Supplementary Evidence submitted by Neil Crumpton,

PAWB (People Against Wylfa B) member


I would like to submit the following Supplementary Evidence to the Committee:


i) In the oral evidence session on 19th October Dr Bluck stated or implied that 100% renewables scenarios depend on 'technologies that don't exist.. or maybe sitting in a lab' (see extract below). PAWB rebuts Dr Bluck's response point blank. Indeed, its the other way round, like the Government-funded hopes pinned on the Rolls Royce 470 MW modular and the high-temperature micro gas reactor, the UK/Canadian U-Battery, that are either on the drawing-board or at the 'mock-up' stage.


Dr Bluck: I am aware of the work, and it is not the only example of that work globally—studies that suggest the 100% renewable scenario, the most famous being perhaps Mark Jacobson from Stanford. All of these involve technologies that don't exist. They currently do not exist. They may exist tomorrow. They may be sitting in a lab, but they do not exist right now. So that is relying upon hope, and hope is not a strategy, I do not think. The potential for a renewables-only one is always there. I do not know what is sitting in everyone's lab, but where has it been done?


A 100% Renewables scenario / deployment policy (or more accurately a 'no-further nuclear build policy' - after Hinkley Point C under construction, and any SZB life-extension) is simply NOT dependent on technologies that are not proven. The main difference between a UK net-Zero 'renewables' deployment from now and the recently announced 24 GW nuclear inclusive 'BESS' deployment is 'additional existing and potentially shared emerging technologies' . There is nothing technologically novel or specifically unproven in the renewables system.


The additional 'RE' scenario deployments would essentially comprise (rather than a further 20 GW new-build nuclear generating 20 x 8.76 x 0.9 capacity factor = 155 TWh/y)  :


i) the additional deployment of mostly offshore wind capacity and some additional PV deployment eg an additional 30 GW offshore wind (generating 30 x 8.76 x 0.55 capacity factor = 145 TWh/y) and sufficient PV to generate say up to 20 TWh/y


ii) the additional deployment of about 20 GW of 'low-carbon' gas back-up generating capacity ie 50 GW of back-up (of various tech) would be needed in a 24 GW nuclear-inclusive scenario and about 70 GW in a renewables scenario - to provide the additional dispatchable back-up needed to ensure reliable supply in low and no wind winter conditions (instead of 20 GW of nuclear baseload there would be 20 GW dispatchable utilising H2, synthetic fuels)


iii) some additional low-carbon fuel, battery and possibly other storage schemes (which have a decentralisation security /Grid resilience benefit)


iv) additional inertia capacity


Note that there are considerable system resilience/security/National Defence benefits in deploying ii, iii and iv above ie additional geographically dispersed back-up generation, storage and inertia infrastructure (decentralised) compared to large coastal centralised nuclear projects or a multiplicity of small nuclear reactors near or within cities.


Offshore wind (fixed bed, 1,000+ TWh/y UKCS resource) is relatively well proven now and some floating offshore wind turbines (a probable feature in any and all future deployment scenarios) are already operating. Hydrogen-fired turbine-generators, gas-engines and fuel cells already exist and are being deployed in various locations globally. Rolls Royce has recently successfully powered one of its AE 2100-A aero-engine using hydrogen. Hydrogen-fired turbine-generators are not much different to Natural Gas turbine-generators and fuel cells use hydrogen as their basic fuel. Hydrogen will be stored at considerable scale also in any and all likely net-Zero infrastructure scenarios (eg the Rough Storage site in North Sea, salt caverns, potentially in solid hydrides) and a relatively small additional storage capacity, and of batteries etc, could hardly be described as an unproven technological hope. It would be a relatively small additional infrastructure cost offset by the additional low cost offshore wind / PV benefit.


Dispatchable back-up schemes could also be fuelled by synthetic low-carbon fuels such as ammonia and hydro-carbon fuels (eg diverted from tourist aviation sector at times of emergency). Synthetic Hydro-Carbon fuels (eg derived from green Hydrogen and captured Carbon dioxide) and ammonia (NH3) are likely in all future energy scenarios.


