Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) and LION UK – Written evidence (AFG0012)

The UK and Afghanistan

International Relations and Defence Committee in the House of Lords

Abstract:

Faced with a dramatic increase in civilian casualties in 2019 and in the first half of 2020, due – amongst other factors – to the acceleration in the number of airstrikes conducted by International Military Forces (IMF) and Afghan Air Forces (AAF), the Afghan government and international partners, including the UK, need to strengthen their approach to civilian harm mitigation (CHM)[1] in their own operations and in their military partnerships. In addition to policy, training, and tactical guidance, best practices include the systematic use of civilian harm tracking (CHT)[2] mechanisms aimed at identifying, analyzing, responding to, and preventing civilian casualties. Such an approach to CHM has the potential to not only significantly decrease civilian harm, but also to support international and UK foreign policy objectives while reducing human suffering and reinforcing compliance with legal obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL).

UK military officers have already been exposed to CHT as they participated in the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team of the Operation Resolute Support; learnings from this experience should feed into the UK’s current engagement in Afghanistan, and further be institutionalized by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) ahead of future commitments such as Mali. To deliver the desired outcomes for civilian protection, CHT mechanisms should overcome key challenges including: operationalizing protection of civilians, providing a holisitic analysis of civilian harm in areas of operation, identifiying where CHM shortcomings among own personnel might lay, increasing the support of military leadership, improving channels for access to information, enhancing the capacity to perform assessments or investigations, and fostering internal learning.

1. Trends in civilian casualties call for a strengthened approach to civilian harm mitigation, including through an increased capacity of the Afghan Forces and their international partners, including the UK, to identify and analyze civilian harm.

Upward trend in civilian harm:

International and Afghan forces’ increased kinetic operations against armed opposition groups (AOGs) in 2019 resulted in a significant rise in civilian casualties in Afghanistan. According to the 2019 “Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict” UNAMA report[3], over 10,300 casualties were documented in 2019 as a result of the conflict (3,403 deaths and 6,989 injuries), 42% resulting from IEDs, 29% from ground engagement, and 10% from airstrikes. As noted in CIVIC’s recent policy brief on Afghan airstrikes,[4] the number of civilian casualties (CIVCAS) attributed to airstrikes increased in the second half of 2019 compared to previous years – the reason being an unprecedented air campaign. 72% of airstrike casualties were caused by international military forces (which performed the majority of operations in close air support of Afghan forces), and 22% were caused by the Afghan Air Force (AAF). In spite of inconsistencies in numbers (for instance between UNAMA and AIHRC),[5] “the upward trend is the most urgent matter”[6], to a point where the Afghan public, outraged by the rise in civilian harm, has engaged in protests[7].

Tracking, analyzing, and responding to civilian harm remains a critical challenge for security forces deployed in Afghanistan, with dramatic consequences for communities. For example, as reported by CIVIC[8], 11 civilians (one man, 7 children, and 3 women) were reportedly killed in an airstrike on March 21, 2020 at Yakatut village in Imam Sahib district, Kunduz province. Local residents told CIVIC that a nearby Taliban judge’s house was probably the target. Confirming the strike has been complex, with diverging statements from MOD and AIHRC. UNAMA’s report for the first quarter 2020 confirmed the incident and the number of casualties[9].

Capacity of the Afghan government and its international partners to mitigate civilian harm:

Afghan government: CIVIC would like to commend the Afghan authorities for two encouraging initiatives which have the potential to yield positive impacts for civilian protection. First, the Afghan government committed to and enacted the 2017 Civilian Casualties Prevention and Mitigation Policy (“POC Policy”) to reduce civilian harm caused by its security forces. CIVIC is also aware that the Afghan MOD is currently reviewing its airstrikes policy.
Second, the Afghan government has undertaken good practices to mitigate civilian harm and reduce operational challenges that contribute to civilian casualties during aerial operations. The AAF has a targeting process that takes into account IHL rules on proportionality and distinction, as well as methods for assessing collateral damage and Rules of Engagement (ROEs) – including existing training sessions (for instance to Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators – ATACs) to better integrate risks to civilians in targeting processes.

