The RAND Corporation – Written Evidence (ARC0008)

1. This written evidence was produced by Nicolas Jouan, Charlotte Kleberg, and James Black at RAND Europe, the European arm of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research institute. It draws on RAND research on a ‘UK Strategy for the High North’ conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)[1], as well as other RAND studies on Arctic security, governance, and related issues.[2] Following the terms of references of the inquiry, this evidence addresses two sets of questions:

• The evolving security environment in the Arctic: Questions 1-4.
• UK strategy towards the Arctic: Questions 8-10.

The Evolving Security Environment in the Arctic

Q1. How do changes in the security situation in the Arctic impact on UK security?

2. As the Arctic’s ‘nearest neighbour’, the UK aspires to maintain stability, security, and freedom of navigation (FON), returning the region to its former status as one of high cooperation and low tension. Stability in the Arctic is crucial given the UK’s geographic proximity, its strategic position on the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap, and its reliance on secure access to sea lines of communication (SLOCs) both for economic (trade, fisheries, oil and gas, offshore wind, telecommunications etc.) and defence-related activities. These include the continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent (CASD), maritime power projection, and seaborne reinforcement of the British Isles or of other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Allies in times of war.

3. Both the 2021 Integrated Review (IR) and the 2023 IR Refresh identify the Arctic as a priority area for the UK and recognise a state of growing competition with Russia and China.[3] The likelihood of ‘vertical escalation’, i.e., a crisis or conflict originating in the Arctic, remains low. However, the region is not insulated from tensions in other parts of the world (e.g., Northern and Eastern Europe). This raises the possibility of ‘horizontal escalation’, i.e., a crisis that begins elsewhere but then rapidly engulfs the Arctic, given its strategic significance.

4. In the near-term, the major shock to Arctic governance has been the collapse of cooperation with Russia via the Arctic Council – collateral damage from the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. Though the Council has no remit for military affairs, it provides an important forum for dialogue, cooperation and building trust between the Arctic States (and observers), e.g., on science or protection of indigenous communities. Though Norway took over the rotating presidency from Russia on 11 May 2023, the breakdown of intergovernmental cooperation via the Council and other multi- or bilateral channels poses a direct challenge to Arctic stability.[4] 

5. In the longer-term, major trends at play include:

a) The impact of climate change: Higher temperatures in the Arctic region expose it, and the UK, to increased risk of extreme weather, flooding, environmental degradation, and changes in ocean currents and the distribution of fish stocks. This poses threats to human security, ecosystems, biodiversity, and coastal habitat. Melting and thaw in the Arctic region could release quantities of methane, a potent greenhouse gas, further exacerbating climate change. Environmental preservation in the Arctic is rightly considered as a key issue by the UK given the exposure of its own ecosystem to the High North and the complex feedback loops between climate change in the Arctic and wider global warming.[5]

b) Territorial claims and shipping lanes. There are unresolved territorial disputes in the Arctic, including to the outer-continental shelf governed by Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This places further strain on FON.[6] Russia has proposed a new law imposing stringent control on navigation in its territorial waters as part of the Northern Sea Route (NSR), requiring clearance for foreign warships.[7]

c) Militarisation and higher risk of conflict. Greater access to the region increases the potential for conflict over sea lanes and natural resources.[8] Having long been essential to Russia’s nuclear ‘bastion defence’, the Arctic is becoming yet more militarised through a build-up of infrastructure and the rotational or permanent presence of military forces.[9] This includes growing investment by non-Arctic powers, such as China (see Q3 below). Furthermore, the region remains vital to any effort by Russia or others to project submarine, surface, or air forces towards the GIUK gap to disrupt SLOCs in the North Atlantic, threatening NATO’s ability to reinforce Europe from the U.S. and Canada in a crisis.

d) Sub-threshold and ‘grey zone’ threats. Besides the risk of overt conflict, the Arctic is also threatened by intensifying competition short of war. This includes the threat of hostile but deniable activities such as disinformation, cyber-attacks, GPS jamming, or efforts to purchase access and influence (e.g., China’s controversial attempted investments in strategic airfields in Greenland and Finland).[10] Svalbard is often cited as one possible flashpoint, given the Russian presence on the Norwegian-owned archipelago.[11]  From a UK perspective, there is also particular concern over Russia interfering with underwater cables.[12] Sub-threshold and subversive activities directed at the UK’s partners in the High North may also increase as result of NATO’s enlargement to include Finland or Sweden.[13]

Q2. What is Russia’s strategy with regard to the Arctic and High North, and how should the UK and its allies respond?

