Written evidence submitted by the Stonehenge Alliance (SRI0017)
Summary
The Stonehenge Alliance is a group of non-governmental organisations and individuals opposed to National Highways’ highly damaging proposals to construct a new route for the A303 trunk road across the Stonehenge World Heritage Site. While there are specific features of this project that are unique, we have identified a number of problems with National Highways’ approach, affecting both the current and future road investment strategies, which we set out in this paper.
The current road investment strategy has been poorly managed by National Highways, leading to delays in project approvals, problems with the SMART motorway programme and inadequate risk management.
Issues that have led to delays in obtaining Development Consent Orders include:
This has increased the time and cost of Development Control Order examinations, made the decision making process more contentious and ultimately led to several applications for Judicial Review. The A303 Stonehenge project provides a good illustration of these issues.
Unfortunately, there is no sign of a change of approach by National Highways and it continues to press for highly environmentally damaging projects to be approved.
As at July 2022, there was no contingency funding left with the second Road Investment Strategy (RIS2) budget. In the face of rising inflation, National Highways appears to be relying on pushing projects back into the RIS3 period to remain within budget. This is likely to result in a large “hangover” of projects from RIS2, many of them with a weak business case, dominating the RIS3 programme. Accordingly, there is a need to pause all projects where construction is not yet substantially underway, so they can be re-assessed in the context of RIS3 priorities.
In order to meet the government’s decarbonisation targets, which are crucial to the welfare of consumers and businesses, there is an urgent need to reduce road traffic levels. The continuing focus on expanding road capacity is contrary to this aim.
The RIS3 programme will need to increase spending on operations and maintenance, while investment should focus on improving the safety, performance and resilience of existing roads, rather than increasing capacity. There is scope for National Highways to use proven technological developments to assist in improving the safety and performance of the network.
1. Introduction
1.1 The Stonehenge Alliance is a group of non-governmental organisations and individuals that seek enhancements to the Stonehenge World Heritage Site (WHS) and opposes development that would cause it harm. Its supporter organisations are Ancient Sacred Landscape Network, Campaign to Protect Rural England (CPRE), Friends of the Earth, Rescue: The British Archaeological Trust and Transport Action Network. Our main focus has been to oppose National Highways’ highly damaging proposals to construct a new route for the A303 trunk road across the Stonehenge World Heritage Site (referred to by National Highways as “A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down” and by others as the “A303 Stonehenge” project). This would cause irreparable damage to the Site and would, very likely, result in the loss of its UNESCO World Heritage listing.
1.2 Clearly there are specific features of this project that are unique. However, in the course of our work, we have identified a number of problems with National Highways’ approach and some general issues which affect the deliverability of the current road strategy overall and have important implications for the content of future investment strategies. In the paragraphs that follow we set these out, using the bullet points in the Select Committee’s Call for Evidence as headings.
2. How effectively the RIS2 enhancements portfolio has been managed to date
2.1 Our overall view is that the RIS2 portfolio has been poorly managed to date. We set out our reasons for this below, taking as sub-headings the three key factors that the NAO Report[1] highlights as forcing National Highways to change its delivery plan for RIS2 enhancements. These are:
2.2 A common theme behind all these issues has been National Highways’ determination to press ahead with the original programme in the face of mounting evidence that the programme was undeliverable. The programme was only changed when it was very obvious that it could not be delivered in the plan period. Even then, National Highways’ “solution” has been to push back much of the programme into the next Plan period, resulting in the RIS2 budget being reduced by £3.4bn to £24bn. This was done without considering whether the projects remain worthwhile and the overall portfolio is balanced.
Development Consent Order Delays
2.3 National Highways does not appear to have expected the delays to obtaining Development Consent Orders that have occurred, despite identifying it as one of the key risks to the programme. In our view, major reasons for this have included:
2.4 This has increased the time and cost of Development Control Order examinations, made the decision making process more contentious and ultimately led to several applications for Judicial Review incurring additional delay. At one extreme this may be relatively short if the application is turned down by the courts, while a decision that project approval was unlawful may lead to indefinite delay or project cancellation. In addition to causing delay, National Highways’ approach has led to cost increases due to inflation and to the deployment of additional resources to defend its entrenched position.