However, a number of challenges should be acknowledged, including the lack of awareness on and implementation of the POC Policy, insufficient learning on civilian harm with the Afghan military, and specific challenges related to airstrikes from the AAF (i.e. insufficient Ground to Air coordination, over-reliance on human intelligence leading to information bias, and reliance on outdated maps for targeting).

International partners: In 2014, as 100,000 ISAF forces withdrew from the country and the ISAF transitioned to the 17,000-strong train, assist, and advise Resolute Support (RS) Mission, there was a need to transfer good practices on civilian harm mitigation to Afghan forces and build the Afghan government’s capacity to track, analyze, and mitigate civilian harm

The Operation RS[10] Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT) transitioned to a smaller unit with fewer resources, while RS focused on training and advising Afghan forces. The NATO mission was slashed down in 2014 under a largely Train, Advise, Assist, Command (TAAC) mandate to consolidate the skills of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANSDF) “with an eye to gradually handing over tasks and capabilities to local troops”[11].

As part of these broader international efforts, the UK participates in Operation RS. It’s worth noticing that in Operation RS, amongst other contributions, the UK supports drone and air strikes performed by international partners. They also head the RS Civilian Casualty Investigation and Mitigation Team (CCMT).

The UK’s military presence also includes the deployment of special forces, jointly with the US, in support to Afghan Special Forces; force protection for UK and coalition advisors through the UK lead within the Kabul Security Forces;[12] and the provision of mentors who work in a training and advisory role within the Afghan National Army Officers' Academy and Infantry Branch School, among other Afghan institutions.

The UK’s footprint in Afghanistan is lighter than it used to be. The nature and scope of its military presence, operations, and activities in the country carry both significant risks and opportunities for the protection of civilians[13] and civilian harm mitigation. Learnings from their experience running the CCMT of Operation RS in the past few years could contribute to developing the UK’s understanding of the civilian impact of military operations in Afghanistan and beyond.

2. The British Army has been previously exposed to civilian casualty identification, analysis, and mitigation experiences in Afghanistan as part of their contribution to NATO’s Resolute Support Operation, and should integrate learnings from these experiences into current and future military commitments

The present section is based on the experience of Mark Goodwin-Hudson, former British Army Lt. Col. and head of the NATO Resolute Support Operation Civilian Casualty Investigation and Mitigation Team, 2016. His direct experience working on a civilian harm tracking and mitigation mechanisms highlights the added value of such mechanisms not only from a legal and moral perspective, but also from a strategic perspective for the effectiveness of military operations. It however also illustrates that, to be effective, civilian harm tracking mechanisms need to overcome a certain number of challenges, including with regards to the extent of the remit of the Team to investigate allegations of civilian harm, the staffing and resources available, and the support across operational units and military leadership.

Context:

Operation Resolute Support (RS) in Afghanistan is the only overseas NATO mission that has established its own in-theatre Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team (CCMT). It was initially created by ISAF, and then transferred into RS in order to better understand the impact of the conflict on the civilian population, and in particular to acknowledge and learn from NATO’s own mistakes, so as to reduce civilian harm, and where appropriate make amends. As the head of the Civilian Casualty Mitigation Team, Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson was double hatted[14] - his primary role was as the NATO Deputy Chief Current Operations. He ran a team of five all over whom were also double hatted over 6-12 months tours, at the exception of the second in command, a retired Gurkha Officer who has now been in post for four years. 

The NATO RS CCMT acted as a data recording unit of all CIVCAS incidents. Without accurate incident reporting, data collection, and record keeping, it would have been impossible for NATO to demonstrate accountability; conduct trend analysis; and initiate appropriate measures of mitigation and amends. The tracking of civilian harm in Afghanistan was carried out through the District Governors who passed the information up to Afghan Ministry of Defence.