6. With a fifth of its territory north of the Arctic Circle, Russia has focused growing military and economic attention on the region. As already discussed, the militarisation of Russia’s northern shoreline, the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea threatens SLOCs connecting NATO Allies.[14] The protection and ownership of the NSR will likely also become more important for Russia as the region opens to increased volumes of maritime traffic.[15] The country has made no mystery of its second-strike sea-based nuclear deterrent capability operating out of the Kola Peninsula, and uses the Arctic to project power into the North Atlantic via the GIUK gap.[16]

7. While war in Ukraine has not directly affected Russia’s core security interests and economic ambitions in the Arctic, it has had cascading indirect impacts. These include some Arctic-based forces being drawn into Ukraine; a depletion of stockpiles of precision munitions and other equipment; added pressure on Russia’s defence industry and mobilisation; and the mixed impact of economic sanctions.[17] So while long-term imperatives in the Arctic have not changed, the strategic calculus and priorities of the Kremlin, as well as its capacity to wield military and non-military levers in pursuit of its goals, are more uncertain – and depend on how Russia ultimately fares against Ukraine. A depleted Russian military may pose less of a conventional threat to NATO in the near term, but it would also be more reliant on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons or on sub-threshold activities to offset this deficiency while it rebuilds. There may be risks to strategic stability if Putin were to feel cornered by defeat or a long, grinding conflict in Ukraine and mounting problems at home. Or, conversely, if he were emboldened by any future disintegration of NATO unity and Ukrainian resistance. Continued robust deterrence and prudent escalation management are thus required by the UK and its Arctic allies.[18]

Q3. What is China’s strategy towards the Arctic and what are the implications for the UK and its allies?

8. China is emerging as a key presence in the region, investing heavily in shipping and infrastructure to pursue political and economic opportunities. In 2018 it published its Arctic Strategy and declared itself a ‘near-Arctic’ state outlining a ‘Polar Silk Road’ economic plan. Beijing describes the Arctic as one of the world’s ‘new strategic frontiers’ ripe for rivalry and extraction, and its military publications defines the Arctic as a possible zone for future military competition. China seeks to boost its regional strategic influence and operational access by engaging in regional institutions, investing in dual-use infrastructure, science facilities, and a range of economic projects.[19] China’s strategic interest in the Arctic is motivated also by the economic prosperity that shorter transit routes and access to natural resources would bring.

9. Closer ties with Russia – whose growing dependency on China has been accelerated by the Kremlin’s botched invasion of Ukraine – is allowing Beijing to increase its leverage in the Arctic and its global ambitions more generally, turning the region into a future arena of great power competition and strategic rivalry with the U.S., the UK and others.[20] At the same time, there are benefits to cooperation with China on issues of mutual interest (such as economic development or global action on climate change), where this is done on an equitable basis and with appropriate safeguards for national security and sovereignty. This necessitates that countries carefully navigate a dual-track approach in their relations with Beijing.

Q4. What is the UK and NATO’s role in the Arctic, and how is this affected by Finland and Sweden’s accession to the Alliance?

10. During the Cold War, the Arctic featured heavily in NATO’s thinking, given the relevance of SLOCs and the potential for nuclear or aerial strikes over the pole. From the 1990s through the 2010s, there was more hesitance around the idea of a prominent role for the Alliance. This reflected a desire to keep the region as one of low tension and high cooperation with Russia, as well as the difficulty of achieving consensus on what any NATO Arctic policy should look like – including with key regional players such as Canada, worried about replacing national or bilateral initiatives with a formal NATO role. However, the breakdown of cooperation with Russia, as well as a growing conceptualisation of the Arctic as sitting within a broader High North or Euro-Atlantic area, have raised new challenges and options for NATO.[21]

11. Already, the Alliance is taking steps. The new NATO Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, VA, renews the focus on securing North Atlantic SLOCs, addressing threats emanating from the Arctic and the Norwegian and Barents Seas. Major NATO exercises have been conducted in the North in recent years, including Trident Juncture and Cold Response. And NATO Allies are investing in relevant capabilities, from submarines to littoral strike to satellite systems with polar orbits. Influential non-Arctic states like the UK can make an important contribution.[22]

