CDD0002

Written evidence submitted by Mr David Allfrey

AUTHOR

1.              David Allfrey is a former Army Officer.  Amongst staff and command appointments, he conducted an audit of State Ceremonial and Public Duties for Defence Costs Study 20 in 1994.  He was Colonel Army Recruiting (2005 - 2007) and Chief of Staff Army Support Command (2009 - 2010).  In 2011, he retired from Regular Service to become CEO/Producer, The Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (REMT).  Since 2020, he has been an independent lecturer, mentor and consultant specialising in major events and festivals, tourism,  marketing and communications, ‘Soft Power’ and cultural diplomacy. 

RESPONSES TO PARTICULAR QUESTIONS

What role do cultural events and institutions play in supporting the UK’s aims when it comes to defence diplomacy?  What is its value to the UK’s position in the world?

2.              Nye defined culture as “a set of values and practices that create meaning for society”. He included high culture (literature, art and education that might appeal to elites) and popular culture (which might appeal to wider audiences).  The British Council defines the term ‘cultural relations’ as “interventions in foreign cultural arenas with the aim of enhancing intercultural dialogue and bringing about mutual benefits connected to security, stability and prosperity.”  Thus, the full range of cultural events and institutions may contribute to the view of others of the United Kingdom, whether presented by Defence or others. 

3.              Given that our Armed Forces represent - and are representative of - our Civil Society, Defence should feel able to champion confidently - and draw influence from - the full range and depth of cultural events and institutions. The Brand Finance taxonomy[1] suggests a framework that includes business and trade, government and democracy, international relations, culture and heritage, media and communications, education and science, people and values).  Such a stance not only reinforces the notion that Service personnel are in-step with their Society but are also cultured, educated and thoughtful. 

4.              It is always challenging to understand the value of Cultural Relations in Defence Diplomacy and/or the contribution played by Defence.  How can you easily measure attitudes in a target audience?  Measures of value such as gross domestic product (GDP) are used to support government decision-making, but these often fail to satisfactorily calculate the full and rounded contribution of the UK culture and heritage assets.  The complex issue of ‘additionality’ and the measurement of effect (quantitative and qualitative) are discussed under a later question but, importantly, a distinction must be made between cost and value.

5.              Defence personnel can afford to be proud of all our national assets and be prepared to sell the national brand whenever the opportunity presents.  For Defence to be involved in cultural activity (whether high culture or popular culture) offers benefit to the Defence personnel while also presenting a rich picture for our audiences - whether these be designed or coincidental.

What is the best and most effective way to utilise the Royal Edinburgh Military Tattoo (REMT)?  What changes would need to be made to facilitate the better use of the REMT?

6.              The REMT is a standalone charity and operating company which has shown itself to be economically and creatively robust across more than seven decades, not just delivering an iconic and world-class event but also contributing significant sums to charities.  For many in the domestic and international audience, the Tattoo is a multi-generational ‘bucket list’ event. 

7.              In similar vein, many nations (55 at last count) have showcased their countries’, culture, and military communities in the Show.  Thousands of VIPs, dignitaries and leaders have been entertained over the years (over 3500 annually).    In doing this, REMT has showcased military and civil values through countless shifts in political, social and economic conditions. 

8.              Across the last 70 years, the Show has been seen live by over 12.5 million people, it has reached up to 100M on television each year and, has delivered up to £88 million in ‘additionality’ (£241 million together with the 12 Edinburgh Festivals annually) and around £30 million in Full-Time Employment Equivalence (FTE)

9.              The REMT marketing and communications investment is considerable.  Not only do the Armed Forces benefit from the REMT investment but also from the significant domestic and international media exposure before, during and after each annual Show.  In one year, the Show was judged - using a particular metric - to have generated more than 3.8 billion media hits.  The audience of 220,000 (8,800 each evening) with VIP capacity of 147 each performance (3675 including salute takers) over 25 performances, is drawn from a broad international span (up to 45% international guests in one year).  As ever, there is scope for greater integration in messaging, albeit in a balanced fashion.

