Written evidence submitted by the
Sport and Recreation Alliance and the Sports Betting Group

DCMS Select Committee Gambling Regulation Inquiry

The Sport and Recreation Alliance is the representative body for the sport and recreation sector, with a diverse membership of around 300 national and local organisations including national governing bodies of sport, national and regional associations, Active Partnerships, sport for development charities and outdoor recreation and movement and dance bodies.

As the independent voice of the sector, we work with government, policy makers and the media to help sport and recreation grow and thrive. Having an active nation is important as it delivers huge benefits to society and the millions of participants, volunteers, staff and spectators.

The Alliance chairs and provides secretariat support to the Sports Betting Group (SBG). The SBG brings together leading sports governing bodies, competition organisers and player associations to provide leadership and share good practice on sports betting integrity issues and to identify changes to the policy and legislative framework to improve the integrity protections afforded to sport. More information on the SBG can be found here.

Introduction

The Government’s ongoing review of the Gambling Act 2005 provides a crucial opportunity to ensure that gambling legislation and regulation is up to date, robust and meets of needs of all stakeholders.

The information below reflects the submission made by the Sports Betting Group to the Government’s 2021 Call for Evidence as part of the review of the Gambling Act 2005 and outlines what we believe should be the key priorities for the forthcoming White Paper from an integrity perspective.
 

Protecting the integrity of sport from betting corruption

1.1               Sport plays a central role in the social and cultural fabric of Britain as well as contributing significant sums to the economy. Betting corruption is an ever-present and growing threat to the integrity of sport – attempts to corrupt the outcome of sporting events for financial gain strike at the very heart of sport. Assuring the integrity of sporting competitions is therefore essential to retaining public confidence, protecting the reputation and financial viability of sport and maintaining Britain’s global reputation for world-class sport and as a place to do business.

1.2               A core function of all sports governing bodies is to maintain the integrity of their sport and these bodies invest significant resources in dedicated members of staff to detect, deter and disrupt those who would seek to corrupt sport. However, sports governing bodies can only police those over whom they have jurisdiction – typically those who participate in sport – and do not have the full investigative and prosecutorial powers available to public authorities. Sports governing bodies can hand down sporting bans to participants but cannot investigate nor sanction those external to sport, often linked to organised crime, who benefit from corrupt and criminal activity.

1.3               In this context, it is essential the Gambling Commission (GC) has the necessary strategic focus, powers, resources, determination and expertise to effectively investigate and prosecute cases of sports betting corruption. This submission sets out a number of recommendations which we believe should be taken forward as part of the Government’s review in order to ensure the GC is best able to protect the integrity of sport in Britain.

The Gambling Commission’s powers and resources

Ensuring the Gambling Commission is fit for purpose, responsive and accountable

2.1              Match fixing and sports betting corruption is the greatest threat that sport faces.  It is imperative that the GC has sufficient powers, resources and expertise to investigate and prosecute sports betting corruption backed by more rigorous accountability mechanisms. The SBG concludes that there is further work to be done to secure this. We believe the following mechanisms should be considered:

• Establishment of explicit and specific powers which the GC can bring to bear to investigate and prosecute suspected cases of sports betting corruption. These powers should be on a par with those afforded to law enforcement agencies and enable the effective investigation and prosecution of sophisticated conspiracies designed to corrupt sport.
• The creation of an enhanced Sports Betting Integrity Unit within the GC with dedicated resources comprising both intelligence and investigatory functions. This unit would build on the existing Sports Betting Intelligence Unit (SBIU) and encompass a wider investigative role supported by staff with specialist expertise.
• Enhanced funding for the GC’s integrity work through an increase in the fees levied on operators. A proportion of this additional funding should be ringfenced to support the activities of the enhanced unit described above and to support sports governing bodies with their integrity functions.
• Introducing a specific requirement on the GC to produce an annual report on sports betting integrity, alongside a formal ministerial statement to Parliament, to deliver greater awareness and accountability.
• Greater oversight and leadership by ministers and officials of the UK’s National Platform – established under the Macolin Convention[1] – to drive progress on sports betting integrity issues as well as provide greater scrutiny of integrity cases raised with the GC and the follow-up action taken. At a minimum the Sports Minister should chair a meeting of the UK’s National Platform each year.

