97
[57] Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower (Crown, 2008), pp. 131.
[58] Moghadam, Assaf, ‘Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa`ida’s Tactical Cooperation’, CTC Sentinel, West Point, April 2017, available on: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/marriage-of-convenience-the-evolution-of-iran-and-al-qaidas-tactical-cooperation/
[59] Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, pp. 240
[60] Jehl, Douglas, ‘For the death of its diplomats, Iran vows blood for blood’, New York Times, September 1998, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/12/world/for-death-of-its-diplomats-iran-vows-blood-for-blood.html?pagewanted=all
[61] ‘Iranian Special Forces Reportedly Fight Alongside US in Battle for Herat’, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency (USA), November 2001, available on: https://spongobongo.wordpress.com/2017/03/14/iranian-special-forces-reportedly-fight-alongside-us-in-battle-for-herat/
[62] Levy, Adrian, and Scott-Clark, Cathy, The Exile (2017, Bloomsbury), pp. 104
[63] ‘Discrimination against the Hazara people in Iran’, Hazara People International Network, October 2011, available on: https://www.hazarapeople.com/2011/10/05/discrimination-against-hazara-people-in-iran/
[64] Feroz, Emran, ‘Treated like second-class citizens’, Qantara, June 2014, available on: https://en.qantara.de/content/afghan-refugees-in-iran-treated-like-second-class-citizens
[65] Also personally experienced by Rohullah Yakobi, Associate Fellow of the Human Security Centre, who was the repeated subject of racism whilst living in Iran
[66] Abedin, Mahan, ‘How Iran found its feet in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, October 2019, available on: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-10-24/how-iran-found-its-feet-afghanistan
[67] Salahuddin, Sayed, ‘Afghan MPs condemn Ghani’s ‘soft’ response to Iran’, Arab News, June 2020, available on: https://www.arabnews.com/node/1691976/world
[68] Abedin, Mahan, ‘How Iran found its feet in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, October 2019, available on: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2019-10-24/how-iran-found-its-feet-afghanistan
[69] Milani, Mohsen, ‘Iran and Afghanistan’, United States Institute for Peace, available on: https://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/Iran%20and%20Afghanistan.pdf
[70] Ibid
[71] ‘Trade route linking Chabahar Port with Afghanistan a security threat’, Dawn News, May 2016, available on: https://www.dawn.com/news/1261792
[72] ‘Iranian minister hints Afghan bank looking to open branch in Chabahar free port’, Intellinews, June 2020, available on: https://www.intellinews.com/iranian-minister-hints-afghan-bank-looking-to-open-branch-in-chabahar-free-port-186114/
[73] Gohel, Sajjan M, ‘Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan’, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, March 2010, available on: https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-ambiguous-role-in-afghanistan/
[74] Malikzada, Ejaz Ahmad, ‘Iran’s Interests In Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism’, Global Security Review, June 2019, available on: https://globalsecurityreview.com/iranian-interests-afghanistan-black-market-currency-water-extremism/
[75] ‘Iran Seeks Increased Energy Trade With Afghanistan’, Tolo News, October 2019, available on: https://tolonews.com/business/iran-seeks-increased-energy-trade-afghanistan
[76] Malikzada, Ejaz Ahmad, ‘Iran’s Interests In Afghanistan: Water, Black Market Currency, & Extremism’, Global Security Review, June 2019, available on: https://globalsecurityreview.com/iranian-interests-afghanistan-black-market-currency-water-extremism/
[77] Ibid
[78] Jain, Rupam, ‘In parched Afghanistan, drought sharpens water dispute with Iran’, Reuters, July 2018, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-iran-water/in-parched-afghanistan-drought-sharpens-water-dispute-with-iran-idUSKBN1K702H
[79] Majidyar, Ahmad, ‘Iran and Afghanistan at loggerheads over water’, Middle East Institute, July 2018, available on: https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-and-afghanistan-loggerheads-over-water
[80] Clark, Kate, ‘Taliban claim weapons supplied by Iran’, The Telegraph, September 2008, available on: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/2958093/Taliban-claim-weapons-supplied-by-Iran.html
[81] De Grandpre, Andrew, and Tilghman, Andrew, ‘Iran linked to deaths of 500 U.S. troops in Iraq, Afghanistan’, Military Times, July 2015, available on: https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-u-s-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan/
[82] Gohel, Sajjan M, ‘Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan’, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, March 2010, available on: https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-ambiguous-role-in-afghanistan/
[83] Hambling, David, ‘'Deliberate Slip' Reveals Afghan Superbombs’, Wired, January 2009, available on: https://www.wired.com/2009/01/aghan-superbomb/
[84] Boone, Jon, and Dehghan, Saeed Kamali, ‘Death of Mullah Mansoor highlights Taliban's links with Iran’, The Guardian, May 2016, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/death-of-mullah-mansoor-highlights-talibans-links-with-iran
[85] ‘Iran says Taliban must have Afghan role, but can't dominate’, Reuters, January 2019, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-talks-iran/iran-says-taliban-must-have-afghan-role-but-cant-dominate-idUSKCN1P311Z
[86] Bezhan, Frud, ‘Iranian Links: New Taliban Splinter Group Emerges That Opposes U.S. Peace Deal’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 2020, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-splinter-group-peace-deal-iranian-links/30661777.html
[87] Bezhan, Frud, ‘The Return Of Pro-Iranian Militia Fighters To Afghanistan Fuels Fears In Kabul, Washington’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, February 2020, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/the-return-of-pro-iranian-militia-fighters-to-afghanistan-fuels-fears/30422587.html
[88] Ibid
[89] Bezhan, Frud, ‘Taliban Splinter Groups Add To Election Fears In Afghanistan’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, March 2014
