BIOPOLE                            ARC0011

Written evidence submitted by BIOPOLE

BIOPOLE is funded by the Natural Environment Research Council with a remit to examine the sensitivity of polar ecosystems to rapid environmental change, specifically in terms of their ability to sequester carbon and to deliver the polar nutrients that keeps the rest of the World’s oceans healthy and productive. The programme involves over 50 UK scientists from 5 research institutes with a large number of international project partners and stakeholders. Further details on the project can be found at https://biopole.ac.uk/

Below, we address questions outlined in Terms of Reference where we have specific expertise within our team. For sections where we have provided a detailed response, we have first provided a summary of the evidence.

1. The Arctic environment

What are the consequences for the UK of the observed climatic and environmental changes in the Arctic?

Summary: There is still no consensus on how rapid changes occurring in the Arctic may affect atmosphere and ocean in the North Atlantic and impact UK extreme weather, however potential disruptive changes arising from these rapid changes in the Arctic can be severe. Decline of ocean-to-European shelf exchange and increased ocean stratification in the shelf areas driven by changes in Arctic-North Atlantic oceanic connections can impact ocean productivity with effect on UK fisheries and sustainable marine management.

Changes in the large-scale ocean circulation influence the transport of biogeochemical tracers in the North Sea and on the North-Western European shelf. The North Sea receives the Atlantic waters brought by the Fair Isle Current, the East Shetland Current, and the Western Norwegian Trench Current, whereas the sea exports shelf waters, mixed with the Baltic outflow through the Norwegian Trench. Climate change could affect the circulation, with slowdown of all currents contributing to the exchange with the North Atlantic (Holt et al., 2018), although the projected changes vary between models (Tinker et al., 2016). The main driver for this change is thought to be an ongoing freshening and increase in stratification in the Faeroe-Shetland channel and within the North Atlantic current, linked to sea ice loss. The North Atlantic waters are the major source of nutrients for the Northern North Sea (Vermaat et al., 2008), and decline of marine productivity is predicted by the models in the eastern part of the Northern North Sea, but partly compensated by the productivity increase in the Western North Sea, fed by fresher and nutrient-rich inflow from the Southern North Sea and the Baltic Sea (Holt et al., 2018). These changes impact oxygen and the carbonate chemistry in the North Sea.

What are the observable realities of ice decline for biodiversity, air quality, sea level changes, permafrost melt and levels of methane?

Summary: The changes in the Arctic have been dramatic during the last and current centuries and are the fastest presently occurring worldwide. Recently, the environmental trajectories of the many components of the Arctic system show potential tipping points and may become irreversible. More of the previously dormant or unconsidered processes are kicking in and are now contributing to the acceleration of global climate change. Their impact on Arctic and global climates are likely to be from moderate to strong. Some examples of these new-emerging feedbacks are given below.

Example 1 - Contribution of the Arctic to global warming: Most of the global warming arises from the greenhouse gases such as CO2 (carbon dioxide), CH4 (methane) and N2O (nitrous oxide) (COMFORT, 2023). Anthropogenic CO2 emissions primarily come from fossil fuel burning, deforestation and cement manufacturing (Friedlingstein et al., 2022). Methane is the second most potent greenhouse gas (GHG) after CO2 with >28 times larger warming potential. CH4 emissions are due to permafrost-thaw, livestock farming, rice cultivation, waste management, as well as biomass burning. In 2020, atmospheric CH4 concentration increased at rate not seen in the past four decades (Saunois et al., 2020), almost twice as fast as that of CO2. Anthropogenic and natural CO2 emissions and anthropogenic CH4 emissions are reasonably constrained (e.g., Fox-Kemper et al., 2021), however, the magnitude, areal extent, causes and timing of natural CH4 emissions (terrestrial and marine permafrost, wetlands, freshwater, and marine gas hydrates and mega-seeps) have large uncertainties with conflicting estimates from different methods (Saunois et al., 2020). In addition, studies on methane release from laboratory soil incubations and actual methane release from the Siberian Arctic shelves have widened rather than narrowed the uncertainty when determining emissions pathways (Shakhova et al., 2013; Thornton et al., 2016; IPCC 2019). The East Siberian Arctic shelves are experiencing among the highest rates of climate warming and have vast yet poorly quantified storage of carbon, which can be mobilised by the changing climate. The East Siberian Arctic shelves are estimated to host 60-80% of the world’s marine permafrost carbon and 75% of the shallow shelf hydrates. This frozen sediment complex caps the “Siberian-Arctic Petroleum Megapool”, a huge reservoir of natural gas and there is potential for emission of this carbon pool to the atmosphere. Studies in the Laptev Sea mega-seeps has found that this mobilization has already started (Steinbach et al., 2021). Marine permafrost has reached thawing temperatures in recent decades with the thaw horizon in marine permafrost deepening more than ten times faster than for land permafrost (Shakhova et al., 2017). In summary, the IPCC reports stress the massive importance of different Arctic CH4 pools, yet there is huge uncertainty regarding their composition, inventories and functioning. Improving knowledge of these systems and transferring this knowledge into models, so that we can make evidence-based predictions of future behaviour, is required to understand the present system and to reach a point where we can make high confidence predictions of future CH4 emissions to the atmosphere from these key natural sources and quantify their future role in the global carbon system.

