Written evidence submitted by CPRE Peak District and
South Yorkshire (CPRE PDY) (SRI0035)

Evidence from CPRE PDSY

The Peak District and South Yorkshire branch of CPRE the countryside charity believes in a thriving, beautiful countryside, rich in nature and playing a crucial role in the response to the climate emergency. Our goal is a countryside that’s valued, enjoyed and understood by, and accessible to, everyone, wherever they live.

We have campaigned on transport issues that impact on the Strategic Road Network (SRN) and the major A road network for many years. Our response draws on our experience as an environmental charity engaging with the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP), the A57 Link Roads.

First, it is essential to define the context for any roads programme. Travel and transport for everyone must be planned through a strategic integrated plan for all surface modes that rapidly reduces carbon emissions, reduces the need to travel and makes best use of existing infrastructure and services. Currently we have strategies for road investment, cycling and walking (Gear Change), bus (Bus Back Better), rail (Connecting people) and freight (Future of Freight). None of these are ‘joined up.’ Below the national level, subnational transport strategies for all  modes, such as those prepared by Transport for the North, city region transport strategies (such as Greater Manchester’s) and local authority transport plans (are struggling without national leadership and funding misdirected to the roads programme.

Investment should focus on improvements that provide best value for society, the environment and the economy using the transport hierarchy devised by the Energy Saving Trust[1].

Q1. How effectively the RIS2 enhancements portfolio has been managed

We answer this question by addressing National Highways (NH) performance against its licence, which provides statutory directions on managing and enhancing the SRN. It should be noted that the expectations of NH run higher than the licence conditions, as spelt out in the Foreword to the licence by the Minister[2].

Through our engagement with management of the South Pennines corridor between Manchester and Sheffield we have witnessed NH’s approach to RIS2. Through the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study and the development of the A57 Link Roads, NH has failed to steward this part of the SRN to ensure value for money, to protect and improve safety on the strategic and local road network, to co-operate with stakeholders, to conform to the principles of sustainable development and to comply with Government policy. All this is documented in detail in Annex A beginning on page 8 – NH’s noncompliance with its licence.

Effective management of the South Pennines corridor requires a corridor-wide strategic appraisal. Instead, NH has ‘salami sliced’ the route into short lengths (an approach condemned by the Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment - SACTRA - in the 1980s) which avoids addressing strategic objectives and issues – the national designation of the Peak District National Park and its internationally important habitats; the impact on communities along the route (the A57 Link Roads bypass one community - those to the east face worse conditions); the huge increases in traffic forecast if the whole route is upgraded which would increase carbon emissions, noise, pollution, visual intrusion and road crashes; sprawling car-dependent development as has happened adjacent to the M1 in South Yorkshire. The history of the corridor demonstrates the failure to plan strategically over 50 years (see footnote[3]).

In addition, development of the A57 Link Roads revealed behaviour unacceptable in a public body. Through two statutory consultations and the development consent order (DCO) examination NH’s behaviour was evasive, obstructive and defensive, and frustrated the many attempts to get substantive answers that would aid understanding of the scheme’s impacts. Its poor behaviour prejudiced effective engagement with stakeholders and the public and called into question not only the integrity of the company but also the veracity of the evidence for the DCO for the scheme (see Annex A, paras 14-50). These conclusions are shared by our consultant, Keith Buchan of MTRU, a Chartered Transport Planning professional who submitted an open letter to the DCO examination in May 2022[4]. Other individuals and organisations have had similar experiences with the Lower Thames Crossing, the A27 Arundel Bypass and the A66 Northern Trans-Pennine Project.

We submitted Annex A to the Office of Road and Rail (ORR) and urged it to enforce behaviour that is expected of a public body and to review the overall monitoring of NH’s licence. We suggested that the ORR a) reviews development of DfT’s RIS and NH’s route strategies to ensure that schemes meet all the criteria for sustainable development, especially for the climate and nature crises; b) insists on, or provides, much more robust assessment and monitoring of scheme development from options appraisal through to project business case; and c) instigates a review of the complete NSIP process. ORR dismissed our concerns as not within their remit. It takes a strategic overview and measures performance of the programme, not a single scheme, against the indicators in RIS2.

In summary, the management of the South Pennines corridor within the RIS2 (and RIS1) portfolio is ineffective, of poor quality and inadequately assessed. 

Q2. Whether risks to the enhancements portfolio for the remainder of the RIS2 period are being well managed;  
No, the risks associated with climate change, with assumptions about traffic growth, and with preparation for the statutory DCO process are poorly managed.

(a)  Climate emissions

The UK has a legally binding net zero target for 2050; by 2030 it is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 68% (compared to 1990)[5]. Transport sector emissions remain unchanged since 1990 and will take up increasing amounts of the UK carbon budgets[6]. The shift to electric vehicles will be too slow to meet our 2035 commitments to reduce carbon emissions[7],[8]. Yet the RIS programme persists in progressing schemes (Lower Thames Crossing, A428 Cambridge and A66 North Pennine Project) which would generate millions of tonnes of CO2 before 2035.

(b) Traffic projections

DfT’s latest National Road Traffic Projections[9] continue the historical trend of overestimating growth.  Five potential scenarios – core, technology, vehicle-led decarbonisation, regional and high economy scenarios - show high traffic growth and fail to meet carbon objectives[10]. The two scenarios showing the least traffic growth and the strongest reduction in carbon are mode-balanced decarbonisation (scenario 7) and behavioural change (scenario 8). Applied together these two scenarios would achieve carbon objectives earlier than the other scenarios. None of the scenarios consider what happens if we do not meet our carbon targets. Defra recommended that all project and policy appraisal should consider two climate change scenarios, 2 degrees and 4 degrees global temperature increases[11]. The RIS programme should deploy Defra’s recommendation and be set within the framework of mode-balanced decarbonisation and behavioural change.

(c)  Statutory process for NSIP development

The statutory process for development of road NSIPs is flawed. The regulations require little information for statutory consultations. Even within this context both statutory consultations for the A57 Link Roads were a travesty of what a consultation should be according to the Cabinet Office guidance and the Gunning Principles[12]. They were not conducted in an open and transparent way. The limited amount of information available was so selective it was biased to the point of being dishonest, and would likely be prejudicial to a party affected by the decision. No-one could have made an intelligent consideration of, or submitted an informed response about, the scheme’s impacts. There was no transport appraisal or traffic figures without which the environmental assessment was meaningless. Unsurprisingly, statutory stakeholders (two local authorities and a National Park Authority) submitted holding objections to both statutory consultations based on the lack of information. To have received holding objections from statutory consultees in response to one consultation, and not addressed those concerns before holding another statutory consultation appears negligent.

A webTAG compliant transport assessment is an essential accompaniment to a roads’ NSIP DCO application[13]. The Transport Assessment Report (TAR) submitted for the A57 Link Roads DCO application was not webTAG compliant. It was a superficial assessment from which crucial evidence was withheld, including assumptions behind the traffic modelling (see Annex A paras 29-35).

The DCO process denies proper scrutiny even to transport experts and is leading to poor schemes being consented. The NSIP process should be front loaded with a WebTAG compliant transport appraisal and full environmental impact assessment available for public scrutiny before the formal DCO process is entered.

Q3. What the impacts of delays and cost overruns are on the overall programme, and whether the revised programme can be delivered to schedule and on budget;  
Delays in the programme will lead to the UK failing to meet its legally binding carbon targets; to increased carbon emissions; to worsening air pollution and failure to meet legally binding air pollutant targets; to worsening public health; to lack of investment in sustainable modes; and to increasing costs.

Abandonment, not revision, of the programme is the solution to overruns. At present five schemes (three A47 schemes, A428 Cambridge and A57 Link Roads) are the subject of legal challenge, and two schemes (A38 Derby and Stonehenge) await ministerial decision following a legal challenge. That seven road schemes are being challenged through the courts, at great cost to the challengers, indicates the extent of public dissatisfaction with the programme. These challenges are based on the unlawfulness of the decision and do not address the poor judgement made by the decision maker in balancing the planning merits.

Q4. What progress is being made on planning for the next Road Investment Strategy

We have had no engagement with planning for RIS 3.
 

Q5. What lessons from RIS2 need to be incorporated into RIS3 to ensure it is achievable and delivers on policy objectives;  
First, lessons are not being learnt. CPRE’s 2017 End of the Road?[14] research presented strong evidence that the outcomes from NH’s Post-Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) for major schemes are being ignored. Its conclusions are:

• Road schemes generate average traffic increases of over 47%; have long lasting impacts on landscape and biodiversity; and do not benefit the economy.
• Road building is associated with a highly car-dependent pattern of land development from housing developments to business and retail parks in the countryside. These generate large numbers of vehicle movements and cause serious congestion. This pattern of road building and associated land development is leading to a semi-industrial / urban landscape in the countryside, and the erosion of Green Belt that is designated to prevent sprawl.
• Local authorities, national government and the business community in England are locked into a highly car-dependent development model, in which road building and the associated development generates more traffic, which creates pressure for more road building. Ribbon-development of homes and businesses along supposedly ‘strategic’ corridors is self-strangling: any respite from congestion provided by a new or widened road is temporary.

The above ‘lessons’ must influence RIS3. In addition, the following flaws in RIS2 should be rectified in RIS3.

(a)  Climate emergency

The climate emergency and achieving net zero carbon must be the framework for RIS 3. The roads programme should urgently reduce its carbon emissions[15] in line with the carbon reduction trajectory for net zero. There should be a separate objective for carbon[16]. 

(b) Nature crisis

Biodiversity loss continues on NH’s estate. A biodiversity action plan should aim to achieve at least 10% net gain in biodiversity. With the resources at its disposal and in line with its licence requirements, NH should be required to show leadership and meet a target of 20% net gain.

(c)  Make best use of the existing SRN

RIS3 should make best use of the existing SRN through asset maintenance and traffic management. Government should not be encouraging ‘mega projects’ and unconstrained traffic growth, and plans must be compatible with net-zero[17]. NH should manage traffic demand to reduce operational carbon emissions, by reducing vehicle miles and cutting motorway speed limits to 64mph[18].

(d) Designated landscapes

The statutory purposes of National Parks must be met by law[19]. ‘Great weight should be given to conserving landscape and scenic beauty in nationally designated areas.’ They ‘have the highest status of protection in relation to landscape and scenic beauty.’ This includes their setting. There is a strong presumption against road widening or new roads in a National Park, the Broads and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty. ‘Planning of the SRN should encourage routes that avoid National Parks, the Broads and Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty’ (NPSNN 5.150 & 5.152). Planning in the South Pennines corridor has failed to meet this policy.

(e)  Landscape

Landscape assessment must include tranquillity. Noise is a poor indicator of tranquillity[20].

(f)    Economic evidence

Economic evidence must be rigorously challenged. SACTRA’s ‘Transport and the Economy’[21], found a ‘strong theoretical expectation’ that transport investment could boost economic growth, but direct evidence was ‘weak and contested’. In a developed economy such as that in the UK, there is no automatic connection between transport investment and economic growth. Roads work in two ways. They can as easily bring commuters into an area, as take residents out to work. Similar results have been found more recently (2017) by Frontier Economics[22]. The link between economic growth and increased congestion must be broken by encouraging more journeys by public transport and active travel[23].

(g)  Performance indicators

At present these fail to uncover important impacts. For example, ORR finds NH is not on track to meet its target of no net loss in biodiversity by 2025[24]. However, the issues causing this run much deeper than not having a plan. With respect to bats (see Annex B, beginning on page 50), for over a decade NH has not fulfilled its monitoring of bat mitigation measures within the POPEs and continues to use mitigation measures that increase bat mortality. How would this gross failure in NH’s duty to protect bats be picked up in ORR’s annual monitoring?

Q6. Whether the Government’s current and forthcoming roads investment programme is meeting the current and future needs of consumers and business;  
The RIS does not meet current demands for anyone because it is not set within the legally binding framework of reducing climate emissions, nor within a holistic transport and travel strategy for all surface modes.

The government continues to rely on improved transport infrastructure ‘to level up and boost connectivity’ [25],[26],[27], instead of making best use of existing infrastructure through demand management and modal shift.  Worse, it is planning without taking heed of failure to meet carbon reduction targets. A future where temperatures rise to between 2-40C must be considered by the road investment programme.

