Written evidence submitted by the Electoral Commission [ELR 004]

The Electoral Commission is the independent body which oversees elections and regulates political finance in the UK. We work to promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity. A key part of our role is to provide advice to the UK’s parliaments on matters relating to elections.

Overview

1. The current registration system does not work well for voters or administrators. To ensure all eligible voters can have their say at elections, the registration system needs to be reformed. 
2. Our evidence shows that millions of people in Great Britain are either missing or incorrectly registered, meaning they are unable to have their say.

3. Despite the recent changes to the canvass and the work of electoral administrators, Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) are struggling to maintain accurate and complete registers. Registration reforms would improve efficiency and enable administrators to spend their time delivering better value for voters elsewhere in the system.
4. Our research shows that the quality of the registers could be improved, and the process streamlined for administrators, if the UK’s governments provided them with access to public data. 
5. It is unlikely that levels of accuracy and completeness will improve significantly without reform. We will be publishing updated data on this in autumn 2023.

Individual Electoral Registration

What are advantages and disadvantages of the existing system of electoral registration?

6. A system of Individual Electoral Registration (IER) has operated in Great Britain since 2014, with a similar system in Northern Ireland since 2002. Individuals are responsible for applying to register to vote, supplying identifying information (date of birth and National Insurance number) as part of their application. Their identity is verified before their name can be added to the electoral register. This represents a significant improvement on the previous system, which was based on the outdated concept of registration by the head of a household and vulnerable to fraud.
7. Online registration has made the system more accessible for people and easier to directly encourage them to register to vote, particularly through public awareness campaigns around major polls.
8. A revised model of the annual canvass was introduced in Great Britain in 2020. This incorporates data matching, which informs the ERO which properties are likely to have an unchanged household composition, to enable them to target their canvass activity accordingly. The new canvass model has helped to address one aspect of sustainability – the resource and capacity taken up through unnecessarily chasing households with no change.
9. The current system may have had a negative impact on those not highly motivated to be registered or with a low level of awareness of registration. For example, under IER, attainers are required to make their own application to register (rather than being added through a single household form); this change has coincided with a marked decline in the registration levels of attainers. For example, our study of the December 2018 electoral registers found that completeness levels among attainers in Great Britain was 25%, compared to 45% in 2015. This level of completeness contrasted significantly with that seen for ages 65+ (94%).

10. On the parliamentary registers in Great Britain, the number of attainers fell by 28.7% between 2020 and 2021. In percentage terms, this marked the steepest year-on-year decline since 2014. In contrast, in Scotland and Wales, the number of attainers increased in 2021 (as in 2020). This is likely to be the result of increased registration activity among younger people following the extension of the franchise for devolved elections to 16 and 17 year olds. This increased activity may therefore be offsetting a systematic problem with the registration of attainers which is evident in England. 
11. Although we cannot yet draw conclusions on the impact of the reformed canvass on the accuracy and completeness of the registers in Great Britain, our analysis of available data suggests potential issues with the effectiveness of the reformed canvass in keeping pace with population movement.
12. Our analysis of the 2021 canvass in Northern Ireland found that despite recording the largest ever electoral register, with over 1.36 million people registered to vote, the canvass in its current format is not an efficient tool for helping to maintain an accurate and complete electoral register. We have therefore recommended that the Government should reform the canvass and wider registration process in Northern Ireland.

How does the system of Individual Electoral Registration compare to an automatic or assisted system of voter registration? 