Powers to investigate and prosecute offences

3.1              Under Section 28 of the Gambling Act 2005 the GC can investigate and prosecute offences under the Act and the powers available to the GC to undertake investigations are outlined in Part 15.[2],[3] These powers typically relate to the appointment of enforcement officers, entering of premises and the gathering of evidence which is located at the premises. In addition to the specific powers in the Act, the GC is listed as a relevant public body under both the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.[4], [5] These acts provide for powers to gather evidence including the use of surveillance, covert human intelligence sources and obtaining telecommunications data.

3.2              Whilst the powers available to the GC under these respective pieces of legislation appear to be wide ranging, our understanding is that there are areas where GC’s existing capabilities may be deficient, for example in terms of the ability to access data from social media or communications apps as well as the ability to compel witnesses to attend interview.

3.3              In any event, we have seen no evidence of these powers being used to investigate sports betting corruption cases. In our view, this is due to a lack of resources, expertise and appetite to take forward criminal investigations. Indeed, the GC’s own approach to compliance and enforcement indicates that, as a general rule, it will not pursue criminal investigations (in relation to licensed operators) and where it uncovers evidence of serious criminality it will generally seek to engage other law enforcement bodies.[6]

3.4              As noted above, this approach is particularly problematic given the limited expertise and resources available to other law enforcement agencies to investigate sports corruption cases and the wider difficulties sports bodies face in tackling external corrupters over whom they have no jurisdiction. Likewise, it is not always straightforward to draw a line between a purely sports disciplinary matter and a potential criminal case – gathering the necessary probative evidence may require a mix of powers, some of which are only available to bodies such as the GC.

3.5              In our view therefore, an outcome of the ongoing review must be that the GC:

• Has the appropriate investigative and prosecutorial powers available to it, in particular to investigate more complex betting corruption conspiracies involving multiple individuals coordinating activities from a number of locations and engaged in remote communication/financial transactions and;
• Has the resources and expertise to utilise these powers effectively.

To this end, we believe there must be an enhanced Sports Betting Integrity Unit within the GC with appropriately experienced leadership, dedicated resources and specialist expertise to fully investigate sports betting integrity issues in line with the powers set out above. This unit would build on the existing Sports Betting Intelligence Unit (SBIU) and encompass a wider investigative role including staff with appropriate expertise. Where appropriate, this unit could also cooperate formally with investigatory teams within sports bodies, for example through the GC’s existing s303 powers to designate external ‘enforcement officers’.[7] Such an approach would importantly ensure the GC is able to carry out the role which was originally envisaged in the Parry Report which recommended the creation of a dedicated integrity unit comprising intelligence and investigatory functions sited within the Gambling Commission.[8]

3.6              Linked to the GC’s powers, resources and expertise is the importance of ensuring the offences it can investigate encompass the full spectrum of criminality related to sports corruption. Section 42 of the Act relates to the offence of cheating at gambling which includes cheating, attempting to cheat or assisting another person to cheat at gambling.[9] It is therefore an important offence under which cases of sports betting corruption would typically be expected to fall. However, our understanding is that only one successful prosecution has been brought under the offence.[10] While this may in part be due to some cases being brought under offences subsequently introduced in separate legislation e.g. the Fraud Act 2006 and Bribery Act 2010, it is nonetheless important that s42 is fit for purpose given that currently the GC can only pursue offences set out in the 2005 Act. It is also important that there is a clear and effective deterrent set out in law for would-be corrupters.

3.7              We therefore firmly believe that Government should take forward a formal assessment of the s42 offence as part of the Gambling Act review. This should include consideration of the effectiveness of s42 relative to existing offences in other legislation (including the length of the applicable sentence) and identify any changes necessary to ensure the GC is able to effectively investigate and prosecute instances of betting-related corruption in sport. Importantly, this must encompass the more complex networks of individuals and groups, often with links to more serious organised crime, who seek to corrupt those within sport for financial advantage. As noted above, the ability to target those involved in these wider conspiracies is critical since sports governing bodies have no regulatory authority over individuals outside of their sport.