10.              For many years, the BBC has produced, and broadcast a 59-minute highlights show for domestic and international audiences.  Abroad, the annual broadcast has been seen by many as a multi-generational ‘Appointment to View’ securing not only a moral link-back to the UK for our Diaspora but also creating an ‘Intention to Visit’.  

11.              REMT effort has always sought to be supportive of UK and alliance priorities including (over the period 2011 – 2020):

a.              Our European neighbours (Norway, Netherlands, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland) with routine collaborations.

b.              with the US in routine and ongoing collaboration.

c.              with Australia and New Zealand, reinforcing defence alliances, in particular in partnership for the 2019 overseas Tattoo in Sydney supporting The Australian Defence Forces’ ‘Pacific Step Up’ specifically with PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Tonga, Fiji and The Cook Islands

d.              Bilateral projects with Brazil, Czechia, India, Indonesia, Malta, Mongolia, Trinidad and Tobago and South Korea (supporting alliances and the Scottish Government initiative for inward investment in renewable energy);

e.              China: The PLA and Beijing Schools performing in Edinburgh and Project LUO PAN (three shows planned during The Golden Era of UK/Sino relationship, for Beijing, Shanghai and a third Tier 1 city) which was shelved ultimately due to the shifting relationship with China;

f.              Russia:  a relationship forged over some years through the Moscow Tattoo;

g.              The Gulf Region: Project ASTROLAB - a project to stage a series of shows in a  range of Gulf countries),

h.              Oman: a productive and ongoing relationship,

i.              …and with Zambia: a new relationship designed for the cancelled show in 2020).

12.              In 2012, REMT collaborated with The Edinburgh International Festival to conceive and plan the staging in 2014, of a combined performance of Tolstoy’s ‘War and Peace’, on the Esplanade of Edinburgh Castle.  The project saw the then celebrated Russian conductor and opera company director, Valery Gergiev partnering with a range of UK and Russian national performers and companies.  The project was ultimately shelved due to a shortfall in funding but would have represented - at that time - a tremendous  international, civil/military collaboration and an exchange of ideas.

13.              In the past, the REMT production has been designed and themed to celebrate important anniversaries and to reinforce Defence and national initiatives.  These have included various Defence emphases and the Scottish Government/VisitScotland’s ‘Years of…   These have encouraged joint marketing and communications.

14.              In addition to the annual Show, REMT has a broader reach and utility.  The Producer and staff have traditionally travelled and liaised widely to secure acts for each Show (often working 3 years out).  This activity has entailed initial contacts through personal contacts, Ministers, and officials (our own and participating countries) and agencies.  Contacts have been developed into liaison visits to build relationships and understand the scale and quality of potential contributions.  In the past, REMT has sought to draw on national priorities for engagement - when these have been defined by the UK and allied Government departments.

15.              Defence contributes annually to the event and production (whether in Edinburgh or abroad) in various ways (event support, production support and performers) with opportunity and real costs being subsidised/abated or passed on to REMT according to formulae that conform to HM Treasury’s Guide to Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government (referred to as ‘The Green Book’).

16.              In essence, REMT has contributed positively and cost-effectively, in major fashion, to the UK, Scottish and Defence brands over more than 70 years, both in attracting audiences from across the United Kingdom and internationally and, in exporting its values and ‘ways of working’ in liaison visits and in international shows.  REMT should be encouraged to continue in this tradition.  A range of initiatives might make their operation easier, more cost-effective and deliver even greater effect.  These initiatives would not only deliver better effect from REMT but would also allow others (in the commercial and third sectors) to contribute more readily to the UK Soft Power endeavour.