2.5 The A303 Stonehenge project provides a good illustration of these issues and we focus on five aspects of National Highways’ approach to this project in the paragraphs below.
Selection of the Preferred Option
2.6 National Highways’ option selection process took as its starting point that the solution would be a high capacity dual carriageway with grade separated interchanges. The initial assessment focussed solely on alternative routes for this new road, with public transport alternatives being dismissed subsequently in a cursory and simplistic technical note. The justification for this seems to be that the project is part of an overall programme to deliver a continuous high speed dual carriageway route from the M3 near Basingstoke to the M5 at Taunton. However, no appraisal has been undertaken for the programme as a whole.
2.7 From the evidence that exists it appears that this would offer poor value for money. No multi-modal appraisal of alternatives for the London to South West corridor has been undertaken since the South West and South Wales Multi-modal Study, more than 20 years ago. This did support a continuous dual carriageway, alongside electrification of both rail routes (via Westbury and Salisbury respectively) between London and Exeter. However, road traffic has not grown as expected at that time, while our understanding of climate change has advanced greatly and its impacts are becoming ever more obvious. It is far from clear that a new multi-modal appraisal would reach the same conclusions.
2.8 Even within the road alternatives, National Highways was very focussed on selecting the shortest feasible route at the lowest cost that it thought would be acceptable to statutory consultees and regulators. The resulting scheme crosses the World Heritage Site with a tunnel under part of it and lengthy approach cuttings, together with surface works within the Site. The public consultation in 2017 did not offer any other alternative to this within the World Heritage Site, the only significant difference between the two consultation options being whether the route passed north or south of the village of Winterbourne Stoke further west. Options which tunnelled beneath the full width of the World Heritage Site were dismissed at an early stage on cost grounds, without any appraisal of whether there were additional benefits that would offset or warrant the extra cost. No option which avoided the World Heritage Site was taken forward to consultation, despite National Highways’ own assessment identifying at least one potentially viable option that would be considerably cheaper than a tunnel option. Since the consultation, National Highways has made only minor changes to the route and been unwilling to seriously engage with alternative options. This has led to much criticism and was one of the grounds on which the Secretary of State’s approval of the project was overturned in the High Court.
Protection of Cultural and Historic Heritage
2.9 It is generally recognised that the ancient sacred landscape of Stonehenge and the surrounding area is remarkable for its unique remains of the Neolithic and Early Bronze Age. This was recognised by UNESCO in designating it, together with Avebury and Associated Sites, as a World Heritage Site in 1986. Throughout the examination of the Development Consent Order Application and subsequent representations, National Highways has maintained the position that the overall net effect of the project on the historic heritage of the World Heritage Site would be moderately beneficial. This is despite the Examining Authority (a panel of five independent planning inspectors) determining that it would cause “substantial harm” to the site[2] and UNESCO indicating that its World Heritage designation would be at risk if the project went ahead in its current form[3]. Even the Secretary of State recognised that the net impact would be negative when he – unlawfully – approved the Development Consent Order.
2.10 The position that National Highways has adopted seems to be determined by its commitment to stand by its existing proposal at all costs. It is also essential to the economic case for its scheme. In its business case, the great majority of the alleged benefits of the project (around £1bn) derive from the value that people are said to place on removing the A303 from the World Heritage Site landscape (which the scheme would not actually achieve). Leaving aside the fact that the methodology used in deriving this supposed benefit was highly questionable, most of it arose from people who had never visited Stonehenge but who valued a proposal which was said to enhance the Site. Clearly National Highways could not credibly claim this benefit if they were to concede that the net effect was negative.
Road Traffic Growth
2.11 National Highways’ justification for the project, and an important component of the economic case, is based on a scenario of continuous high levels of growth in road traffic in the future. It has developed a Central Case for future traffic growth which lies within a relatively narrow range between High and Low Growth scenarios. This is despite evidence of a sea change in behaviour from the early 2000s onwards. Following on from this, National Highways’ approach does not accord with current best practice in traffic forecasting.
