Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge – Written Evidence (ARC0010)
1. The Scott Polar Research Institute (SPRI) is a sub-department of the Department of Geography in the University of Cambridge, and was founded in 1920. As such, it has longstanding experience of the Earth’s polar regions, and in particular of the environmental, social, cultural and historical characteristics of the Arctic and subarctic. While SPRI does not have a brief for security matters, there is in practice some overlap between SPRI’s research and policy concerns and security issues in the Arctic, and former members of SPRI have separately engaged with the House of Lords Arctic Enquiry. We thus do not address the questions directly related to security or defence in this submission.
2. Questions 5 and 6 of the Arctic Enquiry call for evidence (CFE) address economic opportunities and risks. Responding to question 5 (‘Will the opening up of the Arctic lead to new economic and commercial opportunities for the UK? What are the risks, and how should they be mitigated?’), we observe that competition from Asia and the EU will be strong, and it is essential therefore that any UK economic/commercial activity is aligned with the Arctic Council (AC)’s mandates of sustainable development and environmental protection. The UK’s contribution can be four-fold: (1) shipping, including a role for Lloyds of London, and maritime Search and Rescue and Emergency Response activities; (2) law/Business Management, Education & Training (which could contribute to the issue of arctic countries’ youth not moving to and working in the High North); (3) infrastructure engineering and technology (including communications, navigation, remote power generation, and IoT/digitisation & satellite systems); (4) extractive/hydrocarbon industries (adhering to the ‘precautionary principle’, and in line with AC mandates).
3. Strategic risks to the UK from enhanced economic activity in the Arctic could arise from undermining of the AC’s governance role in the region as a result of continuing negative impact on Arctic Sustainability, Predictability, and Stability resulting from Ukraine war. This could undermine major financial confidence and Final Investment Decision-making in the region by UK-based commercial activity.
4. Mitigation of these risks could include a clear economic dimension in any new UK Arctic policy framework, and increased commercial knowledge of and adherence to UNCLOS, the Polar Code, and other (regional) national maritime and trade laws and regulations that affect trade. Institutionally, within HMG, the Polar Regions should now be seen as an additional sphere of UK interest on the basis of both its geography and established UK critical themes (climate, State actors, Energy, Terrorism). Via cooperation with both AC members (over matters of say, Search And Rescue training, Coast Guard dialogue, and infrastructure financing), and also military and security channels, the UK can also contribute to making the region a safe, secure, and economically sustainable environment in which to conduct business. Centres of Polar expertise in UK Higher Education will need additional funding so that they can also play a role in producing future Polar policymakers and increasing understanding of the polar regions across relevant sectors including commerce and HM forces.
5. Question 6 asks ‘How can the UK Government and British business take advantage of new opportunities in the Arctic in a way that takes those risks into account?’. We observe that with increased melting of sea ice, attention is being given to the potential of transarctic shipping. However, speculative plans have tended to ignore some realities of arctic navigation. Climatic changes are predicted to cause reductions in continuous sea ice in the region, replaced by more unpredictable and dynamic areas of floating sea ice, as well as increasing extreme weather, making both conditions more unpredictable and navigation more dangerous. Slower shipping speeds and more icebreakers would be required, and the associated building and operating costs may negate any financial benefits of using the route. It is valuable to recall that despite significant economic investment into the development of a Northwest Passage to the East Indies by nations including the UK, particularly in the 18th and 19th centuries, the route remains to this day relatively insignificant in global trade.
6. Associated infrastructure to support transarctic shipping, such as ports, are receiving investment in northern Russia. In Europe, infrastructure has also been planned although development of the prominent ‘Arctic Corridor’ project, a railway route bringing transarctic freight from northern Norway to central Europe, has been paused due to questions around financial viability and conflicts related to land rights of Indigenous Sámi.
7. When considering its level of involvement in such ventures, the UK should examine the suggested long-term viability and economic benefits of these kinds of Arctic mega-projects with care, ensuring that constraints caused by the unique climate and physical environments in the region form part of cost benefit-analysis. The requirements for operating in these conditions often require emissions-heavy equipment, so the associated environmental impacts, and the effects on nation’s adherence to emissions targets in international agreement, should also be considered.
8. Questions 7-11 of the CFE deal with UK strategy towards the Arctic. Question 7 asks ‘Has the UK set the right strategic priorities in its Arctic Policy Framework? Are the resources allocated to the UK’s Arctic strategy adequate and proportionate?’ We observe that the UK Framework has already evolved and is evolving to accommodate and adapt to, the changing environment; however, diplomatic, legal, technology, and commercial emphases may need re-ordering and/or (re)-prioritising in response to the, as yet unknown, full geopolitical fall-out of events in Ukraine. This will require greater institutional adaptation and understanding, oversight, and frequent assessment of the region, which is now indisputably an emerging strategic sphere of interest for the U.S., Russia, and Asia (notably China). The UK must play a role in this development if for no other reason than to help maintain strategic stability and security in the region, which are fundamental to any commercial investment. In addition, alongside perhaps a review of new UK alliances (with entrants from Asia), an additional emphasis on the Polar-associated domain of Space, overt support for continuing governance by the AC, and recognition of the major role that technology will play in the shaping of the region over the next decade, may well be worthy of further commissioning of an in-depth study of the region.
