Written evidence submitted by Mr Peter Hammond (SRI0002)
1.0 Introduction
1.1 This document provides input and evidence into The Transport Committee’s new inquiry into the Government’s current five-year plan for investing in major roads and motorways.
1.2 The National Audit Office (NAO) report that has led to this inquiry stated that the Department and National Highways could have done more to manage potential risks to the portfolio of works in RIS2, which has led to less work being completed and a budget overspend of billions.
1.3 I agree with the NAO headline and I welcome this inquiry. There is clear evidence of scheme mis-management at NH and DfT. This has to stop. I am a resident of West Sussex and with this document, I have highlighted where I see the areas that need to change, the evidence to support this, and suggest a few measures/changes for consideration going forward.
2.0 Executive Summary
2.1 This inquiry is considering the RIS2 programme that runs from 2020-25: A period that has been dominated by the Global Covid Pandemic, and the War in Ukraine that has been a large contributory factor for a steep rise in Global inflation.
2.2 While it would be very easy and convenient to use the Pandemic and Global inflation as the primary factors as to why RIS2 schemes have taken a long time to develop and why the RIS2 costs have gone billions over its original budget, it would, however, be misleading to do so and it will only serve to mask some very real underlying issues that hopefully this inquiry will address.
2.3 These underlying issues relate to National Highways approach/attitude to scheme development, the Planning Act 2008, its Development Consent Order (DCO) regime and the package of statutory instruments and stated guidance to be used for national strategic infrastructure projects.
2.4 As they stand today these instruments and guidelines are not adequately defined and have too wide an interpretation allowing National Highways to act with impunity with new road development projects that is contributing to the promotion of inappropriate solutions, project delays and the budget over-spend.
2.5 Given that National Highways also enjoy scheme autonomy up to £500m along with little to no external robust scrutiny from scheme inception through preferred route selection to submission of the DCO Application, then as it stands today a significant proportion of the E2E process is ‘not fit for purpose’ and needs ‘modernising’. There must be more emphasis on effective governance and scheme scrutiny, with far more robust and independent validations of traffic forecasts, costs and benefits, more rigour and honesty with preferred route selection and a more transparent and public-centric approach by National Highways.
2.6 Given all of the above, and in order to meet the aims of this inquiry, and with the Transport Committee’s Chair comments in mind, “we must make sure lessons are learned so that time and money are not wasted in future”, consideration should be given to the following measures:
Measures: Short-term (2023-2024)
- Existing RIS2 schemes that do not meet the Government’s minimum investment criteria (i.e., are in excess of the budget set, and/or have a validated Benefits to Cost Ratio (BCR) of less than 1.5, and/or that represent a low to poor Value for Money (VfM) and have low public support) should be immediately reviewed/stopped. Alternatively, where other options exist that meet the minimum investment criteria consideration should be given to switching to these options.
This measure should be immediately actioned as it will mitigate the risk of further RIS2 budget over-run.
Measures: Mid to long-term (2024-2030)
- A review should be undertaken to examine the adequacy and effectiveness of the guidelines and definitions in the Planning Act 2008 with respect to the provision of information and stakeholder consultations. This should also include an escalation path for the public when they have concerns about the process if and when these concerns are not being adequately addressed by the DfT and National Highways. This review should provide recommendations for the circumstances and criteria for when this escalation path can be invoked.
- A review should be undertaken to examine how to improve the transparency and validation of key investment criteria for traffic forecasts, construction costs and economic benefits. This should consider not only a review of National Highways/DfT internal processes, but also include consideration for greater independent validation and more checkpoints – with updates made available to the public - at key stages of the process (e.g., before and at preferred route selection, before the Statutory consultation and prior to submitting a DCO application.)
- A review should be undertaken to consider how a more robust assessment can be taken when making the preferred route selection especially when the short list includes options that are over budget or have a BCR of lower than 1.5 and do not have public support. Potentially this might include, but not limited to, engaging the Planning Inspectorate earlier in the process to perform a more detailed assessment of National Policy Statements for a short-list of potential route options but before the selection of the preferred option.