Example 2 - Arctic coastal erosion:  Erosion of the Arctic coastline poses a threat to infrastructure, coastal settlements and the wider marine environment. Arctic coastal erosion rates are an order of magnitude higher than those in the rest of the world and have been increasing for the last few decades, reaching 25-50 m per year for the hotspots in Siberia and Alaska (Terhaar et al., 2021; Nielsen et al., 2022). The reduction of the compact sea ice in the Arctic shelf seas allows higher waves to propagate towards the shore (Irrgang et al., 2022), causing coastal collapse. The Siberian coastline is presently transitioning from a lower to a higher coastal erosion regime because of the regional sea ice decline. The observed coastal retreat already has reached 400-1100 m over the last six decades in hot spots in the Beaufort and Laptev seas (Grigoriev et al., 2019). The currently observed erosion and corresponding build-up coastal sediments are increasing in hotspots such as Alaska and Siberia, with erosion dominating over build-up (Philipp et al., 2022). The kilometre-scale coastal retreat, observed since the 1960s near several settlements in Alaska, Canadian Northern Territories, and Siberia, is projected to continue (Grigoriev et al., 2019; AMAP, 2021). This, along with the averaged projected pan-Arctic coastal collapse of ~200 m by 2100 (Nielsen et al., 2022), poses a serious socio-economic problem for local populations, but also more widely raising safety and communication concerns (Clare et al., 2022; State of the Cryosphere Report, 2022).

Example 3 - Influx of nutrients from land to sea: Terrigenous fluxes of nutrients can support about one third of the Arctic Net Primary Production (NPP) (e.g., Terhaar et al., 2021), with the main increase in the NPP being in the coastal areas and on the Arctic shelves. The current trend in the riverine nitrates is positive in the American rivers and negative in the Siberia (ArcticGro database, https://arcticgreatrivers.org/; Zolkos et al., 2022). The Arctic Ocean is particularly vulnerable to deoxygenation due to the continuous increase in primary production (e.g., Lewis et al., 2020) caused by the increased terrigenous inputs of both organic and inorganic carbon and nutrients from rivers (Holmes et al., 2012) and permafrost thaw (inland and coastal erosion) (Fritz et al., 2017; Mann et al., 2022).

Example 4 - Ocean acidification: Coupled Earth system models predict that global accumulation of anthropogenic CO2 in the ocean will reduce mean sea surface pH (Bopp et al., 2013; Kwiatkowski et al., 2020, COMFORT, 2023). Effects of ocean acidification tends to increase in the Arctic Ocean where the combined impact of sea ice loss and low temperatures enhance acidification. Already there have been ecosystems impacts with corrosion reported on the shells of calcifying organisms (Niemi et al 2021) and over 20% of the western Arctic Ocean is now corrosive to certain types of calcifying organisms (Qi et al 2017). It is predicted that all mesopelagic layers in the Arctic Ocean will be corrosive to these organisms by the end of this century (Terhaar et al. 2020).

Example 5:  Deoxygenation: The Arctic Ocean is a disproportional contributor to global ocean deoxygenation, driving approximately 8% of the variability in global ocean O2 content while occupying just 1% of total ocean volume (Schmidtko et al., 2017; COMFORT, 2023). The deep Arctic Ocean may experience deoxygenation within the current century (Bindoff et al., 2019) even though coastal areas and continental shelf seas in the Arctic may become more oxygenated (Gong et al., 2021). Factors contributing to deoxygenation in the deep ocean are (i) enhanced stratification due to surface freshening in the Pacific-influenced Amerasian basin (Solomon et al., 2021); (ii) increased heating from advective Atlantic-influenced sources (Polyakov et al., 2017); (iii) increased primary production (e.g., Lewis et al., 2020); (iv) terrigenous inputs of both organic and inorganic carbon and nutrients from rivers (Holmes et al., 2012); and (v) permafrost thaw and erosion (Fritz et al., 2017; Mann et al., 2022).

