Written evidence submitted by the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews (CTE0009)

Introduction

The following CSTPV members contributed to this study:

Dr Tim Wilson (Centre Director, Senior Lecturer): Dr Wilson’s research involves the past, present and future of terrorism and political violence.

Dr Javier Argomaniz (Senior Lecturer): Dr Argomaniz’s research interest is terrorism and political violence in Europe.

Dr Bernhard Blumenau (Lecturer): Dr Blumenau’s research interests lie in the nature and evolution of anti-terrorism efforts.

Dr Peter Lehr (Senior Lecturer): Dr Lehr is a regional expert on the Indo-Pacific, who researches violent ‘grey area phenomena’ such as terrorism, political violence, and organised crime – in particular, maritime terrorism and piracy.

omeni (Lecturer): omeni’s work straddles military history, sociology and operations.

Reason for Submitting Evidence:

The Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) studies the causes, dynamics, characteristics and consequences of terrorism and related forms of political violence. Founded in 1994, the Centre is Europe’s oldest for studying terrorism and is situated at the forefront of terrorism and political violence research. The Centre is well-placed to present evidence on the UK’s international counter-terrorism (CT) policy due to its inter-disciplinary approach to terrorism studies, its regional and thematic expertise and the experience of having previously submitted terrorism-related evidence for the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Integrated Security Review for Nigeria (2021).

Executive Summary

As UK Foreign Secretary William Hague said in 2013, ‘unless our foreign policy addresses the circumstances in which terrorism thrives overseas, we will always fight a rearguard action against it’. A decade later, terrorism still threatens British overseas interests and partner governments.

Afghanistan, under the Taliban, contends with terror attacks even as Western allies worry that the country could become ‘a base for terrorism’. In Somalia, al-Shabaab’s resurgence informed the UK’s decision to shift its counter-terrorism capability there. Despite a decade-long counter-insurgency informed by British military training, Boko Haram’s threat endures in Nigeria. Furthermore, al-Qaeda and Daesh (Islamic State) remain perennial threats to British domestic and foreign interests, despite the UK’s targeted sanctions regime. Both HMG’s Integrated Review (2021) and its Refresh (2023) recognise a need to counter these foreign threats.

With HMG’s limited resources, the Integrated Reviews prioritised threat themes and locations. Yet, where the UK has shifted military resources, such as in Africa in recent years, Russia, via the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group, has moved to win over regimes in Mali, Mozambique and the Central African Republic by offering support for military responses to Islamist terror groups. The Integrated Review refresh (2023) recognises Wagner’s ‘threat’. However, the extent of that threat remains understated.

In Libya, whereas the Kremlin has disavowed responsibility for Wagner’s actions, security in Tripoli has been undermined. For instance, in 2019, Wagner deployed troops supporting warlord Khalifa Hifter’s Tripoli assault. Elsewhere in Africa, not only does Wagner challenge British influence, there are growing concerns that Wagner is ‘fuelling terrorism in Africa’.

As evidenced in Libya and other fragile states with terror threats, British CT influence has shifted away from the ‘boots on the ground’ preferred post-9/11. A replacement approach since 2013 is the capacity-building of partner governments. Since 2015, the UK’s Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), led by the FCDO, has been at the approach’s fore. However, the CSSF reveals long-term challenges for UK foreign counter-terrorism despite its achievements.

Our evidence also identifies improvement areas within CT aspects of both Integrated Reviews. For instance, despite recognition of foreign terror threats and Britain’s response, both Integrated Reviews neglect implications of the fall of the so-called Islamic State Caliphate for British women with children in Northeast Syria camps. Such implications emerge in the case of Shamima Begum and other muhajirats – women who migrated to join Daesh and now seek to return home, arguing that they pose no terror threat and are ‘victims’. The UK’s designation of Begum as ‘a serious threat to national security’  has divided opinion and shut the door on returning muhajirats with children who pose no threat to Britain.