[90] Kachiar, Yatharth, ‘Why Are the Taliban Wooing a Persecuted Afghanistan Minority Group?’, The Diplomat, May 2020, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/why-are-the-taliban-wooing-a-persecuted-afghanistan-minority-group/
[91] Uskowi, Nader, ‘Testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence’, House of Representatives (USA), April 2018, available on: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20180417/108155/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-UskowiN-20180417.pdf
[92] Hauch, Lars, ‘Understanding the Fatemiyoun Division: Life Through the Eyes of a Militia Member’, Middle East Institute, May 2019, available on: https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding-fatemiyoun-division-life-through-eyes-militia-member
[93] ‘Afghans Returning Home After Fighting Syrian War’, Tolo News, April 2019, available on: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghans-returning-home-after-fighting-syrian-war
[94] Jamal, Ahmad Shuja, ‘The Fatemiyoun Army: Reintegration into Afghan Society’. United States Institute for Peace, March 2019, available on: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/03/fatemiyoun-army-reintegration-afghan-society
[95] Uskowi, Nader, ‘Testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence’, House of Representatives (USA), April 2018, available on: https://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20180417/108155/HHRG-115-HM05-Wstate-UskowiN-20180417.pdf
[96] Karum, Umer, ‘Death of Qassem Soleimani: What to Expect in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Royal United Services Institute, January 2020, available on: https://rusi.org/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan
[97] Cunningham, Eric, ‘Iran’s new Quds Force commander brings continuity to the post held by his slain predecessor’, Washington Post, January 2020, available on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-new-quds-force-commander-brings-continuity-if-not-charisma-to-the-post-held-by-his-slain-predecessor/2020/01/04/d62778d2-2e65-11ea-bffe-020c88b3f120_story.html
[98] Karum, Umer, ‘Death of Qassem Soleimani: What to Expect in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Royal United Services Institute, January 2020, available on: https://rusi.org/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan
[99] Hilton, Tommy ‘Iran military commander appears in front of proxy flags on state TV’, al Arabiya, January 2020, available on: https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2020/01/09/Iran-military-commander-appears-in-front-of-proxy-flags-on-state-TV.html
[100] ‘Pakistan asks Iran to investigate suspected Indian spy's Iran links’, Reuters, April 2016, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-india-iran-idUSKCN0WY4TJ
[101] Karum, Umer, ‘Death of Qassem Soleimani: What to Expect in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, Royal United Services Institute, January 2020, available on: https://rusi.org/commentary/death-qassem-soleimani-what-expect-afghanistan-and-pakistan
[102] Gohel, Sajjan M, ‘Iran’s Ambiguous Role in Afghanistan’, CTC Sentinel, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, March 2010, available on: https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-ambiguous-role-in-afghanistan/
[103] ‘Iran dismisses U.S.-Taliban agreement over Afghanistan’, Reuters, March 2020, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan-iran/iran-dismisses-u-s-taliban-agreement-over-afghanistan-idUSKBN20O1I6
[104] Srivastava, Ankit, ‘Why Abdul Ghaffar Khan is special for India?’, New Delhi Times, July 2020, available on: https://www.newdelhitimes.com/why-abdul-ghaffar-khan-is-special-for-india/
[105] Hamdani, Yasser Latif, ‘Was Jinnah Democratic?’ Daily Times (Pakistan), December 2011, available on: https://dailytimes.com.pk/110699/was-jinnah-democratic-ii/
[106] ‘TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN’, Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 1950, available on: https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6584/Treaty+of+Friendship
[107] Berlin, Michael J, ‘India Supports Soviets' Afghan Position in U.N. Debate’, Washington Post, January 1980, available on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/01/12/india-supports-soviets-afghan-position-in-un-debate/17dd1eb5-93f9-44bf-9f95-ecda7285843c/
[108] Choudhury, Avinandan, ‘India in Afghanistan After the Soviet Withdrawal’, The Diplomat, May 2019, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/india-in-afghanistan-after-the-soviet-withdrawal/
[109] Tempest, Rone, ‘India Honors Najibullah as Soviet Pullout Nears’, Los Angeles Times, May 1988, available on: https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-05-05-mn-3641-story.html
[110] Bhadrakumar, MK, ‘Manmohan Singh resets Afghan policy’, The Hindu, May 2011, available on: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/manmohan-singh-resets-afghan-policy/article2021653.ece
[111] Choudhury, Avinandan, ‘India in Afghanistan After the Soviet Withdrawal’, The Diplomat, May 2019, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/india-in-afghanistan-after-the-soviet-withdrawal/
[112] Sudarshan, V, ‘How India secretly armed Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance’, The Hindu, September 2019, available on: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/how-india-secretly-armed-ahmad-shah-massouds-northern-alliance/article29310513.ece
[113] Ibid
[114] ‘India announces $100 mln more aid for Afghanistan’, Reuters, January 2007, available on: https://web.archive.org/web/20081205034947/http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ISL284523.htm
[115] Mullen, Rani D, ‘India in Afghanistan: Understanding Development Assistance by Emerging Donors to Conflict-Affected Countries’, The Stimson Center, August 2017, available on: Awww.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/India%20in%20Afghanistan%20Understanding%20Development%20Assistance%20by%20Emerging%20Donors%20to%20Conflict-Affected%20Countries_0.pdf
[116] Iwanek, Krzysztof, ’36 things India has done for Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, January 2019, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/36-things-india-has-done-for-afghanistan/