Example 6: Changing ocean carbon storage via [and climate mitigation potential of] the ‘lipid pump’: Unicellular primary producers (phytoplankton) in the Arctic Ocean convert atmospheric CO2 and H2O into living biomass through photosynthesis. Small Arctic animals called zooplankton consume this biomass and use it to produce and store massive fat (lipid) deposits during the productive spring and summer months. The key species of lipid-storing Arctic zooplankton migrate into the deep ocean as soon as they have acquired enough fat to survive the harsh, unproductive winter months. At depths greater than 1000 m, these animals survive for 6-9 months without feeding by slowly burning off their fat reserves, and in doing so, produce and release dissolved CO2. The scale of the populations of these animals is so vast that the amount of CO2 they release at depth, where it is trapped away from the atmosphere for decades or even centuries, is so large that it plays an important role in the global carbon cycle and climate regulation (Jonasdottir et al., 2015; Boyd et al., 2019). This so-called ‘lipid pump’ is dependent upon 1) the active populations of zooplankton in surface waters coinciding with massive blooms of phytoplankton, and 2) conditions at depth being sufficiently cold to supress zooplankton metabolic rates for long enough to allow them to survive winter without feeding. On-going warming in the Arctic Ocean, and the concomitant melting of sea ice, is changing the physical, chemical and biological conditions of the Arctic Ocean, influencing the spatial and temporal distribution and magnitude of primary production. The consequences of these changes for the scale of the ‘lipid pump’ and its role in regulating global climate, are currently unknown. On-going warming is also increasing the thermal energy that penetrates the ocean’s interior, increasing the metabolic rates of zooplankton and reducing the time that lipid-storing animals are able to survive. This adds further uncertainty to our knowledge of how biologically-mediated carbon storage in the Arctic Ocean will be affected by climate change.

Example 7: 'Atlantification’ of the Arctic: Warming of the Arctic Ocean is not uniform, but amplified in certain regions, such as where there is enhanced inflow of warm Atlantic water into the Eurasian sector of the Arctic Ocean, termed ‘‘Atlantification’’ (Arthun et al. 2012). As these warmer waters further encroach, they bring with them boreal Atlantic species that alter Arctic community structure and affect how food-webs function (Kortsch et al. 2015; Polyakov et al. 2020). The high-latitude impacts of these inflows have strengthened in recent decades owing to climate change (Ingvaldsen et al 2021). Over that time, strong salinification and potentially altered vertical fluxes have reduced stratification in the upper Barents Sea and Eurasian Basin. These observed changes represent a shift towards conditions that resemble those observed in lower latitude regions — that is, warmer water with weaker vertical stratification. This Atlantification closely relates progression of anomalies from the Atlantic sector of the sub-Arctic seas into polar latitudes. One of the consequences is greater heat exchange between ocean and atmosphere in the Arctic.

Atlantification has substantial impacts on Arctic ecosystems. Arctic biota is characterized by adaptations to ice cover, low temperatures and strong seasonality, precluding colonization by species from lower latitudes. A change towards more-Atlantic conditions has promoted invasion by the lower-latitude (termed ‘boreal’) species, as documented for plankton, pelagic and demersal fish, sea mammals and seabirds. This modifies Arctic biodiversity, community structure, food web organization and ecosystem functioning with implications for ecosystem vulnerability to increasing human activities in the Arctic.
 

According to Ingvaldsen et al. (2021), the impacts of Atlantification on the Arctic climate and ecosystems have primarily been exhibited since ~2000. Rapid and unforeseen environmental changes that can occur if Atlantification accelerates challenge abilities to predict which populations will be able to cope. Predictability of the rate and direction of ecological change is further challenged by the pulsed character of Atlantification, triggering sudden bursts of ecological responses, and by the complex nature of the higher order effects mediated by ecological interactions, hence the urgent need for greater scientific understanding of the consequences of the Atlantification of the Arctic.

2. The UK’s Arctic interests

What use do UK businesses (oil, minerals, fisheries, tourism, shipping) make of the Arctic as a whole, and how may that use develop in coming years, especially as the ice recedes?