The BEIS Dynamic Dispatch Model (DDM) actually models a 'renewables' scenario very similar to the one I've described and proposed above ie mostly additional offshore wind - see Fig 11, page 24 of the BEIS (Dec 202) 'Modelling 2050' report. Fig 11's two bar charts on the right show a 5 GW (HPC+SZB extension) and a 25 GW (BESS) nuclear deployment with mostly additional offshore wind and some PV replacing the 20 GW nuclear. Note also the scenario cost difference of £ 1 billion/year works out at 0.15 pence per kWh so well within forecasting errors of anything in 2050 or even 2025 :


I would contend that technological and or economic 'hope' lies much more squarely on the nuclear technologies. This includes the reliability and construction times of the large EPR and Westinghouse reactors (both have suffered technical problems and delays), the cost of the proposed conventional but essentially commercially unproven modular reactor designs, be they medium scale Rolls Royce proposal or smaller eg 50 MW designs by various 'start-up' companies, and so-called 'advanced' or Gen IV reactors eg the micro scale 10 MW thermal / 4 MWe 'U-Battery'. The U-Battery and other high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) and the proposed associated high-temperature 'RED Hydrogen' production via 900 Centigrade 'Iodine-Sulphur thermochemical process may look promising or just fascinating but technological reliability and commercial viability will take well into the 2030s to demonstrate - or not. Global helium resource constraints may also present problems to any large-scale deployment.


Furthermore, securing future large quantities (NATO-wide) of commercially viable and low 'carbon-intensity' uranium fuel supplies is a significant energy supply and energy security issue in itself though it is treated as a 'given'. The available global resource of commercially viable and 'carbon-viable' grade uranium ores required to fuel existing global nuclear capacity and electricity output (just 2,650 TWh/y) for 60 years let alone a significant expansion that nuclear advocates deem necessary is questionable particularly when geo-political factors are considered. The NATO country demand would surely need to be sourced from regions outside Russian and Chinese 'spheres' of influence or outright control. Those countries (mainly Russia) control over 50 % of global uranium ore production and around 35 % of global fuel enrichment capacity. Growing indigenous political rights in major friendly supplier countries like Australia and Canada may compromise any significant (eg x2) global expansion. In contrast, the UK wind and solar resource is unstoppable, safe and free to collect.


It would be useful to see some global projections on future uranium sourcing IF many other countries followed the UK's 'climate lead' of deeming 25-30 % of annual 2050 Grid demand 'crucially' needing to comprise nuclear baseload. If all countries copied the UK's nuclear energy strategy then the global uranium required would be 5x that of the NEA/IAEA 'most aggressive' global expansion forecast of over 600 GW by 2040 (currently 390 GW).


Issues of WMD proliferation and the weaponisation and targeting of nuclear infrastructure as seen in Ukraine do not even appear to be on the UK's security radar let alone political or public discussion despite widespread media coverage. Note that since the recent Russian targeting of Ukraine's energy infrastructure Ukrainian officials have been requesting generators be sent to provide localised power to vital services. The additional 20 GW of dispatchable RE back-up and transformer capacity, and additional energy storage capacity, could and should be built in a decentralised dispersed deployment thus aiding UK Grid resilience and energy security for decades.


Political support


Professor Bull stated 'we have seen a lot of words and less action from Government'. As a front row participant on stakeholder groups and energy campaigning since Tony Blair's 'nuclear back with a vengeance' comment in 2006 I would say that successive governments have been bending over backwards to support nuclear projects in the UK and that includes planning and financial support.


The fact that the Hinkley Point C scheme is not operational and probably not be so until 2027 or now even later when EdF stated it would be 'cooking the 2017 Xmas turkey' is much more due to technical and construction delays than claimed 'political dithering', lack of political or financial support, or Covid related supply-chain issues. The Conservative Government gave its final investment approval for HPC in Sept 2016. However EdF had actually been allowed to start preparing (bull-dozing and clearing) the site as far back as July 2010 well before the EPR reactor design had even passed the Environment Agency's Generic Design Assessment (GDA) which occurred in 2011. Even if concrete construction had commenced in 2011, shortly after the Environment Agency Generic design Approval (GDA), it would probably still not have been operational in 2022 (even allowing for the Covid slow-down). The EPR reactor vibration and fuel assembly problems experienced at Taishan may have happen at Hinkley C had it been commissioned before 2020.


Political and financial support has been considerable. EdF knew that the British political parties had painted themselves into a corner by their unwavering claims since 2006 that nuclear baseload is 'crucial' critical', 'key' and of 'absolute need' to ensure security of supply and lights not going out. In 2016 the HPC scheme was awarded an eye-watering index-linked £ 92.50 / MWh (in 2012 prices) now over £ 100 / MWh. This was at a time when offshore wind and PV costs were becoming highly competitive which was not accurately reflected in the now much-criticised HPC VfM (Value for Money) 'counterfactual' due-diligence assessment based on a dodgy counterfactual scenario choice.