[117] ‘President Ashraf Ghani’s Congratulatory Message on the Occasion of India’s 73rd Independence Day’, Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, August 2019, available on: https://president.gov.af/en/message/1049
[118] Harsh V. Pant, ‘India’s Changing Role: The Afghanistan Conflict,’ Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, Spring 2011, pp. 31–39
[119] Allen, John R, ‘The US-Taliban peace deal: A road to nowhere’, Brookings Institute, March 2020, available on: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/03/05/the-us-taliban-peace-deal-a-road-to-nowhere/
[120] Sen, Sudhi Ranjan et al, ‘U.S. Withdrawal Opens Way for Terror Alliance in Afghanistan’, Bloomberg Quint, July 2020, available on: https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/u-s-withdrawal-opens-way-for-terror-alliance-in-afghanistan
[121] ‘Afghanistan conflict: Militants in deadly attack on Sikh temple in Kabul’, BBC News, March 2020, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-52029571
[122] ‘UK-India Defence and International Security Partnership’, UK Government, November 2015, available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-india-defence-and-international-security-partnership
[123] Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, ‘India–UK counter-terrorism cooperation: convergences and challenges’, International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), January 2020, available on: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/01/india-uk-counter-terrorism-cooperation
[124] ‘Russian-Indian counterterrorism exercise Indra to be held on November 18-28’, TASS news, October 2018, available on: https://tass.com/defense/1024062
[125] ‘India, Russia call for ‘irreversible, verifiable’ action on terror havens’, Hindustan Times, October 2019, available on: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-russia-call-for-irreversible-verifiable-action-on-terror-havens/story-XIyRYNyrPdoWCqGksTmx0M.html
[126] Ramachandran, Suda, ‘Sino-Indian Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism: Not Truly “Hand-in-Hand” At All’, China Brief Vol 20 No 03, Jamestown Foundation, February 2020, available on: https://jamestown.org/program/sino-indian-cooperation-on-counter-terrorism-not-truly-hand-in-hand-at-all/
[127] Nayar, Mandira, ‘After US cut aid to Afghanistan, India reach out to Ghani to discuss 'evolving situation'’, The Week (India), March 2020, available on: https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2020/03/after-us-cut-aid-to-afghanistan-india-reach-out-to-ghani-to-discuss-evolving-situation.html
[128] Saran, Samir et al, ‘Prospects for EU-India Security Cooperation’, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016, available on: https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/EU-India-Security-Cooperation.pdf
[129] Tourangbam, Monish, and Dwidevi, Neha, ‘Does India Have a New Playbook for a New Afghanistan?’, The Diplomat, June 2020, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/does-india-have-a-new-playbook-for-a-new-afghanistan/
[130] ibid
[131] ‘India welcomes US-Taliban deal in Qatar, MEA reiterates need to bring peace and stability in Afghanistan’, India Today, February 2020, available on: https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-welcomes-us-taliban-deal-in-qatar-mea-reiterates-need-to-bring-peace-and-stability-in-afghanistan-1651219-2020-02-29
[132] Bagchi, Indrani, ‘India elbowed out of Afghanistan peace talks’, Times of India, July 2019, available on: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistan-to-join-us-russia-and-china-to-craft-prace-pact-with-taliban/articleshow/70219048.cms
[133] Haidar, Suhasini, ‘India should talk directly to Taliban, says U.S. Special Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad’, The Hindu, May 2020, available on: https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/india-should-talk-to-directly-to-taliban-says-us-special-envoy-khalilzad/article31537138.ece
[134] Ellis-Peterson, Hannah, ‘India strips Kashmir of special status and divides it in two’, the Guardian, October 2019, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/31/india-strips-kashmir-of-special-status-and-divides-it-in-two
[135] Prasad, Hari, and Leung, Zoe, ‘Kashmir Could Wreck India’s Reputation Among Afghans’, Foreign Policy, November 2019, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/22/kashmir-Muslims-india-pakistan-afghanistan/
[136] Roy-Chaudhury, Dipjanan, ‘India and Iran set to revive regional approach model for stabilising Afghanistan’, Economic Times (India), September 2020, available on: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-and-iran-set-to-revive-regional-approach-model-to-stabilise-afghanistan/articleshow/77966351.cms
[137] Roy-Chaudhury, Dipanjan, ‘Foreign minister S Jaishankar meet Iranian counterpart Javad Zarif in Tehran’, Economic Times (India), September 2020, available on: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/foreign-minister-s-jaishankar-meet-iranian-counterpart-javad-zarif-in-tehran/articleshow/78003315.cms
[138] Aamir, Adnan, ‘China-Iran deal overshadows Pakistan Belt and Road project’, Nikkei Asian Review, July 2020, available on: https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-Iran-deal-overshadows-Pakistan-Belt-and-Road-project
[139] ‘India hands over strategic highway to Afghanistan’, The Hindu, January 2009, available on: https://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/India-hands-over-strategic-highway-to-Afghanistan/article16358624.ece
[140] Singh Roy, Meena, ‘India’s Chabahar Dilemma’, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, July 2020, available on: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/india-chabahar-dilemma-mroy-310720
[141] Omid, Haidarshah, ‘Chabahar Could Replace Karachi As Country’s Key Port’, Tolo News, October 2017, available on: https://tolonews.com/business/chabahar-could-replace-karachi-country’s-key-port
[142] Basravi, Zein, ‘Iran's Chabahar port spared from US sanctions in rare cooperation’, al Jazeera, June 2020, available on: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/06/iran-chabahar-port-spared-sanctions-rare-cooperation-200620161933575.html