Summary: At present UK businesses do not have a substantial involvement in the Arctic areas, although this may change with shifting the industrial foci towards the more technology-driven, advanced green and nature-based industries where the UK could show leadership. Strategic planning in support of high-tech investments requires co-design between the applied technological and environmental research and industry, supported by a dedicated long-term funding commitment.

Shipping: The prospects of UK being a leading actor in the Arctic shipping are not strong due to competition from the existing well-developed Arctic maritime industries in Canada, Finland, Norway, USA, and Russia. The cargo flow through the Arctic seas is still small compared to the global cargo volume turnaround and experiences large fluctuations due to economic and political factors. Even with sea ice retreat, the harsh and dangerous sailing conditions in the Arctic will remain. This will increase the need for real time environmental information for both the shipping and the insurance industries. This may present opportunities in developing telecommunication, satellite data streams, and in sea rescue/clean up technologies, where the UK industries can play a leading role.

Reduced sea ice cover changes shipping routes and affects maritime operations, as well as fisheries. (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Arctic Shipping Status Report (ASSR) #1, 2020; Todorov, 2021), and raises the possibility of previously sea-ice-covered regions providing shorter accessible routes for shipping. However, the shipping intensity will vary with economic conditions (with environmental conditions acting as a moderating factor), and shipping transits and cargo volumes can fluctuate substantially from year to year as a result (e.g., Aksenov et al., 2017). Emerging hazards from changing environmental and navigational conditions in the Arctic (for the Polar Code Area (PCA) definition – see International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Resolution MEPC.265(68), 2022) are multi-faceted and often create compound risks. Awareness of the new emerging combined hazards, such as sea ice and wave impacts, spray deposition/icing and bergy-bit collisions should all be considered as they have wide relevance to many maritime industries (e.g., Aksenov et al., 2022). Numbers of ships entering the PCA are increasing, and more ships are present in the PCA. Larger vessels (>1000 GT) with larger drafts, and an expansion in regional routes and a 75% increase in distances may lead to more grounding and accidents, more work on harbours and dragging of navigational channels. However, the main increase in the PCA voyages is due to fishing vessels, specifically in the Barents Sea, but also along the Siberian and Alaskan coasts (41% of all ships sailing are fishing vessels), therefore more accidents from maritime code violation, such as grounding, ship-to-ship and ship-to-offshore/shore structures collisions are expected, with potential pollution of the ocean with debris and oil.

Telecommunication networks: The global economy relies on uninterrupted use of a seafloor network of >400 fibre-optic cable systems that extend 1.8 million km across the global ocean. Today, more than 95% of all digital data traffic worldwide and $trillions/day in financial transactions are transferred via this vital network. Consequently, subsea cables are considered critical infrastructure. The Arctic is not presently a well-developed region for telecommunication cable routes. To date, only two regional subsea cables operate inside the Arctic Circle, latitude 66°34’N – the link between Svalbard and mainland Norway and a recently completed system along the north Alaskan continental margin. However, the loss of sea ice cover driven by climate change may open new opportunities and major trans-Arctic Ocean subsea cables are planned and range from preliminary proposals to fully funded projects scheduled for completion in 2022–2023, including the Far North Fibre project, aimed at the first pan-Arctic subsea cable system connecting Europe and Asia via North America to be operational by the 2026 (https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/2bj7k752flnoa8hi3rf28/news/far-north-fiber-commences-cable-route-study). At the same time, new hazards for telecommunications are likely to be complex in high latitude regions, including the direct impacts of sea ice and icebergs, as well as combined impacts from waves, ocean currents and land-coastal processes, including inundation of cable landing stations by storm tides (e.g., Muis et al., 2016; Stephenson et al., 2011). The coastal zone is liable to become more vulnerable due to increased exposure to open-ocean storms, which may become more frequent and intense (Parkinson and Comiso, 2013; Simmonds and Keay, 2009). It is unclear if cables on the continental shelf and slope will be exposed to more seabed scouring by icebergs, although the number of observed icebergs in the polar oceans appears to have been increasing since the 1990s. A century of observations of icebergs from west Greenland reveal strong interannual and decadal variability but with a period of pronounced increased discharge in 1990–1999, two to three times more than in previous decades back to 1900 (Bigg et al., 2014). Other industrial activities may change in that region (e.g., fishing, shipping, resource exploitation, construction of shore terminals and other structures), which should be considered at the earliest stages of planning for new communications and cable systems (Wopschall and Michels, 2013).