Implicitly and explicitly factoring in such salient issues, this CSTPV collaborative evidence report addresses the Foreign Affairs Committee’s nine questions about the UK’s international CT policy.

1. In which regions and countries overseas is the terrorist threat to the UK acute or developing?

Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, al-Qaeda affiliates in the Sahel, and Daesh pose enduring terror threats. In December 2020, UK Minister for Africa, James Duddridge, visiting British troops training the Somali Army, ‘underlined’ the UK response to al-Shabaab. In Nigeria, despite Presidency claims that Boko Haram is ‘technically defeated’, its threat has expanded into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. And despite losses, Daesh has grown ‘its global network, brand, and operations, especially in Africa’. Outside Africa, the Islamic State’s ingress into Southeast Asia is of further concern: parts of the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) now claim to be the Islamic State, East Asia Province. A twin bombing in Jolo in August 2020 suggests that this claim cannot be dismissed as mere grandstanding. This regional threat could further manifest as kidnap-for-ransom operations targeting British nationals or attacks against merchant vessels and warships transiting these waters.

With such a broad spread of terror threats globally, a tempting approach to CT might be to increase arms exports to regimes fighting terrorism overseas. However, case studies like the Mali one suggest a need for arms export caution, especially for fragile states facing acute terror threats.

2. What factors and trends can be identified in the global terror picture? What are the ambitions, locations, tactics, ideologies and level of organisation of the terror threat?
3. How does UK foreign policy impact on the threat of terrorism to the UK and UK interests?

(Combined Responses for Questions 2 and 3 Below)

The UK’s foreign policy influences its vulnerability to terrorism in several ways. First, involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq exposed Britain to terrorist acts. British peacekeeping roles, such as in Mali, can also draw terrorist attention to UK interests. Second, the UK’s representation of ‘Western’ values and its close relationship with the US makes it a target for groups, such as Daesh and al-Qaeda, opposed to these principles. Third, foreign UK citizens, diplomats, and agents can be targeted to sway UK policies or gain financial concessions. Fourth, UK support for foreign opposition groups, such as those in Belarus and Syria, coupled with policies towards countries like Russia, China (over Taiwan), and Iran, could invite state-sponsored terrorism. This threat extends to UK domestic and international interests, particularly in critical infrastructure and cybercrime.

Foreign leftist or rightist extremist groups might also target Britain based on its immigration, LGBTQ+ rights and abortion policies. Moreover, perceived climate policies or controversial guidelines around fracking could make the UK a target for foreign or intranational environmentalist extremists.

4. Which overseas terror groups or organisations most directly threaten UK interests? How has the nature of the threat from these groups changed in the past 5-10 years? How is this threat expected to evolve in the coming 5-10 years?

Al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliates remain Britain’s primary threat overseas terror threat. However, the groups’ tactics have evolved. As PM David Cameron said under the impression of the terrorist attacks in November 2015, ‘[i]t is clear that the threat from [Daesh] is evolving’.

Whereas CT experts expected other marauding attacks like in Paris (2015), Daesh favoured ‘killing by mundane means’. This includes using ramming attacks with vehicles and stabbings. Less lethal than marauding incidents, such ‘mundane’ attacks are nevertheless easier to conduct even by individual actors (‘lone wolves’). Since such incidents are also easier to plan with no particular ‘tell-tale’ material required (such as precursors for explosives), they are also more difficult to stop during the planning stage. For Daesh, such ‘low impact, high probability’ incidents work well enough due to their media exposure.

Conversely, the Manchester Arena bombing of May 2017 demonstrates the threat of al Qaeda-linked ‘high impact, low probability’ events. Unlike Daesh, al Qaeda remains interested in terrorist spectaculars, with many people watching and dying. Thus, domestically, the UK will likely confront a mix of Daesh and al-Qaeda-linked terrorist incidents ranging from car-ramming and stabbings to suicide bombings. Also, although currently unlikely, complex-coordinated marauding attacks, similar to Paris 2015, cannot be ruled out.