- A review should be initiated to consider the level of autonomy given to National Highways including the monetary value set to ensure the desired outcomes and organisational behaviours expected for a public-centric approach are not to be compromised or violated.
- A review should be initiated to consider how the NAO and ORR could/should be engaged at a scheme level and not just at a programme level to ensure the process is being followed and License conditions and organisation behaviours are being met. Again, this could be limited to borderline and/or contentious schemes where National Highways has a tendency to go into ‘Reputation Protection’ mode.
2.7 All the above mid to long-term measures could form one review that should be concluded within 6 to 12 months. They are put forward as a package of measures to (a) address the inadequate practices currently being witnessed, (b) to speed up the scheme development process, (c) to ensure the validity of any proposal being made and (d) to ensure solutions are effectively scrutinised so that the public can have confidence in future solutions and that public taxpayer money is not being wasted.
2.8 The current approach – introduced a few years ago now to speed up the process - is clearly failing as is the level of Governance used to ensure that schemes are developed in a timely-manner, represent value for money and are within budget. The current issues have been raised with the DfT: see also the 10 points at section 4.1, as well as the points raised in the DfT correspondence provided in Appendix B. These were all ignored by the DfT.
The evidence and rationale to support this Executive summary and recommended measures for change can now be further considered in the following sections beginning with a review/examination of a representative and existing RIS2 scheme or case example.
3.0 Case Example
3.1 As the Transport Committee Chair Iain Stewart MP said: “Careful scrutiny is needed over which projects can be delivered, when by, and at what expense to the taxpayer”.
3.2 Careful scrutiny is one thing that has not happened with the A27 Arundel bypass project that will come at great expense for little to no benefit for the taxpayer and is a good example of what is wrong with RIS2 schemes.
3.3 The solution (known as the Grey route) being promoted by National Highways and the DfT is a massive departure from its original RIS2 expectations (i.e., affordability, value for money, alignment with wider government policies) but it was still selected as the preferred route and then subsequently promoted by a number of inappropriate and inadequate practices in order to hide the fact that better alternatives exist.
3.4 The detrimental harm to the local Arun district of the ‘Grey’ solution for the A27 Arundel bypass will be immense and there are no factors (e.g., economic benefits) outweighing its excessive costs and harm. Nor are there any significant indicators on the horizon to suggest the high costs will be reduced and the low-cost to benefit ratio figure of 1.37 will be improved for it to have been allowed to continue through to DCO.
The current situation and solutions options are represented in the image below.
3.5 This is an example of a ‘live’ scheme that is contributing to the RIS2 budget overspend as it is wasting time, resources and taxpayer money today due to a lack of effective scrutiny, honesty, transparency, adequate solution options assessment and exacerbated by National Highways inappropriate scheme management that cannot be described as public-centric.
3.6 In fact, the A27 Arundel bypass scheme can be characterised as a scheme developed by selective and mis-use of information and National policies, inaccurate and missing information, misleading and wrongly claimed benefits, selective optioneering and solution bias all adding up to poor and inappropriate decision-making.
This characterisation is expanded upon in the next section.
4.0 Inadequate and inappropriate scheme practices
4.1 To be as succinct as possible, the characterisation attributed to this scheme stems from a number of inadequate and inappropriate practices evident on this scheme, but not limited to this scheme, that are now summarised below.
1. Not Public-centric: NH/DfT have failed to be open, honest and transparent given they have omitted critical evidence (e.g., legal input that the Information Commissioner has stated NH should release) that was crucial to understanding the scheme’s impacts. They have also consistently presented biased evidence, misrepresented evidence (e.g., road safety, journey time benefits, etc.,) refused to share information and were/are reluctant to give straight answers to stakeholder questions.
2. Inadequate public Consultations: NH/DfT have failed the public with inadequate Statutory and Supplementary consultations where they have misled the public as they were/are prejudicially biased, withheld information critical to understanding the impacts of the scheme and failed to meet basic standards of consultation (i.e., NH refusal to answer public questions is not conducive to effective scrutiny: see also Appendix A.)