3.8              It is important that any revisions to the s42 offence, if deemed necessary, include specific safeguards to prevent the inadvertent criminalisation of sportspersons. In particular, any revisions would so far as possible need to make a clear distinction between conduct designed to improperly influence the outcome of a sporting contest for financial gain and conduct which may typically be expected within a sport, for example a mistake during play or behaving in a certain way for sporting or tactical reasons.

3.9              Legislation including specific sports corruption offences exists in other jurisdictions. The Australian state of Victoria’s integrity legislation is one such example and makes specific reference to those who facilitate corruption and encourage others to engage in corrupt conduct, including through threats and pressure.[11] There are therefore global examples of specific criminal offences relating to the encouragement and facilitation of corruption, often by individuals from outside the sport itself.

Powers to restrict markets/bet types

4.1              The GC has broad powers to restrict or place conditions on the offering of certain markets or bets. While we recognise that in general the GC’s approach is to permit gambling and rely on the reporting mechanisms set out in Licence Condition 15.1[12] to highlight any sign of suspicious betting, we consider some markets to pose a particular reputational/integrity risk due to the ease of manipulation or potential for misuse of inside information such as markets for player transfers, first foul or card in football or wides/no balls in cricket. It is our understanding that these markets typically do not provide substantial commercial revenue for operators but can nonetheless present significant challenges for sport. High-profile cases in football and snooker highlight the issues caused by these types of markets, which could largely be avoided if they were restricted.[13],[14] Indeed certain operators have subsequently taken the decision themselves not to offer some of these markets.[15]

4.2              In this context we believe sports bodies should have greater control over the markets offered on their sports. Ideally this could be achieved through the introduction of a mechanism – similar to that which exists in other jurisdictions such as Australia – which gives sports bodies a formal role in approving markets and bet types to be offered on their sport.[16] An alternative approach would be to create a mechanism for sports bodies to formally request the GC use its existing powers to take rapid reactive measures to restrict certain markets which are particularly susceptible to manipulation or which are deemed to pose a particular integrity risk.

Powers to share information

5.1              Section 30 of the Act sets out the GC’s powers to share information and Schedule 6 of the Act outlines the persons or bodies with which the GC is able to share information. Part 3 of Schedule 6 sets out the sport governing bodies this schedule applies to.

5.2              We believe the clarity and effectiveness of these provisions would be enhanced by more explicit reference to the prevailing data protection requirements relating to the sharing of information for the purposes of protecting sports integrity, notably the provisions contained in the Data Protection Act 2018.[17]

5.3               In addition, we believe the process for amending Schedule 6 should be streamlined such that individual bodies or whole classes of bodies (for example sports governing bodies recognised by the Home Sports Councils) can be added or amended without the need for additional consultation or parliamentary approval. Recent experience demonstrates that making even minor changes to the Schedule can take many months and in the meantime organisations not listed on the Schedule must rely on burdensome alternative information sharing mechanisms which creates an integrity risk for those sports.[18]

Funding and Resources

6.1              As outlined above, we believe the GC must have the resources, expertise and strategic focus necessary to pursue sports betting corruption. However, it is also accepted that in order for this to change, the GC must receive sufficient funding and to this end it should have the ability to increase its resources through an uplift to licence fees. Given the increasing complexity and unpredictability of integrity cases and related work, it is important this mechanism is flexible such that the GC can raise appropriate fees as necessary. Consideration should also be given to ringfencing a specified proportion of fee income to support the work of the enhanced intelligence and investigative unit we propose above.

6.2              In addition to the resources required by the GC, significant costs also fall on sports bodies to police betting integrity issues and to support education and prevention programmes. Going forward, one way to ensure that these costs are covered would be to introduce a fair return to sport from gambling, as has been proposed in a separate paper submitted to the Committee’s inquiry and to which the Sport and Recreation Alliance is a co-signatory. Part of such a mechanism would provide additional resources to sports bodies to support their own efforts in preserving the integrity of sport. 

Sport and Recreation Alliance/

Sports Betting Group

February 2023