Written evidence submitted by Professor Simon Mabon (MENA0017)

1. Summary and Credentials

I am Professor of International Politics at Lancaster University where I founded and direct SEPAD (Sectarianism, Proxies and De-sectarianisation Project). SEPAD brings together more than 60 world renowned experts and early career scholars from over 20 countries in pursuit of knowledge production, policy engagement, impact and outreach activities, and media work. Since its formation in 2018, SEPAD has positioned itself as a leading global hub of research and expertise for all matters related to the emergence, evolution, and exploitation of sect-based difference in the region and beyond. 

I am the author and editor of 12 books including the most recent: The Struggle for Supremacy in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia and Iran (Cambridge University Press, 2023); and I have also published in a range of leading Middle East and International Relations journals.[1] I am a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre. In 2016-7 I served as academic advisor to the House of Lords International Relations committee inquiry into the UK’s relations with the Middle East. I regularly consult with governmental agencies and for international news outlets.

This submission, and its recommendations, draws on this research from across the Middle East, looking at the fluctuating political and geopolitical landscapes. In light of these developments, the UK’s engagement with the Middle East must be multifaceted. For the UK to retain a position of influence in the region and beyond it must not focus its attentions on short term economic gains but seek a longer-term set of relationships based around values, security, and economics. In particular, the following points should be considered:

• Better acknowledgement of the ‘facts on the ground’.
• More consideration of political dynamics that play out beyond the institutional fabric of the state.
• Take a longer-term view of engaging with the region that looks beyond short term economic gains or strategic interests.

2. Key Recommendations for the UK Government:

1.       Reflect on a long-term foreign policy agenda that combines security and economic needs with humanitarian concerns.

2.       Use influence on the world stage to ensure humanitarian assistance is provided and received by those in need. This must include conflict zones and states beset by political and financial crises.

3.       Recognise Palestine as a state, put pressure on Israel to stop settlement building and engage in dialogue with all parties.

4.       Call for a new Security Council Resolution in Yemen that better captures dynamics on the ground.

5.       Work with Gulf states – including Iran – to develop a regional security architecture.

6.       Continue to offer asylum to those facing persecution at home and put pressure on key allies to better respect political and human rights.

Q1: What are the key challenges facing the countries of the Middle East and North Africa in the medium and long term and what implications do these have for UK foreign policy?

1. In the past two decades, life across the Middle East has been precarious, beset by a range of intersectional challenges.[2] The invasion of Iraq and its aftermath exacerbated the opening up of social and sectarian divisions which took on increased salience in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings of 2011.[3] Often, these divisions played out between rulers and ruled, contributing to the catastrophic loss of life and the displacement of millions of people. The underlying conditions that prompted the events of 2011 continue to shape the political and social lives of people across the region.

2. These structural challenges show no sign of being addressed and risk being exacerbated by socio-economic transformations. In 2019, protests broke out in Lebanon and Iraq reflecting a widespread frustration at political and economic inertia, corruption, and the dominance of political life by sectarian elites.[4] The extent of this dissatisfaction is revealed in a recent survey of people in Iraq and Lebanon which produced the following results.[5] In Lebanon, 59.2% of respondents were either not very interested or not at all interested in politics, pointing to a rising apathy at the political situation. This was supported by 74.7% of people responding that no party matches their views on important issues. In part, this was a consequence of deep dissatisfaction with government performance and the perceived corruption of officials. Unsurprisingly this maps onto perceptions of government performance: 87.1% of respondents were unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with overall government performance and close to 60% thought that public officials sought personal benefits while in office. Amidst precarious political, social and economic conditions, maintaining security and stability was deemed the most important national issue for 37.4% of people, whilst locally fighting poverty and unemployment was more important, with 45.9% ranking it as most important.