3. NH Autonomy drives undesirable behaviours: NH/DfT’s approach throughout the process was/is to reduce adverse impacts to insignificance and to dismiss challenges, rather than engage in constructive dialogue. They are evasive, obstructive and defensive, and have frustrated the many attempts to get substantive answers that would aid understanding of the scheme’s impacts and in doing so are failing to be compliant with their License obligations and other legal requirements (e.g., Gunning Principles.) NH operate without fear of being held accountable.
4. Inadequate scheme assessment: NH/DfT have failed to adequately assess NPSNN policies at route selection, and ahead of the Statutory consultation for the preferred route and in doing so have made the wrong strategic route choice and not adequately informed stakeholders and the public. With so many omissions (e.g., NPSNN 4.3, 4.4, 4.6, 5.11 and others,) it is not credible to even attempt to make a preferred route selection. Or to proceed to DCO without factually answering most of the statutory consultees and public’s concerns. This must be a pre-requisite.
5. Solution bias: NH/DfT have failed to take a balanced approach with the preferred route selection and are guilty of solution bias by giving, for example, inappropriate weighting to NPSNN 5.150 in comparison with little to no weightings applied for key investment criteria such as affordability, benefits to costs, environment and community impacts.
6. Solution not aligned with other Government policies: NH/DfT have failed to give due regard to other policies with the selection of the preferred route (e.g., Levelling-up, and the UK Net Zero Strategy 2021 - NH made no assessment of significance of the scheme’s carbon emissions against the annual carbon reduction targets and trajectories for transport in the Net Zero Strategy.)
7. Unvalidated costs and benefits: NH/DfT have failed to ensure scarce public money is spent wisely. The economic justification for spending £384m to £700m (at preferred route selection for the case example) has never been made or the costs and benefits validated. Statements that the current congestion restricts potential economic growth, as the delivery of goods to businesses is often delayed and the route is not ideal for commuters, which limits employment opportunities’ will be fixed is too generic and is often untrue and not informed by any credible evidence.
8. Inappropriate Solution Engineering: NH/DfT have failed to adequately and fairly assess all alternative options. Other alternative solutions have been cast aside due to the selective use of assessment criteria (some would say deceit) of NH’s Project Team and management failings of the NH Executive team who could have intervened and ensured all assessments were honest and creditable. But did not!
9. Public have been misled and misinformed: NH/DfT have failed to take an impartial and honest position throughout the process since 2018, as shown through various materials such as the misinformation on their websites on scheme benefits for Storrington, and through their colour brochures that show prejudicial bias for the case example. These focus entirely on Arundel to the exclusion of all other areas to the west of Arundel that will suffer the consequences of the proposed Grey route.
10. Lacking in any effective oversight and scrutiny: NH/DfT have failed to ensure there has been any robust assessment and monitoring of scheme development from options appraisal through to the Supplementary consultation and project business case. The DfT is responsible and must be held accountable for allowing a process/scheme to continue that is seriously flawed. This case example scheme should have been stopped before now but ‘Reputation Protection’ at NH/DfT has allowed it to continue and spend/waste even more scare public money.
More evidence supporting the ten statements above can be found in Appendices A & C.
4.3 The concerns summarised in this document have been raised with the DfT on a number of occasions who either pass these concerns directly to National Highways to answer – who respond at such a high-level to warrant them as worthless – or the DfT Correspondence team reverts to script by stating the scheme is subject to ongoing development and dismiss the merits of the points raised without hesitation. An example of the responses from the DfT that highlights their total disregard for legitimate questions and process concerns can be read in Appendix B.
4.4 I would also like to bring to the attention of the Inquiry Committee a concern about who should be acting in the public’s interest when (a) National Highways fail to answer the public’s questions, (b) the DfT is dismissive of the public’s concerns and (c) when the local MP refuses to help constituents?