13. IER requires the citizen to take proactive steps to be registered by making an individual application to register to vote. A system of assisted voter registration would uphold the key principle underpinning IER, because the citizen would still be required to opt-in proactively. One possible model could see voter registration integrated into other public service transactions. Citizens could – for example – be invited to register when applying for a passport or driving licence, or enrolling at university. This would increase the number of available electoral registration channels, improving both accessibility and visibility of the process.
14. By contrast automatic voter registration (AVR) would represent an in principle acceptance of the idea that the state may in certain circumstances take proactive steps to register citizens without their consent. It would thereby switch the “unregistered” default status of citizens. Under a true system of AVR, citizens would be added to the electoral register, or their addresses updated, without any requirement for them to take any further steps. It is important to stress that other systems may be based on a lesser degree of automation – for example, reliable data could serve as the basis of a citizen’s application, but the citizen would still be required take further, affirmative steps before being added to the register.
15. A system of AVR (or a system with a greater level of automation) could run in parallel with the current IER system to boost registration rates among under-registered groups, such as attainers and home movers.

Data issues

How can existing public data and digital methods be better utilised to create a more joined up electoral registration system?

16. The evidence of significant levels of under-registration and inaccuracy shown in our research demonstrates the need for modernisation. A modern, joined-up electoral register would:

• Use trusted public data to keep itself accurate and complete throughout the year without relying solely on action by individuals; and
• Make it as easy as possible for people to ensure their own registration record is accurate and complete, particularly ahead of elections and referendums.

17. More digital methods using existing public data could also help address some of the specific challenges highlighted in our research. For example:

• Regular access to reliable data about recent address changes from other public services would allow EROs to make contact directly with people who have recently changed address (including those who move frequently).
• Integrating electoral registration applications into other public service transactions could make it easier for individuals to keep their registration details up to date and accurate. This could be particularly effective for people who are already updating their details with other organisations.

18. Existing public data could also help to improve levels of completeness among some of the specific under-registered groups identified in our research. For example, data from the education sector could help EROs to identify attainers and other young people. Data from the Department for Work and Pensions could be used by EROs to register young people to vote automatically when they are allocated their National Insurance number.

What issues exist regarding cyber security, data and privacy, and how can these concerns be addressed?

19. The dispersed nature of electoral registers managed by individual local authorities means that some potential data, privacy and cybersecurity risks may be minimised. This structure also presents a barrier to some innovation, however, not only for registration but for other aspects of the electoral process, including voting itself.
20. In relation to registration reform, our 2019 feasibility studies identified some legal and technical challenges that would need to be addressed to enhance the use of national data sources by EROs. In many cases data cannot be shared by a data-source organisation without legislation. A legal gateway would therefore need to be created, giving EROs power to inspect records held by specific public authorities. Alternatively, individuals would need to consent to the sharing of their data with another public authority.
21. Data-source organisations may also need to establish their own technical infrastructure in order to share data, and would need to work together with the UK Government to set up an interface between the data source and individual EROs or their software systems.
22. For automatic or more automated electoral registration processes, there would be a greater need for data held by other public sources to be robust, current and complete. This could require frequent updates of recent transactional data from reliable data sources. Data would also need to contain all of the fields necessary to support automatic registration (i.e. name, address, date of birth, National Insurance number, nationality and, in some cases, immigration status). In practice, automatic registration may require EROs to combine information from different datasets, which could increase technical and legal complexity.

What issues do electoral registration officers face in relation to electoral data, including access to and sharing of data?

23. EROs are legally entitled to access local data sets from:

• the council which appointed them (including county councils in areas where the ERO is appointed by a district council)
• any registrar of births, deaths and marriages, including any superintendent 
• any person, including a company or organisation, providing services to, or authorised to exercise any function of, the council; this includes those that are providing ‘outsourced’ services under any finance agreement.

24. There are no statutory restrictions on this disclosure (including data protection legislation). However, EROs can face issues with the quality and accuracy of this local data, which can mean that they are unable to use it with confidence. 
25. There is currently no provision for EROs to access national data that may be of higher quality and reliability.

Impact on local authorities

What are the challenges presented by event-led registration, and what additional burdens does this place on local authorities?