17.              The Tattoo could be more strongly supported in its intentions to host international contributions (each year) and to export the Show (periodically) through the Cabinet Office,  HMT, MOD, FCDO, DBIS, DIT and DCMS.  This should entail conceptual support (the thoughts and ideas), physical support (people, information, logistics, finance etc) and moral support (leadership and management).  This support should be coordinated in Whitehall and encouraged in our posts internationally (through Ambassadors, High Commissioners, Consul Generals, Defence Attaches and non-Defence officials - in particular The British Council and the GREAT Campaign) 

18.              Invitations for contingents to perform and guests to attend would ideally be targeted with foresight and creatively to support UK strategic intentions be refined through a cross-Departmental mechanism, with Defence supported and OGDs supporting. 

19.              Experience shows that when advice is sought individually from Government Departments in respect of which international partnerships should be prioritised, the priority can vary between Departments.  It would be helpful to have a clear High Priority Target List (aligned to short-, medium- and long-term alliances and partnerships) and perhaps a central ‘clearing house’ for those seeking to contribute to Soft Power.  

20.              Where practical, Defence resources might be staffed and ear-marked 2 - 3 years ahead.  While challenging, particularly as resources tighten, this might align  to a ‘Lead Service’ and Defence priorities to offer better certainty and reduce commercial risk for REMT production planning and initiatives to take the Show abroad.  To give a sense of scale, an international Tattoo might typically require a promoter prepared to underwrite £10 - 20 million before production, marketing and sales processes can begin with enabling contracts having to be set 18 months out.

21.              The staffing and contracting of UK Defence Resources for the REMT tends to be bureaucratic and relatively low priority, with enabling contracts often agreed and set relatively late in the production process (sometimes only weeks out).  Contracts with UK Defence are by their nature, highly conditional and relatively costly (based on capitation rates) when compared to invited international contingents (who tend to attend based on paying their own wages/per diems  with REMT providing enablers, food and accommodation); this because REMT is a commercial - as well as charitable - entity which sells goods and services in order to be financially sustainable.  A streamlined process for allocating resources and a ‘boiler plate’ contract and standard staffing timetable would obviate the need for an ab initio request and agreements for resources each year.

22.              If REMT were to be even more strongly recognised and supported - along with other Soft Power assets  and projects that might potentially benefit Defence, whether in Defence or without - then, the allocation of resources (financial, human and facilities) and the inclusion of REMT in Defence and national Soft Power planning would be greatly improved. 

How should naval assets be used for furthering defence diplomacy, for example their use for receptions and trade missions?

23.              From experience, the impact of a Royal Navy ship visit is considerable, even disproportionate relative to the cost and effort involved.  The Royal Navy are expert and practiced in making the most of these visits and understanding  their strategic impact.  Ship visits are carefully managed by Naval Attaches with guest lists and agenda linked carefully to the host and UK aspirations.  

Has the Government adequately supported and facilitated the pursuit of defence diplomacy through cultural events and institutions?

24.              The question of ‘adequacy’ depends on the relative weight placed on the value of defence diplomacy through cultural events and institutions relative to their  cost and priority.  Generally, Defence personnel will look at collaborations in cultural events and institutions as a lower priority relative to the established devices for Defence diplomatic conversations.  Unless an individual attaché or other official is enthused with an idea, it will seldom gain easy traction.  The success of most Defence Diplomatic endeavour is very personality dependent and nowhere more so than in collaborations outside the purely Defence sphere. 

25.              This tendency is amplified by the fact that Defence Sections have been cut back significantly over the years and therefore the time and energy for collaborations outside the mainstream are carefully rationed.  The first question that most Defence Attachés will ask when approached for support to the REMT (whether in Edinburgh or abroad) will be: “what resources (real or opportunity) do you seek?” - time and effort is precious and must be carefully apportioned. 

26.              The support and facilitation of REMT and other Soft Power instruments are often made more complicated insofar as they partner third sector or commercial entities.  The Green Book is very specific about any Government support that might be given to any organisation that might make a profit or a surplus.  The notion of ‘shared benefit’ is challenging for MOD to embed in its contracts. 