4.5 To expand on the point above, the proposed Grey route for the case example scheme was selected by National Highways (NH) despite the fact that only 7% of the local public voted for this route and 93% voted for any other route but not Grey (see page 22.) There is nothing polarised about this result, a word that NH used to minimise this result in order to continue with their preferred route.
4.6 Given that the DfT dismissed my many process concerns and reminded me that I could have my say when the DCO Application is submitted – which is too late at this point and something the DfT will be only too aware of - I wrote to and asked the Arundel & South Downs MP if he would represent the concerns of the vast majority of his constituents in Westminster raising them with the Department for Transport and some of the Commons Select Committees.
4.7 Unfortunately, he also refused to support his constituents. Without his support there is no other way the public can have their concerns heard in the halls of Parliament, buildings in Westminster or anywhere else!
4.8 He is also the Treasury Minister, and he will know better than most that better solutions exist at a fraction of the cost of the Grey route that will also provide a much better overall fit against every one of the scheme objectives (see also pages 19 & 20) and other Government policies than the Grey route solution will ever be able to do.
4.9 The National Highways complaints procedure also fails to address the publics concerns of questions not being answered. So, when the DfT is also dismissive and the local MP refuses to get involved, then this is a concern and must be addressed. This inquiry will hopefully take this point onboard and find a solution to this legitimate concern. Is this not a public agency, paid or by the public and who are supposedly developing solutions for the public and business? Or am I missing something here!
5.0 Other key considerations for all schemes in the portfolio.
5.1 The A27 Arundel bypass project is just one scheme in the wider portfolio of many and could be an exception to the rest. But if it is representative of other schemes – and I fully expect this enquiry to hear about very similar concerns with other schemes - then it is more than reasonable to conclude that the portfolio is not being effectively managed. Nor will this situation change until the scheme mis-management, process/guidelines concerns and inappropriate practices discussed in this document are addressed.
5.2 After 5 years plus and at a development cost in excess of £25million, this example scheme is still highly contentious and is at risk of not being approved because it is a bad solution due to scheme mis-management.
5.3 National Highways propensity to show contempt for the process and public is a constant as it is deeply embedded into their culture. By way of an example of this contempt, National Highway are currently aiming to submit their Arundel Bypass DCO Application in the Spring of 2023. Yet, after 5 years of development and with a supplementary consultation that was recently held in December 2022, National Highways still refuse to answer stakeholder and public questions. Instead, they use scripted replies such as, “The data and information provided is aligned with guidelines,” and/or “This information is still under development and will be made available as part of the DCO Application”. So, after 5 years and with the DCO submission just a few months away, the public and other stakeholder’s questions remain unanswered: a situation that is completely unacceptable. Guidelines need to be changed to address this loophole.
5.4 This inappropriate approach and attitude is likely to result at some point in yet more Judicial Reviews. More delay. More wasted taxpayer money, and potentially still no solution for many schemes.
5.5 To add to section 4.1 point 10 - because it is critical to better outcomes - the process is lacking in any effective scrutiny and independent check-points. Combine this with the interpretation that National Highways is able to arbitrarily apply to the guidelines and wording stated for the consultation stage within the Planning Act 2008, then this allows National Highways to act with impunity without fear of being held accountable. This is not in keeping with Nolan principles, the spirit of the planning act 2008 and it is certainly not acting in the best interests of the public or ultimately ensuring scarce public money is being spent wisely.
5.6 For such challenging and contentious schemes such as the case example, and others less so contentious, the process needs to be far more transparent and robust in the validation of key scheme investment criteria. This robust approach must also involve an independent NGO such as the National Audit Office (NAO) or the Office for Road & Rail (ORR.) The economic aspects of the business case should not be left to National Highways and DfT alone to approve.
5.7 Similarly, the Planning Inspectorate should also have a role earlier in the process to ensure the right strategic decisions are made with respect to the choice of preferred route. Greater consideration and factual comparisons should be made on National Policy statements for a short-list of schemes by the Planning Inspectorate. Such key strategic decisions must be based on facts assessed by recognised authorities and less weight given to what the lawyers might advise along with other internal biased presumptions.