Q7. Whether the Government’s roads investment programme aligns with other policy priorities, such as decarbonisation, levelling up, productivity and growth;  
The roads investment programme fails to align with:

• DfT’s Decarbonising Transport (TDP) goal that by 2030 50% of all journeys in urban areas would be made by active travel. Nor does it align with the proposed trajectory to meet net zero in both the TDP and the UK’s Net Zero Strategy - we showed that the carbon emissions from the A57 Link Roads alone does not follow the TDP trajectory[28]. According to IEMA guidance, schemes that fail to meet this trajectory would have a significant impact on climate emissions[29]. Investing in new roads undermines the TDP’s ‘intention to make public transport better value and more competitively priced. Further action is still needed[30]’ and could be delivered through a reprioritisation of funding away from large road and major infrastructure projects, as well as from new revenue-raising measures[31].
• The Treasury Green Book which emphasises a strategic approach that reflects national and regional/local objectives and adopts a natural capital approach. This approach, which was ignored by NH when developing the A57 Link Roads, is fundamental to sustainable outcomes and should be rigorously tested for and challenged throughout the business case development.
• Levelling Up as it takes invaluable funding away from investment in London-style public transport across the country[32] and in digital connectivity which reduces the need to travel.
• The Government’s 25-yr plan to improve the environment which requires more habitat; in better condition; in bigger patches that are more closely connected.

Q8. How RIS3 should take account of technological developments, and evidence on ways of increasing capacity on the Strategic Road Network.

Increasing capacity of the SRN should not be pursued. The SRN should be managed to make best use of existing infrastructure through mode shift and demand management, as technology alone will not be enough to reach net zero.

ANNEX A

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ITS LICENCE CONDITIONS

1       CPRE PDSY is a branch of CPRE, the countryside charity. We are also as the Friends of the Peak District, the National Park society for the Peak District National Park and a member of the Campaign for National Parks. We believe in a thriving, beautiful countryside, rich in nature and playing a crucial role in the response to the climate emergency.  Our goal is a countryside that’s valued, enjoyed and understood by, and accessible to, everyone, wherever they live. Through all our work we look at the role of our countryside in tackling the climate emergency, including seeking ways to increase resilience and reduce impact.

2       Through our engagement with Highways England/National Highways’ (NH) plans for major road building impacting on the Peak District we have found that the company has not complied with several of its licence conditions, some of which are statutory directions. This relates particularly to the development and progression of its proposed A57 Link Roads[33]. The non-compliance described below represents not only a serious malfeasance but also demonstrates that the process through which the A57 Link Roads has passed has been both unlawful and encumbered by participatory unfairness making any decision which might be made to proceed with the scheme untenable. As the Highways Monitor, we understand that the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) monitors National Highways’ compliance with the statutory directions and regard to the guidance issued by the Secretary of State for Transport (SoS) in its licence. We are therefore bringing this non-compliance to your attention.

3       With respect to the A57 Link Roads we urge the ORR to assess NH’s performance in the light of this representation to you and report your findings to the SoS before they make a decision on the scheme in mid-November 2022. More generally we urge the ORR to enforce behaviour that is expected of a public body. In particular, we suggest that the ORR a) insists on, or provides, much more robust assessment and monitoring of scheme development from options appraisal through project business case, and b) reviews or instigates a review of the NSIP proposal and DCO process, for example in line with paragraph 29 below.

4       The document is laid out as follows

(A) Background

(B) Behaviour unacceptable in a public body, Licence para 5.19, as demonstrated by

(1) Statutory consultations

(2) Transport Assessment Report

(3) NH’s response to CPRE PDSY’s requests for information

(4) Examination of Development Consent Order (DCO) application

(C) Failure to comply with statutory directions in the Licence, paras 4.1 management of Strategic Road Network (SRN), 4.2 general duties on Licence holder and 5.29 Government policy

(D) Failure to have regard to guidance in the Licence, paras 5.15 and 5.23

(E) Conclusions.

       BACKGROUND

5       The A57 Link Roads (the scheme) developed as NH’s favoured option out of the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study[34]. It is a dual carriageway bypass of Mottram between the M67 and the A57T, continuing as single carriageway extension A57T to A57 to Glossop, which would effectively bypass part of the A57 called Woolley Lane (see figure below). National Highways (or Highways England as it was) held statutory consultations on the scheme in 2018[35] and 2020[36]. (The scheme was called the Trans-Pennine Upgrade until 2020 when it became the A57 Link Roads.)

6       As a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project (NSIP) the scheme’s draft DCO was submitted to the Planning Inspectorate (PINS) on 28th June 2021, when all the application documents became publicly available, and was accepted for examination on 26th July 2021. The examination of the DCO application was conducted between 16th November 2021 and 16th May 2022. The Examining Authority (ExA)’s recommendations must be made by 16th August 2022 and the SoS’s decision must be made by 16th November 2022.

7       CPRE employed a professional transport planner, Keith Buchan of MTRU (Metropolitan Transport Research Unit), to develop our alternative proposals to the scheme for consideration through the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study and to give evidence to the Examination-in-Public (EiP)[37]. MTRU’s engagement in the EiP led to consistent and expert challenge by a professional transport planner with extensive experience.

8       As a branch of CPRE we have had a 50 year history of engagement with the scheme in all its iterations. The evidence we present here is focused on our engagement with development of the scheme over the last 8 years; a comprehensive assessment of both the 2018[38] and 2020[39] statutory consultations which was submitted to the PINS as evidence of the inadequacy of the consultations; and full engagement as an Interested Party (IP) at the EiP into the scheme. We objected to the scheme on the basis that sustainable alternatives exist that should be trialled before unsustainable road building is pursued. We are not here concerned about the scheme and its impacts except in so far as they demonstrate non-compliance by NH.

9       All the DCO documents for the scheme appear on the PINS website[40]. References beginning REP, EV, APP, AoC or AS refer to documents in the EiP library. The library lists all documents accepted into the EiP and provides links to each one.  See footnote for link to the Library[41]. 

Framework for assessment of NH’s performance

10   The expectations of NH run higher than the conditions of its licence. They are spelt out in the Foreword to the licence by the Minister for Transport at the time: ‘Government remains responsible for strategic roads and Ministers will continue to be accountable for making sure that the network is managed responsibly, in a way that safeguards value for public investment, meeting the needs of road users, securing individual well-being and supporting economic purpose, both today and for future generations... This document represents a crucial part of that system, by setting out the Secretary of State's statutory directions and guidance to Highways England. It makes clear, to both Highways England and the wider community of road users and stakeholders, what we expect Highways England to achieve and how they must behave in discharging their duties and in delivering our vision and plans for the network, set out in the Road Investment Strategy.

11   The Licence emphasises that the role of Highways England is about more than just complying with the letter of the law. We expect the company to go the extra mile in the way it engages with road users and collaborates with other organisations to develop shared solutions. And they must take a lead in promoting and improving the role and performance of roads in respect of broader communal responsibilities, such as the aesthetics of design, safety and the environment, as well as driving forward wider progress on technology and innovation.’

12   In addition the baseline standard of the Seven Principles of Public Life (the Nolan Principles) applies to anyone who works as a public officeholder, including all people appointed to work in non-departmental public bodies, such as NH[42]. Five of the seven principles are key to our assessment. These are:

• Objectivity - Holders of public office must act and take decisions impartially, fairly and on merit, using the best evidence and without discrimination or bias.
• Accountability - Holders of public office are accountable to the public for their decisions and actions and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to ensure this.
• Openness - Holders of public office should act and take decisions in an open and transparent manner. Information should not be withheld from the public unless there are clear and lawful reasons for so doing.
• Honesty - Holders of public office should be truthful.
• Leadership - Holders of public office should exhibit these principles in their own behaviour and treat others with respect. They should actively promote and robustly support the principles and challenge poor behaviour wherever it occurs.

13   It is within this context that we have assessed NH’s performance, under the headings (B) Behaviour Unacceptable in a Public Body, (C) Failure to Comply with Statutory Directions in the Licence, and (D) Failure to Have Due Regard to Guidance in the Licence.

(B) BEHAVIOUR UNACCEPTABLE IN A PUBLIC BODY

14   We start with the licence condition that applies to NH’s interface with the public. Although para 5.19 is not a statutory direction, it should be a golden thread through all NH’s interactions with organisations and the public, and we quote it below for reference.

Licence Para 5.19 In complying with 5.17 and 5.18, the Licence holder should co-operate with other persons or organisations in a way which is demonstrably:

(a)  Open and transparent – involving relevant stakeholders, ensuring that essential information is available to affected and interested parties, and that the processes for engagement and communication are clear;

(b) Positive and responsive – seek to build trusting and effective working relationships with key partners and stakeholders, engaging with due efficiency and economy and in a timely manner;

(c)  Collaborative – working with others to align national and local plans and investments, balance national and local needs and support better end-to-end journeys for road users.

15   We show below, through (1) the statutory consultations; (2) the Transport Assessment Report; (3) NH’s response to CPRE’s requests; and (4) the EiP, how NH omitted critical evidence that was crucial to understanding the scheme’s impacts, presented biased evidence, misrepresented evidence, refused to share information, was reluctant to give straight answers to questions and failed to follow best practice.

(1) The statutory consultations

16   Through both statutory consultations NH withheld and refused to share essential information. There was insufficient information to allow the public to make an informed assessment of the impacts of the scheme. Some of the statements were misleading and bordered on the dishonest.  NH steered the consultations away from over-arching fundamental questions, such as the need for the scheme and possible alternatives, towards detailed matters of design.

2018 statutory consultation

17   No transport assessment or traffic modelling results and little information as to the impacts of the scheme on the environment or the community[43] were made available during this first statutory consultation. As a result High Peak Borough Council, Derbyshire County Council and the Peak District National Park Authority all submitted holding objections.

18   In view of these omissions, we asked Highways England if it would make traffic data available for the next consultation. It promised to do so[44] but the promise was never honoured.

2020 statutory consultation

19   The second 2020 statutory consultation was held during a complete lockdown for the Covid pandemic. NH claimed to have mitigated the effect of the restrictions but comparison of the 2018 and 2020 consultations revealed the only ‘mitigation’ was the addition of 3 non-interactive webinars. These provided wholly inadequate replacements for face-to-face events. In addition, people were expected to view hard copies of the documents in three cramped local post offices (as local authority offices were closed) or to view the documents on line.

20   A DCO applicant has a duty to consult the community in accordance with the Statement of Community Consultation (SoCC)[45]. The SoCC stated ‘we’re publishing … consultation material to assist well-informed responses to the consultation... The report will provide information about the potential environmental effects of the scheme.’ The consultation material comprised a colour brochure delivered to the majority of households in the area, a non-technical summary and three volumes of the Preliminary Environment Information Report (PEIR). The SoCC-promised delivery of a 37-page document of FAQ to the majority of households in the area did not occur. Air pollution, noise and carbon emissions were the only impacts assessed and then only partially. The omissions and misrepresentations from the consultation were extensive and are detailed in Appendix A. They included no transport assessment, traffic data or traffic modelling; no mention of the adverse impacts on Glossopdale, on the Peak District National or on the Green Belt; a misleading impression that road safety would improve; and a brochure which focused to the exclusion of all else on the immediate benefits to residents of Mottram and on Woolley Lane – a sales pitch for the scheme, not an honest presentation of its effects.

21   Just as with the preceding statutory consultation in 2018, in the 2020 statutory consultation neither the public nor the statutory consultees had the information available to them to make informed responses. Once again Derbyshire County Council, High Peak Borough Council and the Peak District National Park Authority all submitted holding objections based on lack of information in the PEIR and the absence of any traffic modelling or transport assessment.

22   The degree to which the impacts of the scheme were withheld from the public through the consultation only became apparent through the scrutiny allowed by the EiP. These impacts included (i) increased traffic impacts and congestion causing rat running on residential streets (counter-productive to the adoption of active travel measures), poorer urban environment and increased risk of road crashes, all within Glossopdale; (ii) increased risk of road crashes on both the SRN and the local road network, particularly the A57 Snake Pass; (iii) severe adverse impacts on the Green Belt; (iv) increased traffic on cross-National Park roads. None of these are mentioned in any of the consultation documents. The brochure delivered to everyone’s home concealed information that would have a huge impact on people’s well-being. The statements on road safety in the FAQ were in total contradiction to the results presented with the DCO application and bordered on the dishonest. The concealment alone is sufficient to make the consultation on the scheme invalid, and to call into question the validity of the claimed support for the scheme, not to mention NH’s integrity.

23   The statutory consultations are the only means available to the public to gain an informed impression of the scheme and its impacts. PINS regards them as the best time to influence a project whatever one’s opinion[46]. The next step, the DCO application, is daunting, technical, requires huge amounts of time to read thousands of pages of evidence, and total commitment to keep up with weekly deadlines, answering questions from the Examining Authority (ExA), rebutting evidence and scanning revised versions of NH’s original documents. It therefore excludes the majority of the public who do not have the resources or perseverance to engage.