12. The accession of Finland and, potentially, Sweden to NATO will only reinforce this posture. The two Scandinavian countries not only share the UK’s ambition of ensuring that the Arctic remains peaceful, stable, and sustainable, but also cooperate closely with the UK and U.S. on security issues and in joint military exercises. Existing cooperation frameworks, above all NATO Enhanced Opportunity Partnership (EOP) status and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), have helped ensure Finland and Sweden’s interoperability with NATO standards.[23] Finland’s accession, with its well-trained reserve forces, already represents a boon to the Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture in the High North.[24]

13. With an increased focus on the Arctic as a zone of competition with Russia, and the need to maintain a capability to fight in challenging conditions and extreme cold, Finland and Sweden offer valuable expertise and niche capabilities relevant to this operating environment. Furthermore, their accession has broader, if uncertain, consequences for Arctic governance, with Russia left as the only non-NATO Arctic State. It similarly affects the opportunities for collaboration via other minilateral frameworks, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), Northern Group, or Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). The UK could play an important role in seeking to reshape, de-conflict and cohere these various overlapping groupings, not least given its leading role within the JEF and in NATO more generally.[25] 

UK strategy towards the Arctic

Q8. How should the UK pursue its long-term strategic aspiration to restore the Arctic as a region of “high cooperation and low tension”?

14. Pursuit of the UK’s goals in the Arctic is first linked to the country’s ability to create good synergies with Arctic States historically wary of non-Arctic interferences in the region. The 2021 IR hypothesised the UK’s role as the ‘nearest neighbour to the Arctic region’ to explain its legitimate interest in fostering peace, stability, and prosperity.[26] Although not an Arctic State, the UK has historically been the main European contributor to the securitisation of the GIUK gap giving access to the North Atlantic. Furthermore, the progressive opening of trade routes from melting ice will position the UK as a shipping gateway to Western Europe via the NSR on Russia’s coast or the North-West Passage on Canada’s shoreline. The UK also has contributions to bring to Arctic issues in areas of national strength, such as on climate action, science, maritime issues, international law, finance, or emerging technology.[27]

15. HMG should use these arguments to shape its diplomatic effort and cement its influence in the Arctic. Areas of concern where the UK could have an immediate impact relate to the regulation of behaviours at sea and environmental protection. Growing hostility with Russia should be no deterrent to the promotion of responsible behaviours at sea or in environmental management, but rather an imperative, given the added risk of unintended escalation.[28]

16. Militarily, the UK should also leverage its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to secure the GIUK gap, and continue to deepen cooperation with NATO Arctic States in all domains. NATO’s ‘360-degree approach’ defines a leading role for the UK in securing the flank. Building on the existing provision of joint training and exercises, whether through bilateral arrangements (e.g., the longstanding deal to train Royal Marines on cold weather ops in Norway) or the JEF, there are opportunities to deepen cooperation with regional partners. This includes deepening cooperation around common platforms, such as the F-35 combat aircraft or the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, as well as improving situational awareness and sharing intelligence and data to form a common operating picture for the region. There are also opportunities for cooperation in new domains, such as cyber and space, and for the UK to inform, and in turn learn from, the models of Norway, Sweden, and Finland’s Total Defence concepts. These emphasise bolstering national preparedness and societal and psychological resilience in the face of sub-threshold threats.[29]

17. Such actions aim at consolidating the UK’s contribution to NATO’s conventional deterrence and defence posture in the North Atlantic and Arctic, supporting key allies while also protecting the UK’s security and bolstering its influence within the Alliance. But they are not mutually exclusive with repairing relations with Moscow in future, should Russia withdraw from Ukraine, and it remains important to pursue political options for dialogue and de-escalation. A more proactive and better-resourced HMG role, coordinated across Whitehall and integrating all levers of power, would also place the UK on a more robust footing to engage and, where necessary, compete with China’s own ambitions for the region.[30]

Q9. Has the UK set the right priorities for its Defence Contribution in the High North? Does it have the necessary capabilities to deliver on its priorities, e.g.:

1. Protecting critical national infrastructure.

18. The recent accelerated acquisition of Multi-Role Ocean Surveillance Ships (MROSS) is a step in the right direction for the UK in its attempt to secure sub-sea critical infrastructure.[31] Nevertheless, more could be done pre-emptively to ensure deterrence and resilience. For example, the Royal Navy currently operates a single two-decade old ice patrol ship, HMS Protector, to cover the two polar regions.[32] The acquisition of dedicated new vessels and/or uncrewed assets assigned to each pole would help to protect the UK’s critical infrastructure in austere northern oceanic environments all year-round, and to reassure allies and partners.