Strategic and moral value of civilian harm tracking:

Previous experience from the ISAF has shown that CHT has the potential to increase operational effectiveness while also reducing and preventing civilian harm in a given area of intervention. According to a NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learnt Centre (JALLC) Report,[15] a “significant correlation between successive COMISAF Tactical Directives and the successful reduction of ISAF-caused CIVCAS in the period 2008-2014” could be established through statistical analysis. “Such reduction (…) was achieved through the implementation of a number of CIVCAS reduction best practices.” The report concludes that successful CIVCAS reduction processes include three phases: “prevention, mitigation, and learning.” CHT, meaning being able to identify, track, and analyze civilian harm, is at the start of such a comprehensive civilian harm mitigation cycle.

Key Features of the CCMT:

Data collection: In 2016, the Afghan Ministry of Defence (MOD) ran a small CIVCAS tracking cell that largely only acknowledged incidents of civilian harm committed by the Taliban or ISIS. The CCMT therefore got its information about allegations of civilian harm against Afghan Defence Force and its international partners from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), who has its own database; the Afghan media; and Taliban Twitter feeds. On occasion, NATO servicemen also made allegations of civilian harm caused by NATO airstrikes.

The CIVCAS figure in Afghanistan has not gone below 10,000 per year since NATO tracking started in 2014. Agreement on exact figures was rare. On average 70-80% of the CIVCAS figures were caused by ISIS and the Taliban. The remaining 20-30% were attributed to the Coalition/Afghan Defence Force, and were often the subject of debate between NATO and UNAMA. According to the data collected by the CCMT in 2016,[16] civilian casualties were caused by ISIS and Taliban suicide bombers, the Afghan Air Defence Force, Coalition Airstrikes, Afghan mortar fire, crossfire, IEDs, unexploded ordnance, and the military’s use of localised explosives. 

“Investigations” into incidents of civilian harm: All allegations of civilian harm attributed to the Afghan Defence Force and the Coalition Forces had to be investigated by the CCMT. This investigatory process is a formal documented process, conducted by the Civilian Casualty Credibility Assessment Review Board (CCCARB), and made up of the members of the CCMT, Army Legal branch, Civil Affairs, and the operations planning team that was responsible for the mission that led to the allegation.[17] The assessments were always based on written and photographic evidence, and the purpose of each investigation was to assess if there was sufficient evidence for the allegation to be deemed credible. A credible decision led to a recommendation for amends to the victim(s).

Successful mitigation initiatives:

Training: Tracking civilian casualties enables commanders to identify trends and put in place measures to mitigate civilian harm. At the end of 2016, CIVCAS training became part of the annual force preparation training programme with the Afghan Defence Force.   

In 2017, the CCMT initiated a Train the Trainer (T3) (ToT) three day CIVCAS course for the Afghan government. The main topics covered were: what is CIVCAS, data collection, record keeping, and how to investigate allegations. As a result of this training, the Afghan government has established its own CIVCAS tracking database and started to conduct its own CIVCAS investigations.

The CCMT also partnered with CIVIC and worked with the Afghan government on producing its own CHM policy and implementation plan.

Engagement with civil society and communities: The CCMT has established channels of communications with INGOs, UN agencies, and other civilian stakeholders (such as local CSOs) in order to support the triangulation of information on civilian incidents, conduct threat analysis, implement precautionary measures, and develop strategic communications (the need for precautionary measures, threat analysis, strategic communications). This dialogue also fed into commuications with the MOD in order to better prevent and respond to incidents, and a dedicated Working Group was created which uniquely had representation from RS, the Afghan government, INGOs, and the UN.