3. In Iraq, 62.3% of respondents were either not very interested or not at all interested in politics, once again pointing to a growing apathy. This was supported by 74.5% of people responding that no party matches their views on important issues. In part, this stems from a rising anger at government performance: 60.3% of people asked were either unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with government performance. Fighting poverty and unemployment was deemed the most important national and local issue across Iraq, with 34.6% choosing it as the most important national issue and 41.2% selecting it as the most important local issue.

4. In the years since the survey, the precarious conditions facing many across Lebanon and Iraq have deteriorated, exacerbated by the combination of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine which has increased the price of food, fuel and medical supplies. The impacts of this combination has been felt across the region, with wheat prices increasing between 25 and 30% since the start of the conflict.[6] Yemen previously imported 95% of its wheat needs, with 30-40% coming from Russia and Ukraine.[7]

5. These conditions have a devastating impact on health and wellbeing. In Yemen, 45% of children are stunted and 86% have anaemia. In Lebanon, 94% of children do not receive the diets they need. In Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Sudan, over nine million children under the age of five are in need of nutritional assistance.

6. In Egypt, more than 70 million people rely on subsidised bread while in Lebanon more than 80% of the population are now in multidimensional poverty.[8] Governments that import food will be vulnerable to changes in global politics.[9] Additionally, rising food prices limit dietary choices, with implications for health, culture and tradition.[10] In light of the fraught political, social and economic environments, the distribution of food and medicine is increasingly politicised.[11]

7. As the cost-of-living increases, social contracts that traded public goods and services for political acquiescence have become increasingly fragile. In such contexts, it is harder to enact change through formal political routes, prompting widespread apathy at politics and growing distrust of political figures. In wealthier states, notably those across the Gulf, rulers have sought to transform economies away from a reliance on oil, embarking on significant infrastructure projects (NEOM, The Line, etc.), reinforcing the power of ruling elites often at the expense of marginalised or indigenous groups.

8. Frustration at political elites continues to resonate, prompting spates of protest and the re-imaging of social contracts. In many instances, this process of re-imagining has turned violent and remains unresolved. Notably in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Libya, the state itself has begun to fragment, creating a political environment that cannot be viewed through the lens of the ‘sovereign’ state.[12] In some cases, the provision of humanitarian aid perpetuates division, entrenching violence.[13] In others, political developments point to an ‘authoritarian resurgence’, with those in power deploying a range of strategies that restrict political and social rights and freedoms.

9. In all states across the region, climate change poses a serious challenge to daily life, exacerbating intersectional challenges. In particular, people face the challenges of rising temperatures – in the Gulf temperatures regularly top 50 degrees Celsius – along with access to water, flooding and extremes. Climate driven migration will become a serious issue in the coming years.[14]

10. The shifting contours of regional politics exacerbate these challenges. The days of a region divided along bipolar lines (US-USSR, Arab-Israel, Saudi-Iran) are consigned to history. In their place are complex, multipolar dynamics where states previously understood as rivals have begun to work together. While there have been a number of notable diplomatic successes of late (the Abraham Accords, and the Saudi-Iran normalisation agreement), regional politics remains fraught. Diplomatic developments at a regional level will not resolve crises within states.[15] States who appear to be close allies have dramatically different visions for the future of particular states and the region as a whole.

11. At a time when British influence on the world stage is being questioned, it faces a challenging future in the Middle East. Balancing the various factors at play within foreign policy is the key challenge when considering Britain’s engagement with the region. This includes the complex and shifting nature of regional politics, a fragmentation of states and the emergence of localised forms of politics, the increased global influence of powerful states in the Gulf, and serious concerns about human rights abuses. Indeed, several key British allies have been criticised for their apparent disregard for human rights.[16]

12. British foreign policy in the Middle East remains trapped between the two pillars of self-interest, governed by economic and security imperatives, and a broader humanitarian commitment to human rights and democracy. These two pillars are increasingly at odds with each other, posing a serious challenge to Britain’s engagement with the region. The UK must address this issue with a long-term perspective.

Q2: What are the main countries in which the UK should focus its efforts within the region?