24   NH is required to produce a Consultation Report to show how it met its legal duties with respect to consultation and took account of the comments made. The Consultation Report is therefore an important document. Best practice[47] advice is for those making a DCO application to make it available before the application is submitted to PINS. NH refused to do this when we asked[48] and only submitted it with the DCO application. It therefore failed to follow best practice. Seeing the comments made and NH’s response to them would have helped the public prepare for the DCO process.

25   Once the DCO application is submitted, all the local authorities are invited to submit adequacy of consultation reports to PINS. Although all responded that NH had held the consultation according to the SoCC, Derbyshire County and High Peak Borough Councils (AoC-003) and the Peak District National Park Authority (AoC-004) drew attention to multiple flaws in the consultation; and reported that insufficient information was published with the consultation to enable them and the local community to determine the likely impacts of the scheme. The Councils also reported that they had ‘received multiple letters from residents which raised similar concerns’.

26   In summary, both consultations were a travesty of what a consultation should be. Under its licence NH is bound to follow the Cabinet Office guidance on consultation. The current version of this, issued in 2018, encourages those preparing consultations to ‘give enough information to ensure that those consulted understand the issues and can give informed responses’. The Gunning Principles for consultation[49] require ‘There is sufficient information to give ‘intelligent consideration’ - The information contained in a consultation document should not be as inaccurate or incomplete as to mislead potential consultees in their responses.’ The Aarhus Convention guarantees the right of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities, subject to limited conditions.

27   We have shown above that the consultation did not follow best practice according to any of these principles or guidance. It was not conducted in an open and transparent way. The limited amount of information available was so selective it was biased to the point of being dishonest, and would likely be prejudicial to a party affected by the decision. No-one could have made an intelligent consideration of, or submitted an informed response about, the scheme’s impacts.

28   It appears contrary to good practice to have received holding objections from the statutory consultees in response to the 2018 consultation, and not addressed those concerns before holding another statutory consultation. An effective approach would have been to address all the statutory consultees’ concerns and to then seek public views before proceeding to a DCO application. Development of a NSIP should be front loaded with a WebTAG compliant transport appraisal and full environmental impact assessment available for public scrutiny before the formal DCO process is entered. This was not done.

      (2) Transport Assessment Report (APP-059)

29   The failure to supply full information about the transport impacts, the traffic modelling and traffic data continued into the DCO application. A full WebTAG compliant appraisal, essential to understanding the impacts of the scheme, was not presented as part of the DCO application, as required by National Policy Statement National Networks 2014 (NPSNN) 5.207. The Transport Assessment Report (TAR) accompanying the DCO application did not allow full comprehension of the traffic effects of the scheme or provide sufficient evidence to test the impacts of the scheme against legal, policy and guidance requirements.

30   The withdrawn but de facto guidance states that ‘a TA is a comprehensive and systematic process that sets out transport issues relating to a proposed development. It identifies what measures will be taken to deal with the anticipated transport impacts of the scheme and to improve accessibility and safety for all modes of travel[50]’. Current Government Guidance[51] for planning states ‘Transport Assessments are thorough assessments of the transport implications of development’, and ‘care should be taken to establish the full range of studies that will be required of development at the earliest opportunity as it is unlikely that a Transport Assessment or Statement in itself could fulfil the specific role required of a transport element of an Environmental Impact Assessment where this is required’ as in this scheme (our emphasis).

31   Despite all this guidance NH reduced the main purpose of the TAR as ‘to summarise the development of the Scheme in a single, stand-alone report for general consumption.[52]’ The omissions and flaws detailed in Appendix B show how far the TAR fell short of presenting a report for general consumption, never mind a ‘thorough’, ‘comprehensive and systematic’ assessment of the transport implications of the scheme. No details were given of the traffic modelling and the results showed numerous inconsistencies, still unexplained at the end of the EiP. In three and a half pages it named the modelling software and used three figures to show the modelled area and local zone disaggregation. There was no local model validation report, no forecasting report, no options report, no strategic case report, no economic case report, no appraisal summary. The impact of increased traffic within Glossopdale was barely addressed - the increased risk of road crashes on residential roads, severance of pedestrians, the impact of HGVs, longer travel times were not mentioned or addressed. Journey time savings were limited to parts of journeys, not actual journeys the travelling public would make. There was no assessment of the impact on buses.

32   We challenged NH on the quality of the TAR when the DCO documents were submitted but did not receive a reply until well into the EiP. It was defensive and dismissive[53]: ‘It is not normal practice to submit all the detailed information relating to the traffic and economic analysis and modelling of a scheme due to the complexity and sheer volume of the data that underpins it, which cannot generally be understood and interpreted by interested parties, unless they are specialists in the fields of traffic modelling and economic analysis[54].’

33   Notwithstanding that NH knew there would be, and was, at least one transport professional (MTRU) engaged in the EiP, this was obstructive and counter to understanding the scheme’s impacts. Others also challenged the quality of the TAR to which NH responded[55]: ‘The Transport Assessment Report (TAR) (APP-185) was prepared in accordance with industry standard best practice which is based on previous Department of Transport (DfT) guidance on the preparation of transport assessment that was withdrawn several years ago and not subsequently replaced by alternative guidance. Therefore, currently there is no guidance regarding the preparation of transport assessments for transport schemes’. Due to the poor assessment we and other IPs appealed to the ExA [REP10-017] that NH should produce a Web-TAG compliant transport appraisal that addressed our concerns. The ExA did not respond to our request. NH did respond [AS-011] as a late submission to the penultimate deadline,  reasserting arguments previously made.

34   In summary, the TAR contained highly selective information designed to promote the scheme and conceal the serious adverse impacts it would impose. NH failed to meet the minimum standard set by Government for TARs as a ‘comprehensive and systematic’ assessment of the transport implications of development, let alone go the extra mile required by its licence. NH has no excuse for producing such a poor assessment.

35   The lack of transparency regarding the information and data about the traffic modelling is most serious. It limits the public’s involvement in the EIA process, which is important, not just to ensure compliance with the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (‘EIA Regs’), which seek to ensure a process by which the public is given an opportunity to express their opinion on environmental matters, but also with the Aarhus Convention in respect of public participation. The public can only participate and give a reasonable opinion on environmental matters if sufficient background data on projected environmental effects is provided. It also undermines the process through which the SoS will seek to ensure that he is satisfied that the material provided by NH is sufficient for him to reach a reasoned conclusion on the significant effects of the proposed development on the environment.

      (3) NH response to CPRE PDSY’s requests for information

36   On our behalf Keith Buchan of MTRU began asking for background data on the transport appraisal and traffic modelling in March 2021 in order to inform the development of our alternative proposal and to understand scheme effects. His requests received no response. NH claimed not to have received the emails, although MTRU had never experienced such difficulties with NH before. Although we were told that the failure to receive MTRU emails was being investigated, a year later we have not received any details and on occasion NH did receive emails directly from MTRU. From May 2021 CPRE forwarded all emails from MTRU to NH. We have dealt with our experience during the pre-EiP period, through four key documents supplied to us and during the EiP.

9. Pre-examination

37   Listed below are our repeated requests by email for information relating to the full transport appraisal[56], only one of which was successful (in bold).

• 8th June 2021 we resubmitted our list of requested documents[57], all of which would have been available had a full WebTAG compliant appraisal been undertaken.
• 22nd Jul 2021 we asked if the sifting of options exercise[58] had been repeated since the 2015 Transpennine Routes Feasibility Study and for a response to 8th June email.
• 24th Aug 2021 NH confirmed ‘that we have not repeated the Early Appraisal Sifting Tool (EAST) since finalising the options in 2015’. 
• 30th July having read the DCO documents we submitted questions and request for information (summarised in footnote below to show they were straightforward[59]).
• 6th August NH indicated it was dealing with our 30th July request under the terms of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 with a due date for issuing a response of 20th August.
• 24th August NH, responding to our email 6th Aug, referred us to the transport modelling and forecasting reports submitted with the DCO. As we have shown above in para 32 there were no transport modelling and forecasting reports submitted with the DCO.
• 2nd Sept we repeated our request for information.
• 15th September 2021, MTRU made a formal complaint ‘about the failure to supply basic information on a major scheme DCO: the A57 Link Roads.  This has two aspects: the failure to supply the information and the way in which specific requests have not been answered or answered in an unsatisfactory manner. This has severely restricted the ability to scrutinise the justification for the scheme… Please engage with me so that my information requests can be met and my requests for clarification answered.’ To date, MTRU’s formal complaint has still not been addressed.

38   NH’s target to respond to emails is within a maximum of 10 working days. The only email which received a response within 10 working days was the email in which NH invoked the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 – NH failed to meet this deadline too. The blatant delay in responding was uncooperative and negative. Directing us to where information could be found, knowing full well that it was absent, breaks multiple Nolan principles. NH’s approach to dealing with our requests for the full transport appraisal was in contrast to general enquiries which were dealt with in a timely fashion, including those relating to the scheme’s environmental statement and road collisions which were addressed under Freedom of Information. This gave us the impression that NH had something to hide from scrutiny in the background transport work to the scheme.

39   For eight months NH were uncooperative, unhelpful and withheld information about the full transport appraisal that should have been supplied with the DCO application. Finally in the evening of Friday 12th November - one working day before formal proceedings for the EiP commenced on Tuesday 16th November - four background documents were sent to us; the Combined Modelling and Transport Appraisal Report, the Economic Appraisal Package, the Transport Forecasting Package and the Transport Modelling Package for the A57 Link Roads.

ii) The four background documents – REP2-090

40   When NH shared the four technical documents they told us they would not be submitting them to the EiP ‘due to the technical depth of these documents. The Transport Assessment produces the data in layman’s terms and should be used instead[60]’. In the interests of openness and transparency we submitted them to the EiP at with our written representation on January 14th 2022, Deadline 2. They were accepted by the ExA and published by PINS as one combined document - REP2-090 (in which two of the documents are repeated). A number of IPs, including CPRE, referred to REP2-090 in their submissions. At first NH ignored references made to it. However, on 23rd February 2022 in response to IP submission REP3-032 drawing attention to REP2-090, NH stated[61]:

41   ‘It is not normally appropriate to release partial information into the public domain in advance of the full package of information being submitted with the Development Consent Order application. This is because partial information would potentially be misleading or misunderstood in the absence of all the supporting information for the Scheme that enables full comprehension of all aspects of the Scheme assessment in combination’.

42   This statement was not only misleading, it was also incorrect [REP6-032]. The full package of information accompanying the DCO application was accepted by the Planning Inspectorate on 26 July 2021. The four documents were released by NH to CPRE on 12th November 2021, nearly 4 months after the DCO application was accepted, not in advance of its submission.

43   Furthermore these documents are not ‘partial information’ but fundamental and essential background documents to understanding the ‘partial’ Transport Assessment Report, which is not fit for the purpose of examining a major highway scheme. The fact that the four documents were accepted by the ExA indicates they must have been considered of use to the EiP; the ExA and IPs were able to read them in the context of all the supporting information for the scheme. We found them crucial for scrutinising evidence. They emphasised the poverty of information in the TAR and how much essential evidence NH had withheld. For example:

44   The Transport Forecasting Package revealed that refinements were made to the model during development of the scheme in order to reduce air pollution in Tintwistle and Dinting Vale Air Quality Management Areas (AQMAs), and along Glossop High Street West[62]. The pollution arising from the scheme would otherwise have been of such severity that it was considered that it would jeopardise the application for development consent. These model refinement steps could have led to the anomalies in the traffic outputs described above. They could also have led to differences between 2025 ‘do minimum’ and ‘do something’ modelled traffic flows through both AQMAs and along the A57 not meeting the criteria for, and therefore being excluded from, assessment of air quality[63]. They could also have led to changes in traffic flows on the A628T with the scheme not meeting the criteria for assessment under the Habitats Regulations Assessment.

45   The Transport Forecasting Package also revealed that the traffic model had been applied to reduce traffic flows on the A57 through Glossop and divert them onto residential roads, leading to all the consequences described in para 32 above. It revealed a diversionary route labelled ‘Hadfield Alternative’. This information was not available in any of the DCO documents and was a key point of concern to IPs[64].

iii) During the EiP

46   Once the EiP started and the ExA was taking note of proceedings NH became more responsive. We had two technical meetings with NH during the EiP on 15th December 2021 and 19th January 2022 in order to allow MTRU to ask questions, request information and increase our understanding of the transport assessment. The meetings were led by NH; direct technical dialogue with those undertaking the assessment of the scheme was not allowed. This fundamentally limited our understanding. The bulk of the requested information was supplied by 7th March [REP7-025, 9.69.61]. However the data requested on public transport was never satisfactorily resolved (see Appendix C a. below).