The same thing is happening now with Sizewell C due diligence counter-factual scenario assuming a Value-for-Money (VfM) assessment is being carried out. The BEIS DDM model appears to be too grainy to show the winter-time supply benefits of offshore wind farms. The model needs updating to use recorded daily /weekly/monthly offshore wind speed data from which to more accurately model the additional (generally windier) winter months offshore wind fleet output in supplying the high future UK winter electricity demand. I think the current model uses just three sampling wind/PV weather scenarios but this aspect needs to be checked.


The HPC deal is now compared favourably, by well-financed nuclear PR staff, with the current high price of electricity resulting from Putin's invasion of Ukraine - even though the reactors are still years away from any output. What is not mentioned is that just a few months after the £ 92.50 / MWh HPC contract-signing the Triton Knoll 860 MW (3.8 TWh/y) offshore windfarm was awarded a contract at a strike price of £ 74.75 /MWh and the project became fully operational January 2022 thus reducing gas imports before the Ukraine invasion. The even larger 950 MW (4.5 TWh/y) Moray east offshore windfarm, also awarded a contract in 2017 (Sept) at just £ 57.50 / MWh (same 2012 based figures) became fully operational in April 2022 after delivering first power (from the first installed turbines) a year previously.


If more offshore wind projects had been awarded contracts around 2017 then even less Natural Gas imports would now be needed for reliable electricity generation in this time of energy crisis. Consumers would also have lower bills, not further construction delay or contract extension announcements (penalty-clause changes to 2035) from Somerset. Also as so many (at peak over 50 %) of nuclear reactors are offline in France (many relatively modern) awaiting safety checks the National Grid company is warning of possible power shortages in the UK as France has to import so much (gas and or wind) power at times from its EU neighbours there is little left for interconnector export.


The even larger 3.6 GW Dogger Bank windfarm (A, B, and C, each 1.2 GW generating 6 TWh/y) was given Planning Consent in 2015, a CfD contract in the 2019 auction, and work began in 2020. The phases are on schedule to generate first power in 2023, increasing to a fully operational 18 TWh/y in 2026 (so approaching the scale of future HPC output of 25.5 TWh/y from 2027+). It will use the world's most powerful 13-14 MW turbines and annual Capacity Factors around 57-60 % (what might its December CF be !). Note that some of the steel used in the foundations is made in Port Talbot and North-Wales based Jones Bros company has already installed 110 miles of HVDC underground cables to the sub-station near Hull.


Imagine if the HPC construction effort to date (workforce thousands, skills, steel and concrete) has been put to additional offshore windfarm construction from 2017.


The proposed Sizewell C developers have also been given or promised considerable financial support by then Business Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng this year to make the project 'investment-ready'. In January £ 100 million was given and a further near £ 700 m promised in September in addition to Government announcing a 20 % equity stake in the £ 20+ billion RAB project. The UK consumer penalty clauses As regards the Hitachi project at Wylfa the energy secretary at that time offered several significant financial incentives but Hitachi could afford to ask a higher price as it had developed other interests post Fukushima eg HVDC cables, so it walked away.


Ironically, it was the backing by UK engineering institutions for the Sizewell B (SZB) scheme scheme in the mid 1980s which helped derail the UK wind industry (the UK had built a world-leading 3 MW turbine at Burgar Hill, Orkney by 1987). Hence today's North Sea turbines are made by Danish and German-Spanish companies. One criticism of the possibility of offshore wind technology put forward at the SZB inquiry was health and safety and the potential for high fatalities if offshore turbine deployment. On 27th Oct 2022 the Dogger Bank offshore wind team won a major safety award. Last month, a Hinkley C worker died in a crush injury. Considering the scale of civil works of both these different deployments the level of accidents and fatalities (one ?) looks to be extremely low.


The engineering institutions undermined the prospect of a British based / owned offshore wind industry for no good reason other than an ideological preference for nuclear energy. Some Oxford University based academics consider nuclear energy as the latest technological step from (primitive) renewables to fossils in the industrial revolution to nuclear fission from the 60s and fusion soon. Issues of proliferation, waste, uranium supply, critical infrastructure vulnerability, weaponisation, waste storage, actual or possible health effects of even high levels of radiation are essentially brushed aside.