19. Furthermore, the protection of sub-sea cables and pipelines could be further consolidated between the Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS), the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and the MOD, e.g., via creation of a dedicated cross-government office. Similarly, HMG could deepen its partnerships with industry to help them understand and take practical steps to bolster their resilience in advance of, during, and after any possible disruption of sub-sea infrastructure. Infrastructure could also be built with more in-built sensors, standardised components, and redundancy safeguards, speeding up monitoring, repairs, and replacement. Such measures would have the added benefit of contributing to deterrence by denial, thus reducing the likelihood of attack in the first place.[33]

2. Ensuring the observance of international law and the freedom to navigate and operate across the region.

20. The respect of international law, especially UNCLOS, and FON principles relies on three factors cited in the MOD’s Defence Contribution in the High North paper, namely: development of environmental data; presence of physical assets; and multilateral coordination.[34]

21. More could be done in each of these areas. For example, the UK could use its proximity to the High North and harness the development of Scotland as a space launch hub to take the lead on satellite coverage in the region and improve ISR capabilities.[35] An argument could be made for the Royal Navy to position extra ASW platforms and ice patrol ships at HMNB Clyde. Similarly, more cooperation could be sought with like-minded nations like France or the Netherlands to perform FON operations in the Arctic, e.g., with the Littoral Response Group.[36]

3. Delivering defence research and development relating to the Arctic.

22. Defence would benefit from further research into the effects of Arctic climate change on operations, equipment, personnel, ecosystems, and landscapes, both in the region and further afield.[37] For example, alterations in the Arctic environment could increase the odds of extreme climatic events in the UK, threatening people and infrastructure. This would drive demand for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), placing added strain on the Armed Forces.[38] Exploring and modelling these cascading effects with more accuracy could help in mitigating or preparing for them, for instance with the creation of plans and civic engagement frameworks for climate adaptation and response, or the development of new specialist capabilities.[39] An enhanced climate intelligence function like this would also be a useful mechanism for cooperation between likeminded nations, and be of use well beyond the defence sector.

4. Countering malign and destabilising behaviours.

23. As outlined in Q1-4, malign and destabilising behaviours in the Arctic, particularly from Russia and China, translate into sub-threshold threats whose attribution is not straightforward. Actions to boost the UK’s own ISR capabilities and better share information with NATO Allies can contribute to deterrence, by enabling a common threat assessment and the early identification of hostile activities. The accession of Finland to NATO is also a great opportunity to develop further the UK’s involvement with the Hybrid Centre of Excellence (CoE) in Helsinki.[40] Past RAND research on this topic for the UK MOD, U.S. Department of Defense, and others, emphasises the need for a cross-government and whole-of-society approach to anticipate, identify, understand, mitigate, and recover from sub-threshold threats. The UK’s Scandinavian partners have significant experience and expertise in this regard, and the UK Government, National Preparedness Commission and others could benefit from further international engagement to share lessons learned and best practice.[41]

Q10. How can the UK increase its diplomatic influence in the region and work effectively with Arctic states?

24. As has been discussed in relation to earlier questions, the effects of Russia’s illegal war on Ukraine are also felt in the Arctic, with the breakdown of Arctic Council activities and other forms of institutional cooperation.[42] The UK must consequently rely more on a complex web of overlapping bi- and mini-lateral relations with Arctic States to exert its influence.

25. This is already the case through the UK’s science and climate action, its active participation in frameworks such as the ASFR and coordination of the Northern Group or JEF, and its prominent role in NATO and the UN.[43] The UK could also lead environmental reforms with non-Arctic states like Germany and France, e.g., for the creation of ‘protected maritime areas’ as mandated by the ‘Oslo and Paris Convention’.[44] Efforts to develop a code of conduct at sea could also be explored through the mandate of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which is headquartered in London.[45] Science diplomacy is another option for the UK, for instance through the International Arctic Science Committee.[46] The suspension of the Arctic Council’s activities need not be a brake on the UK’s diplomatic ambition in the Arctic but rather could be an opportunity to connect the region with broader international issues in creative ways.

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13 May 2023