UK overseas interests also face terror threats. The Houthis of Yemen, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and various Chinese maritime militias, dubbed ‘little blue men’, are examples. All three have the capability to attack British shipping, and in the case of the IRGC’s naval branch (IRGC-N) have already done so.

5. How effective are the Government’s efforts to track and forecast future terrorism trends (including state-sponsored terrorism), with reference to the Integrated Review (2021) and Integrated Review Refresh (2023)? How can these be improved?

The 2023 Integrated Review wisely notes that ‘we cannot rule out the possibility of a significant resurgence’ in Islamist terrorism. One way to head off that long-term threat would be to make a more concerted effort with international partners to deal with the challenge of re-integrating the camp populations that constitute a legacy of the overthrow of the ISIS Caliphate (and a foreseeable future disaster). This is consistent with the idea that effective CT overseas goes beyond troop deployment or military aid. The humanitarian debate around camp conditions in Northeast Syria cannot be overstated, with thousands of children being ‘indefinitely held in conditions that are life-threatening and so deeply degrading that they may amount to torture’.

Despite the Integrated Review (2021) noting the UK has resettled 25,000 refugees from Syria, gendered responses within this governance of terrorism and violent extremism remain underspecified. For instance, many camp populations are vulnerable females with young children. This demographic has gained currency within humanitarian and CT debates due to the public discussion around Western women such as Shamima Begum and other muhajirats — women who travelled to ‘al-Sham’ (Syria) but now aspire to return to the UK. Both Integrated Reviews do not address the implications of Daesh’s fall, including consequences for muhajirats.

The Integrated Review Refresh rightly notes that ‘the threat from self-radicalised individuals with a variety of ideologies remains high’. However, there is a neglect of how vulnerable muhajirats from marginalised communities were radicalised as ‘victims’ to begin with. Without a clear understanding of links between radicalisation, vulnerability and victimhood, the government’s ability to ‘track and forecast’ this potential threat category may be limited.

Beyond the Islamic extremism threat, both Integrated Reviews are also evasive about violence from the Extreme Right. Spectacular terrorist attacks like those staged by Breivik (2011) and Tarrant (2019) remain an ever-present danger. But hitherto-unthinkable attempts to subvert democracy with violence have also occurred: the US Capitol Riot (6 January 2021) and the German coup plot (December 2022) are examples. It seems extraordinary that the Integrated Reviews, supposed ‘blueprints’ of UK security strategy, ignore implications of such developments for the UK. For instance, where is the contingency plan for a Trump presidency in 2024? Such questions are not unconnected to the emergence and activity of the Extreme Right and are worth considering in the next Integrated Review. 

6. What steps might HMG take to counter the global promotion of terrorism (e.g. foreign online radicalisation and recruitment), and how might this be improved?

Counteractive strategies to combat terrorism are based on two pillars. The first, a short-term approach, leverages and expands the dense international legal frameworks to thwart or preempt imminent acts of terrorism. This successful piecemeal strategy targets distinct aspects of terrorism, such as dismantling ‘safe havens’ for prosecution and obstructing infrastructures that enable attacks.

The second approach, with a long-term focus, aims to address the underlying causes of radicalisation and terrorism. This necessitates bilateral or multilateral collaboration with nations where terrorists originate. It comprises three key areas: first, investing in education and social programmes in regions susceptible to radicalisation, providing opportunities and reducing the appeal of extremist ideologies. Additionally, fostering cross-cultural, inter-religious, and inter-political understanding and tolerance to alleviate feelings of alienation and perceived injustice that can fuel radicalisation.

Finally, reinforcing the rule of law and human rights in vulnerable regions helps establish a secure environment for democratic dissent and offers alternative outlets for expressing grievances. Such long-term approaches to countering emergent terror threats are more sustainable than short-term foreign military intervention.

7. What has been the effectiveness of the FCDO in leading HMG’s counter-terrorism approach across government? Where can these efforts be improved?
8. How effectively has the FCDO exerted influence on counter terrorism policies bilaterally and multilaterally in recent years? How resilient are these relationships and networks?