13. The focus of UK efforts should be divided into two main strands. The first focuses on powerful states who wield influence on regional and global politics, necessitating the development and cultivation of relationships. The second pertains to the provision of humanitarian assistance.

14. The key players in Middle Eastern politics remain Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Israel. As a result, there are good reasons to focus efforts on cultivating relations with these four states. There are strong ties with each of the four, albeit in varying forms, with high levels of investment in London and key UK institutions. The dramatic economic and social transformations underway in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE create opportunities for trade, technological development, business relationships, and education and security ties (closely linked to technology and economic/business). Each of these states wields a degree of influence in the UK as a result of economic investments, long-standing relationships, and political proximity, pointing to the possibility of continued – and improved – relationships which should be of benefit to the UK. At the same time, the UK should push these states on important issues including (but not limited to) the Palestinian question, human rights, democracy, and political reform. Gulf States in particular have been hostile to calls for reform or greater attention to human rights issues, creating a dilemma for officials in the UK.

15. The second strand focuses on the provision of humanitarian assistance. People in Yemen, Syria and Libya have endured years of conflict which has had a devastating impact on the lives of many, destroying homes, schools, medical centres and other essential infrastructure. The direct and indirect consequences of the conflict will continue to be felt for decades. Moreover, reconstruction has taken on a political component, often punitive and serving the interests of those in positions of power.[17]

16. At the same time, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine have endured torrid political, social and economic conditions, requiring humanitarian and financial support. In a number of cases, political situations have prevented aid reaching those who require it most urgently, either as a result of the politicisation of aid distribution (such as Syria) or the breakdown of necessary infrastructure (Yemen).

17. The UK should use whatever influence it has across diplomatic fora to ensure that humanitarian assistance is provided and then received by those in most urgent need. The war in Ukraine has had a devastating impact on humanitarian assistance to the region. A Yemeni donors conference in 2022 requested $4.2 billion to avert further tragedies yet only secured $1.3 billion; this was the sixth consecutive year that Yemen’s humanitarian response plan was not fully funded.[18] Ensuring that those hardest hit by conflict, humanitarian tragedies and climate change receive the necessary funding is a both strategic imperative and a normatively good thing which will be beneficial for the UK’s standing in the region and across global politics.

Q3: What are the possibilities for a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine and how can the UK engage with all the parties involved to help bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict?

18. For many in Israel and Palestine, the two state solution is a myth, albeit one that many Palestinians do not wish to give up because of the repercussions of such an acknowledgement. The reality of the situation is that the two-state solution is moribund, a political and geographical impossibility in light of developments over the past two decades. The continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza has prevented steps from being taken towards this solution. In part, this reflects Israeli security concerns but it is also emblematic of the increasingly right wing dominated Knesset and political landscape, for whom the two-state solution is unpalatable. The blockade and occupation have had a devastating impact on life, affecting children in particular.[19]

19. Politicians use the process to stay in negotiations and retain influence over domestic constituencies. As Palestinian colleagues have regularly remarked, the dialogue is a smokescreen to prevent alternatives from emerging, leading to de facto Israeli control from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.

20. The occupation is enabled by the settlement projects which are deemed illegal under international law. Most settlements are condoned by the Israeli state, although a small number are also illegal under Israeli law and have been demolished. The settlement project has contributed to the establishment of what one Israeli human rights organisation has termed an “apartheid project”.[20]

21. The spatial transformation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem is designed in such a way to prevent the establishment of a two-state solution, limiting movement and, as a result, placing restrictions on work, access to healthcare, and the very imagination of what it means to be Palestinian.[21] In addition, social and economic infrastructure in East Jerusalem has been subjected to specific regulatory processes designed to prevent actions to provide people basic amenities.

22. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority has little credibility left amongst the Palestinian population, reflecting a widespread distrust of the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas.[22] This apathy has helped violent factions to gain support across both West Bank and Gaza.