[143] Samanta, Pranab Dhal, ‘Chahbahar-Zahedan rail link: Iran's insistence on roping in a specific entity put deal off track’, Economic Times (India), July 2020, available on: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/iran-pressure-for-work-to-revolutionary-guard-entity-put-deal-off-track/articleshow/77073804.cms?from=mdr
[144] Shashikumar, VK, ‘Indian built Zaranj-Delaram Highway under Taliban Control’, Indian Defence Review, October 2011, available on: http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indian-built-zaranj-delaram-highway-under-taliban-control/
[145] Feroz, Emran, ‘In Afghanistan, the Dead Cast a Long Shadow’, Foreign Policy, July 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/hamdullah-mohib-mohammed-najibullah-afghanistan/
[146] Trumbull, Robert, ‘U.S. Asserts Afghans Ignored Pleas Not to Attack Abductors of Envoy’, New York Times, February 1979, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/15/archives/us-asserts-afghans-ignored-pleas-not-to-attack-abductors-of-envoy.html
[147] Kent, Arthur, ‘A 40-year-old murder mystery: the death of a US ambassador’, CNN, February 2019, available on: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/02/13/opinions/40-year-old-murder-mystery-death-of-us-ambassador-kent/index.html
[148] ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980’, US State Department, available on: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/soviet-invasion-afghanistan
[149] ‘Afghanistan 10 years after Soviet pull-out’, UN Human Rights Council, February 1999, available on: https://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=3ae6b81cf0
[150] Barlett, Donald L, and Steele, James B, ‘The Oily Americans’, Time, May 2003, available on: http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-2,00.html
[151] Pentz, Peter A, ‘The Mujahidin Middleman: Pakistan's Role in the Afghan Crisis and the International Rule of NonIntervention, Dickinson Journal of International Law, Vol 6, No. 3, Penn State International Law Review, 1988, available on: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1081&context=psilr
[152] Schake, Kori, ‘Biden’s Bad Foreign-Policy Ideas’, The Atlantic, June 2020, available on: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/bidens-chance-disavow-his-bad-foreign-policy-ideas/612787/
[153] This is a technical term, denoting the deliberate killing of specific individuals in a terrorist organisation in order to disrupt it. Targeted killings are often carried out by drone strike, but can also be conducted by special operations teams, as with the US Navy SEAL Abbottabad raid which led to the death of Osama Bin Laden.
[154] ‘US wants India to play a more active role in Afghanistan: Official’, Economic Times (India), July 2018, available on: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-emerging-as-important-regional-strategic-partner-to-us-official/articleshow/60205965.cms?from=mdr
[155] Masood, Salman, ‘Trump’s Request for India’s Help in Afghanistan Rattles Pakistan’, New York Times, August 2017, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/world/asia/pakistan-trump-afghanistan-india.html
[156] Wemer, David, ‘Adviser on Biden’s foreign policy: Start at home and repair alliances’, Atlantic Council, August 2020, available on: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/adviser-on-bidens-foreign-policy-start-at-home-and-repair-alliances/
[157] ‘Afghanistan (09/03)’, US Department of State, available on: https://2009-2017.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/afghanistan/27143.htm
[158] Momand, Wahid, ‘Mohammad Daud Khan’, AfghanLand, available on: https://web.archive.org/web/20170817040633/http:/www.afghanland.com/history/biography/daoud.html
[159] ‘The Soviet Invasions of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning’, Central Intelligence Agency, October 1980, available on: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000278538.pdf
[160] Solomon, Christopher, ‘40 Years After His Death, Hafizullah Amin Casts a Long Shadow in Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, December 2019, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/40-years-after-his-death-hafizullah-amin-casts-a-long-shadow-in-afghanistan/
[161] ‘The Chernyaev Diary 1979’, National Security Archive, George Washington University, May 2019, available on: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2019-05-25/chernyaev-diary-1979
[162] Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC Politburo meeting, September 1979, Wilson Center Digital Archive, available on: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111568
[163] Whitney, Craig R, ‘20‐Year Treaty Moves Afghans Closer to Soviet’, The New York Times, December 1978, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/1978/12/06/archives/20year-treaty-moves-afghans-closer-to-soviet-friendship-pact-calls.html
[164] ‘The King of Afghanistan’, Daily Telegraph, July 2007, available on: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1558293/The-King-of-Afghanistan.html
[165] Halliday, Fred, and Tanin, Zahir, ‘The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978-1992: Institutions and Conflicts’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol 50, No 8, December 1998, available on: https://www.jstor.org/stable/153920
[166] Klass, Rosanne, ‘Afghanistan: the Accords’, Foreign Affairs, summer 1988, available on: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1988-06-01/afghanistan-accords
[167] Braithwaite, Rodric. Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–1989. Indo-European Publishing, 2007. pp. 296
[168] Vereykina, Elizaveta, ‘Russian Soldiers Start a Second Life in Afghanistan’, the Moscow Times, July 2015, available on: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2015/07/06/russian-soldiers-start-a-second-life-in-afghanistan-a47933
[169] Rubin, Alissa J, ‘Russians Seek Fate of Missing in Afghan War’, the New York Times, October 2012, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/23/world/europe/russians-seek-fate-of-soldiers-from-afghan-war.html
[170] Risen, James, ‘Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels’, the New York Times, July 1998, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/27/world/russians-are-back-in-afghanistan-aiding-rebels.html