2.12 Even prior to the COVID pandemic, the Department for Transport was moving towards a scenario-based approach. This involves setting out a number of possible future scenarios considering factors such as economic growth, changes in people’s desire for car ownership, energy prices and the pace of transition to electric vehicles. These scenarios provide differing future forecasts of traffic levels and best practice would suggest adopting projects that are worthwhile in all or most of them. The pandemic has led to major changes in travel patterns and this makes the future even more uncertain.
2.13 However National Highways has not taken this into account in its latest forecasts. The main change it has assumed is a more rapid transition to electric vehicles than they had assumed previously, but with no tax changes to take account of the loss of fuel duty that would result. Implicitly it is assuming that the substantial annual gap, estimated by the Transport Committee to be £35 billion[4], will be funded from other taxation. The Committee did not see this as a credible position and has recommended potential solutions, which would have the effect of reducing traffic growth relative to National Highways’ forecast. As the Committee noted “in addition to generating taxation to fund essential public services, motoring taxation plays a key role in managing congestion by regulating demand to use public roads. If the Government fail radically to reform motoring taxation, the UK faces an underresourced and congested future.”
2.14 As yet, National Highways has not published forecasts that are consistent with the DfT’s latest National Road Traffic Projections[5], let alone ones which are compliant with the 6th carbon budget and the Climate Change Committee’s balanced pathway to net zero. These are discussed in the next section.
Climate Change and De-carbonisation
2.15 In addition, National Highways’ approach is inconsistent with Government’s net zero commitment in at least two respects.
2.16 Firstly, the growth in traffic that it forecasts is not compatible with achieving net zero by 2050. As the then Secretary of State – Grant Shapps – wrote in the Introduction to the Government’s Transport Decarbonisation Strategy:
“It's about using cars less, not giving them up completely… We want to reduce urban road traffic overall. Improvements to public transport, walking and cycling, promoting ridesharing and higher car occupancy, and the changes in commuting, shopping and business travel accelerated by the pandemic, also offer the opportunity for a reduction or at least a stabilisation, in traffic more widely” [Our emphasis].
2.17 As most inter-urban journeys start or finish in an urban area, reducing urban traffic will also reduce the use of inter-urban roads.
2.18 Separately, in its 2020 report[6], the Climate Change Committee highlighted the fact that surface transport is now the economic sector which produces the largest share – 24% – of the UK’s greenhouse gas emissions. Reducing this is critical to achieving its proposed 78% reduction in carbon emissions relative to 1990 (63% relative to 2019) by 2035. The Committee recommended that emissions need to fall by 68% between 1990 and 2030, a marked increase from the 57% recommended in the 5th carbon budget for the same period. The Committee highlights a number of measures that need to be taken to achieve this, with the first being[7]:
“Reduction in car travel…….. compared to baseline growth, we assume that approximately 9% of car miles can be reduced (e.g. through increased home-working) or shifted to lower-carbon modes (such as walking, cycling and public transport) by 2035, increasing to 17% by 2050. The opportunities presented to lock-in positive behaviours seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and societal and technological changes to reduce demand (e.g. shared mobility and focus on broadband rather than road-building) are key enablers.”
2.19 The Government’s Net Zero Strategy further sets out how this may be achieved including:
“Alongside road vehicle decarbonisation, we must increase the share of trips taken by public transport, cycling and walking. We want to make these modes the natural first choice for all who can take them. As more journeys are cycled or walked, and taken by public transport, the carbon, air quality, noise and congestion benefits will be complemented by significant improvements in public health and wellbeing.