Amends:[18] Under ISAF, some NATO nations developed best practices for making ex-gratia payments to victims of incidental harm. While per se very commendable to mitigate some of the consequences of civilian harm, involved states have also recognized the unintended negative consequences of this practice as a result of their incoherent and inconsistent application of these payments that often spark frustration, if not increased resentment, on the part of the affected civilians. While this practice is less developed under Operation RS, there are reports of US/UK Special Forces taking money with them on strike operations in order to make numerical amends immediately at the scene of an incident.  

Challenges faced:

Insufficient understanding of civilian presence in the battlefield: Over a four month period in 2016, Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson chaired more than 70 CCCARBs. The majority of the allegations that the CCCARB investigated were to do with the Afghan Airforce or Coalition airstrikes. According to Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson, the CCARB highlighted not only the need for additional civilian harm mitigation training for Afghan pilots, but also evidenced that, in some cases, the civilians killed in “terrorist” buildings targeted by RS outnumbered the terrorists, which, in many instances, raises questions on the proper application of the principle of proportionality and on how the anticipated military advantage is balanced out with civilian presence. Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson concluded that the CCCARB explained to Coalition Commanders the need to improve their understanding of civilian presence on the battlefield.

Remit of the CCMT: Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson’s remit was to assess all CIVCAS allegations. At that stage, a CCCARB had never investigated allegations of CIVCAS involving UK/US Special Forces (SF) or the CIA. Access to SF/CIA operations had always been denied. Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson rightly notes that “it makes no difference to the civilian victim of harm, how special or otherwise the nature of the NATO combatant is; the human effect is still the same.” When questioned, his chain of command upheld his remit, and a SF Liaison Officer joined the CCCARB. As a result, for the first time UK/US SF[19] started to acknowledge a role in civilian incidents, and began playing a role in effectively mitigating harm. The CIA, on the other hand, refused to even acknowledge the requests to attend the CCCARB. Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson explains that “this was problematic since the local population (Afghan villagers) knew which warlords were being funded and trained by CIA.” As a result, he adds, “they held the CIA/Coalition Forces indirectly responsible for the atrocities committed against them by said warlords.”

Lack of available evidence to assess the credibility of the claims: The CCCARB quantified eight definitions of CIVCAS, only one of which confirms that the allegation is “credible”, the remaining seven are all varying levels of “not credible”, based on lessening degrees of evidence. The weighting therefore was heavily against proving credibility[20]. The Board on average spent 15-20 minutes on each investigation, primarily because there was often very little evidence available - the Board was not granted the time, the access, or the authority to visit the incident sites or conduct its own interviews.

In addition, the Board had limited access to classified intelligence used to support US/UK SF operations[21]. It is important to note that accurate targeting is more than just the precision of modern weapon systems, it also requires corresponding levels of veracity and credibility in the intelligence that underpins it. The Board was simply told that casualties were “terrorists”, because UK/US SF intelligence sources said they were. In one case, the victims were clearly unarmed, and local/NGO reporting said they were innocent pilgrims staying at an Imam’s hostel on their way back from Mecca[22].

During Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson’s tenure, the CCCARB confirmed less than 10 of the allegations as credible. In one instance an allegation was made by a US drone pilot, who raised concerns about an F16 airstrike in Helmand for which he had provided overwatch from his Ground Control Station in Las Vegas. The subsequent CCCARB confirmed the allegation as credible, and as a result the senior RS officer in Helmand lost his right to authorise airstrikes.

Therefore, the CCMT often suffered from the lack of comprehensive assessments into incidents to support analysis of root causes and identify remedial measures to prevent harm. Without proper assessments used to establish the credibility of an allegation, amends would indeed not be provided to affected civilians.

Importance of the support of the military leadership: Sustained commitment by high-level civilian and military leadership, including a command climate that emphasizes the importance of preventing civilian harm, is essential for civilian harm mitigation.[23] When Lt. Col. Goodwin-Hudson was in Afghanistan, views on civilian harm amongst senior commanders varied, and for him “it often came down to personality.”