It has also just been announced (30th Nov 2022) that the UK Government and EDF have 'revised' the HPC contract to allow subsidy funding even if the scheme does not start until 2035. EDF would have incurred penalty payments post 2029 under the previous contract. So the precedent is set that a final RAB-funded SZC contract will transfer most if not all construction delay penalties onto the British consumer and taxpayer, despite what the initial RAB contract may say about limiting British liability to avoid alarm or opposition in the run up to the contract terms. It seems that EdF can do no wrong in the eyes of the Westminster bubble.


On 30th Nov the Government also announced it is to pay the Chinese state-owned power group £ 100 million (of Johnson's £ 680 million package) to exit its stake in the SZC project. NGO's opposing nuclear energy raised security concerns about using Russian and Chinese nuclear technology back in the mid-noughties BERR public consultations. How was it not obvious to BERR, Tory and Labour politicians and UK security advisers that if they are gong to build 'critical infrastructure' (by centralising necessary infrastructure) then it is not advisable to use the technologies of your two most likely principal strategic adversaries (that essentially justifies HMG's rationale for the CASD).


The Sizewell C proposal is now distracting and diverting funding, materials and especially skills (particularly steel and concrete related) from scaling-up the UK offshore wind industry to actually achieving the ambitious 50 GW by 2030 Government target. Note that 50 GW offshore would generate roughly 230 TWh/y (eg 50 x 8.76 x 52% fleet average CF) which is more than the BESS 24 GW nuclear ambition of 190 TWh/y by 2050 (ie 24 x 8.76 x 90% baseload CF).


Indeed, if 40-50 GW offshore were built by 2030 (ie around 38 GW in the next 8 years) then because only around 70 GW of offshore wind is needed in the 24 GW nuclear BESS the UK wind (deployment) industry would then presumably go into rapid decline during the 2030's. Only 20-30 GW more offshore wind capacity would be needed post 2030. The offshore wind industry would have developed a deployment capability of up around 7+ GW per year by year 2030 to reach target so even 30 GW post 2030 might take only 5 years to deploy (ie by 2035, just as SZC if built may become operational).


Additional post 2035 offshore wind deployments could be used for export to the EU but that output could have been used to ensure greater UK Grid wind 'reliability' (ie more hours per year wind/PV being available to Grid to supply instantaneous consumer demand). This raises the question of why so much wind/PV is 'curtailed' (ie dumped not exported) in the BEIS DDM cost-comparison scenarios.


It is not evident that BEIS has carried out such basic arithmetic or considered such strategic 'boom-then-bust' business and employment factors. Such deployment choices would effect the 'levelling-up' agenda eg offshore wind jobs in ports such as Holyhead, Swansea, and in Scotland and North Sea facing England eg Hull, Grimsby, Tyneside, Felixstowe (near Sizewell) and in building decentralised hydrogen fuelled back-up generating capacity nation-wide eg in cities and towns throughout inland UK.


Note that it would take 5 GW of the latest offshore wind turbines to generate the 25.5 TWh/y output of SZC (ie 5  GW x 8.76 x 58 % CF = 25.4 TWh/y). So by the mid 2030s the offshore wind industry could be churning out 7+ GW of capacity per year ie more output than one large (3.2 GW) nuclear project PER YEAR.



NGO motivation against nuclear energy


The Chair asked Dr Parr what Greenpeace's 'intellectual difficulty' was with nuclear energy. From a wider NGO perspective (and deputy NGO co-Chair on the BEIS-NGO Forum) I observe that it varies from group to group and individuals within such groups and has changed over the years. The main concerns are, in no particular order : WMD proliferation, long-term waste generation and storage (eg Cumbria Trust, FOE, GP), security (traditionally mainly terrorism), health effects of major accidents and routine discharges (eg Low-Level Radiation Campaign), cost and subsidies, civil-military links (ie cross-funding, skills, materials eg CND, SPRU), adverse effects on culture (eg PAWB) and indigenous peoples health, lands and rights (ie uranium mining eg FOE Australia), and environmental/developmental, local, site-specific concerns (eg Stop Sizewell C).


A growing concern is a wider 'weaponisation' risk (in addition to terrorism) following recent events in Ukraine. State-on-state warfare using modern and emerging weapon technologies, the use of nuclear facilities for military 'cover', and the threat of serious radio-toxic release by deliberate targeting and risk by stray ordinance, are new concerns to most public and politicians. The previously unthinkable has become a very real possibility if not already an actuality.