We will support and encourage modal shift of freight from road to more sustainable alternatives, such as rail, cargo bikes and inland waterways.”[8]
2.20 Most recently, the Department for Transport issued ‘additional information’ about the estimated carbon and traffic consequences of different national projections of traffic. This was restructured to use the DfT’s framework of ‘Common Analytical Scenarios’ included in the National Road Traffic Projections. These scenarios are specifically designed to allow a wider consideration of alternative assumptions about traffic from those of a ‘most probable’ central value plus small sensitivity testing, usually favoured by National Highways. There is quite a wide spread between the highest and lowest traffic growth assumptions, emphasising that (at least) the highest and lowest case should be tested in appraisal of specific major schemes.
2.21 However, it is important to note that these alternatives are generated essentially by modelling a variation in the generic influencing factors including population, economic growth, different evidence on the sensitivity of traffic demand to costs and speeds, and changes in traffic growth that might be influenced by changes in travel costs, at a broad, aggregate level. They do not explore the combined effects of all such factors taken together, and there is only very limited treatment of the effect of changes in Government policy beyond the schemes and policies already ‘committed and funded’. These are taken to include some 1400 lane miles of new road, but not, for example, an increase in funding on Active Travel England, Low Traffic Neighbourhoods, new public transport schemes, changes to regulation on speeds and the enforcement, etc.
2.22 Most importantly, there is no scenario tested which would achieve the substantial reduction in urban traffic envisaged in the Transport Decarbonisation Strategy, including 50% of all urban trips by walking and cycling, increases in car occupancy, use of land use planning to reduce unnecessary travel, etc, and its consequent follow-on effects on the strategic network. There has been no suggestion by the Government that this is because these targets are unachievable and would be demoted to vague long term ‘aspirations’. Rather, the suggestion is that the form of detailed testing that would be necessary to implement the specific policy, taxation and organisational instruments to these ends are a subject of separate analytical work not embodied in the traffic projection scenarios. This creates an obvious inconsistency between the traffic projections and government decarbonisation policy.
2.23 Secondly, National Highways denies that the impacts of road projects on carbon emissions and climate change are significant. It argues this on the basis that no single road project would generate sufficient extra carbon to compromise the UK’s ability to meet its climate change commitments. This would be true of almost any project taken in isolation and ignores the guidance on assessing climate impacts by the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA). In addition, the cumulative impacts of the overall programme would be much greater. In any case, the strong commitment to reducing carbon emissions described above means that projects which increase emissions should only be approved in the most exceptional circumstances.
2.24 The current carbon projections published in the Additional Information essentially are focussed on tail-pipe emissions only. This is not because it can be realistically assumed that that all electricity generation is carbon-free and that there are no carbon costs of the huge increase in vehicle manufacture necessary for an accelerated transition to electric vehicles. Rather, it is because in accounting terms, these additional carbon costs are not attributed to the ‘transport’ sector but to power and industry. Such accounting conventions are unavoidable but in order to make transparent the full carbon costs under IEMA principles, the carbon allocated to other sectors, but essentially due to travel and transport decisions, need to be laid out in appraisal information. This can be done simply and transparently.
2.25 A further omission from the appraisal is that all the scenarios considered are based on the simplifying assumption that there is no material change in the climate, which would affect the operating conditions of roads and transport, during the appraisal period. This, of course, may not be true. DEFRA has proposed that all major policies and projects should be appraised also on the assumption that there may be a 2° or 4° increase in global average temperature, which would materially affect the social and economic geography of the country, the distribution of pollution, employment and trade, the incidence of major weather-related crises including drought, flooding, cold and heatwaves, the design needs of roads including water run-off and resilience, planning for emergency movements of large numbers of people, and of course the special protection needed for low-lying roads and tunnels. There would also be long term effects on economic growth, real incomes, and the conditions and quality of life. None of this is considered within the narrower terms of the traffic scenarios but goes beyond them in scale and importance.
Weak Business Case
2.26 The Business Case for the A303 Stonehenge project is very weak. The case submitted to the Development Control Order Examination showed only £1.08 in benefits for every £1 of expenditure. This makes it “Low” value for money, implying the project should only proceed if there were no other pressures on public expenditure. In their latest submission, National Highways has raised the ratio of benefits to costs to 1.55, which means that it just scrapes into the “Medium” value for money category. The changes that it has made to achieve this have not been subject to independent scrutiny and, in some cases, do not seem plausible.