47   We initially agreed to aid the EiP and the ExA as to where we did and did not agree with NH through a Statement of Common Ground (SoCG). Due to NH’s obfuscation and ignoring our requests for clarification we were unable to complete this.

48   In summary, NH was completely resistant to engaging with us and providing information before the EiP started. There was no good reason for withholding any of it, and it could all have been shared at the latest with the DCO application. Once the EiP started, the formal process required at least a show of cooperation but even that was hampered by NH’s restrictive management of the dialogue.

      (4) Examination of the DCO application

49   The topics through which NH tried to conceal crucial evidence are detailed in Appendix C. They ranged from assessment of public transport; assessment and review of appraisal options; explanations of the spurious traffic data, the uncertainty log and associated development; increase in vehicle kms; a sensitivity test for carbon emissions; visibility of the scheme to the public; major nearby development Godley Green Garden Village; and the impacts of national and regional policy on public transport walking and cycling policy on the scheme. The tactics demonstrate a spectrum of behaviour from delay in producing information to the extent it was too late for the EiP to consider, trying to show due process had been followed when it had not, avoidance of answering questions and drip feeding small amounts of information, playing circular games, offering diametrically opposing answers to the same repeated question, and poor understanding of its own evidence. All this wasted EiP time and opportunities for proper scrutiny, gave rise to a lack of confidence in the work undertaken by NH and its contractors, and challenged the integrity of the environmental, social and economic assessment of the impacts of the scheme.

Summary of non-compliance with Licence para 5.19

50   Both statutory consultations misled the public as they were prejudicially biased, withheld information critical to understanding the impacts of the scheme and failed to meet basic standards of consultation. NH, when dealing with our requests for information, failed to engage in an open, transparent, responsive and collaborative way. Instead it was obstructive, only improving its behaviour once under observation from the ExA. The TAR presented with the DCO application was an exceedingly superficial assessment of the scheme from which crucial evidence was withheld. NH’s approach throughout the EiP was to reduce adverse impacts to insignificance and to dismiss challenges, rather than engage in constructive dialogue. It was evasive, obstructive and defensive, and frustrated the many attempts to get substantive answers that would aid understanding of the scheme’s impacts.

(C) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH STATUTORY DIRECTIONS IN THE LICENCE

Licence Para 4.1 It must operate and manage the SRN in the public interest in respect of both current activities and needs and in providing effective stewardship of its long-term operation and integrity. 

51   The process of addressing the problems along the A57/A628/A616T corridor was deeply flawed. The A57T is but one section of the strategic South Pennines Corridor between the Port of Liverpool and the Humber Ports[65]. Instead of addressing the whole route the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study focused on the traffic ‘hot spot’ at Mottram. It excluded another strategic corridor, the M62, the traffic on which interacts with the A628T corridor. The study focused on highway matters, avoided a multimodal approach, and failed to adopt a full corridor approach. It did not therefore follow the WebTAG requirements to start with a blank sheet, consider transport problems in the round and consider all solutions including non-transport ones[66]. This narrow approach is reflected in the South Pennines Route Strategy in which all the issues on the SRN are solved with highway interventions without due regard to modal shift to rail. The Mayor of Liverpool has expressed his dissatisfaction with this approach in his recent rejection of the A5036 Port of Liverpool dualling at the west end of the corridor[67].

52   The scheme under examination is what remains of previous, larger scale proposals (the 2007 Mottram-Hollingworth-Tintwistle bypass). The issue of piecemeal implementation disguising real strategic impacts was dealt with as far back as the 1980s and by SACTRA. Yet even now this piecemeal approach continues to east and west of the scheme within this corridor. To the east NH is exploring the feasibility of the Hollingworth-Tintwistle bypass[68]. It is likely that the current scheme will increase traffic along the A628T through Hollingworth and Tintwistle, fuelling irresistible demands for road building to relive the villages. The next step would then be the proposed dualling of the corridor to the M1[69]. Any extension to the east would impact directly on the Peak District National Park and bring the test of major development in a National Park into play. By developing a small length of the corridor the big strategic impacts are avoided and resistance is reduced as each piece passes through its formal process as a standalone scheme.

53   In the other direction, five miles to the west along the M67, the M67/M60 J24 Denton Island interchange was excluded from the scheme’s assessment. Yet the interchange has long been recognised as a pinch point for congestion[70] in need of improvement, and the proposed interventions are part of the Trans-Pennine Upgrade of which this scheme is a part. ‘Considerations as to mitigation at the M60 Junction 24 Denton Island form part of the wider planned Trans-Pennine Upgrade, which is currently being investigated by Highways England’s Major Projects and the Department for Transport… It is included in the Highways England Risk Register for the project[71]’. The A57 Link Roads would add, according to NH modelling, an extra 8,000 vehicles every weekday to the M67 in 2025 the opening year[72].  Adding in traffic from the proposed nearby major development Godley Green Garden Village (see Appendix C ix) would lead to the interchange operating at above or approaching capacity[73]. National Highways’ plans for mitigation measures at the M60 J24 interchange were not mentioned in the DCO application.

54   All these failings stem from a failure of those undertaking an appraisal to understand and/or have due regard for the strategic context within which a proposal sits, as identified by the Treasury’s Green Book 2020 (see para 92 below). Effective stewardship of the SRN’s long term operation and integrity also requires a strategic multimodal approach, which NH has failed to take.

55   Increasing carbon emissions in a climate crisis is not effective stewardship in the public interest. In June 2021 the Climate Change Committee stated: ‘Decisions on investment in roads should be contingent on analysis justifying how they contribute to the UK’s pathway to Net Zero. This analysis should demonstrate that the proposals would not lead to increases in overall emissions[74].’ In June 2022 it identified that ‘Substantial investment in roadbuilding should only proceed if it can be justified how it fits within a broader suite of policies that are compatible with the UK’s Net Zero trajectory[75]’. The case for the A57 Link Roads was developed many years in advance of DfT’s Decarbonising Transport (2021) and the UK’s Net Zero Strategy (2021),  and did not foresee these key policy documents of the current legal framework, let alone attempt to align with them. The traffic modelling failed to express either document’s policy objectives or targets as core assumptions - the current traffic models are based on assumptions which reflect very different scheme specific objectives that date from many years ago.

Licence Para 4.2 Without prejudice to the general duties on the Licence holder under section 5 of the Infrastructure Act 2015, the Licence holder must, in exercising its functions and complying with its legal duties and other obligations, act in a manner which it considers best calculated to:

       Para 4.2d. It must ensure efficiency and value for money.

56   NH prematurely rejected alternatives (our package of lorry control system and sustainable travel measures; and the proposed Mottram Gyratory Flow) that both scored as well or better than the scheme in the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study.

57   Our package was rejected as difficult to deliver – updated technology has simplified lorry control systems based on weight restrictions. The MGF, as proposed by an IP Mr Bagshaw, was initially described[76] as the ‘best performing individual option against the sifting criteria and for meeting the objectives for the Scheme’ and as deliverable and feasible. Then, curiously, at this point in the assessment of options[77] it was decided to assess the MGF not as a standalone scheme, nor in conjunction with other sustainable measures, but in conjunction with a package of measures which included first and foremost a link road between the A57 (T) and the A57 in Glossop.

58   As NH failed to review the options during development of the outline business case for the scheme, the scheme is not proven to provide the most efficient and best value for money. The Economic Case for the scheme has not been made.

59   Compounding this error is the failure to include public transport, walking and cycling in the traffic modelling, which led to a BCR that does not reflect the current policy framework. The Government plans to cut urban traffic by increasing walking and cycling to 50% of all trips by 2030. Greater Manchester plans for no net increase in motor vehicle traffic and to reduce car’s share of trips to no more than 50%, with the remaining 50% made by public transport, walking and cycling by 2040. Had the traffic modelling reflected these policy measures it would have shown a reduction in traffic forecasts for the scheme, and therefore a reduction in the value of journey time savings and the value for money. The failure to include public transport walking and cycling is part of NH’s failure to engage with the strategic context of the proposal (see para 92).

Licence Para 4.2e. It must protect and improve the safety of the network.

60   The SRN and local road network would become more dangerous for drivers, not safer, with the scheme. The risk of road crashes would increase across the modelled network by 0.3%, the brunt of which would occur on the A628T and the A57 Snake Pass (county A road across the National Park). Despite the increased risk being a direct result of the scheme NH dismissed it as insignificant and offered no mitigation.

61   The increased crashes on the A628T would appear despite, and would negate the effect of, the A628T Safety and Technology improvements, previously part of the scheme but progressed separately as not requiring development consent. The improvements focus on crash hotspots and the provision of electronic signs[78] and were included within the baseline ‘do minimum’ scenario[79] for the scheme. The increased risk of crashes on the trunk route is due to traffic diverting off the safer motorway network and onto the A628T[80]. In addition, ‘the severity of the accidents which are predicted to occur on the new link road may increase due to the increased speed’ (TAR 7.2.12). NH’s acceptance of increased crashes on the SRN does not meet the statement in Road Investment Strategy (RIS) 2020-2025: ‘enhanced safety remains Highways England’s first imperative and informs everything it does from design principles, road standards, operational procedures and investment decisions. We will strengthen this ambition through our investment plan, performance specification and targeted safety improvements through the small schemes fund’.

62   The A57 Snake Pass ‘is forecast to experience a modelled predicted increase of more than 160 accidents over the 60-year appraisal period[81]’ with the scheme. NH took the attitude that ‘safety features in areas outside the Scheme are not within the Applicant's remit[82].’ The route is already considered a high risk rural road. To mitigate the scheme’s impacts Derbyshire County Council proposed the use of average speed cameras. However, such measures would cause harm to the National Park’s statutory purposes and were challenged by the National Park Authority[83]. In the face of these difficulties NH proposed to ‘update’ the model with respect to the incidence of crashes on the Snake Pass at the detailed design stage when there would be no accountability through the EiP. ‘It is possible that the appraisal overestimates the forecast increase in accidents on this section of road…’ ‘…scheme modelling will be updated as the detailed design evolves[84]’. The start of the Snake Pass is 3.2miles east of the scheme. The detailed design of the scheme is not going to alter the incidence of crashes on the Snake Pass unless it includes a massive traffic restraint measure akin to the Mottram crossroads and/or average speed cameras along the Pass. This ‘updating’ appears most unusual as the modelling of accidents on the Snake was set up to ensure the most accurate relationship between accidents and flow [REP2-090, 4.7.32-4.7.33]. It appeared to us as subterfuge – an attempt to ‘magic away’ adverse impacts of the scheme and avoid mitigation which could prove difficult and costly to implement. 

Licence Para 4.2f. It must cooperate with other persons or organisations for the purposes of coordinating day-to-day operations and long-term planning;

63   This duty stems from section 5(1) of the Infrastructure Act 2015, to cooperate with other persons or organisations in order to:

(a)  Facilitate the movement of traffic and manage its impacts;

(b) Take account of local needs, priorities and plans in planning for the operation, maintenance and long-term development of the network (including in the preparation of route strategies);

(c)  Provide reasonable support to local authorities in their planning and the management of their own networks.

64   We have not been privy to any of the meetings between the statutory stakeholders and NH. What follows has been collected from written statements made before and during the EiP. On the evidence before us NH has failed to meet this duty and licence condition.

65   As noted in para 22 above two local authorities and the Peak District National Park Authority put in holding objections on the basis of inadequate information. The latter changed this to an outright objection. This reflected not only the adverse impacts on the National Park, but also the lack of information available in the DCO documents.

66   HPBC requested an extension to the 2020 statutory consultation area so that all wards within Glossopdale would receive a coloured brochure about the scheme. This was denied.

67   NH refused to meet High Peak Borough Council’s request to assess air quality through two AQMAs. It remains an area ‘not agreed’ through the SoCG[85] (see para 45 above).

68   NH dismissed the need for mitigation measures requested by High Peak Borough and Derbyshire County Councils for traffic impacts and increased risk of road crashes. NH considered all these impacts to be insignificant and not requiring mitigation. Towards the end of the EiP NH agreed to work on some measures, outside the DCO process, thus avoiding public scrutiny.