For my own part, FOE staff campaigner between 1994-2010, PAWB member since the late 1980s and having defence interests previously (Marconi naval radar engineer, avid 'war-game' player as a child) my concerns have been essentially social-environmental (particularly post a major malicious act), WMD proliferation and security (terrorism AND wider weaponisation). I consider the likely risks posed by malicious actions relating to civil nuclear infrastructure and activities (terrorism, proliferation, weaponisation) to be greater than risks of an actual major nuclear weapons attack, exchange or major mishap.


As an NGO rep on the BEIS-NGO nuclear Forum I have written detailed discussion papers on national security issues since around 2016 including the use of hypersonic missiles and massed drone attacks (five years before events in Ukraine). I, like other NGO campaigners, am not simply jumping on the latest Ukraine events band-wagon to augment unspecified 'ideological' (and hence discountable) reasons. That said, even I had not envisaged the use of nuclear facilities as a un-attackable 'safe-havens' from which military operations can be conducted.


One reason why nuclear energy is so inexplicably favoured by most English Tory and Labour senior politicians may be because they believe (perceive) that a civil nuclear programme is 'needed' (eg crucial, key etc) to provide practical support for a military nuclear weapons programme including the nuclear-propelled submarine Continuous-At-Sea-Deterrence (CASD) irrespective of any low-carbon or energy security reasons. In 2006 Prime Minister Tony Blair may well have believed Cumbrian politicians and Cumbrian nuclear industry supporters (eg Sellafield, BAE Systems Barrow) who were saying or implying that a civil nuclear industry / programme was needed to 'support' a military nuclear deterrence (via cross-benefit of workforce skills, specialist companies eg Sheffield Forgemasters, R&D). Well they would wouldn't they - local jobs in the North-West were at stake. Blair may well have also been impressed by a RN nuclear submarine travelling at sustained high speed long-distance to the Iraq theatre in 2003.


A civil-military link was strong (ie 100% certainty) though hidden in the 50s and 60s. Calder Hall and the Magnox power stations (including Wylfa) co-produced electricity but primarily produced Plutonium 239 for the UK's (and possibly US) nuclear weapons programme. This was only officially revealed by Secretary of State Tony Benn in the 1970s. The Windscale fire of the 1950s had also been 'hushed-up'. The resulting public mis-trust of politicians on anything nuclear-related was considerable and totally justified and has been an enduring motivation within the NGO movement. The fact that HMG has expressed such continued interest and steadfast support for nuclear energy despite the technology experiencing so many problems (eg Fukushima, falling cost of renewables, slow build times, corrosion, other technical issues) leads some to conclude that there must be a hidden reason for its support. This is an understandable argument but I think its well-funded, well-targeted lobbying by well-placed people eg pedalling baseload myths, playing on next-generation low-cost face-saving hopes and British ? innovation (SZC EPR is French technology), and topped with craftily worded press releases.


My view is that nowadays a civil-military link, hidden or otherwise, is in actuality weak and essentially co-incidental and I have made this point in meetings. The military has long since acquired all the weapons-grade plutonium it could possibly need. The UK now has an inventory of around 130 tonnes of so-called 'reactor-grade' plutonium (from which, due to its isotope grade, crude WMD bombs can be made with as little as 5 kg). The UK also has a stockpile of sufficient highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to fuel its submarine fleet for about 70 years. The tens of grammes per year of the hydrogen isotope Tritium, needed to significantly boost the destructive yield of the Trident warheads (ie hydrogen bombs), can be produced in modern linear / particle accelerators (tritium decays very quickly having a half-life of 12.3 years so requiring the warheads to be periodically 'refreshed' with a few grammes of newly-produced tritium). New civil reactors are NOT needed for such military purposes, let alone 24 GW.


Energy ministers have clearly stated in person at the BEIS-NGO nuclear Forum that new reactors are not needed and would not be used for military purposes. That said, multi-departmental strategic decisions would be taken at National Security Council (NSC) level where only the BEIS Secretary may be in attendance and junior ministers and departmental staff would not be party to the policy rationale. Furthermore, IF any new-build reactor did become useful for a future national defence reason then stated policy and any promises would simply change and probably with little public opposition (eg Covid > force-majeure > HPC contract changes and 2007 'no nuclear subsidy' > 2022 government 20% stake in SZC).