2.27 In any case, the majority of the alleged benefits remain unchanged and still arise from the invalid assessment of the so-called benefits of removing the A303 from the World Heritage Site. Without this element, the costs would continue to greatly exceed the benefits. Clearly, the tunnel under part of the World Heritage Site adds significantly to the costs. However, a rough calculation, based on the cost of other projects, indicates that the transport benefits would still be insufficient to cover the costs of a surface based scheme. This indicates that the project would be poor value for money, even without the unique issues associated with Stonehenge.
Conclusions
2.28 While the above points are specific to the A303 Stonehenge project, they are symptomatic of National Highways general approach. Some practices, in particular those relating to traffic forecasting and climate change, are evident across the project portfolio.
Lower Thames Crossing
2.29 We also note that the Development Consent Order Application for the largest project in National Highways portfolio, the Lower Thames Crossing, was delayed by two years following feedback from the Planning Inspectorate on the initial submission, suggesting that it was poorly prepared and did not adequately address all relevant issues.
SMART Motorways
2.30 Concerns about the safety of SMART motorways, and particularly the use of the hard shoulder as a running lane, had been growing for several years prior to the Select Committee’s investigation of the issue in 2021[9]. National Highways was unwilling to acknowledge that this was an issue and it required a decision by the then Secretary of State to pause the programme. Subsequently National Highways is using much of the budget for future projects to enhance the safety of existing schemes. This situation is very unfortunate for several reasons:
2.31 While the Lower Thames Crossing and SMART motorways are not directly relevant to the Stonehenge scheme, they have been included here to further show how National Highways’ attitude has led to costly delays elsewhere. The issues seen at Stonehenge are not unique and are seen across all of National Highways’ work.
3. Risk Management
3.1 The original budget for Road Period 2 included an allowance of £1.16 billion for risks that apply across the project portfolio, such as changes in environmental issues, rather than specific project costs. In their report, NAO notes that “by July 2022, National Highways had allocated all of the contingency fund for the five-year road strategy. In the first year (2020-21), National Highways committed £655 million (56%) of the contingency to address cost increases in projects between the draft road strategy in 2018 and final publication in 2020. National Highways told us that the contingency was not supposed to be used in this way, but that reopening the budget would be challenging at that stage of the timetable. A further £533 million (net) was allocated between April 2020 and July 2022, taking the total contingency committed to £1.19 billion, £26 million more than the initial budget” As a result there is no remaining contingency for the remainder of the Road Period and further cost increases will either require a budget increase, cancellation of more projects or deferring more expenditure to the next period.
4. Whether risks to the enhancements portfolio for the remainder of the RIS2 period are being well managed
4.1 As yet, there is no sign of a change in approach by National Highways. It continues to press for highly damaging proposals to be approved regardless of opposition and, in the case of A303 Stonehenge, warnings it has received about the impact on the World Heritage Site. This is bound to lead to further controversy and potential legal challenge unless there is a change of approach and significant revisions to proposed schemes. Continuing to press for approval is a significant risk that is likely to see the proposals being dropped altogether or moving completely to RIS3.
5. What the impacts of delays and cost overruns are on the overall programme, and whether the revised programme can be delivered to schedule and on budget
5.1 National Highways continues to promote projects which are environmentally damaging and have weak economic cases. As noted by the NAO, only 7% of projects that are expected to be completed after April 2025 currently represent “High” value for money, even on National Highways own appraisal, compared with a target that 80% should achieve that ranking. Given this, there is a high probability of delay in obtaining approval for projects and of legal challenge to approvals once given. This can be expected to lead to further delays to the programme.
5.2 As noted above, there was no contingency funding available within the programme budget as at July 2022. The NAO states that, in the absence of a significant budget increase, National Highways will have to delay, de-scope or cancel projects to remain within budget through to 2025. So far, it appears that their approach is to press on with the current programme, relying on a combination of approval delays and re-scheduling work to remain within budget. As a result, it appears that the aim is to spend the budget, but to deliver much less than promised.