3. The UK government should reinforce their approach to civilian harm mitigation in their own operations and activities, as well as in their security partnerships in Afghanistan and beyond.

In order to address the upward trend in civilian casualties in Afghanistan, CIVIC recommends the Afghan government and international partners, including the UK, take immediate steps to strengthen Afghan policy, practices, and trainings to better prepare forces to protect Afghan civilians, mitigate civilian harm, and adhere to IHL and IHRL obligations. CIVIC also urges the AAF to take immediate steps to mitigate civilian harm arising from aerial operations.

Recommendations:

To the UK military:

• Acknowledging the importance of civilian harm tracking to minimize civilian harm arising from military operations, CIVIC recommends the UK military to augment or implement mechanisms to collect, assess, analyze, and respond to instances where civilians are harmed and integrate lessons learned into relevant Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and training. Assessments of civilian casualties should be systematically conducted to identify what happened, whether policies were followed, and what lessons can be learned, and in case of doubt of lawfulness under IHL, be legally investigated.
• Civilian harm tracking should apply to the UK’s own operations and partnered operations. The remit of civilian harm tracking mechanisms should include the activities and operations of special forces and other government agencies, including intelligence units.
• When investigations into civilian casualties are conducted, their results should be made publicly available and follow-on mitigation measures should be made clear. Moreover, impacted families should systematically receive post harm assistance.
• The British Army (BA) should systematically integrate a robust approach to civilian harm mitigation in their “train, advise, and assist” activities. CIVIC recommends that they integrate a practical approach to civilian harm mitigation in training activities, and further expose partner forces to better understand how to translate protection of civilians’ requirements into practice, including through adjustments in guidance, SOPs, and tools.

To the UK MOD and government:

• CIVIC recommends that the MOD and the UK government define, adopt, and implement a “Civilian Harm Tracking policy of the UK Government”, as per the action point identified after the “Chilcot report”[24]. Such policy would frame and institutionalize the UK’s approach to civilian harm mitigation, including through the use of Civilian Casualty Mitigation Teams to better identify, assess, investigate, analyze, and respond to civilian harm arising from military operations, activities, or presence. It would also include specific guidance on engagement with local and international civil society on incidents and patterns of civilian harm.

Conclusion:

Proactively mitigating civilian harm and protecting civilians holds the key to achieving military and foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan and other conflict contexts. Until protecting the population becomes, as General Petraeus said in 2007, “the new big idea”, Western government’s attempts in Afghanistan will continue to falter, limiting their capacity to support the Afghan government’s efforts to bring forward peace and stability to the country.

About CIVIC: CIVIC is an international NGO which supports communities affected by conflict in their quest for protection and strengthens the resolve and capacity of armed actors to prevent and respond to civilian harm. Over the past 15 years, CIVIC has engaged with NATO, the UN, the EU, the US, and European governments, as well as armed forces and communities in conflict-affected countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, Yemen, and most recently the G5 Sahel Joint Force, in view of promoting the adoption of best practices for civilian harm mitigation and the protection of civilians. Through its expertise in policy and training, CIVIC has supported the creation of civilian casualty mitigation teams within NATO ISAF, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and AMISOM. CIVIC has also initiated a dialogue with the UK government to work towards strengthening the protection of civilians in the UK’s own operations and security partnerships. 

About LION UK: LION UK is a new, widely connected, organisation, designed to bring together experts in Defence to work in concert with civil partners in order to examine and develop ways by which governments and militaries conduct contemporary warfare. Modern wars are increasingly fought in a civilian-centric battlespace, and LION UK supports CIVIC as an international champion for the protection of civilians in conflict. LION UK believes that a failure to deploy combat power to proactively protect civilians in conflict will always lead in the medium or long term to the failure of military and national objectives. Lt. Col. Mark Goodwin-Hudson is the founder and Executive Director of LION UK.

Received 7 September 2020