[171] O’Flynn, Kevin, ‘Russia in multi-million arms deal with Northern Alliance’, The Guardian, October 2001, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/23/afghanistan.russia
[172] ‘Russia's new role in Afghanistan’, DW News, March 2016, available on: https://www.dw.com/en/russias-new-role-in-afghanistan/a-19087432
[173] Gurganus, Julia, ‘Russia's Afghanistan Strategy: How Moscow Is Preparing to Go It Alone’, Foreign Affairs, January 2018, available on: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2018-01-02/russias-afghanistan-strategy
[174] Ibid
[175] ‘Russian Official Blames Afghan Heroin For 500,000 Deaths’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 2014, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-official-blames-afghan-heroin-for-500000-deaths/25385583.html
[176] Daly, John C K, ‘Russia Shutters Northern Distribution Network’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 12, No 11, Jamestown Foundation, June 2015, available on: https://jamestown.org/program/russia-shutters-northern-distribution-network/
[177] Nakashima, Ellen, et al, ‘Russian bounties to Taliban-linked militants resulted in deaths of U.S. troops, according to intelligence assessments’, Washington Post, June 2020, available on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-bounties-to-taliban-linked-militants-resulted-in-deaths-of-us-troops-according-to-intelligence-assessments/2020/06/28/74ffaec2-b96a-11ea-80b9-40ece9a701dc_story.html
[178] Bunkall, Alistair, ‘Russia offered Taliban-linked fighters bounties to attack British troops - as senior Tory MP seeks answers’, Sky News, June 2020, available on: https://news.sky.com/story/russia-paid-taliban-fighters-to-attack-british-troops-in-afghanistan-12016425
[179] ‘The Dreadful Eight: GRU's Unit 29155 and the 2015 Poisoning of Emilian Gebrev’, Bellingcat, November 2019, available on: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2019/11/23/the-dreadful-eight-grus-unit-29155-and-the-2015-poisoning-of-emilian-gebrev/
[180] Nakashima, Ellen, et al, ‘Russian bounties to Taliban-linked militants resulted in deaths of U.S. troops, according to intelligence assessments’, Washington Post, June 2020, available on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-bounties-to-taliban-linked-militants-resulted-in-deaths-of-us-troops-according-to-intelligence-assessments/2020/06/28/74ffaec2-b96a-11ea-80b9-40ece9a701dc_story.html
[181] Goehl, Sajjan M, and Bailey, Allison, ‘This Time, Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win’, Foreign Policy, July 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/russia-afghansitan-united-states-bountygate/
[182] Ramani, Samuel, ‘Russia Is Winning the Information War in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, August 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/05/russia-is-winning-the-information-war-in-afghanistan/
[183] ‘Russia's Sputnik sows lies, chaos in Afghanistan, officials say’ Central Asia News, March 2018, available on: https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2018/03/13/feature-01
[184] ‘The war in Afghanistan is a milk cow for the U.S. establishment and NATO that they refused to lose’, Sputnik News, July 2020, available on: https://sputniknews.com/analysis/202007011079769373-russiagate-30--afghan-peace-talks-who-benefits-from-pushing-russia-bounty-narrative/
[185] Vatchagaev, Mairbek, ‘Caucasus Emirate and Islamic State Split Slows Militant Activities in North Caucasus’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol 12, No 29, Jamestown Foundation, February 2015, available on: https://jamestown.org/program/caucasus-emirate-and-islamic-state-split-slows-militant-activities-in-north-caucasus-2/#.VOKW5vmUe4Y
[186] Gambhir, Harleen, ‘ISIS DECLARES GOVERNORATE IN RUSSIA’S NORTH CAUCASUS REGION’, Institute for the Study of War, June 2015, available on: http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-declares-governorate-russia’s-north-caucasus-region
[187] ‘Russia Dagestan shooting: Five women killed in attack on churchgoers’, BBC News, February 2018, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43105171
[188] ‘Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Deadly Russian Apartment Blast — Reports’, The Moscow Times, January 2019, available on: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/01/18/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-deadly-russian-apartment-blast-reports-a64189
[189] Joscelyn, Thomas, ‘Islamic State claims attack on Chechen leader’s home in Grozny’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. June 2019, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/06/islamic-state-claims-attack-on-chechen-leaders-home-in-grozny.php
[190] Parfitt, Tom, ‘Isis has double the fighters US thinks in Afghanistan, claims Russia’, The Times, May 2019, available on: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-has-double-the-fighters-us-thinks-in-afghanistan-claims-russia-7sd2sh3c2
[191] Katawazai, Ahmad Shah, ‘Islamic State Sees a Bloody Opportunity in the US-Taliban Deal’, The Diplomat, August 2020, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/islamic-state-sees-a-bloody-opportunity-in-the-us-taliban-deal/
[192] ‘Ghani Meets Russia’s National Security Advisor’, Tolo News, November 2017, available on: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/ghani-meets-russia’s-national-security-advisor
[193] Rowlatt, Justin, ‘Russia 'arming the Afghan Taliban', says US’, BBC News, March 2018, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-43500299
[194] Ramani, Samuel, ‘Russia’s Falling Out With Kabul’, The Diplomat, June 2019, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/russias-falling-out-with-kabul/
[195] Lewis, David G, ‘Return to Kabul? Russian Policy in Afghanistan’, Security Insights, George C Marshall European Center for Security Studies, June 2020, available on: https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2020-06/SecurityInsights_60_1.pdf
[196] ‘Lavrov Slams U.S. For 'Double Standards' Over IS’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 2014, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-islamic-state-double-standards/26647019.html