9. Question 8 asks ‘How should the UK pursue its long-term strategic aspiration to restore the Arctic as a region of “high cooperation and low tension”?’ We observe that scientific collaboration, and the scope it offers for Science Diplomacy activity, should continue to be fostered in the Arctic as an important end in itself but also for the role it can play in lessening tension and promoting political cooperation. ‘Bottom-up’, peer-to-peer links between individuals and institutions in different countries have proved their ability to facilitate improved understanding between countries, and the UK has been relatively effective in this area in the Arctic context as elsewhere. We note in particular the achievements of the Science and Innovation Network, and especially the progress that was being made towards improving alignment between the UK and Russia until the freezing of relations as a result of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and we believe that science collaboration, encouraged by government, is likely to be one of the first areas in which relations will unfreeze once the geopolitical situation begins to improve. Meanwhile, it is highly desirable that supranational structures with a partial or exclusive remit for shaping such collaboration be supported. The UK should use its observer status on the AC to encourage it not to eject Russia from membership.
10. Question 10 asks ‘How can the UK increase its diplomatic influence in the region and work effectively with Arctic states?’ We propose the following five actions: (1) appoint a UK Roving Ambassador for the Polar Regions. This would not necessarily have to be a FCDO or other Government appointment, and could potentially be co-funded commercially. The Ambassador’s role is two-fold: to representing and reporting to HM Government, including diplomatic coordination with the regions’ UK ambassadors and their Science Diplomacy activity; and to act as Ambassador at Large for UK commercial activity, assisting and facilitating commercial investment in the Polar Region(s). (2) Maintain proper adherence to the environmental and sustainability mandates of the AC in all dealings. This would imply continuing overt support for governance of the region by the AC, including supporting UNCLOS, Polar Code responsibilities, and SAR, HM forces, and Coast Guard activities). (3) Expand diplomatic and strategic relations with Permanent Observer AC members in Asia and SE Asia (e.g. Japan, Republic of Korea, India), whilst intensifying dialogue in expanding regional spheres of International Relations, with North American member states of the AC. (4) Intensify outreach educational and training activities, as well as HM Government-sponsored commercial activities (trade shows, additional consulates, conferences), and high-profile diplomatic visits by Ministerial level MPs. Sponsor Arctic related meetings, international conferences, and seminars in the UK. (5) Take fuller and more coordinated diplomatic advantage of UK’s NATO, strategic asset, Five Eyes, and institutional and wide scientific knowledge in/of both Polar Region(s), to work with Polar allies.
11. Question 11 asks ‘How can the UK support the rights of the region’s indigenous peoples?’ We observe that many fundamental rights of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, such as land rights, resource rights and rights to self-govern, are complex and politically charged, being pursued in courts of law and at the level of the United Nations. Whilst they are matters of great importance, direct UK involvement in these discourses may have limited positive impact, beyond research providing data which may be used as evidence in some of these cases. However, much can be done to support Indigenous rights in other ways. Due to a lack of facilities, many young Indigenous people in the Arctic must move south to access higher education, and must also remain south to get related jobs, leading to a ‘brain-drain’ in northern communities, particularly of women. The UK has a strong research and educational record, including on Arctic subjects, so could play a valuable role in partnering and collaborating with current and future northern educational institutions to increase their capacity to train and maintain young Indigenous peoples in their homelands. Through gaining qualifications in fields like law, management, international relations, history and the sciences, as well as remaining within their traditional communities and cultures, these young people could then go on to advocate more effectively for the rights of their own peoples. The UK is already making steps in this direction, such as by launching the CINUK (Canada-Inuit Nunangat-United Kingdom) Arctic Research Programme in 2021, with partners in Canada, which stipulates the involvement of Indigenous collaborators.
12. Question 12 relates to Arctic governance and the future of multilateral cooperation, and asks ‘What is the impact of the effective suspension of the Arctic Council for the governance of the region? Are there other governance mechanisms that could be leveraged? What are the prospects for multilateral cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic and High North?’ We observe that the AC’s suspension of work, other than climate-related, with Russia, is paralysing regional governance and will has the potential to adversely affect aspects such as safety at Sea (there is now no dialogue or coordination with Russia about SAR, or Emergency response activities). China, and maybe other countries, will suggest that without Russian input into the AC, the forum is now weakened and ineffective and should be replaced by an alternative governance system. As a result of sanctions and the suspension of Russia’s activities, the following has already occurred: (1) Intensification and deepening of Sino-Russian relations in the region (vis. the Chinese Coast Guard and FSB MoU, signed in Murmansk in May 2023) and intensification of joint Arctic-related Space activities. (2) An overt move by Russia from Securitization of the Arctic to its Militarization. (3) An unchecked expansion of Russia’s “Freedom of Movement” around the Arctic including greater emphasis with China in developing a Eurasian Arctic region, closely coordinated with joint activities (from the Arctic’s high latitude location) in the Space domain.
13. Other coordinating and effective regional forums such as the Barents-EU forum, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, as well as various regional UN organizations (the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS)), etc, may prove fruitful for the UK to intensify relations with. Similarly, organizations like NATO (which must be addressed outside of the AC) must now be considered too, with specific regard to the safety, security, and sustainability of the region; and most vitally – supporting the governance of the region by the AC. The prospect for continued – and intensifying multilateral coordination and cooperation in the Arctic is good; it is also growing, unavoidable, and absolutely essential. Its primary strategic priority, raison d’etre, and Modus Operandi, must be centred around the global concern of climate change. This is and must continue to be the unifying and steadying focus of all powers in the region, including countries such as Russia and China.
14. To implement such a universally supported strategy is impossible without the vision, the setting of necessary agreed parameters, and the climatic framework’s centrality being largely steered and undertaken by the international scientific community, supported by governments. To that end, we believe that the UK is very well positioned indeed to contribute in a very significant way to this mission.
13 May 2023