6. What progress is being made on planning for the next Road Investment Strategy
6.1 The Stonehenge Alliance is aware that National Highways is assessing a large number of projects for potential inclusion in RIS3. However, unless there is a change in approach from National Highways, there will be a very large “hangover” of projects carried over from RIS2. These will include both projects started in RIS2 and not completed and schemes where the start of construction has been delayed (for example A303 Stonehenge). These projects have the potential to absorb a high proportion of the enhancements budget during RIS3, leaving little funding for more environmentally and geographically appropriate investment. The NAO Report notes that the cost of completing projects carried over from RIS2 was estimated to be £11.5 billion, before recent inflationary pressure, compared with a total of £12.5 billion for enhancements in the RIS2 budget.
7. What lessons from RIS2 need to be incorporated into RIS3 to ensure it is achievable and delivers on policy objectives
7.1 The RIS2 programme has been shown to be undeliverable within the programme’s time frame and budget.
7.2 In the Stonehenge Alliance’s view, a major re-think of investment priorities is urgently required to develop a sustainable and deliverable programme for RIS3. In order to prevent the new programme being dominated by the backlog of projects from RIS2, there is an urgent need to pause construction on all major schemes where construction is not already substantially underway. This will allow them to be re-assessed in the context of the priorities for RIS3 as recommended by the roads investment scrutiny panel of leading academics in the transport field[10]. This includes not only a serious reconsideration of the constraints on the road programme required by climate imperatives, but also improvements in the scrutiny of appraisals carried out by National Highways: the role of Scheme Promoter and control of the whole appraisal procedure does not increase confidence that the appraisals are carried out in a transparent, accountable and neutral way. We have been particularly concerned that many aspects of the Stonehenge appraisal have been technically suspect, rejected by the Examining Authority, and theoretically and practically flawed.
7.3 National Highways also needs to take more time and care with the information it places in the public domain and be more open about the data that underpins the business cases for its schemes. It also needs to properly and openly explore alternatives in a way that looks at least regret options and maximises modal shift, rather than business as usual. It should build support by focussing on solutions that minimise environmental and heritage impacts.
8. Whether the Government’s current and forthcoming roads investment programme is meeting the current and future needs of consumers and business
8.1 The continued focus on expanding road capacity that fuels traffic growth during a climate emergency with the need to reduce traffic levels overall is making things worse. It is using valuable resources that could be better utilised to improve resilience and maintenance on the existing Strategic Road Network as it is subjected to more extreme weather events. Also funding should be directed towards more efficient forms of transport such as public transport. The current approach will leave the UK with assets that are expensive to maintain and do not deliver on economic growth.
9. Whether the Government’s roads investment programme aligns with other policy priorities, such as decarbonisation, levelling up, productivity and growth
9.1 As noted above, the current roads programme is poorly aligned with government policy on de-carbonisation and environmental protection, while the economic case for many projects is weak. 80%, by cost, of the projects to be carried forward into RIS3 are located in Southern England, which is not consistent with the Government’s levelling-up agenda.
9.2 The Department for Transport has set six draft objectives for RIS3:
9.3 While these objectives may not be unreasonable at a high level, it does not necessarily follow that building new roads is an appropriate way to achieve them. In the case of safety, National Highways argues that motorways and dual carriageways have lower incident rates per vehicle mile than single carriageway roads and building them therefore improves safety. However, in reality, they generate extra traffic which causes additional incidents, both on the strategic network and on connecting roads, which have a higher incident risk. There are well established techniques for improving safety without major infrastructure investment, for example through using average speed cameras. Similarly, improved network performance can be achieved by better management of existing infrastructure using techniques such as variable speed limits, advanced notification of incidents and the deployment of Traffic Officers. While these have become widespread on parts of the motorway network, they are far from universal on the strategic road network.