23. The signing of the Abraham Accords was viewed by some as a step towards improving the situation for Palestinians – by virtue of Arab states exerting influence over Israel – but despite this initial promise, the situation has deteriorated.[23] It may be that if the rumoured Israeli normalisation with Saudi Arabia occurs then the Arab Peace Initiative may be taken more seriously, but the spatial transformation of the West Bank makes the two-state solution an impossibility.

24. The UK has been vocal in its criticism of Israeli settlement building and, calling for the cycle of violence to be broken.[24] Despite robust remarks from UK officials – and others – settlement building continues, leaving hopes for a two-state solution in tatters.

25. The two-state solution cannot be seriously considered without the recognition of two states. At present, the UK only recognises Israel as a state, failing to establish the necessary and relevant diplomatic initiatives. The UK should recognise a Palestinian state as a matter of urgency. Doing so will help push Israel into dialogue with Palestinian representatives, albeit requiring a creative resolution, most likely a one-state system with dual legal codes. The UK should ensure that all politically elected groups are represented in dialogue, including Hamas. It should also encourage elections across the West Bank and Gaza to ensure that the Palestinian Authority has a legitimate mandate, something that has been prevented from taking place.[25]

Q4: How can the UK best perform its role as UN Security Council Penholder for Libya and for Yemen to achieve UN objectives for these two countries?

26. The UK has pushed hard for a diplomatic resolution to conflict in Libya and Yemen and for this it should be commended. Yet within these efforts, the ‘sovereign state’ is positioned centrally which poses a challenge for those looking to build a lasting peace. In Yemen, the state is a largely peripheral actor, as territory is broadly split across five cantons, each controlled by a different faction with their own agenda, many of which are in tension with each other. For example, the Southern Transitional Council has secessionist aspirations, to the chagrin of the Yemeni Government, but the two work together against the Houthis.

27. Continuing to emphasise the centrality of the officially recognised government and the territorial integrity of Yemen misses key dynamics that are continuing to drive the conflict. Additionally, UNSCR 2216 fails to recognise gains made by the Houthis, a key actor in the conflict. While the Houthis have routinely abused human rights and are repressing people across the territory they hold.

28. Conflict has been exacerbated by the role of external actors, notably Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iran. External involvement has taken on a range of different characteristics, including the direct bombing of Houthi targets in the north by Saudi Arabia, financial and logistical support for Houthis and the UAE’s mobilisation of private military organisations in support of the southern cause. The role of external powers has entrenched these divisions, making peace building increasingly difficult.

29. At a grassroots level, important peace building initiatives have been set in motion, but these play out in the shadow of conflict and in the embers of the Yemeni state. Supporting humanitarian missions and grassroots peace building initiatives is imperative.

30. Ultimately, diplomatic efforts have thus far not produced a viable and lasting solution, as a consequence of the penetration of conflict by regional rivals and as a consequence of failing to adequately capture the realities of ‘facts on the ground’.

31. The UK must call for a new UN Security Council Resolution that reflects dynamics on the ground, recognising gains made by the Houthi movement and the Southern Transitional Council, along with a delegation that can enforce a settlement.

Q5: How can the UK work with its allies to curb Iran’s nuclear programme and deter Iran from supporting terrorist groups and other hostile actions in the region?

32. Iran has long been viewed with trepidation by regional and global powers as a result of its nuclear activity and the support for hostile groups across the region. Curbing nuclear aspirations and further proliferation (a recent statement from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman suggested that the Kingdom would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran acquired one) is essential, but can only be achieved through diplomatic initiatives and the development of a security architecture that includes the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran’s nuclear programme, while permitted under the IAEA and NPT, has provoked much concern. There was broad disappointment at the US withdrawal from the JCPOA (aside from in Saudi Arabia and Israel), but most states in the region with the exception of Israel would welcome a new nuclear agreement. For Iran, such an agreement is necessary to bring about an easing of the crippling sanctions which have caused widespread devastation across society.[26]

33. The foreign policy aspirations of the Islamic Republic are under growing pressure from domestic challenges. The US sanctions regime, designed to impose “maximum pressure” has had a devastating impact on socio-economic conditions, detrimentally affecting many and hollowing out the savings of many erstwhile middle class figures. The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy has been subjected to vocal criticism from Iranians angry at the provision of huge sums of money to groups across the region while people across Iran continue to suffer.