5.8 Additionally, the lack of any regulation at the scheme-level is another contributing factor that is driving inadequate behaviours and practices by National Highways. The total control NH have over what they say and do without fear of any comeback needs tempering with an appropriate level of scheme oversight and inspection beyond what is being provided today. This could/should be given to the ORR to carry out who currently only operate at a programme level. The conditions and circumstances of when this oversight/inspection should be done on a scheme still needs to be determined, but it could be as simple as a one-off spot check. This needs to be done in conjunction with a tightening of the guidelines and definitions used for Statutory and Supplementary consultations.
5.9 As mentioned in 5.6 above, the level of transparency on key investment-decision criteria such as Traffic forecasts, construction costs and economic benefits is of serious concern as is the level of robust scrutiny on the road benefit claims (e.g., safety) made by National Highways on all schemes. Even at the DCO examination stage there is no forensic examination of traffic forecasts, construction costs and risks, and economic benefits by the Planning Inspectorate or any other organisation. This is done solely by NH with a cursory check by the DfT. Even the Post Opening Project Evaluation (POPE) reports are performed inhouse at National Highways! This lack of independent scheme-level scrutiny has to be addressed given that any external checks carried out are only audits and these are only high-level audits done at a Programme-level.
5.10 As a member of the public, I also cannot understand how spending/wasting hundreds of millions over the budget on a project that has little to no economic benefits and when such a cost is avoidable deep in the Conservative south is consistent with the aims of the Governments Levelling-up agenda. This is what is happening on the Case example.
5.11 Or how building a new dual-carriageway bypass over 5 miles on the border of the South Downs National Park aligns with the governments various Environmental policies when a much shorter and on-budget 2.5-mile wide-single lane alternative scheme will fit the bill just as well and with much less harm. Again, I am referring to the case example.
5.12 Or how spending/wasting hundreds of millions of pounds over budget is justified given the case example scheme does not meet minimum scheme investment criteria conditions for approval and moves the existing Arundel congestion problems 5 miles up the road to Fontwell. All this at a time when there is a gaping chasm in the public finances and with other public services screaming out for extra help and cash. How is all this being public accountable and demonstrating effective Governance?
5.13 The A27 Arundel solution and scheme development is so bad it could be an exception to the rest of the portfolio. But the evidence from other schemes that this inquiry will get to hear about will underpin the fact that inappropriate and inadequate practices is in the DNA of National Highway and the DfT and is to a large degree the cause for poor solutions, scheme delays and budget overrun in the RIS2 programme.
5.14 This needs to change along with an enhancement - ‘modernisation’ - of the current processes, practices, guidelines, organisational behaviours and overall Governance to ensure the aims of this inquiry are met today and into the future.
More details to support the comments above can be found in the following Appendices.
Appendix A
National Highways have consistently suppressed key information to the public and other forums
Throughout the whole process National Highways have not shown any serious intent to consult and interact with the public in order for them to fully understand the benefits and implications of their proposals. Their approach has flown in the face of the Government's own Consultation Principles that state consultations should "facilitate-scrutiny" and "give enough information to ensure that those consulted understand the issues and can give informed responses.
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/691383/Consultation_Principles__1_.pdf
This lack of effective information, consultation and scrutiny was evident with the preliminary environmental impact report (“PEIR”), which NH had produced for the Statutory consultation. Throughout the PEIR there was a distinct lack of information provided to allow anyone to review and consider NH’s proposals in any meaningful way. This lack of crucial detail can be seen in a number of places in the PEIR, including sections dealing with the air quality assessment, cultural heritage mitigation, ecology surveys, and others.
This lack of detail was also evident in the Supplementary consultation. Not only does the approach by NH put a question-mark about procedural fairness, this consistent lack of information fails to meet two fundamental legal requirements:
- the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 for it to provide information that “is reasonably required for the consultation bodies to develop an informed view of the likely significant environmental effects of the development”;
- and b. the Gunning principles (as set out in the decision in R v London Borough of Brent ex parte Gunning), the second of which requires there to be sufficient information to give intelligent consideration and response. Neither of these requirements, nor the Planning Inspectorate’s Advice Note on the drafting of PEIR have been complied with. It is not acceptable for NH to defer provision of information on so many crucial aspects of the Scheme to the environmental statement, when time for consultees to influence the Scheme has passed.