69   It refused to meet the Peak District National Park Authority’s request to assess the impacts of the scheme on the European Natura 2000 sites adjacent to the trunk route[86], on the Tintwistle AQMA and on the Tintwistle Conservation Area.

70   Although NH’s safety responsibilities are limited to the SRN, it is expected to cooperate with government agencies, the devolved administrations, local government, enforcement authorities, a host of other public and private bodies, and road users to improve road safety[87]. Every Local Highway Authority with responsibility for the roads that would see increased crashes with the scheme in place unanimously seek reduction of road crashes and casualties, all of which NH has ignored both in future day-to-day operations and long term planning:

• DCC LTP 3 2011-2026;
• South Yorkshire Mayoral Combined Authority[88], which aims to improve safety on the network for all users. ‘Safety for all road users must remain of paramount importance’;
• South Yorkshire Local Transport Plan aims to maximise safety[89];
• Sheffield City Council Transport Strategy (2018)[90];
• Kirklees MBC 2025 Transport Vision[91];
• GMCA’s ‘ambition’ is ‘To reduce deaths on our roads as close as possible to zero (by 2040)[92]’.

71   In the final version of the SoCG between Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM) and NH, TfGM requested that NH provide a response to how the scheme would contribute to the Government’s Transport Decarbonisation Plan and to Greater Manchester’s local carbon targets and budgets[93]. ‘The Climate Emergency declarations that are guiding local policy and therefore should be a key consideration in planning and implementing transport infrastructure. Given that half of GM’s transport related carbon emissions are associated with the SRN and as the proposed scheme has an interface and impacts on the local network we consider it appropriate that an assessment of how this scheme would affect overall transport emissions in GM is undertaken’. NH refused this request despite the requirements of NPSNN para 4.4 and the EIA Regulations. However, it ‘prepared a table to split the predicted GHG emissions for Greater Manchester and … has issued this to TfGM.’

72   TfGM also asked NH ‘how the scheme contributes to Greater Manchester’s Right Mix targets and the Greater Manchester’s 2040 policies’. This is Greater Manchester’s plans for no net increase in motor vehicle traffic and to reduce car’s share of trips to no more than 50%, with the remaining 50% made by public transport, walking and cycling by 2040. NH avoided the request and gave a tangential answer. In fact the traffic modelling in which TfGM had played no part had taken no notice of the Right Mix targets, and hence it could not know what impact the scheme would have. It is still unclear if TfGM understands the impacts of the scheme as it was only engaged in scrutiny of the scheme through the SoCG

73   Despite the scheme creating adverse impacts on the responsibilities of all these authorities, NH refused to take responsibility for addressing them, deeming them insignificant and, if related to traffic impacts, the responsibility of the highway authority.

Para 4.2g. It must minimise the environmental impacts of operating maintaining and improving the network and seek to protect and enhance the quality of the surrounding environment;

74   NH fails to meet this statutory direction as follows.

75   Operational GHG emissions have not been minimised as no traffic restraint measures were applied to the proposal[94]. The scheme would result in 410,000tCO2 emitted over 60 years.

76   Hollingworth and Tintwistle - NH has failed to minimise the environmental impacts of the SRN as it passes through Hollingworth and Tintwistle. These two villages straddle the A628T, lie immediately east of the scheme and experience traffic congestion with long queues, air pollution from heavy lorries and increased road crashes. Every consultation about the scheme has raised key concerns around these two villages, found the plans did not address their problems[95], and showed strong support for measures to relieve traffic through both villages. In the 2018 statutory consultation[96] Highways England declared it ‘is unable to resolve[97]’, that Hollingworth and Tintwistle are not part of the solution. During the 2020 consultation NH refused to engage with questions on Hollingworth and Tintwistle, stating that measures for wider relief are at an early concept design stage. Given that traffic along the entire Trans-Pennine route will be affected by the scheme this is a serious oversight. A strategic approach towards long term planning for the whole of the corridor would have avoided this.

77   The surrounding environment that the scheme would harm includes the (a) Peak District National Park, (b) Glossopdale and (c) Greater Manchester.

(a) The first statutory purpose of the National Park is to protect and enhance natural beauty wildlife and cultural heritage (our emphasis). The Dark Peak, crossed by both the A628T and the A57 Snake Pass, is famed for its desolate and exposed tracts of moorland that stretch great distances, create a sense of remoteness[98] and are largely inaccessible to motor traffic. The noise from traffic on all these roads already affects the natural beauty and tranquillity of the Park up to a mile distant on open moorland[99]. The increased traffic generated by the scheme would further harm these nationally important landscapes and impair their tranquillity. NH refused to recognise that the impacts of increased traffic through the Peak District National Park would be significant, as considered by the statutory authority for the National Park, and offered no mitigation. The objection from the PDNPA shows that NH’s interpretation of the National Park’s statutory purposes and associated policies does not meet the standard required of it by its s.62 duty under the Environment Act 1995.

(b) Within Glossopdale the local environment would be impacted negatively by more congestion, rat running on residential roads, noise, and air pollution. NH dismissed the impacts as insignificant.

(c) The scheme would have a major irreversible negative effect on local landscape and townscape which NH refused to recognise as significant [APP-063, 7.7.8]. The scale and formality of its infrastructure - dual and single carriageways, three concrete underpasses, two bridges, huge new junction, lighting,  signage,  embankments cuttings and false cuttings, drainage features, fencing, access tracks, new plantings - and its associated traffic would encroach on and fragment open countryside reducing its permeability for wildlife; destroy the individual character of the pastoral landscapes; and harm the setting of the historic village of Mottram and the openness of the Green Belt. The huge new junction where the scheme crosses the A57T is out of scale with the surrounding townscapes. The scheme consumes open land, a finite irreplaceable asset in the UK. It is both natural capital and strategic open space, which supports multiple ecosystem services critical to urban areas which have higher vulnerability to climate change due to their lack of habitats.

Licence Para 4.2h. It must conform to the principles of sustainable development.

78   The licence spells out sustainable development as ‘encouraging economic growth while protecting the environment and improving safety and quality of life for current and future generations.’ All of the above impacts described in paras 51-77 indicate that the scheme fails to conform to the principles of sustainable development.

Licence Para 5.29 It must comply with or have due regard to Government policy.

79   The NPSNN 2014 is the framework for decision making but recognises that relevant national, regional and local policies are in play. In particular a series of provisions of the Planning Act section 104 are incorporated in the NPS, and some of its requirements are specifically stated in terms of other laws and regulations such as the EIA Regs 2017. When dismissing challenges made by us or other parties using other policies, NH quoted NPSNN as the sole framework of relevance to decision-making. The scheme fails to meet a number of NPSNN policies as follows.

80   NPSNN 4.3 requires that for a proposed development the ExA and SoS should take into account its potential benefits, and its potential adverse impacts. The transport assessment and modelling are fundamental to the environmental assessment. With so many omissions and unexplained spurious results within them, it is not credible to even attempt to reach a reasoned conclusion on the significant effects of the proposed development.  

81   NPSNN 4.4 requires environmental, safety, social and economic benefits and adverse impacts, to be considered at national, regional and local levels. There was no local or regional assessment of the scheme’s carbon emissions despite two sets of available data (BEIS UK carbon emissions national stats and local authority SCATTER budgets from the Tyndall Centre), and a third set of self-scaling data – a local/regional proxy – provided by the study area and traffic model itself (when corrected and fully transparent) [REP9-039]. Local adverse impacts of all kinds – social environmental and economic – were concealed from the public and stakeholders at consultation stage and underplayed during the EiP (see paras 23, 32; Appendix A b-g; Appendix B b-g; Appendix C c, f, i, j).

82   NPSNN 4.6 – projects should usually be supported by a local transport model to provide sufficiently accurate detail of the impacts of a project. The impacts on Glossopdale were withheld from the public as detailed above (see para 23 above) and then from the EiP. When pressure on the issue increased throughout the course of the EiP NH stated that the work had been done, and yet still refused to share their findings with the Examination [REP8-018, Q3.6]. NH’s detailed analysis of the traffic on one select link [REP9-029], Dinting Road, appeared to validate IPs’ requests for further analysis of all of Glossopdale but none was forthcoming [REP12-022, 9.87.8].

83   NPSNN 4.15-4.17 invokes Schedule 4 of the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 which sets out the information that should be included in the environmental statement. The assessment of GHG emissions does not conform to these requirements [REP8-029, 7.5]. First, it does not provide an accurate quantification of the scheme in isolation; second, it does not provide a proper quantification of the cumulative carbon emissions; therefore, the application is not compliant with the EIA Regulations [REP8-029]. NH’s claim that the traffic model is ‘inherently cumulative, or is ‘compliant with DMRB’, does not make the environmental statement compliant with the EIA Regulations on cumulative carbon emissions assessment.

84   NPSNN 4.26-4.27 lists the legal and policy requirements for consideration of alternatives, which are not exhaustive. As we have shown above the 2015 options appraisal was flawed and has not been reviewed. Therefore the scheme’s status within the RIS, the 2004 Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council Unitary Development Plan 2004 and the Greater Manchester Transport Strategy 2040 is questionable.

85   NPSNN 2, 2.24, 3.2 and 4.64-4.66 address road safety. The increased risk of road crashes on the A628T corridor and on local roads means NH has failed to meet the requirements of NPSNN which quotes the Strategic Framework for Road Safety 2011[100].

86   NPSNN 5.11-5.12 Air quality considerations are particularly relevant where schemes are proposed within or adjacent to AQMA or nature conservation sites (including Natura 2000 sites and SSSIs), and where changes are sufficient to bring about the need for a new AQMA or change the size of an existing AQMA; or bring about changes to exceedances of the Limit Values, or where they may have the potential to impact on nature conservation sites. NH adjusted the modelling in a way which removed potential exceedances of limit values for nitrous dioxide within 2 local AQMAs (one on the A57 Dinting Vale through Glossop and one on the A628T through Tintwistle), on A57 High Street West through Glossop and on the Natura 2000 sites adjacent to the A628T. NH refused to assess air quality at any of these locations including the two AQMAs. Hence these NPSNN considerations have been ignored.

87   NPSNN 5.150 Great weight should be given to conserving landscape and scenic beauty in nationally designated areas. Despite the scheme causing traffic increases on cross-Park roads, NH refused to recognise this requirement, arguing incorrectly that the policy only applies to development that lies within the National Park.

88   NPSNN 5.152 requires NH when planning the SRN to avoid National Parks, in this case the Peak District National Park. This it failed to do. The 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study focused only on the corridor through the National Park. In addition, the scheme would cause traffic to divert off the M62 outside the National Park onto the A628T within the National Park.

89   NPSNN 5.202 Development of national networks can have a variety of impacts on the surrounding transport infrastructure including connecting transport networks… The consideration and mitigation of transport impacts is an essential part of Government’s wider policy objectives for sustainable development. NH dismissed the scheme’s impacts on the local road network as insignificant and refused to consider mitigation. They also refused to share with the Examination the work they had done which justified their conclusion that the effects were ‘insignificant’.

90   NPSNN 5.207 requires the WebTAG methodology to be followed. We showed above (paras 30-36 and Appendix B) how the TAR failed to meet the requirements of a WebTAG compliant appraisal.

91   Other policies with which NH failed to comply, or to which it failed to have due regard, include:

(a)  The Treasury’s Green Book 2020 identified the common failure of those writing appraisals to engage properly with the strategic context in which their proposal sits. Specifically, business cases frequently do not demonstrate the necessary understanding of:

• the proposal’s specific contribution to the delivery of the government’s intended strategic goals (such as levelling up or net zero); and
• the specific social and economic features of different places and how the intervention may affect them;
• other strategies, programmes or projects with which the intervention may interact, including in a particular geographical area.

This results in significant flaws in appraisals and business cases. All of the above bulleted shortfalls apply to the A57 Link Roads, were initiated in the 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study from which the scheme derives[101], and have led to the noncompliance described in paras 52-60 and 78-91 above, and here in para 92.

(b) The UK Net Zero Strategy 2021 - NH made no assessment of significance of the scheme’s carbon emissions against the annual carbon reduction targets and trajectories for transport in the Net Zero Strategy [REP9-039, 10].

(c)  The Government’s Decarbonising Transport, A better greener Britain; Bus Back Better – National Bus Strategy for England; and Gear Change – A bold vision for cycling and walking. By omitting walking, cycling and public transport (except rail users with access to a car) from its transport assessment NH has failed to comply with all of these.

