Oliver-Gordon-Brown and Ella Startt – Written Evidence (ARC0015)

What is China’s strategy towards the Arctic and what are the implications for the UK and its allies?

Implications for the UK and her allies

Scientific research

1. In the area of environmental sustainability, China, the UK, and the latter’s northern partners share many mutual interests. Like the UK, which is concerned by global sea rise and the impact of climate change on its weather patterns and biodiversity[1], China is very aware of the risks posed by melting glaciers in the Arctic to its own land. According to most climate simulation models, China’s coastlines will flood in the next century, forcing the relocation of approximately 20 million people and gravely impacting resilient agricultural production [2]. A surprising feature of China’s 2018 white paper outlining its Arctic policy is the focus on environmental issues, more specifically on the efforts to increase scientific research activities to ensure environmental and ecosystem protection [3].
2. Successful cooperation between China on the one hand, and the UK and its allies on the other is highly possible, as China has already shown itself to be a vital partner in biodiversity preservation governance in the Arctic. Since its 2018 white paper, China has supported the adoption of legally binding international agreements on Arctic fisheries management. China signed the 2018 Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAOFA), and also signed the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies in 2022, representing two important milestones in ocean sustainability cooperation [4]. China has also proven itself to be a valuable partner in scientific research concerning pollution, climate change, and environmental security in the Arctic, which the UK and its allies could further explore. In 2015, China sent to collaborate with South Korea on its sixth Korean Actic Scientific research and also collaborated with the Institute of Marine Research in Norway a year later [5]. Iceland and China also established a Joint Aurora Observatory (CIAO) in 2016, which will be accessible to the international scientific community when inaugurated[6].

Economic development

3. The thawing of the Arctic icecap has revealed an abundance of valuable natural resources. The region is expected to have 22 percent of the world’s untapped oil and gas reserves currently accessible with existing technology, which numerous experts predict to be one of the main reasons for China’s increasing involvement[7]. It has also been noted that China, as a country that heavily relies on exports, could strongly benefit from transit via the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which runs along the north coast of Russia to cut down transit time, carbon footprint, and related costs, as the journey between Shanghai and Hamburg is 6,400 kilometres shorter than the route that goes through the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. As such, China has an interest in developing economic activities in the Arctic [8].
4. The UK could benefit from China’s efforts to push Arctic states to recognize the interests of non-arctic states. As a valuable trading partner for many Arctic states, China has an immense amount of bargaining power when seeking greater involvement and access in the Arctic. For instance, China has become Canada’s second-largest trading partner, its seventh-largest source of foreign investment, and provides half of Canada's mineral exports [9]. China has also built ties with Greenland, which continues its efforts to break away from Denmark and become an independent state. Greenland has begun to look towards China as a source of foreign investment, and due to the abundance of iron ore, oil, natural gas, uranium, rare earths, and other minerals there, China is likely to reciprocate [10]. China has also fostered a strong partnership with Iceland, which was the first European state to sign a free trade agreement with China [11]; the latter also operates a research station in Iceland [12]. The fact that China’s white paper also highlights its intent to cooperate with other non-arctic states regarding scientific exploration and commercial activity also provides an opportunity for the UK to leverage China’s influence in the region to its advantage.

Stability and Security

Closer alliance with Russia

5. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, experts have become increasingly concerned about a strengthening Sino-Russian alliance, which could expand into arctic geopolitics. Historically, Russia has been rather resistant to China’s requests to become more involved in Arctic politics. It barred Chinese vessels from conducting research along the NSR in 2012 and rejected China’s campaign to become an Arctic Council observer in 2013 [13]. However, Russia’s isolation from the international community through war-related sanctions has fuelled expectations that Russia will be more reliant on China and thus be cornered into accepting China’s expansion in the Arctic. In Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s meeting in March 2023, Putin told Xi: “We see cooperation with Chinese partners in developing the transit potential of the Northern Sea Route as promising,” marking a shift from Russia’s previous reluctance towards Chinese increasing Arctic presence [14]. Several Western experts are concerned that the Arctic will turn into another front where China and Russia’s anti-democratic alliance will manifest itself [15], however, China remains cautious when confronting its democratic european partners to not jeopardise its economic relations with them [16]. Considering most Arctic states are European states that China has a vested interest in maintaining friendly relations with, it is highly likely that China will continue to carefully balance its Russia alliance with its relations with European counterparts, and therefore wouldn’t adopt an overtly coercive and imperialist stance in the arctic.

Military Development and Aspirations

6. China’s operation of any military activities in the Arctic are extremely limited: up to now, they have only involved the construction of its two ice breakers and the dispatch of naval vessels on diplomatic visits in the region[17]. Chinese texts aimed at international audiences downplay China’s military ambitions in the Arctic. Its 2018 white paper does not mention any military aspirations but does mention its intent of working with Arctic states to improve search and rescue operations which indirectly implies the development of military activity in the region[18]. However, its military texts regard the Arctic as an upcoming region for great power competition and clearly encourage the development of military activity [19]. Some Chinese military scholars also recognize the strategic importance of controlling the Arctic, as it connects three continents and two oceans [20]. If China is ever successful in mounting military operations in the Arctic, the UK and its allies will feel increasingly pressured to accept and cooperate with China’s regional aspirations and goals.

7. In the short- to medium-term, China’s expansion of dual-use technology in the Arctic should be the UK and its allies’ predominant concern. Through its polar research programs, China has been conducting oceanographic surveys and acoustic modelling in the Arctic which can have military applications. For instance, during the Cold War, the Soviet military conducted acoustic modelling surveys in the northern Atlantic to enhance its ability to detect UK nuclear submarines operating in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap[21]. In 2020, the Swedish Space Cooperation (SSC) decided against renewing its contracts with China out of concern that the station could be used for military intelligence gathering[22]. The US’s 2022 Arctic policy also asserted China’s expansion of scientific activities “to conduct dual-use research with intelligence or military applications in the Arctic”[23]. While European and Western Arctic states have taken proactive measures to hinder Chinese military expansion in the Arctic, Russia’s evolving partnership with China should continue to be a key concern for the UK and its allies. As Russia’s negotiation power lessens in light of its increasing international isolation, its increasing reliance on China makes it more susceptible to allow Chinese military installations in the Arctic. China is likely to leverage Russia’s position as an Arctic state as a gateway for any military aspirations. The most recent edition of China’s National Defense University textbook on Military Strategy calls for increased participation of military forces in polar scientific research [24]. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could use both conventional and nuclear-powered icebreakers (the latter of which China has expressed an interest in developing) for maritime nuclear propulsion and logistical support for military operations alongside electronic, radio, and magnetic field monitoring equipment for military communications, command and control operations and ISR [25].

14 May 2023