I have raised many clarification questions with National Highways – as have many other members of the public – but these are never responded to within the time-frame of the consultation periods and when I do get a reply, they provide no meaningful answers to my questions. An example of this is provided in Appendix B.
The public are not only the ones frustrated by NH’s, Elected representatives are too.
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/917699/response/2174385/attach/11/22.11.22%20Attachment%20Davis%20Nov22%2036.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1
Below is the statement from the URL link above.
ERF (Elected Representatives Forum) – November 14th 2022. I have a short statement followed by a question.
It will come as no surprise that I have become increasingly frustrated by this forum, and by National Highway’s approach to it, and its approach to general consultation. It is factual that National
Highways has misrepresented the views of statutory consultees, for example it is factual that whilst being contacted by Elected Representatives, and by the CEO of Arun District Council, National Highways has failed to correct its misrepresentations.
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated case, there are numerous mistakes and errors made by National Highways throughout the consultations, mistakes that they refuse to apologise for, and mistakes that they fail to correct. Another example being the “Spotlight on Storrington” article which was false and misleading, and which still remains available to read online.
For 2 years I have been asking about figures they have used, housing figures, and traffic figures. Time and time I have been promised this to be actioned in the following ERF and time and time again National Highways stalls and refuses to give them. My personal experience is that National Highways say one thing to themselves and to Government Ministers, and then something totally different to this forum.
In this forum we have been told that we can’t be trusted with information and I quote verbatim “we are not going to tell you, because we don’t have to”, whilst at the same time being told these meetings cannot be held in public because they contain sensitive/confidential information. My personal experience also attests factually that National Highways have manipulated and misrepresented the minutes of this forum on many occasions, even in times where I have given my exact notes that I read verbatim, they manipulated the minutes to change the meaning of what I actually said.
For 2 years I have stated my concerns with the process of consultations and the running of this forum, and instead of things getting better, they appear to get worse. I represent residents across the whole area of this proposed scheme, always knowing that not everyone can be pleased with the outcome, my intention has always been to be open, transparent, and ensure the process is correct.
In my opinion the process has not been correct or fair, and where previously I have warned National Highways that if they don’t make changes to process to avoid a Judicial Review, I am now of the opinion that a Judicial Review will be warranted, and that I would support any review with my testimony. I am aware that National Highways has lobbied my MPs office to try and control me and my scrutiny which does not sit comfortably with me, but more concerning to me is that I am aware that the Independent Chair has tried to do the same by contacting the CEO at Arun District Council with the sole topic of controlling and silencing me.
So, to my question, given the independent chair is appointed by National Highways, paid by National Highways, has tried to silence my scrutiny by going to the Chief Executive of Arun District Council. And given that the independent chair has not answered my last 5 emails, and that the Independent Chair supports that National Highways owns the secretariat and does not enforce the action points of previous meetings (such as providing figures, or having the ERF have input into this upcoming consultation for example), how can I, anyone here, or the public we represent have any faith in this forum or National Highways generally?
Appendix B
The DfT dismiss legitimate public concerns and questions and wrongly distance themselves from the process. Evidenced by this correspondence with the DfT on June 22nd and with my counter replies (in blue text) sent back to the DfT on 5th August 2022.
In the example email/letter below, the DfT never did answer any of my 10 (ten) searching and very relevant questions to them as to why this route was selected. Or why - given it continues to fail to meet key investment decision-making criteria - it has been allowed to continue to DCO some 2 years after being selected. How is it possible that the financials of this scheme have not been further examined some 2 years after Ministers briefing in 2020 when the scheme failed then to meet minimum investment criteria conditions? Since 2020, neither the DfT or NH have provided any further public updates as to the financial merits of this scheme. This is unacceptable.