27.              Looking overall, the British Council’s Global Britain: the UK’s Soft Power Advantage highlights where the UK is in a position of strength. It also considers where work is needed to maintain and increase the UK’s reserves of soft power in an increasingly competitive international environment. For comparison, in 2018/19 the UK invested around £140 million in its Soft Power agencies while the German state invested £550 million and France: £478 million. 

28.              In the case of REMT (at least over the period 2011 - 2020), it can be noted that, save a few notable exceptions, even greater value could have been derived from REMT activity at home and abroad.  A huge amount of effort in support and facilitation has been given by some individuals and departments but often support has needed to be hard fought - both at a Departmental and individual levels. 

What role should the Government have in supporting and coordinating cultural defence diplomacy?

29.              The support and coordination of cultural defence diplomacy is currently conceived and managed by MOD (in principle), the Services Secretariat (in cost and contracts) and the Services staff (allocation of resources and support to projects).  It is assumed that support and coordination of all potential Soft Power and diplomacy, from agencies outside Defence, is managed in a similar way.

30.              If the Defence Committee and its Sub-Committee are seeking to liberate the opportunities and efficiencies through Defence’s contribution to national brand and the UK’s Soft Power position, then an empowered Working Group should be assembled to assess the deeper and wider principles, process and people that lie behind the Defence contribution to Soft Power, with the aim of making recommendations.  In particular, the Working Group should be charged with testing the linkages between Defence and OGDs and their respective constituencies (for example DCMS might be consulted to establish what options and resources exist for collaboration between Defence and with the National Companies) 

Which organisations or sectors should be responsible for supporting the UK’s defence diplomacy efforts?

31.              As the established lead for diplomacy, the FCDO is charged with using Soft Power as a tool of UK foreign policy to promote British values, advance development and prevent conflict, expand the UK Government’s contribution to conflict prevention, to promote British values - including human rights - and contribute to the welfare of developing countries.  It is understood that while this remit will shape all manner of FCDO business, the relative emphasis will depend on the scale of other perhaps more important foreign policy challenges. Accordingly, the shaping of OGD policy and effort in Soft Power (including that in Defence) is perhaps less strong than it might be.  Certainly, it is judged that there is an appetite for partnership, in the commercial sector, yet unrealised.  As the UK ‘Hard Power’ and relative standing in the world diminishes - even if this is momentary - then a greater emphasis and resource needs to be set towards enabling ‘Soft Power’ influence.  This call for a greater relative emphasis and energy, is easily embraced within the Global Britain strategy and no doubt its successor.  But, perhaps greater emphasis needs to be placed in converting aspirations into concrete output.

32.              In similar vein, in Defence, the value of Defence Diplomacy is set out in a variety of documents (including a joint FCDO/MOD International Defence Engagement Strategy).  The challenge comes in converting this intent to operational outcomes.  For effort to be coordinated effectively and efficiently the connections and resources available to MOD and the Attaches, the Foreign and Liaison Staff (engaging with foreign attaches in the UK), between the MOD and OGDs and the MOD and the Single Services (in matters of Defence Diplomacy) need to be audited and potentially reinforced. 

33.              Those service personnel and officials with a remit for Defence Diplomacy should be briefed and encouraged to take a view of 'Soft Power’ and ‘Cultural Diplomacy’ that goes beyond purely Defence activity.  The excellent Defence Attaches Foundation Studies Course at the Defence Academy of The United Kingdom is a good anchor point while even greater encouragement from Ambassadors and the military chain of command would also serve well.  AS ever, interdepartmental collaboration should be encouraged at all levels. 

How should value from cultural defence diplomacy be measured? Is there currently an agreed or effective framework for measuring impact against objectives?