(d) National Planning Policy Framework 2021, para 175. NH refused to recognise that great weight should be applied to protection of the National Park and its setting. The objection from the PDNPA shows that NH’s interpretation of the National Park’s statutory purposes and associated policies does not meet the standard required of its s.62 duty under the Environment Act 1995.

Summary of noncompliance with statutory directions in Licence

92   Through development of the A57 Link Roads NH is failing to meet the public interest and provide effective stewardship of the long term operation and integrity of the SRN. The value for money of the scheme has not been ensured as the options’ appraisal was flawed and has not been reviewed. The scheme would be detrimental to the safety of the network, not protect or improve it. NH has failed to co-operate with the local authorities and the National Park Authority over a number of issues. It has also failed to minimise environmental impacts – carbon emissions would increase; traffic would impact adversely on two adjacent villages, on Glossopdale, on the Peak District National Park; the proposed infrastructure is out of proportion to and would disfigure local landscape and townscape. Consequently the scheme does not conform to the principles of sustainability. This is reflected in NH’s non-compliance with Government policy in NPSNN, the Treasury’s Green Book, UK Net Zero Strategy, Decarbonising Transport, Bus Back Better, Gear Change and NPPF.

(D) FAILURE TO HAVE REGARD TO GUIDANCE IN THE LICENCE

Licence Para 5.15 It should seek to ensure protecting and improving safety is embedded into its business decision making, and to achieve the best possible safety outcomes.

93   The 2015 Trans-Pennine Routes Feasibility Study included a safety objective, against which the scheme scored +1 (beneficial impact). For the 2020 statutory consultation and for the DCO application the safety objective was omitted, despite high accident rates and accident clusters along the route, as safety measures were progressed separately from the scheme (the A628T Safety and Technology improvements). However, as these measures were included in the baseline traffic modelling and road crashes increased, the mitigation appears to fail. Thus the evidence suggests safety was not embedded in the decision-making for this scheme, which would now score negatively (adverse impact) against such an objective.

Licence Para 5.23 It should ensure protecting and enhancing the environment is embedded into its business decision making.

94   NH did not avoid the Peak District National Park when planning the SRN as required by NPSNN 5.152.

95   There was no scheme objective to address GHG emissions or climate change despite the 2008 Climate Change Act and the UK’s legally binding carbon budgets.

Summary of noncompliance with guidance in the Licence

96   Although these licence conditions are considered guidance, rather than statutory directions, they are extremely important. They are both concerned with business decision making which starts with options’ appraisal, followed by scrutiny by DfT. Unless the initial appraisal is robust and scrutiny is rigorous the result will be a poor choice. The A57 Link Roads have been developed as a standalone scheme in order to build demand for the next section of new road. For fifty years NH and its predecessor organisations have been trying to force road building to link Manchester and Sheffield rather than address the transport issues within their strategic context. The Peak District National Park designation, through which the A628T corridor passes, does not permit major development unless there are exceptional circumstances and it is in the public interest. Most recently the  climate and nature emergencies, and the experience of the Covid pandemic, also challenge the business-as-usual model of building roads to meet future traffic demand. The 50 year history of failed road solutions should be indication enough that what is required here is a fundamental rethink. The National Park designation and more recent events demand it. That is the context within which these licence conditions should be considered.

(E) CONCLUSION

97   We have documented above a catalogue of NH’s non-compliance with the statutory directions and guidance laid down by the SoS in its licence. NH has evidently failed to meet baseline requirements, never mind meet higher expectations. The whole sorry story casts strong doubts on the credibility of NH and its evidence for the A57 Link Roads DCO application.

98   NH withheld crucial information, gave inconsistent, inaccurate or misleading statements and answers through the statutory consultations and the EiP. It repeatedly tried to wriggle out of accountability for the scheme with obfuscation and delay. This is contrary to behaviour expected of a public agency to be as open as possible about all its decisions and actions, and to restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.

99   The development of the scheme, from the 2015 feasibility study out of which it emerged to the DCO application, demonstrated all that the Treasury Green Book identified about the failure of project sponsors to engage properly with the strategic context in which their proposal sits. With respect to the A57 Link Roads NH failed to address (a) the proposal’s specific contribution to the delivery of the Government’s intended strategic goals in 2015 (such as climate change) and in 2021 (such as levelling up and net zero); (b) the specific social, environmental and economic features of Greater Manchester, Glossopdale, Longdendale and the Peak District National Park and how the intervention would affect them all; and (c) a raft of other strategies, programmes and projects with which the scheme would interact from the national to the more local. These ranged from addressing climate change and road safety - both key policy areas identified by the ORR for RIS3[102] - to Greater Manchester’s transport decarbonisation programme through its Right Mix policy, and the PDNPA’s goals to reduce traffic within, and through, the National Park.

100          The consequences of both NH’s behaviour towards engagement with stakeholders and the public, and its failure as the steward of the long term sustainable future and integrity of the strategic road network, led to multiple areas of non-compliance with its licence conditions. These were demonstrated through the statutory consultations which failed to follow best practice; the transport assessment accompanying the DCO application which failed to meet the standard expected of a WebTAG compliant appraisal; the failure of the proposed scheme to conform with the principles of sustainable development; and finally through the EiP, the effectiveness and efficiency of which was compromised by NH’s omissions and obfuscations. At the end of the EiP the ExA was still asking fundamental questions about NH’s evidence, and new evidence that conflicted with NH’s evidence was presented and left unscrutinised. The result is that neither the ExA nor the SoS have the information needed to weigh up the planning balance. The overall effect is to limit democratic involvement and accountability.

101          The ORR has recently identified that where projects fail to be delivered on time, most of the delays occurred during the development phase – before construction begins. Statutory planning processes were one of the four most prevalent risk factors. In our experience it is not the statutory planning processes, red tape or regulations which have hindered the effectiveness of the A57 Link Roads DCO application and its EiP but NH’s approach and behaviour towards consultation and the planning system. Any subsequent delay to delivery of the scheme - the scheme is at risk of missing its start of work commitment[103] - can be laid wholly at NH’s door, through its behaviour, its attempts to conceal the real effects of the scheme, its failure to engage robustly in discussions, its failure to have due regard to its legal duties and Government policy, its failure to plan within the appropriate strategic context.

102          These shortfalls in performance do not appear to be picked up when monitoring NH’s performance. Although the key performance indicators (KPIs) test how well NH manages traffic on the SRN and how quickly it delivers its enhancement projects, they do not robustly test NH’s role as the steward of the SRN’s long-term future and integrity, fit to meet all the challenges of this century in a sustainable way[104]. For example, in the 2021-2022 assessment of performance, the focus is on individual project delivery with no mention of the strategic context of wider Government policy[105]. Consequently, there does not appear to be a robust framework for monitoring all of the licence conditions.

103          Some of the non-compliance we have documented e.g. taking a piecemeal approach to addressing issues along a corridor instead of strategic long term planning, raise fundamental issues not only about the preparation of the RIS by DfT and of route strategies by NH, but also about the testing by DfT of potential projects as they pass through their development stages. The final stages for an NSIP - the statutory consultation and the DCO application - are deeply flawed. To have received holding objections from the statutory consultees in response to the 2018 consultation on the scheme, and to have not addressed those concerns before holding another statutory consultation smacks of both incompetence and disregard for standards of best practice. An effective approach would have been to address all the statutory consultees’ concerns and to then seek public views before proceeding to a DCO application. Development of a NSIP should be front loaded with a WebTAG compliant transport appraisal and full environmental impact assessment available for public scrutiny before the formal DCO process is entered. The EiP would then be able to proceed as it appears to have been envisaged – to iron out technical issues with planning agreements. In view of what we have experienced we believe a review of all these processes is required and that monitoring of them should be more robust.

104          Two key areas are highlighted by the evidence we have presented - environmental issues and engagement with stakeholders, organisations and the public.  Environmental impacts and objections on environmental grounds are a key risk to the achievement of planning consents for road schemes[106] yet environmental issues are not addressed through the RIS and only at a late stage of the NSIP process when the DCO application is submitted. This means adverse impacts are only picked up very late through a process which is not geared to addressing fundamental issues, only to tinkering around the edges. The entire programme being considered for RIS3 (whether carried over from RIS2, or new schemes) must be assessed within a Strategic Environmental Assessment as required by the Infrastructure Act 2015 and the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive. Schemes should not enter the RIS unless they have been subject to a full and proper appraisal. Once chosen the options appraisal should be regularly reviewed to ensure the scheme remains the best performing, sustainable and cost effective option.  The full environmental assessment and the transport appraisal on which it is based should be the subject of scrutiny through the statutory consultation, as we have noted above.

105          With respect to engagement there is no KPI. A review two years ago[107] of NH’s engagement and cooperation with regional and local partners, but not the public or communities, concluded that ‘Highways England is complying with the prescribed elements of its licence engagement duties but there is scope for further development of its duties to support regional and local stakeholders and manage their expectations’. It specifically drew NH’s attention to ‘recognition of the obligations and priorities of local stakeholders, for example in areas such as decarbonisation and air quality’. Through the A57 Link Roads, NH’s response to stakeholders concerns was the reverse of the ORR’s advice – it denied their significance and/or their legitimacy to be considered, of which the most extreme examples were to take no account of Greater Manchester’s well developed approach to decarbonisation through radical changes in travel behaviour, or of the views of the statutory authority for the National Park, the PDNPA. Our experience also showed how poorly NH has failed to engage with communities and the public. Engagement must be formally addressed and monitored, as engagement worthy of a public body applies to all elements of the licence. The ORR has promised to review assessment of engagement as part of NH’s RIS2 and RIS3 plans[108] but this should be extended to cover community and the public’s engagement in project development.

106          NH receives huge sums from the public purse - in financial year 2020-2021, it spent £160,527,000 on staff and £3,198,000 on consultancy fees[109] - and is responsible for spending the £24billion committed to the 2020-2025 roads’ programme. For that the public would expect NH’s performance to at least meet the requirements of the licence, if not the extra mile, and for robust monitoring of that performance.

107          With respect to the A57 Link Roads we therefore urge the ORR to assess NH’s performance in the light of this representation to you and report its findings to the SoS before he makes a decision on the scheme in mid-November 2022. More generally we urge the ORR to enforce behaviour that is expected of a public body and to review the overall monitoring of NH’s licence. In particular, we suggest that the ORR a) reviews development of DfT’s RIS and NH’s route strategies to ensure that schemes that arise from them meet all the criteria for sustainable development, especially with regard to the climate and nature crises; b) insists on, or provides, much more robust assessment and monitoring of scheme development from options appraisal through to project business case; and c) reviews or instigates a review of the complete NSIP process.

APPENDIX A

OMISSIONS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS IN 2020 STATUTORY CONSULTATION

1. There was no transport assessment, traffic data or traffic modelling results; this despite the SoCC p5 promise of ‘more information about key environmental impacts including air quality, noise and traffic.’ Later when presenting draft traffic information to the local authority steering group NH[110] ‘confirmed this was the data presented within the Preliminary Environmental Information Report (PEIR)’. No traffic data was presented in the PEIR or available to the public until the DCO application was submitted.

2. There was no mention in any of the documents of the impacts of increased traffic, all generated by the scheme, on Glossopdale. This would lead to rat running on residential streets to avoid congestion on the A57 through Glossop. People were unaware that, with the scheme, the walk or cycle to school, work or the shops would become more intimidating, dangerous and unpleasant; congestion would increase journey times for drivers within Glossopdale; road crashes would increase. The FAQ gave the opposite impression. ‘Will the scheme create traffic in other areas? What about Glossop?’ was answered as ‘Our traffic assessment shows that overall, the scheme draws traffic on to the strategic road network and off local roads. Therefore we wouldn’t expect to see a significant increase in traffic through Glossop during peak times.’ This misrepresentation was only revealed through the EiP.

3. The infrastructure for the scheme lies within the National Park setting and ~2km from its boundary. There was no mention of the increased traffic on trans-Pennine routes through the National Park or its impacts on tranquillity, wildlife and road crashes, again all only revealed through the EiP.

4. The whole scheme lies within and crosses the Green Belt yet the word Green Belt appeared only once in - PEIR Vol 3 with respect to the Planning Act 2008. There was no mention of the strict policies surrounding Green Belt, no map of the Green Belt, no mention of the scheme’s profound impacts on four of the five functions of the Green Belt and its harm to openness, as revealed by the EiP. Of all planning policies, Green Belt is the best known, best loved and best understood by the general public but it was completely excluded from all the consultation documents.