(Combined Responses for Questions 7 and 8 Below)

The FCDO is only partially responsible for the external dimension of Britain’s wide-ranging counterterror efforts. It oversees the global CT response, implements the UK’s sanction regime, and upholds the ‘no concessions’ policy for Kidnap for Ransom. The FCDO’s most operationally relevant work is to apply and shape the global sanctions policy. An essential part of the UK CT regime is the domestic implementation of UNSC Resolutions. For example, Daesh and Al-Qaeda sanctions’ regime affects the UK’s obligations under UN Security Council resolution 2368.

Bilateral FCDO relations fund partner countries’ CT efforts, and Africa represents a priority area. An example is Kenya’s Anti-Terrorism Police Unit HQ in Mombasa. The UK’s foreign military assistance programme also leverages partners’ existing CT strategies – evidenced in UK-Ghana security and defence dialogues. As a counterbalance to actual or potential Wagner Group influence, this involvement is mainly carried out by the Ministry of Defence and Home Office and lacks substantial FCDO input. Therefore, there is potential for more significant FCDO input. 

Globally, the UK plays a crucial role in multilateral counterterror fora (UN, EU, GCTF, OSCE and others). HMG remains a prominent actor in sponsoring and shaping regulation and hosting high-level policy and expert meetings. Furthermore, the FCDO uses its sway to shape international responses. However, there are signs that this influence may be on the wane. One factor is the negligible financial allocations relative to other significant actors: the UK is the 14th-ranked country for total contributions to the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT).

The other factor is Brexit. The UK is now unable to affect EU policy on this matter. Previously, it was a pacesetter. The UK has also lost complete access to critical instruments such as the European Arrest Warrant, SIS II and Europol databases. Overall, whereas the Windsor Framework facilitates EU-UK security cooperation, the UK relinquishing its role as a leading shaper of policy will represent a considerable loss of influence for the country in CT and other security areas.

9. How does the FCDO structure and respond to the threat of terrorism to the UK, including through CSSF (Conflict, Stability and Security Fund) programming?

Launched in 2015 as part of the Cabinet Office, the CSSF constitutes HMG’s cross-government fund to address foreign security issues with short and long-term threat implications for UK national security. The FCDO is a principal actor within CSSF allocation as the two largest CSSF delivery partners, the FCO and DFID, merged in 2020 to form the FCDO. The graphic below shows CSSF spending, by government department, in the first 12 months (2015-2016).

Figure 1: CSSF Spend by HMG Department in the First 12 Months (2015 – 16).

Over the past few years, the multiplier effect of CSSF collaborative emphasis is evident: currently operating in over 85 countries, the CSSF delivered more than 90 programmes employing ODA and non-ODA funding via a ‘blended model’.

The CSSF’s relevance to CT is evidenced in the Fund’s upward trend of CT funding. Whereas the CSSF enables military collaboration with European and African partners, this approach fails to address the risk of future and potential extremists. Seeking to fill this security gap, the CSSF Collective Resilience Against Extremism (CREATE) programme in East Africa provides intervention packages for individuals most at risk of radicalisation. These packages offer mentorship, social support, and referrals to socio-economic opportunities and advice.

As lead government agency (Figure 1), the FCDO has enabled programmes like CREATE (Case Box 2), such as the Pursue Capability Programme funded by the CT Programmes Fund (CTPF) within the CSSF. The programme supports the overseas elements of CONTEST, the UK CT strategy, and has been delivered with partner governments. The rationale is that if stabilised partner governments can prevent individuals from radicalisation overseas, it reduces direct terror threats to Britain.

Notwithstanding the Fund’s achievements, shortcomings in aid programme delivery are undermining its contribution. For instance, there is little reliable data on whether projects achieve their intended results or deliver value for money. Thus, a helpful adjustment might be introducing country or regional plans specifying how the CSSF’s portfolio of aid programmes contributes to National Security objectives.

June 2023

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