While Rolls Royce does design and build naval reactors (around 200 MW thermal) for steam-turbine propulsion of the Royal Navy's Trident missile and fleet nuclear submarines it hardly seems likely that there is now a significant deliberate or hidden governmental cross-subsidy (eg of £ hundreds or billions/year), as distinct to an obvious but non-crucial cross-benefit in related design and construction skills and specialist industrial capability. Indeed, when Sheffield Forgemasters (which makes civil and naval reactor parts) got into in financial difficulties it was nationalised by the MOD in July 2021. When BAE Systems experienced financial difficulties in 2002, due to CAD-related cost-overruns and construction delays to the Astute class submarine programme, the MOD provided £ 430 million (and brought in US naval reactor specialisms). Naval reactor related financial support is hardly hidden from the public or of much outrage to the public.


If there are hidden motivations it may be more likely in unwritten, horse-trading, tacit agreements such as HMG support for SZC for additional French co-operation on coastal patrols to stop migrant crossings. PM Rishi Sunak did suddenly change his mind and attended last month's COP conference in Cairo, and spent time with French President Macron agreeing a coastal co-operation policy, which help his embattled Home Secretary Suella Braverman out of a tight spot.


Nevertheless, a continuing hidden civil-military link is put forward by some anti-nuclear campaigners, particularly academics at SPRU and in CND. These groups presumably believe that exposing a significant hidden cross-subsidy of the military would cause public outcry against political support for civil nuclear energy AND the UK's nuclear weapons programme. I doubt if this would be happen even if it were true at scale. The percentage of public and politicians supporting nuclear weapons has probably increased and hardened since the invasion of Ukraine by the Putin-led, nuclear-armed, Russian Federation. The actions and ambitions of the Chinese authorities are also causing genuine concern. So WMD support / subsidies is hardly a convincing argument. However, I think it is a distracting argument to the more clear-cut NGO reasons and can be playing against such clear reasons.


I am concerned that the numerous, valid and technically detailed major concerns expressed by NGO groups opposing new-build nuclear power stations are being in essence summarily discounted in total on the assumption or implied association with support for unilateral WMD disarmament. In June this year, during a live BBC Radio 4 'Any Questions' discussion programme, my views were summarily dismissed by panelist Baroness Claire Fox of the Academy of Ideas think-tank, to some applause, for having an 'ideological opposition' to nuclear power. I'm still wondering what she meant or what the applauders were thinking. I can imagine that pro-CASD politicians, ie most English MPs over several decades, have come to dismiss the views of those (virtue-signalling ?) who would unilaterally disarm the UK especially if presenting a 'moral' case in an angry manner. I have seen angry exchanges happen. A ideological schism is created into which reasoned points and discussion fall and disappear. Hearts and minds are not won just anger released and deaf ears created. Note that a 'moral' case FOR civil nuclear energy (to address climate change) has been put, by Baroness Worthington (my ex line-manager in Friends of the Earth).


I make these points because the promotion of nuclear energy by the Coalition and current UK Government as a necessary part of any national and global climate and energy security solution is in my view reckless and would result in numerous significant and intractable, if not irreversible, nuclear-related risks to several if not many future generations that could have been avoided. Given that non-nuclear solutions exist, are essentially are as cheap if not cheaper than nuclear-inclusive energy systems, have proven to be quicker to build, have unstoppable energy sources, and are crucially far safer in various major radio-toxic respects (WMD proliferation, terrorism, weaponisation, waste storage, major accidents and inevitable accumulated releases) a pragmatic case can be made against progressing civil nuclear energy whether one supports the case for nuclear weapons or not. 


In Wales this issue is complicated by the point that an independent Wales, advocated by Plaid Cymru, would be a relatively very small nation of 3.2 million people. On the grounds of WMD proliferation alone there is a clear case for an independent Wales to not have a WMD deterrent. A similar point holds for an independent Scotland. Presumably Wales and Scotland would become part of NATO which comprises nuclear weapon states of England, France and the US. These NATO countries also seems relaxed about promoting civil nuclear energy globally as a significant part of solution to climate change and pay scant, lip-service, attention to the resulting WMD proliferation and weaponisation potential.


Note that these are my individual views and motivations and other members of PAWB will have their own views, experiences and motivations eg cultural for opposing a Wylfa B and nuclear energy more widely.


Neil Crumpton, member of PAWB, deputy NGO co-Chair BEIS-NGO nuclear Forum




December 2022