Dear Mr Shapps,
It is disappointing that you still do not take my claims of misappropriation of public money and mismanagement of the A27 Arundel Project and potentially the wider RIS2 programme seriously as you have still not engaged someone to review my case. Instead of which, I have had a less than satisfactory response from your Correspondence Team for Strategic roads.
This response is shown below along with my responses in blue text that includes a number of questions that I look forward to hearing specific answers to.
So, to your Correspondence Team’s latest response……
Dear Mr Hammond,
Thank you for your recent email addressed to the Secretary of State. As you will appreciate, the Secretary of State receives large volumes of correspondence from members of the public and unfortunately, is unable to answer each one personally. Therefore, your enquiry has been passed to the Correspondence Team, Strategic Roads division for a response.
Thank you for coming back to me.
I fully appreciate how busy the Secretary of State must be.
I am also aware that there are other road ministers and other civil servants who could consider the merits of my claims and who can provide a more specific and substantive response and not just leave it to the Correspondence Team who respond with high-level platitudes.
There is someone in the Secretary of State’s team who would have approved the selection of the preferred route for Arundel and it is that person I was expecting to step in on behalf of the Secretary of State and provide some specific answers as to why you (DfT) are allowing an inappropriate solution to be progressed.
I understand that you have concerns regarding the proposed A27 Arundel Bypass scheme and appreciate you engaging on this issue.
As I have written on each occasion, my concerns are not just restricted to the proposed A27 Arundel scheme solution, they include concerns about the management of the whole process surrounding this scheme including the role of the DfT.
I am concerned about the criteria and basis on which the preferred route was selected and approved by the DfT. I have concerns about the deceit and misinformation given to the public as well as the transparency and availability of key information made (not) available to the public. I have concerns about the interpretation and application of many relevant aspects of the Planning Act 2008. Plus, I have concerns about the adequacy of scrutiny and governance being applied within and between the DfT and National Highways.
In selecting the preferred route, I do not believe that both the DfT and National Highways are acting in the best interests of the public, and that public money is being spent wisely with this scheme.
As you may already be aware, the scheme is classified under the Planning Act 2008 as a Nationally Significant Infrastructure Project and will therefore require development consent prior to the scheme being constructed.
You are correct: I am fully aware of the process.
Ahead of submitting the Development Consent Order (DCO), National Highways will update their calculations for both the scheme’s Benefits Cost Ratio (BCR) and the Value for Money (VFM) statement. In addition to this, a Consultation report and a detailed Traffic Assessment Report will be prepared and submitted to the planning inspectorate as part of the DCO submission later this year. This will be reviewed by the Planning Inspectorate who will consider the application and make a recommendation to the Secretary of State at the end of the Examination Stage. The Secretary of Stage will then decide on whether development consent should be granted.
Yes, I know the process and the deliverables required for the Planning Inspectorate.
What you (DfT) seem to be failing to grasp and/or ignoring is that not all new road schemes will or should go to the Planning Inspectorate. This is one such scheme.
I would like to know how is it possible for the DfT to approve the preferred route and allow the DCO application process to continue when the following conditions prevail:
1. There was/is no business case to justify support for the preferred route. Consider the following table.
KPI | Aims | Actual |
Costs | £250M (budget) | £384M to £1B (unaffordable) |
BCR | 2.5 | 1.37 |
VfM | High | Low |
Wider economic benefits | Not stated | Poor (& unevidenced) |
Landscape impact | Low negative impact | Very Large Adverse |
People impact | Low negative impact | Very Large Adverse |
Objectives | Strong alignment | Average alignment |
2. Alternate options were either misrepresented or simply not considered and as a consequence they were falsely discarded.
The DfT was not given a full brief on the various options as evidenced by the ministerial briefing in late 2020. The online single-carriageway options have right up to this day never been properly considered.
3. No strong evidence and/or assumptions were provided to the DfT to give them confidence that there would be a much-improved business case going forward to justify approval of the selected route.