5. Safety was only addressed in the FAQ where a misleading impression was given. Improving safety for road users was described as a key objective of the A57 Link Roads, but there was no such objective. Safety benefits improvements were implied: ‘Our traffic assessment shows the scheme reducing accidents across the local area, because traffic will be moved onto more modern roads.’ There was no mention of the increased risk of road crashes in Glossopdale and on trans-Pennine routes which came to light in the DCO application.

6. The economic justification for spending £225m (later reduced to £180m) on the scheme was not made. The statement in the brochure that congestion ‘restricts potential economic growth, as the delivery of goods to businesses is often delayed and the route is not ideal for commuters, which limits employment opportunities’ was not informed by evidence.

7. The colour brochure showed prejudicial bias. It focused to the exclusion of all else on the immediate benefits to residents in Mottram and on Woolley Lane and on the engineering and design changes made since the 2018 consultation. There was no mention of Glossop as a township that might be affected by the scheme – the word Glossop appeared only twice in the brochure to explain that the ‘Glossop bound’ traffic would be separated. There was not a single mention of GHG/carbon emissions despite the all-pervasive climate emergency and the fact the scheme would increase these emissions. There was no mention of road safety or of the adverse impacts on the Green Belt. With more pressing issues such as the Covid pandemic on people’s minds, the brochure is likely to have been the only document the majority would have read. Its systematic distortion and concealment of the scheme’s effects misinformed people as to the effects on their well-being and quality of life. 

APPENDIX B

OMISSIONS AND FLAWS IN TRANSPORT ASSESSMENT REPORT

a. Traffic modelling –  No details appeared in the TAR. In three and a half pages it named the modelling software and used three figures to show the modelled area and local zone disaggregation. There was no local model validation report, no forecasting report, no options report, no strategic case report, no economic case report, no appraisal summary table.

(i) Assumptions and factors which were built into the model and the values ascribed to these factors were not available to stakeholders or to the ExA.

(ii) No information was available as to how public transport, walking and cycling were dealt with in the model. Late in the EiP NH revealed that only rail trips for households with a car were included. NH continued to confuse the definitions between rail, public transport as a whole, trips which were included or not included in the model and in fact how the limited rail modelling was undertaken [REP9-040, Q3.4, page 5].

(iii) The source of errors in terms of model parameters and specification were concealed from the EiP. NH stated[111] they were captured in the high and low growth sensitivity tests but provided no details.

(iv) The impacts of the scheme on transport networks in Greater Manchester, despite the majority of journeys being within it, were not presented. Later NH revealed that the scheme was treated as an isolated bypass with limited access to Greater Manchester, with a fixed cost function and masking applied to Greater Manchester within the model.

(v) Data from various sources was used to calibrate the model but how it was applied was not fully explained or given in sufficient detail. Conflicting statements were made about updating the model[112]. 

(vi) Inconsistencies in the outputs from the model remained unexplained at the end of the EiP on a number of routes through and within Glossop, Hadfield and Padfield, and along the A628T[113]. NH dismissed IPs’ attempts to understand these as mistaken[114] but failed to supply a valid explanation for the majority of these or to provide specific data to validate its arguments.

(vii) The EIA Regs Schedule 4 para require ‘a description of the relevant aspect of the current state of the environment (baseline scenario)’. This is essential to understanding the current traffic situation and how it would change with the scheme. With the impact of Covid 19, the most recent actual traffic flows would be 2019. Instead NH used traffic surveys from 2015-2016 and modelled them to create the ‘do minimum’ scenario in 2025 against which to test the impacts of the scheme. This is not a ‘current baseline’ and led to a number of discrepancies when comparing the 2025 ‘do minimum’ with existing counts from the DfT traffic website – some flows were much greater, others much lower.

All the above led to enormous problems with understanding the outputs from the traffic model.

b. Road crashes – The TAR, like the consultation documents, maintained there would be ‘reduced safety risks within the built up area…’ (TAR Executive Summary). The built up area includes Glossopdale where High Peak Borough Council’s Local Impact Report [REP2-046] showed an increased risk of road crashes on residential roads in Glossop. NH excluded from assessment residential roads on ‘which the scheme is not expected to have an impact’[115], roads which we now know through the EiP process, and which NH knew when it submitted the DCO documents, would have more traffic as a result of the scheme and therefore more crashes. The evidence presented in the TAR is the shockingly poor Figure 7.8 of the spatial distribution of safety impacts (the scheme incurs a safety disbenefit of -£7.32m over 60 yrs) which is too crude to decipher in the built up areas. 

c. Severance – the word does not appear in the TAR. In Environmental Statement (ES) Ch12 NH’s concern is wholly with severance of land holdings and reducing community severance on the bypassed A57T[116]. Nowhere is NH concerned with the severance experienced by those attempting to cross the A628T in Hollingworth or Tintwistle (despite the ‘high number of pedestrian accidents’[117]), the A57 through Glossop or residential roads in Glossopdale where traffic generated by NH’s scheme would increase.

d. HGVs –The high percentage of HGVs along the trunk route subjects people, communities and the fabric of buildings adjacent to the road to severe impacts. The TAR barely addresses the issues[118]. The scheme removes HGVs from part of the A57T but not from the A628T through Hollingworth and Tintwistle or from the A57 through Glossop. Yet the TAR does not address their potential diversion to avoid congestion along these routes, or the severance, the intimidation, the risk of road crashes, the disincentive to walk or cycle on these routes that HGVs impose. NH’s only concern is for the small length of the trunk road that would be bypassed.  This is in direct contradiction to NPSNN’s insistence at para5.202 that impacts on local road networks must be taken into account.

e. Journey time savings – The TAR spells out the importance of journey time reliability (para 1.1.1), which features in the scheme’s objective for connectivity (para 1.2.1), and provides monetised benefits worth £11m (para 7.2.6). Despite their significance, journey time savings were presented only as partial parts of journeys, not actual journeys the travelling public would make. Journey time savings on the SRN between Manchester and Sheffield were given for a 10-mile stretch of a 40-mile journey between the city centres and avoided the congestion that would be met within both urban areas. NH’s main argument was to claim13 that journey times are captured in the modelled road network, which is no substitute for presenting specific evidence. The reason for NH’s resistance became clear when it revealed Sheffield to Manchester journey time savings as ~5 minutes [REP5-022, 9.54.64]. This answer meant that claimed city-to-city journey time savings would be significantly reduced - for the 10-mile stretch eastbound savings were predicted as 8-10mins and westbound as 5-6mins – which would substantially reduce the value for money of the scheme and hence the Benefit Cost Ratio.

f. Public transport – There was no assessment of the potential for car journeys to switch mode to public transport, or of the time delay that would be experienced by bus passengers on routes which would see increased traffic. In TAR 3.4.11 NH claimed bus services ‘will benefit from improved journey times and reduced congestion’. This was revealed as a misleading assertion without evidence; in response to the ExA’s questions[119] NH admitted it had not assessed bus times. Bus journey times should have been supplied in the TAR. When they were finally supplied [REP6-017 Appendix A] some improved and some took longer with the scheme.

g. Impacts on Glossopdale – we have detailed these above. The TAR referred only to journey times from Glossop (para 7.1.16) and to ‘small increases in accidents through Glossop’ (para 7.2.13), by implication on the A57. Repeated requests for a proper assessment using a local model were refused, despite the requirements of NPSNN 4.2.

APPENDIX C

WITHOLDING OF CRUCIAL EVIDENCE DURING EXAMINATION OF DCO APPLICATION

1. Assessment of public transport

This was important in view of the strong policies in Greater Manchester for radical reduction of car trips and increased travel by public transport, walking and cycling. In order to understand how NH had assessed travel by all modes it was necessary to know how the traffic model dealt with this. This was not disclosed by NH until 5th April Issue Specific Hearing (ISH) despite constant reference to public transport in our emails, at technical meetings, and through requests for clarification. When we first asked NH in July 2021 how public transport was included in the model, we were referred to the transport modelling and forecasting reports submitted with the DCO. As stated above (Appendix B a.) there were no transport modelling or forecasting reports submitted with the DCO, only the TAR which told the reader nothing about how public transport was assessed. Furthermore neither the Transport Modelling nor Transport Forecasting Packages[120] supplied to us in November 2021 contained that information. Despite two meetings with NH, we were still asking for clarification in March 2022. To aid progress MTRU asked NH to confirm our understanding with a suggested statement for us to agree with NH within a SoCG: “The model contains public transport trips by people who have a car available but not by other users.  In addition, only trips with either an origin or destination in the Area of Detailed Modelling are actively modelled.  All other public transport trips are fixed.”  We received no reply and were only answered orally during the ISH on 5th April and by writing [REP8-018 page 55]. However, even that answer contained obfuscation as there were apparently two traffic models for the scheme – a regional mode choice transport model to forecast mode shift and a traffic model.

2. Review of appraisal options

(i) In order to establish if the scheme continued to be the best option since it was chosen in 2015, it was important to establish if a strategic level re-assessment of options had been undertaken since the original sifting of options in 2015[121]. The Treasury’s Green Book 2020 advises that options should be checked at each stage of the Business Case process, updating of the appraisal options is expected for all schemes in the RIS[122], and since 2015 addressing the climate and nature crises has become urgent. Another strong reason for review was the lack of a suitable traffic model for the 2015 Study. As a result the Study noted (Stage 3 Report 4.2.17) there is ‘a risk that forecasts developed using a new traffic model may differ from those produced as part of this assessment.’

(ii) NH’s answers when questioned on this matter were changeable. It first confirmed in August 2021 ‘that we have not repeated the Early Appraisal Sifting Tool (EAST) since finalising the options in 2015’. It then used timing as an excuse not to undertake the review - ‘The updated Green Book postdates consideration of alternatives to the Scheme and selection of the preferred option[123]’ - ignoring the fact that the need for review continues after selection of the preferred option. When questioned by the ExA, NH then claimed it had undertaken a review, using changes to design or exclusion of certain elements[124] which is not what a strategic review of the options appraisal is about. When challenged on that argument it reverted to its original position of not having undertaken a review because ‘it would not be practicable’[125]. We therefore concluded that NH had not undertaken a review as required by RIS and the Treasury Green Book. Trying to show it had undertaken the required review when it had not emphasised how poorly NH has followed procedure and how it sought to conceal this from the EiP.

3. Explaining the spurious traffic data

(i) The outputs of the traffic model, i.e. the predicted traffic flows and their distribution, nature and composition, were fundamental to all the evidence about the scheme’s effects on the transport networks, on road safety and on the environment, society and the economy. Clarity is required on both the model’s limitations and its outputs. Our lack of confidence in the modelling and its results increased throughout the EiP, was shared by other interested parties (IPs), and was comprehensively expressed through a joint letter to the ExA [REP10-017]. It was also shared by the Peak District National Park Authority[126] and by High Peak Borough Council[127].

(ii) Initially NH relied on blanket statements that it had absolute confidence in the traffic modelling, which is no substitute for open, comprehensive and consistent presentation of data and for engaging with challenges constructively. Later it described the process in some detail but the outputs – the spurious and extraordinary traffic modelled results - were not explained. It persisted with addressing questions about content with answers about methodology. It used arguments that did not withstand scrutiny and, when challenged, provided the same arguments. It failed to engage with substantive evidence submitted by us and others, and provided vague and unintelligible answers to questions. This severely impeded understanding of the traffic data and the scheme’s impacts and led to the ExA asking serious questions about the traffic modelling even as the EiP closed.

(iii) Three working days before the EiP closed, NH supplied some explanation as to the disparities between some of the DfT observed traffic flows and modelled traffic flows in the ‘do minimum’ 2025 scenario [REP11-010, 3.1 page 13]. These explanations exposed local zone limitations as the cause of some of these disparities. These limitations are a good reason for using a more defined model of Glossopdale, something we and others had repeatedly requested throughout the EiP and been denied, and which NPSNN 4.2 requires.

(iv) Public interest in the integrity of the traffic modelling was extremely important for this scheme. The 2007 public inquiry into the Mottram-Hollingworth-Tintwistle bypass (the previous iteration of the scheme) was formally adjourned in December 2007 after 10 days of hearings due to serious flaws and repeated errors with the traffic model. Revised traffic figures due to an error in the traffic modelling were followed by further inconsistencies in feeding data into the traffic model[128] which ultimately rendered the results of the model null and void. The statutory consultees were unable to validate the traffic model and the public inquiry was formally closed in March 2009.