Tourism: “Nature adventure” tourism can provide a moderate niche for the UK touring industry. This will require access to the Arctic EEZs and co-operation with the Arctic Circle States.

What are the risks to the climate and the environment of current business trends, especially extractive industries, in the Arctic?

Summary: Contaminants are prevalent in the Arctic, transported from temperate regions by atmosphere and ocean, but also from the land by rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean. Changes in the Arctic marine, atmospheric and hydrological terrestrial environment alter pathways of the contaminants through ecosystems and human populations. The full-scale impact is unknown, although recent data show that it is potentially large and increasing: for example, the Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme (AMAP) has added marine plastics and mercury to the list of threats to the Arctic.

The Arctic is a region of great natural and cultural value; however, it is under stress from human drivers, including climate change and anthropogenic contaminants. Many contaminants have been present at elevated levels in human and wildlife populations in the far north, primarily transported via long-range atmospheric transport, ocean currents, and rivers (Ma et al. 2018). Pollutants have been detected throughout the Arctic marine ecosystem but the extent of exposure to microplastic particles and subsequent bioaccumulation in marine systems is largely unknown (PAME, 2019).

Example 1 - Plastic pollution: Based on surveys of plastic macro-debris, more than 70% of plastics come from regional Arctic fishing activities (Bergman et al., 2017), although microplastic particles observed in surface and deeper waters of the Arctic Ocean are of a wide mix of polymers, likely from long range transport by ocean currents through Arctic ‘gateways’ from the Atlantic and North Pacific and from the discharge of Arctic rivers. Microplastics are an emerging contaminant in polar regions (Peeken et al. 2018; Botterell et al, 2022) and their presence in the Arctic has been identified as higher than in temperate marine locations (Barrows et al. 2018). The Arctic is in danger of becoming the “sixth world ocean garbage patch” (Tekman et al.2017; van Sebille et al. 2012). With rapid increases in contamination, the Arctic Ocean already contains higher microplastics concentrations than other world oceans (Barrows et al., 2018). Microplastics, frozen into the sea ice and fragmented by fluctuating temperatures and mechanical abrasion, can be transported across the Arctic Ocean and beyond. The Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme (AMAP) has added marine plastics and microplastics to their list of chemicals of emerging concern, declaring plastics as a threat to the Arctic, as they are persistent and are transported long distances with growing evidence that they can accumulate in lower trophic level marine organisms in the Arctic (Botterell et al., 2022).

Example 2 – Mercury pollution: Most mercury pollution is brought to the Arctic via long-range transport from lower latitudes by air and ocean pathways. Mercury is cycled in the environment, builds up in food chain, exposing wildlife and humans, especially Arctic Indigenous populations and local communities that rely on marine animals as part of a traditional diet. AMAP’s assessment (AMAP, 2021) shows that mercury from human activity continues to travel to the Arctic, with the global emissions of mercury from human activities having risen in recent years. Atmospheric levels of mercury appear to be decreasing in the Arctic, linked to lower emissions in regions closest to the Arctic.

3. The UK’s contribution to the Arctic through scientific research

What are the benefits for the UK of support for Arctic research activity?

The rapid and unprecedented environmental change in the Arctic will impact the UK. Now is the right time to support Arctic research to 1) understand the mechanisms of change, 2) monitor and the chemical, physical and biological consequences of these changes, and 3) develop tools to help mitigate the effects of these changes. All of these activities will underpin the legislation changes needed to minimise the impact on the UK.

• Melting land ice will contribute to sea level rise, risking low-lying coastal communities and increasing coastal erosion.
• Changing ocean and sea-ice properties in the Arctic will likely adversely impact UK weather patterns.
• Accelerated climate change will likely have negative effects on marine and terrestrial ecosystems in the Arctic and sub-Arctic, which are important natural resources for the UK and international partners. 
• Marine ecosystem shifts include altered patterns of primary and secondary production, with as-yet poorly understood consequences for 1) the export of nutrients to lower latitudes, 2) the sustainability of Arctic capture fisheries, and 3) the ability of the ecosystem to sequester carbon away from the atmosphere.

Benefits to supporting Arctic research activity include:

• Intellectual leadership, particularly through expanding world-leading polar research in the Antarctic (such as methods, knowledge, tools, training, infrastructure etc.) into Arctic system.
• Furthering our understanding of the Arctic’s role in Earth System and its ability to contribute to global climate regulation and future mitigation activities.
• Helping to develop a fairer and more equitable use of Earth’s resources.