The only assumption given to the DfT was the following: The scheme cost is likely to be reduced by 10-15% and thus the VfM may raise to potentially 1.5-1.7 as further scheme efficiencies are applied. This hardly makes a dent in improving the business case.
Two years on and there is still no further evidence that can give any new confidence to this assumption and that there will be an improved business case.
4. It was recognised in 2020 that the best schemes are online solutions that would pass the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test for development inside the National Park but strangely these were rejected out of hand because of construction concerns.
There are also construction concerns with the selected route and the preferred route has major environmental and community impacts in comparison with online solutions but these were considered of little consequence.
There is no doubt that National policies do allow for some road development in the park, and one of the online solutions would have and will pass any test of compliance. It was also recognised at the DfT/National Highways meeting in August 2020 that online solutions will better meet a wider range of National policy statements; they deliver a much-improved business case, are affordable and will get support from the statutory bodies and the public. But these were rejected!
Based on the 4 points above, it is far from clear how you (DfT) approved support for the recommended preferred route.
The DCO application process will provide the opportunity for you, and other interested parties to participate in the examination and I would encourage you to raise your concerns through this process once it gets underway.
Are you telling me – albeit very nicely - to go away?
The 93% of the public who voted for any solution rather than the selected option would like some answers today. Plus, we have a number of questions that the Planning Inspectorate will not be answering.
Given there are many misgivings with the management of this scheme we would like to hear from the DfT, not the Planning Inspectorate or National Highways, just the DfT with their responses to the following questions:
1. Why did the DfT approve the selected route when the business case was far from sufficient?
2. Does the DfT believe that the alternative options were adequately considered and presented? If so, what convinced you that there was no better alternative option?
(Please do not say this is a consideration for the Planning Inspectorate (PI) when you have made a strategic decision. The PI may review this at a fairly superficial level but you have set the direction based on what was put before you.)
3. Does the DfT believe that there are no conditions that will allow some road development in the National Park and therefore no other option could be considered?
4. When the DfT approved the selected route did you do so based on certain provisos and conditions being met? If so, what were those conditions and were any time-scales set?
5. What facts or assumptions gave the DfT any confidence that the current low VfM indication would get better?
6. Since the DfT was briefed in August/September 2020, how many other scheme assurance reviews have taken place and is the DfT prepared to share the inputs and outputs of these meetings?
7. Who is the Road Minister responsible for this scheme and who approved the selection of the preferred route at the DfT? Is that person or persons open for a discussion on this matter?
8. Do the DfT condone the misrepresentation of the facts (e.g., on journey time savings, road safety benefits, route impacts on communities, air quality impacts on people, and others) of this scheme made to the public by National Highways? If not, why is it being allowed to happen?
9. What is special about this scheme (with a low BCR & VfM and unaffordable) when compared with others such as the A120 Braintree link road to the A12 (with a very high BCR & VfM) that has been stopped well before reaching the Planning Inspectorate? (Please do not tell me one is committed while the other is a pipeline!)
10. If the DfT agrees that it is not beyond scrutiny and it fully stands by its approval of the preferred route, then what possible reasons could prevent the DfT answering all the questions above in support of your decision and ahead of the detailed investigation by the Planning Inspectorate?
I would remind you, that like the public, I too want a solution for Arundel’s wait time problems of just 1 to 8 minutes mainly seen at the week-day peak hours. We just don’t want a bad solution (a sledgehammer to crack a nut solution) like the one you have sanctioned.
More information about the DCO examination and how you can register to become an interested party can be found on the Planning Inspectorate’s website.
We are looking for more information - answers to the questions above would be a start - from the DfT who are accountable for the strategic decision they made when they approved the preferred route. These are answers that the public of the Arun Valley deserve and these will not come from the Planning Inspectorate.
Thank you for your engagement on this issue,
Yours sincerely,
Correspondence Team, Strategic Roads, Economics and Statistics
I look forward to hearing from someone at the DfT who knows the specifics of this scheme and can provide meaningful answers to all my points and questions.
Kind regards,
Pete
Mr Peter Hammond
5th August 2022