9.4 It is also important to note that transfer to more sustainable modes of transport, such as rail, could make a substantial contribution to achieving the environmental, performance and economic growth objectives. The Rail Freight Group has estimated that a significant proportion of long distance road freight, which will be hard to de-carbonise, could transfer to rail with relatively modest levels of investment, allowing local deliveries to be made by electric trucks and e-cargo bikes.
9.5 An increasing challenge is the need to make the strategic road network more resilient in relation to the impacts of climate change. This applies both to the physical infrastructure, which will require more strengthening, and to the functionality of the network during increasingly common extreme weather events – such as the very heavy rain which caused the closure of the M74 in Scotland on 30th December 2022 and flooding that caused lane closures of the already dualled A303 around the Deptford (A36) interchange for several days in January 2023. More generally, many older parts of the Strategic Road Network struggle to cope with surface water, impacting on safety and reliability. This will require an increase in National Highways’ maintenance and operational budget, leaving less funding for enhancements. There is little point in building new roads if the existing network is increasingly unable to cope with climate change impacts.
9.6 In summary, work should be paused on RIS2 enhancement projects to avoid the risk of the RIS3 programme being dominated by inappropriate, environmentally damaging projects which offer poor value for money and are mostly based in Southern England. The RIS3 programme will need to allow greater expenditure on operations and maintenance, while investment should focus primarily on improving the safety, performance and resilience of existing roads, rather than increasing capacity. In line with the Government’s levelling-up agenda, it should also be more evenly balanced across the regions of England.
10. How RIS3 should take account of technological developments, and evidence on ways of increasing capacity on the Strategic Road Network (such as smart motorways and potential alternatives to them)
10.1 Drivers and, indeed network managers and enforcement agencies, have more technology at their direct disposal than ever before. Some of it, for example adaptive cruise control and lane detection has the potential to improve road safety, and therefore network performance, directly. The near universal availability of satellite navigation aids (either fitted to the vehicle or via mobile phones) gives drivers advance information on road conditions and potential alternative routes, and better evidence of responsibility for specific incidents.
10.2 A challenge for National Highways is to work with these technological developments to maximise the safety and performance of the network. Given environmental constraints we do not consider that the objective should be to increase capacity for more vehicles, although improved network performance would increase capacity to some extent. The introduction of variable speed limits and improved driver information have been shown to be important in improving reliability and safety. To date, this has largely been communicated to drivers by signage. In future it may be possible to rely less on this and make more use of direct communication with the vehicle. However, this can only be an additional tool until all vehicles are appropriately equipped, which will take many years.
10.3 Satellite navigation gives drivers much more information on road conditions ahead and offers options to avoid delays. However, it is also used to enable, or encourage, drivers to divert on to local roads that do not have sufficient capacity to accommodate them, resulting in more congestion, delay and negative impacts on local communities. Accordingly, there may be benefits in National Highways working with navigation aid developers to enhance their products to spread diverting traffic over alternative routes and with local highway authorities to assist in managing diverting traffic.
February 2023
Endnotes
[1] National Audit Office, “Road Enhancements: Progress with the Second Road Investment Strategy (2020 to 2025)”, Paper HC906, November 2022
[2] The Planning Inspectorate, “A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down Examining Authority’s Report of Findings and Conclusions and Recommendation to the Secretary of State for Transport”, 2020
[3] UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage: World Heritage Committee, Extended 44th Session, Fuzhou China, 16 – 31 July 2021, Decision, pp.152-3
[4] House of Commons Transport Committee, “Road Pricing”, Paper HC789, February 2022
[5] Department for Transport, “National Road Traffic Projections 2022”, December 2022
[6] Climate Change Committee, “The Sixth Carbon Budget: The UK’s Path to Net Zero”, December 2020, page 21
[7] Climate Change Committee, “The Sixth Carbon Budget: The UK’s Path to Net Zero”, December 2020, page 97
[8] HM Government, “Net Zero Strategy: Build Back Greener”, HMSO, 2021, page 156
[9] House of Commons Transport Committee, “Roll-out and Safety of Smart Motorways”, paper HC26, November 2021
[10] Road Investment Scrutiny Panel “Key Questions for Road Investment and Spending”, 2023