34.              Measurement might be quantitative and qualitative:

a.              Return on Investment (RoI) is a performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency or profitability of an investment (in time and money) relative to the cost of the investment; measured in terms of financial returns, increases in communications reach etc (sometimes called ‘cold metrics’).  This metric focusses on ‘cost’ and can be related to ‘additionality’.

b.              Return of Influence (RoF) ) is a performance measure used to evaluate the engagement and conversion resulting from ‘Soft Power’ initiatives relative to the cost of the investment in those initiatives; measured in terms of engagement levels, synergistic and viral factors, conversion, loyalty, sentiment analysis etc (sometimes called ‘warm metrics’).  This metric focuses on ‘value’.

35.              UK’s Soft Power and position relative to others is routinely researched by the British Council and variety of commercial  (including Brand Finance and Portland Communications), media and academic players.  Most of the research is qualitative and relies on targeted interviewing and workshops shaped around standard question sets.  Like most marketing and communications output, opinions vary on the efficacy of quantitative research.  Without decrying the excellent work and aspirations of officials, measurement tends to be campaign-aligned, often superficial and based perhaps on Advertising Value Equivalence (AVE) or media and social media metrics.  Stakeholder analysis often provides a helpful baseline for work but often this is not followed through to ‘effect’ and conversion.

36.              The measurement of RoI and ‘additionality’ is complex and time-consuming.  Additionality can be defined as “an additional impact measured in terms of the extent to which something happens as a result of an intervention that would not have occurred in the absence of that intervention” - arguably a somewhat negative perspective when considering a desire for growth.  Unless required specifically for a Balance of Investment (BoI) analysis, the measurement of additionality in a project is often judged less than efficient.

37.              RoF offers a better measure of Soft Power impact, but experience suggests that the measurement of UK influence - excepting specific cases - is insufficiently penetrative, informative, or sophisticated for the contemporary world.  This perhaps reflects our relatively modest investment in Soft Power, even when compared with our European neighbours.  To measure cultural defence diplomacy, we need to measure the cost and value of Defence Diplomacy and the subset Cultural Defence Diplomacy.

What is the contribution to defence diplomacy of the Armed Forces’ ceremonial roles?

38.              As with other diplomatic endeavour, it is challenging to measure the relative contribution of State Ceremonial and and other Armed Forces ceremonial activity.  The impact (and value) of state ceremonial is inexorably bound with our Constitutional Monarchy (also with only a proportion of its value marked against its cost) and its contribution to the international view of the United Kingdom.  It is difficult to measure the effect quantitatively as the monetary ‘value added’ and additionality needs to be calculated for first, second and third order beneficiaries and for the wider economy. 

39.              Qualitative accounts would suggest that our state ceremonial and other ceremonial events never fails to impress international guests, not least because our output is unique and of the highest standard, arguably unequally by any other country. 

40.              Unusually, UK military and state ceremonial is conducted by service personnel in the basis of dual roles.  The Royal Marine Band Service, the Army Bands (including the State Bands), The RAF Music Service, The Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment, The Brigade of Guards’ Public Duties Increments, The King’s Troop Royal Horse Artillery and The King’s Colour Squadron are allocated full-time to ceremonial roles.  Most other contributors (including Pipes and Drums, Bugles etc who are dual-roled) deliver ceremonial output on an ‘as and when’ basis and their value is seldom properly recognised and is not afforded so much support.  They rely instead on individual and regimental passion and non-public support from Regimental Trusts and the like. 

41.              Whilst our ceremonial assets are deployed abroad in support of a variety of Defence Diplomacy tasks, this tends to be the exception relative to the volume of domestic engagements.  This tendency reflects an institutional concern that should our ceremonial assets have any spare capacity (that might be used for broader influence tasks) then they would be ripe for savings measures.  This reflects the Defence (and OGD) propensity to measure cost rather than value.  Instead, we should be marking the use - and cost - of Defence assets relative to other communications channels and counting their value accordingly.  

3 November 2022