[197] Walker, Shaun, ‘Russia's 'irrefutable evidence' of US help for Isis appears to be video game still’, November 2017, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/14/russia-us-isis-syria-video-game-still
[198] Ansar, Massoud, ‘Afghan Peace Discussed At Moscow Summit’, Tolo News, November 2018, available on: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/afghan-peace-discussed%C2%A0%C2%A0moscow-summit
[199] Seligman, Lara, ‘As U.S. Mulls Withdrawal From Afghanistan, Russia Wants Back in’, Foreign Policy, January 2019, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/31/us-mulls-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-russia-wants-back-in-taliban-peace-talks/
[200] Sediqi, Abdul Qadir, and Jain, Rupam, ‘Russia plays power broker as U.S.-Taliban talks gather steam’, Reuters, January 2019, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-russia-taliban-idUSKCN1PP19A
[201] ‘Hosting Taliban Delegates, Russia Calls For Withdrawal Of Foreign Forces From Afghanistan’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 2019, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-envoys-arrive-in-moscow-to-meet-afghan-politicians-tribal-elders/29967224.html
[202] O’Connor, Tom, ‘Russia Willing to Help Donald Trump Get U.S. Troops Out of Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, August 2019, available on: https://www.newsweek.com/russia-help-trump-withdraw-afghanistan-1456634
[203] Ramani, Samuel, ‘Here’s why Russia keeps hosting Afghanistan peace talks that will almost certainly fail’, Washington Post, January 2019, available on: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/02/heres-why-russia-keeps-hosting-afghanistan-peace-talks-that-will-almost-certainly-fail/
[204] ‘Russia hosts Taliban delegation following collapse of US talks’, The Guardian, September 2019, available on: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/15/russia-hosts-taliban-delegation-following-collapse-of-us-talks
[205] Jahanmal, Zahibullah, ‘Russian Businessmen Looking to Invest in Afghanistan’, TOLO News, October 2017, available on: https://tolonews.com/index.php/business/russian-businessmen-looking-invest-afghanistan
[206] Ramani, Samuel, ‘Russia’s Soft Power Push in Afghanistan’, the Diplomat, November 2017, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/russias-soft-power-push-in-afghanistan/
[207] Ibid
[208] Bezhan, Frud, ‘Afghanistan's Dostum Turns To Old Ally Russia For Help’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 2015, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-russia-dostum-seeks-military-help/27293696.html
[209] ‘Head of Afghan Militia Asks for Russian Help Against Daesh’, Sputnik, March 2015, available on: https://sputniknews.com/asia/201512031031194889-afghanistan-militia-russian-aid/
[210] Ramani, Samuel, ‘Russia’s Anti-Drug Crusade in Afghanistan’, the Diplomat, December 2017, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/russias-anti-drug-crusade-in-afghanistan/
[211] ‘Afghanistan opium production up 43% - UN drugs watchdog’, BBC News, October 2016, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37743433
[212] illegal drug trafficking caused by the U.S. war in Afghanistan has killed more Russians than the Soviet Union lost in 1979-88
[213] ‘Lavrov calls on NATO to join efforts to fight Afghan drug threat’, Tass News, December 2017, available on: https://tass.com/politics/978839
[214] Mohanty, Baisili, ‘China in Afghanistan: Security, Regional Standing, and Status’, Observer Research Foundation, October 2017, available on: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ORF_OccasionalPaper_126_ChinaAfghanistan_FinalForUpload.pdf
[215] Girard, Bonnie, ‘How 1980 Laid the Groundwork for China’s Major Foreign Policy Challenges’, The Diplomat, September 2018, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/how-the-1980-laid-the-groundwork-for-chinas-major-foreign-policy-challenges/
[216] Clarke, Michael, ‘In Afghanistan, China Is Put to the Test’, National Interest, August 2015, available on: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/afghanistan-china-put-the-test-13605
[217] Ramachandran, Sudha, ‘China's Peacemaking Between Pakistan and Afghanistan’, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 2017, available on: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13468-chinas-peacemaking-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan.html
[218] Sediqi, Abdul Q, and Jain, Rupam, ‘Afghanistan's Taliban meets Chinese government in Beijing’, Reuters, September 2019, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-china/afghanistans-taliban-meets-chinese-government-in-beijing-idUSKBN1W70I3?il=0
[219] Mohanty, Baisali, ‘China in Afghanistan: Security, Regional Standing, and Status’, Observer Research Foundation, October 2017, available on: https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/ORF_OccasionalPaper_126_ChinaAfghanistan_FinalForUpload.pdf
[220] ‘China joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in security alliance’, Reuters, August 2016, available on: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKCN10F1A6
[221] Wu, Wendy, and Lo, Kinling, ‘Xi Jinping sends unity message at regional security summit in China after G7 disarray’, South China Morning Post, June 2018, available on: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2150117/xi-jinping-sends-unity-message-regional-security-summit
[222] Kucera, Joshua, ‘Report: China Building Military Base on Afghan-Tajik Border’, EurasiaNet, January 2018, available on: https://eurasianet.org/report-china-building-military-base-on-afghan-tajik-border
[223] Toktomushev, Kemel, ‘China’s Military Base in Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, January 2018, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-military-base-in-afghanistan/
[224] Farmer, Ben, ‘China ‘building military base in Afghanistan’, as increasingly active army grow in influence abroad’, Daily Telegraph, August 2018, available on: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/08/29/china-building-military-base-afghanistan/
[225] Huang, Kristin, ‘China may ‘push forward’ Afghanistan peace process to protect Belt and Road interests’, South China Morning Post, January 2019, available on: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2184155/china-may-try-push-forward-afghanistan-peace-process-protect