26. Our research has found that public interest in electoral events, particularly high-profile elections such as the 2019 UK parliamentary general election, is increasingly driving electoral registration applications immediately prior to elections. An accessible online registration process means it is easy for people who want to make sure they can take part to apply, and to do so close to the deadline.
27. This means that EROs and their teams are often under pressure to manage large numbers of registration applications received in the period leading up to the deadline before elections. Electoral administrators have reported that large volumes of registration and absent vote applications can make it harder to focus on running the election at a critical point.
28. In 2019, 3.85 million people applied to register to vote between the date that Parliament voted to approve the general election and the registration deadline, and 660,000 people applied on deadline day. Data provided by EROs after the election suggested that more than one third of these were duplicate applications, submitted by those already correctly registered. We have recommended that the UK Government undertake further work to explore how the system could be improved to address the significant administrative impact of processing duplicate applications ahead of electoral events.
29. Further pressure can also arise where electoral registration and postal voting application deadlines fall on the same day or close together before an election. EROs will be under pressure to urgently process both types of application in line with the legal timescales.

How have the changes introduced by the Elections Act 2022 impacted on electoral registration officers? For example, has this introduced additional administrative burdens on EROs specifically, or local authorities more generally? 

30. The most significant changes introduced by the Elections Act have not yet been implemented by EROs and ROs. Electors could apply for a Voter Authority Certificate (to use as proof of identity for voting in polling stations) from Monday 16 January 2023.
31. Other significant changes (the requirement for voters at polling stations to show proof of identity; the provision of equipment to enable or facilitate voting by disabled people) will be implemented for the first time at the May 2023 local elections in England. The implementation of the provisions removing the 15 year limit on voting rights for British citizens living overseas will also have significant implications for EROs, as will the rolling out of an online absent voting application service. Clear and timely secondary legislation will be essential in enabling EROs to prepare for these changes. We will continue to provide guidance and resources to support EROs and ROs in delivering them.
32. We will collect and monitor evidence about the delivery of these changes so that we can assess the impact on voters and electoral administrators through our election reporting later this year.

How best can Government support local authorities to alleviate additional burdens and improve accuracy and completeness of their registers?

33. The UK’s governments should support EROs to improve accuracy and completeness of electoral registers – and improve efficiency to alleviate resource burdens – by giving them access to high-quality data from other public service organisations. Depending on the quality coverage of these data sets, this change could support automatic registration, integration of registration applications alongside other public service transactions, or simply enable EROs to send targeted invitations to register to specific individuals not currently correctly registered.
34. As noted above, EROs already have some rights to inspect data from local organisations to enable them to maintain electoral registers. In practice, however, they would be dependent on the UK Government (and in some cases the Scottish or Welsh Government) to give them access to any national or UK-wide data.
35. Our 2019 feasibility studies identified that government departments that are responsible for the data source organisations would need to provide legal gateways to allow data sharing with EROs (for example the Department for Transport for access to DVLA data). It is likely that a centralised interface would also be needed to manage the flow of data between the data source organisations and individual EROs, similar to the IER digital service that was established by the UK Government and managed by the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities.
36. Integrating registration applications alongside other frequently used public service transactions would also require support and some resource investment by data source organisations and relevant departments. They would need to develop and maintain the necessary technical infrastructure to collect and transfer data about potential new electors, and to manage the relationship with any centralised interface.

Annual canvass

Have the Government’s recent reforms done enough to improve the annual canvass process, or are further changes required?

37. Our analysis of the reformed canvass in Great Britain in 2021 found evidence that suggests potential issues with the effectiveness of the reformed canvass in keeping pace with population movement:

• The new pre-canvass data matching process meant that some households were allocated to the ‘wrong’ canvass route – nearly a fifth of responses from households allocated to the lighter-touch canvass route (Route 1, where no change in household composition was expected based on the results of the data match) still reported significant changes to electors’ details.
• Some changes to electors’ details may still not be reflected on the revised registers published after the canvass – 2.4 million households did not respond to the canvass (representing one third of those allocated to Route 2, where a change in household composition was expected).
• The reduction in the frequency of communication with some households may be contributing to the under-registration of attainers – the decline in the number of registered attainers, which began following the introduction of IER in 2014, continued in 2021. The number of registered attainers dropped by 28.7% relative to 2020.