4. Uncertainty Log

NH’s failure to engage constructively is also well demonstrated by its approach towards our challenge of the Uncertainty Log. In our written representation [REP2-069 4.2.11-4.2.17] we raised issues about the Uncertainty Log with respect to future development. A limited list was appended to the ES Ch.15 on Cumulative Effects. We found a much longer list in the Traffic Forecasting Package NH supplied to us [REP2-090, Appendix B, pdf pp 337/790] . We compared the results given in the DCO application documents with those available in the Traffic Forecasting Package, pointing out data was missing and asking for clarification on how the model had addressed future development. NH offered ‘Details of the schemes and developments listed in the Uncertainty Log can be provided by National Highways if necessary’. We responded ‘As offered, please may we see the complete list, ie the long list and the short list, of schemes and developments excluded and included in the Uncertainty Log’[129]. NH responded[130] ‘The uncertainty log is included in Appendices B & C of the Traffic Forecasting Report that has previously been provided by National Highways to CPRE’. These were the very appendices which we had analysed in REP2-069 and to which we were seeking details and clarification. This circular game playing by NH was obstructive and did not address our concerns.

5. Investigation of Mottram Gyratory Flow (MGF)

One IP Mr Bagshaw presented the MGF as an alternative to the scheme. When asked by the ExA if the MGF alternative had been considered previously NH’s response was an unequivocal ‘No’[131]. ‘The Mottram Gyratory Flow alternative presented in Mr Bagshaw’s submission was not one of the alternative options considered by National Highways’… ‘The scheme previously proposed and presented in Mr Bagshaw submission was not one of the potential alternative solutions identified through this process’. Towards the end of the EiP[132] the ExA was obliged again to ask NH to clarify its position as to whether the MGF, or a similar scheme was considered through options appraisal. The NH completely reversed its reply both orally at the hearing and in writing to a definitive ‘Yes’. ‘The option submitted by Mr Bagshaw was presented as an alternative scheme at the public inquiry of 2007. A scheme looking at a gyratory system in the area of Mottram was assessed in 2015 as part of the EAST study; these were forwarded on to the DfT for consideration but were not included in RIS1[133]’. Thus two directly contradictory answers were given by NH. Mr Bagshaw then showed that it had not been examined as a standalone option but only as an addition to the current scheme (REP8-042 para 5 pp 5-8).

6. Increase in vehicle kms

Both the TAR (7.2.9) and ES Ch.14 Climate referred to increases in vehicle kilometres generated by the scheme but no absolute figures were given. NH twice gave the opposite impression: ‘Total vehicle kilometres across the appraised road network are effectively the same with the Scheme as without it. This indicates that the Scheme is not forecast to induce additional traffic… and that increases in traffic flows on some roads due to the Scheme are balanced out by reductions on other roads because of rerouting or redistribution of some journeys[134]’. Only in response to a question from the ExA, on 13th April (10 months after we originally asked for the figures) did NH reveal the increases in total vehicle kilometres due to the Scheme would be +0.7% (on approximately 12,000,000 daily veh-km in 2025) in the area of detailed modelling and +9.5% (on approximately 410,000 daily veh-km in 2025) in the Local Study Area[135]. NH not only refused to supply the absolute figures to us but also denied there would any increase in vehicle kilometres.

7. A sensitivity test on the carbon emissions

NH submitted the results of the test but did not make the methodology of the test available[136]. Nor did NH explain how the test affected the significance of the carbon emissions associated with the scheme. The validity of this test awaits DfT approval at some time in the future. Given this, it was incredible that this data was provided to the ExA as if it might add value to the ExA’s recommendation to the SoS. 

8. Visibility of the eastern portal of the underpass to the public

ES Ch.7, 7.9.25 implied that the eastern portal of the Mottram underpass would be visible from publicly accessible viewpoints. ‘Views represented by Viewpoint 5 would be more open, with visibility of the new underpass structure and the cutting slopes present at the eastern portal’. During site visits we searched from around Viewpoint 5 (on a public right of way) for visibility of the underpass structure but could not find it, and requested an accompanied site visit to view the eastern portal. In response NH considered ‘that all parts of the Scheme can be viewed from publicly accessible land, and thus we do not consider that an Accompanied Site Inspection will be required[137]’ (our emphasis). When we asked NH (email 22nd November) from where a full view of the eastern portal could be seen, it responded (21st December 2021) ‘the only views of the eastern portal would be visible from private agricultural land containing no sensitive receptors’. This is a complete contradiction to ‘all parts of the scheme can be viewed from publicly accessible land’.

9. Godley Green Garden Village (GGGV)

(i) GGGV is the largest proposed development within Greater Manchester, is included in Greater Manchester’s emerging spatial framework Places for Everyone and would lie 1Km from the scheme on a road that joins the M67 J4 roundabout, at the western end of the scheme. The allocation is proposed to deliver 2,350 dwellings and would generate approximately 529 to 1,057 two-way vehicle trips during peak hours[138]. Clearly this is a major development which would interact with the scheme. NH’s approach towards the scheme’s interaction with GGGV provided two diametrically opposed stances. 

(ii) NH’s assessment[139] for the DCO application records ‘no significant cumulative effect’ as a result of the scheme with the GGGV development, a conclusion which is directly contrary to the Places for Everyone assessment in which NH participated. The latter records that traffic generated by this allocation is ‘likely to result in material implications on the operation of the SRN that would require mitigation[140] ’ at both the M67 J4 roundabout and M60 J24 Denton Island[141] which lies 5-miles west of the scheme along the M67. Outside the EiP NH behaved as if the scheme would have significant effects: in response to TMBC’s 2021 planning application 21/01171/OUT for GGGV, NH submitted a formal recommendation[142] that planning permission is not granted for a specified period, as it did not have ‘sufficient comfort that the development would not cause a detrimental impact to the SRN.’ The conclusions that NH reached in regard to the scheme’s cumulative effects with GGGV are contrary to those evidenced by PfE and its own response to the planning application.

10. Transport for Greater Manchester’s SOCG with NH

A prime example of delay is the handling of the SoCG between NH and TfGM. The initial version indicated TfGM was concerned with detailed design of traffic management [APP-192] but the second version in January 2022 briefly alluded to concerns about strategic planning issues [REP2-019]. The nature of the latter were not revealed until the next and final version of the SoCG appeared 4 months later during the final hours of the EiP [AS-010 and REP12-010]. Several new issues and new angles on known issues were disclosed as of concern to TfGM, all too late for scrutiny within the time frame of the EiP.

ANNEX 2

EFFICACY OF MITIGATION FOR BAT VEHICLE COLLISIONS DUE TO NEW ROAD SCHEMES -

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS’ ROLE IN EVIDENCING THIS

1. All the UK’s bat species are legally protected from killing / harm, disturbance, and obstruction / destruction of their roosting habitat by the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 and the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (as amended). This legal protection was put in place to address historic declines and some bat species are showing early signs of recovery.

Current situation with respect to research on impact of road schemes on bats

2. The potential impacts of road schemes on bats include destruction, degradation and fragmentation of roosting, foraging and commuting habitat; mortality through collision with vehicles and disturbance from noise and lighting associated with the road[143],[144]. Whilst the barrier and edge effects of roads may reduce the distribution of local bat populations in proximity to major roads, some bat species continue to fly over roads. Crossing height was strongly correlated with verge height, suggesting that elevated verges may have some value in mitigation, but increased flight height may be at the cost of reduced permeability[145].

3. Highway mortality may affect approximately 5% of a colony, indicating that collisions with vehicles are an important threat to bats and should not be overlooked, especially in areas with a dense road network[146]. Because of their small body size, bat mortality on roads is almost certainly underestimated - road-killed individuals may be quickly squashed or removed by scavengers. Low-flying species, male individuals and young bats are most frequently observed in roadkill counts. In deforested areas or areas with shorter trees bats tend to fly closer to the ground increasing the risk of bat-vehicle collision[147]. The risk of bat-vehicle collision is also increased by the construction of roads across existing migration or commuting routes and features that improve habitat quality near roads, such as wetlands that many bats preferentially forage above. 

Evidence of effectiveness of mitigating the risks of bat-vehicle collision

4. Crossing structures are the main strategy used to avoid bat-roadkill, however, their effectiveness is still unclear. Bats have been observed using most of these measures as intended, but only a few recent robust studies have evaluated the effectiveness of some of the measures. The results are ambiguous[148]. As a consequence, there is a limited knowledge of the effectiveness of bat mitigation measures and further research is needed to make detailed recommendations, especially on structure design[149]. Based on currently available evidence the best way to maintain safe bat commuting routes and increase the permeability of linear transport infrastructure is a combination of appropriately designed underpasses and green bridges. Wire bridges/gantries are unlikely to be effective since no design tested so far has shown any promise and they meet none of the essential ecological or behavioural needs of bats[150].

What role has National Highways played in reducing bat mortality from roadkill?

5. As the builder of strategic roads over many decades, National Highways has had plenty of opportunity to assess the efficacy of bat mitigation measures. The 2008 Interim Advice Note 116/08 Nature Conservation in relation to bats (now withdrawn) identified the Highways Agency as the lead authority on bats and roads, giving advice to others. At that time the Highways Agency had a Species Action Plan for bats and was piloting a range of strategies to mitigate for severance, as ‘there was little data available on the success of these strategies at the time of writing…’ ‘These include provision of crossing structures for commuting bats or alternative habitats, including roosts and foraging habitat... The note also emphasised that ‘It is essential that appropriate monitoring is programmed as part of the mitigation to determine the success of the mitigation and to enable modifications to be undertaken as required… Without ongoing monitoring it will be impossible to determine what is working and what is achievable for future highway projects’.

6. In 2011 Highways Agency undertook a literature review of ‘Bat Mitigation in Relation to Highway Severance’. This concluded that road severance is a key concern for the conservation of bat populations but the review could not come to firm conclusions due to:

• Inconsistencies between baseline surveys and post-construction monitoring;
• Variation in methodology and information recorded in surveys;
• Variation in use of the mitigation measures between species;
• Inconsistency in measurement and reporting of the success of mitigation;
• Factors such as sample size and available survey data limited the validity of evaluating or comparing the relative success of the range of mitigation measures; and
• Longer term performance of the mitigation measures has not been subject to evaluation.

7. Despite identification of the need for robust monitoring and evidence National Highways has failed to provide any evidence of the efficacy of bat mitigation measures in the following eleven years. Using five-year Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) of National Highways schemes we tried to assess the efficacy of mitigation for bats[151]. We excluded one-year surveys, as giving too short a monitoring period to provide robust assessment of mitigation measures; and Smart Motorways, as the work is undertaken within the highway footprint. We excluded POPE of highway schemes in the National Archives as they predated the 2011 literature review. On the Government website 23 schemes had 5-year POPEs. A 2015 meta-analysis giving an overview of POPEs supplied 8 more schemes giving a total of 31 schemes.

8. Three of the schemes did not mention bats and monitoring was not required in two schemes. The remaining 26 schemes all reported impacts on bats. Fourteen had no monitoring reports for bats at 5-years (see Table below). The remainder gave a mixed picture of monitoring, with POPE reporting if mitigation measures had been implemented rather than the outcome for bats. Overall, the POPEs did not have the data for the evaluator or us to reach a meaningful conclusion of the impacts of new highway schemes on bats or the efficacy of the mitigation intended to address this. It appears that the issues found by the 2011 Highways Agency’s literature review applied to these 26 schemes.

9. The failure of National Highways to use its opportunity as strategic road builder to undertake robust monitoring of bat mitigation appears to continue until recently. In 2021 the Examining Authority’s 2022 report (para 4.12.24) on the A47 Blofield to North Burlingham scheme (TR010040) stated: ‘I asked the Applicant [PD-006] whether all potential options (had) been explored to mitigate the moderate adverse and thus significant effect on bats. I was satisfied with the Applicant’s response [REP1-061], though sought some further clarification at ISH2 [EV-023 to EV-029] on the potential effectiveness of the proposed bat hops and the timeframe for results of a National Highways pilot scheme, which had been agreed with NE, to use raised netting to encourage a higher flight path for bats to cross roads. The Applicant responded [REP4-051] stating that the pilot scheme was ongoing and was unlikely to be completed before the close of the Examination and that the effectiveness of the bat hops was uncertain as such mitigation had not been monitored on other schemes.’

Conclusion

10. With all the new roads National Highways has built since 2008 it is a disgrace that in 2022 it is not in possession of robust research on the efficacy of bat mitigation measures but doing another pilot study. What happened to the 2008 pilot study? This behaviour can only be described as negligent.

Final 8 schemes* were taken from a meta-analysis undertaken in 2015 of 5-year POPEs for NH major schemes. Few details were provided except those replicated here. 

February 2023