[226] ‘China to Create Mountain Brigade for Afghan Army in Badakhshan’, Ariana News, December 2017, available on: https://ariananews.af/china-to-create-mountain-brigade-for-afghan-army-in-badakhshan/
[227] Gishkori, Zahid, ‘Pakistan mounts secret raids in hunt for Chinese militants’, The News (Pakistan), April 2018, available on: https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/299777-pakistan-mounts-secret-raids-in-hunt-for-chinese-militants
[228] Rahi, Arwin, ‘China's New Silk Road Won't Have An Afghan Lane’, Forbes, January 2016, available on: https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/01/21/no-room-for-afghanistan-on-chinas-new-silk-road/
[229] Risen, James, ‘U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan’, New York Times, June 2010, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html
[230] Wilson, Lorimer, ‘$1 Trillion Motherlode of Lithium and Gold Discovered in Afghanistan’, Mining.com, June 2010, available on: https://www.mining.com/1-trillion-motherlode-of-lithium-and-gold-discovered-in-afghanistan/
[231] Dowd, Alan, ‘Afghanistan’s rare earth element bonanza’, Mining.com, January 2014, available on: https://www.mining.com/web/afghanistans-rare-earth-element-bonanza/
[232] Wines, Michael, ‘China Willing to Spend Big on Afghan Commerce’, New York Times, December 2009, available on: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/asia/30mine.html
[233] Abrar, Mian, ‘Peshawar-Kabul motorway paves way for Afghanistan’s entry to CPEC’, Pakistan Today, September 2019, available on: https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/09/08/peshawar-kabul-motorway-hints-at-elevation-of-warn-torn-afghanistan/
[234] Bokhari, Farhan, ‘China offers Taliban road network in exchange for peace’, Financial Times, September 2020, available on: https://www.ft.com/content/69110b85-bce9-45cb-a2f4-eadcd3edc6e3
[235] Devonshire-Ellis, Chris, ‘China Funded Lapis-Lazuli Transport Corridor Unites Caucasus and Central Asia’, Silk Road Briefing, September 2017, available on: https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2017/12/05/china-funded-lapis-lazuli-transport-corridor-unites-caucasus-central-asia/
[236] Jorgic, Drazen, ‘China interested in joining TAPI pipeline project - Pakistan official’, Reuters, August 2018, available on: https://uk.reuters.com/article/pakistan-china-tapi/china-interested-in-joining-tapi-pipeline-project-pakistan-official-idUSL5N1UY1GR
[237] Putz, Catherine, ‘More TAPI Delays, This Time in Afghanistan’, The Diplomat, January 2020, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/more-tapi-delays-this-time-in-afghanistan/
[238] Ramachandran, Sudha, ‘Is China Bringing Peace to Afghanistan?’, The Diplomat, June 2018, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/is-china-bringing-peace-to-afghanistan/
[239] O’Donnell, Lynn, and Khan, Mirwais, ‘The Taliban, at Least, Are Striking Gold in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, September 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/22/taliban-afghanistan-mining-peace-talks/
[240] Ibid
[241] Huang, Kristin, ‘China may ‘push forward’ Afghanistan peace process to protect Belt and Road interests’, South China Morning Post, January 2019, available on: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2184155/china-may-try-push-forward-afghanistan-peace-process-protect
[242] Sarwar, Mustafa, ‘China Ramps Up Role In Afghanistan Ahead of U.S. Withdrawal’, Gandhara, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 2020, available on: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-ramps-up-role-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-u-s-withdrawal-/30594555.html
[243] Fazl-e-Haider, Syed, ‘Is China set to play a greater role in Afghanistan?’, The New Arab, January 2020, available on: https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/1/30/will-china-play-a-greater-role-in-afghanistan
[244] ‘China holds trilateral meeting to mediate Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict: Beijing agrees to help Kabul in peace process’, Indo Asian News Service, First Post, December 2017, available on: https://www.firstpost.com/world/china-holds-trilateral-meeting-to-mediate-afghanistan-pakistan-conflict-beijing-agrees-to-help-kabul-in-peace-process-4275953.html
[245] Ramachandran, Sudha, ‘China's Peacemaking Between Pakistan and Afghanistan’, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, September 2017, available on: https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13468-chinas-peacemaking-between-pakistan-and-afghanistan.html
[246] Sarwar, Mustafa, ‘China Ramps Up Role In Afghanistan Ahead of U.S. Withdrawal’, Gandhara, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 2020, available on: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-ramps-up-role-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-u-s-withdrawal-/30594555.html
[247] Wehrey, Frederic, and Alkoutami, Sandy, ‘China’s Balancing Act in Libya’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2020, available on: https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/10/china-s-balancing-act-in-libya-pub-81757
[248] ‘Enhancing Security and Stability In Afghanistan’, US Department of Defense, January 2020, available on: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/23/2002238296/-1/-1/1/1225-REPORT-DECEMBER-2019.PDF
[249] Sarwar, Mustafa, ‘China Ramps Up Role In Afghanistan Ahead of U.S. Withdrawal’, Gandhara, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, May 2020, available on: https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/china-ramps-up-role-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-u-s-withdrawal-/30594555.html
[250] Gohel, Sajjan M, and Bailey, Allison, ‘This Time, Russia Is in Afghanistan to Win’, Foreign Policy, July 2020, available on: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/russia-afghansitan-united-states-bountygate/
[251] ‘Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America’, February 2020, available on: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf
[252] Joscelyn, Thomas, ‘Ayman al Zawahiri swears allegiance to the Taliban’s new leader’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, June 2016, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/ayman-al-zawahiri-swears-allegiance-to-the-talibans-new-leader.php
[253] ‘Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council, May 2020, available on: https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/415
[254] Ibid
[255] Ibid
[256] Ibid
[257] Evans, Michael, ‘Peace deal at risk as head of al-Qaeda Ayman al-Zawahiri ‘is in Afghanistan’’, The Times, June 2020, available on: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/al-qaedas-continuing-links-to-taliban-threaten-peace-deal-says-us-general-z56wvb6hr
[258] Joscelyn, Thomas, ‘Al-Qaeda Lauds Taliban’s Great ‘Victory’ Over America and Allies’, Real Clear Defense, March 2020, available on: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/03/17/al-qaeda_lauds_talibans_great_victory_over_america_and_allies_115124.html
[259] Marty, Franz J, ‘The Taliban Say They Have No Foreign Fighters. Is That True?’, The Diplomat, August 2020, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/the-taliban-say-they-have-no-foreign-fighters-is-that-true/
[260] Sediqi, Abdul Q, ‘Members of Islamic State-Haqqani Network Arrested Over Kabul Attacks’, Reuters (Via US News), May 2020, available on: https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-05-06/members-of-islamic-state-haqqani-network-arrested-over-kabul-attacks
[261] Ratan, Sudha, ‘The Trump Administration’s New Afghan Problem: The Islamic State’, The Diplomat, April 2018, available on: https://thediplomat.com/2018/04/the-trump-administrations-new-afghan-problem-the-islamic-state/
[262] ‘Andarabi claims new Daesh leader is a Haqqani member’, Ariana News, August 2020, available on: https://ariananews.af/andarabi-claims-new-daesh-leader-is-a-haqqani-member/
[263] Tweet by Bilal Sarwary, Jun 2020, available on: https://twitter.com/bsarwary/status/1272207814325350402
[264] ‘Letter dated 19 May 2020 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council’, UN Security Council, May 2020, available on: https://www.undocs.org/S/2020/415
[265] Bezhan, Frud, ‘Iranian Links: New Taliban Splinter Group Emerges That Opposes U.S. Peace Deal’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 2020, available on: https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-splinter-group-peace-deal-iranian-links/30661777.html
[266] Amiri, Sharif, ; Taliban Will Pursue Both Peace Talks and Jihad: Deputy Chief’, Tolo News, June 2020, available on: https://tolonews.com/afghanistan/taliban-will-pursue-both-peace-talks-and-jihad-deputy-chief
[267] ‘Islamic State group claims deadly attack on Afghanistan prison’, BBC News, August 2020, available on: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53633450
[268] Weiss, Caleb, Turkistan Islamic Party touts captured equipment, training camp in Afghanistan’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, December 2019, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/12/turkistan-islamic-party-touts-captured-equipment-training-camp-in-afghanistan.php
[269] ‘Who is fighting in northern Afghanistan?’, DW News, October 2015, available on: https://www.dw.com/en/who-is-fighting-in-northern-afghanistan/a-18765739
[270] Roggio, Bill, and Weiss, Caleb, ‘Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan faction emerges after group’s collapse’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, June 2016, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/06/islamic-movement-of-uzbekistan-faction-emerges-after-groups-collapse.php
[271] Gul, Pazeer, ‘Waziristan Accord signed’, Dawn, September 2006, available on: https://www.dawn.com/news/209220/waziristan-accord-signed
[272] Roggio, Bill, ‘Talibanistan: The Establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, September 2006, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/talibanistan_the_est.php
[273] Ibid
[274] Ibid
[275] Roggio, Bill, ‘The Islamic Emirate of Waziristan and Greater Talibanistan’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, September 2006, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/the_islamic_emirate.php
[276] Roggio, Bill, ‘Talibanistan: The Establishment of the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, September 2006, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/09/talibanistan_the_est.php
[277] Roggio, Bill, and Weiss, Caleb, ‘In tribute to Hakeemullah Mehsud, TTP exposes ties to Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda’, Long War Journal, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, April 2020, available on: https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2020/04/in-tribute-to-hakeemullah-mehsud-ttp-exposes-ties-to-afghan-taliban-al-qaeda.php
[278] ‘3,400 militants killed in Operation Zarb-e-Azb: ISPR’ The Express Tribune (Pakistan), December 2015, available on: https://tribune.com.pk/story/1008791/3400-militants-killed-in-operation-zarb-e-azb-ispr
[279] ‘DFID Afghanistan’, Department for International Development, July 2018, available on: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/913336/Afghanistan-Profile.pdf
[280] ‘Transcript of a speech by Sir James Bevan KCMG, UK High Commissioner at the Vivekananda International Foundation in New Delhi, Wednesday 8 January 2014.’ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, January 2014, available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-india-and-afghanistan
[281] ‘United Kingdom’, Soft Power 30, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, available on: https://softpower30.com/country/united-kingdom/
[282] ‘UK-India Defence and International Security Partnership’, UK Government, November 2015, available: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-india-defence-and-international-security-partnership
[283] Transcript of a speech by Sir James Bevan KCMG, UK High Commissioner at the Vivekananda International Foundation in New Delhi, Wednesday 8 January 2014.’ Foreign and Commonwealth Office, January 2014, available on: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/britain-india-and-afghanistan
‘United Kingdom’, Soft Power 30, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, available on: https://softpower30.com/country/united-kingdom/