38. While we know that new registration applications are most readily driven by high-profile electoral events, the canvass and other registration activity should also support accurate and complete registers throughout the year. This can help reduce the large volumes of applications received immediately in advance of major polls, when EROs’ staff capacity is already stretched.
39. Our analysis of the 2022 canvass will be published by the end of March 2023. This will allow us to update on the trends observed in 2021, highlight any new issues and look ahead to the findings from our next accuracy and completeness study due in autumn 2023.

Engagement and accessibility issues

What are the barriers to eligible electors registering to vote? 

40. We know that people who have recently changed address are less likely to be correctly registered at their new address. Many will have been registered at their previous address and have not yet re-registered. Where this is the case, this is a practical barrier, which could be tackled by providing EROs with more publicly-held data to tell them about recent home movers.
41. However, our evidence also indicates that some people are not motivated to register because they do not plan to vote. This can be because of strong, active dis-engagement – feeling there is no difference between parties/candidates or distrusting politicians – or an absence of interest in politics, leading to a lack of urgency in updating registration details. For some participants in our research it was because of a lack of information. Some felt that they should not vote (and therefore did not register) because they did not know enough to cast their vote effectively.

Why are there so many inaccurate entries and duplications on the register? How can they be rectified in a cost-effective manner? 

42. Inaccuracies on the registers are mainly caused by home movement, particularly between different local authorities. When a person moves house the ERO for that local authority can be notified if/when they register at their new address. However, this only happens if the individual provides their previous address when re-registering. Where the ERO either does not receive that information, or where there is a delay in receiving it, the inaccurate entry will remain on the register until the annual canvass takes place or a new resident tries to register to vote. Given levels of home movement across the UK this can lead to significant numbers of inaccuracies on the registers.
43. This issue could be addressed by a more automated registration process which provides EROs with better access to other publicly-held data and proactively gives them information on changes of address.

How can resources be better targeted to ensure better engagement and accessibility for certain demographics?

44. We have highlighted above how the government could support EROs to use their limited resources more effectively, particularly to address lower levels of completeness among specific groups, by providing access to high-quality data from other public service organisations.
45. We also have a statutory duty to promote public awareness of electoral systems, a key aspect of which is our work to increase voter registration ahead of an election and to inform people how to participate. We focus the majority of our media advertising spend on the demographics that we know are less likely to be registered, which are 18-34 year olds, students, recent home-movers and private renters. We create resources for use by local authorities and civil society organisations, and promote these widely.

International comparisons

Which countries have high levels of electoral registration, and what lessons can the UK learn from these electoral registration systems?

46. Comparisons to Australia, Canada and New Zealand are most useful because of the structure of registration in those countries, including the absence of any centralised citizen registration.
47. Information on how these countries measure the accuracy and completeness of their registers is limited; however the statistics below show the number of registered electors as a proportion of population size.

• Australia: The Australian Electoral Commission says that the “Estimated proportion of eligible Australians enrolled” is currently 97.0%; it also says “The enrolment rate (known as the participation rate until December 2014) is calculated by dividing the number of electors on the electoral roll by the estimated eligible population.”
• Canada: Elections Canada’s report on the September 2021 Federal Election said: “At the issue of the writs, 96 percent of electors were registered, 92.3 percent of them at their current address. This means, 88.7 percent of all electors were registered at their current address and “ready to vote.” While these quality indicators were marginally lower than at the call of the 43rd general election in 2019, they aligned with the long-term trend of improvements in the quality of the elector data maintained by Elections Canada.”
• New Zealand: The New Zealand Electoral Commission currently estimates 88.1% completeness, but this is based on registered electorate as a proportion of estimated population size.

48. Evidence from other democracies indicates that few countries rely solely on individuals taking steps themselves to register to vote, and the use of automatic registration for specific groups or assisted/automated registration using data from other public agencies is increasingly common.

February 2023