• A rise in the profile of UK Science given the growing level of esteem of Arctic research.
• Facilitation of a strong community of polar scientists within the UK, even attracting non-UK early career researchers with polar science expertise (through fellowships, training, academic visits) which often leads to wider collaborations, publications and funding.

What more could the UK do to improve or increase its contribution to Arctic science?

At present UK has little leadership in marine Arctic science, with the major programmes and infrastructure led by other (not always Arctic-bordering) countries. The UK must invest more in Arctic research if it is to increase its strategic influence in this region.

We propose the following:

• More cross/multi-disciplinary research to tackle the complex environmental change underway in the Arctic, and multiple-stressors acting on Arctic ecosystems.
• More co-production of research with local and Indigenous groups in the Arctic to improve the relevance of the research carried out (using the Canada-Inuit Nunangat-United Kingdom Arctic Research Programme 2021 – 2025, CINUK, as a model).
• Greater use of autonomous technology to improve the spatial and temporal resolution of observations.
• Increased understanding of fundamental biology and ecology of Arctic organisms, with the goal of developing truly processed-based models that can predict the future ecological and biogeochemical effects of climate change in the Arctic.
• Further integration of model and observational data, and engagement with AI to build digital twin environments for understanding underlying processes and designing more effective/efficient observing systems.

• To build upon the outputs, collaborations and networks created by the NERC’s Changing Arctic Ocean programme (https://www.changing-arctic-ocean.ac.uk). The legacy of this programme has a huge potential for impact in Arctic research.
• Commit to starting and maintaining long term observatories in Arctic and sub-arctic waters equivalent to those presently operated by NERC Institutes and UK Universities in the Antarctic and Southern Ocean.
• Maintain active involvement in EU Arctic science programmes – e.g. PolarRes (https://polarres.eu), EU PolarNet (https://eu-polarnet.eu).

How can future Arctic research in UK institutions be supported so as to maintain and enhance the UK’s leadership in Arctic science?

The UK is in a strong position to lead in policy-relevant Arctic research. Further strategic funding of existing UK assets would benefit Arctic research greatly:

We propose the following:

• An enhanced pool of cutting-edge and polar-hardy infrastructure and oceanographic equipment with appropriate levels of data and sample management.
• Develop longer-term Arctic research funding initiatives that are available to the wider UK research community.
• Support for world-leading researchers, with strengths in training the next generation of scientists, and in engineering sciences, especially in autonomous underwater robotics and drones.
• Cross-discipline collaborative and science-into-policy organisations, such as the UK Arctic and Antarctic Partnership.
• Proposing international flagship programs such as the successful Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate (MOSAiC), with funding cooperation on an international scale (e.g. UK government cross-department ‘International Ocean Strategy’).
• Momentum and motivation for co-producing research with local communities and Indigenous Peoples Organisations (e.g., CINUK).

• Co-funding to increase time on-board international research vessels to maximise our science outreach and productivity.
• Provide more opportunities to visit and collaborate with leading institutes in Arctic science outside of the UK – e.g. Norway, Finland, Canada, US.

More immediately, we could leverage greater interest, awareness and funding through our hosting of the Arctic Science Summit Week in Edinburgh in 2024.

Has the UK’s departure from the EU had an impact on UK research in the Arctic? Has there been any impact on agreements on international cooperation, joint research projects and access to funding streams such as Horizon Europe? 

There are a number of matters of concern with regards UK’s departure from the EU in terms of scientific cooperation which are affecting UK’s science capabilities in the Arctic.

• There is a funding uncertainty raised due to changes of the UK contribution to the EU science programmes: currently the successful bids with UK partners must go through the interim funding guarantee procedure by UKRI for the Horizon Europe programmes until the June 2023, when the UK association with Horizon Europe Programme is expected to be finalised. The ability to lead and coordinate EU projects by UK institutions has been diminished as a consequence of this process (e.g. we know of instances where UK leads of successful EU proposals have had to step down and transfer leadership to an EU partner).
• The Arctic research network is particularly thinly spread through the world and through the UK and Europe itself. Employing non-UK EU professional nationals is becoming an increasing problem due to the changed regulations involving an extra level of applications and approvals.
• Scientific data exchange and sharing protocols seems to be unaffected, however the difference between UK and EU cyber security rules may create difficulties to free data exchange.
• At present, personal level scientific interactions do not show any examples of differential treatment of the UK scientists in collaboration and communication with the EU colleagues. However, this is at risk should the UK diverge from EU science funding frameworks.

April 2023

Literature cited