33. Integrating Iran into a collective regional security architecture with states across the Gulf and, into broader systems of global governance around nuclear deterrence and arms control is an important step. Placing stringent inspection regimes on Iran would go some way to reassure sceptics in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Jerusalem and Washington.

34. The recent normalisation of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran is key in improving the security environment across the Middle East and, as a consequence, creating conditions where Iran is better integrated into regional politics and less likely to engage in destabilising activity. This integration is a necessary step in both making the region less hostile and preventing further nuclear developments.

35. There is much evidence to support the claim that Iran has been behind a good part of the region’s unrest over the past two decades, yet the exact nature of this involvement has been misunderstood. While the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy goals are clear and express a desire to support ‘downtrodden’ groups, the essence of this support ranges between contexts. For instance, in Iraq the Islamic Republic has exerted influence across the formal and informal parts of political life, much to the chagrin of Iraqis, many of whom protested against Iranian involvement in Iraqi politics. In contrast, Iranian involvement in Yemen is far more limited, a form of strategic opportunism that saw Tehran provide support for the Houthis albeit exerting little influence over the group. Acknowledging the different modes of Iranian engagement is an important step in working to deter Iranian support for terrorist and hostile groups. Local dynamics condition the nature of Iranian (and other states) support for groups such as the Houthis, Hizballah, and Iraqi PMUs.[27]

36. There is no one size fits all approach to reducing the threat posed by hostile actors across the region, some of which operate with Iranian support. Instead, a better understanding of local dynamics and Iranian foreign policy is a necessary and essential step in working towards the establishment of a robust regional security architecture.

Q6: How can and should the UK engage with countries whose regimes do not respect human rights but who may be important for our resilience strategy, counter-terrorism efforts, economic growth and green-energy transition, or who may need humanitarian assistance?

37. Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the UK pertains to the need to balance a commitment to human rights and normative values along with a continued need to engage with regimes who may not always adhere to such values. There is scope to develop relationships with a number of influential states across the region, but that may come at a reputational cost in the short, medium and long term.

38. The UK is in a difficult position having to balance economic and security needs with the commitments to upholding human rights, good governance and democracy. Key allies have been accused of abusing human and political rights and have criticised the UK when officials have spoken about the need for reform. Economic and security needs have been used to justify this silence, yet this should not continue.

39. Whilst it may be desirable to some to support those able to provide stability over the possibility of an uncertain democracy, this must be avoided. Such a policy is deeply problematic for two reasons: 1) it leaves the UK open to charges of hypocrisy, and accusations of supporting democracy only when parties deemed palatable to London and other Western powers are victorious (see the case of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas); and 2) authoritarian leaders have marginalised large groups of people across the region. In some cases this has led to atrocity crimes (see the Raba’a Massacre in 2013) and a broader repression of political and humanitarian rights (LGBTQ+ groups have experienced widespread repression). The consequences of this are dire for people, many of whom have been forced to flee and now live in diasporic communities, including in the UK.

40. The UK is home to a number of civil society groups from the Persian Gulf (in particular) whose members had their citizenship revoked by allies in the Gulf. In Bahrain, 985 people had their citizenship revoked in the years after the Arab Uprisings.[28] Whilst the King rescinded this revocation in a number of cases, over 400 remain stateless and a large number of stateless individuals reside in London (and elsewhere) as a direct result of the actions of allies. Many of these individuals and their family members experienced torture and human rights abuses, both directly and indirectly.

41. The UK must continue to offer asylum to those fleeing persecution in their home countries. It should also call on allies to respect human and political rights. Such calls are important not only for improving the situation in relevant states but also in working to aligning the UK’s values and actions in its foreign policy more broadly.

October 2023