Written evidence submitted by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Written evidence from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) to the DCMS Sub-committee on Online Harms and Disinformation’s inquiry into Misinformation and Trusted Voices
Overview
1. The Government is pleased to respond to the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Sub-committee on Online Harms and Disinformation’s inquiry into the role of trusted voices in combating the spread of misinformation. The Government takes the issue of misinformation and disinformation very seriously, from COVID-19 and vaccines to Russia’s use of disinformation as a tool in their war in Ukraine, it is a pervasive threat. We look forward to the Sub-committee’s evidence and recommendations on this subject.
2. Some of the questions posed in the inquiry’s call for evidence are not for the Government to answer. It would not be appropriate for the Government to make judgments about which organisations are most trusted or where individuals seek authoritative information. However we have provided comments which we hope may aid the Sub-committee’s inquiry.
3. The Government defines ‘misinformation’ as inadvertently spreading false information, whilst ‘disinformation’ refers to the deliberate creation and dissemination of false and/or manipulated information that is intended to deceive and mislead audiences, either for the purposes of causing harm, or for political, personal or financial gain. In our response the Government refers to both misinformation and disinformation as the impact on audiences can be similar.
4. The Government believes that the spread of misinformation and disinformation requires a multi-faceted, whole of society approach. Whilst promoting authoritative information is a key element in combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation these challenges cannot be addressed by a single strategy or sector alone.
5. That is why the Government’s response involves a range of legislative and non-legislative actions that addresses the environment in which misinformation and disinformation spreads, disrupts those who seek to spread it, and builds resilience amongst audiences, empowering users with the skills that they need to make informed and safe choices online.
Which organisations are the most trusted sources of information in the UK?
6. GOV.UK is the single, trusted source of UK government information and services. It is essential for anyone living, working or studying in the UK, and is visited by millions of people every day for complex, routine and sometimes life changing reasons. It is regularly updated with the latest information to help its millions of users.
7. Ofcom carries out regular research into news consumption across television, radio, print, social media, podcasts, magazines, and other websites/apps. This research considers measures such as trustworthiness, alongside quality, accuracy and impartiality. Ofcom’s News Consumption in the UK 2022 Report can be found here.
8. During the COVID-19 pandemic, both newspapers and radio were identified as vital sources of trusted information on COVID-19 and the government response, playing an important role in tackling the spread of disinformation. Ofcom’s 2022 News Consumption Survey found that 67% respondents consider print newspapers to be trustworthy and 66% for radio, compared to only 35% for social media.
9. The Government recognises the importance of the public having access to the information they need to participate in our democracy, such as voting in an election or referendum. Structures are already in place to provide accessible and neutral information on the administration of elections and referendums. For example, the Electoral Commission is responsible for informing the public about and promoting awareness of current electoral systems in the UK, including systems that have been enacted by the UK Parliament but are not yet in force. As part of this duty, the Commission encourages accurate voter registration and access to polls. Local authorities also publish information about elections being held in their area, including information on how to register to vote and voting in elections.
10. Media Literacy skills also enable citizens to effectively navigate the information landscape, and to recognise and identify authoritative information sources. In July 2021, the Government published the Online Media Literacy Strategy, which set out our vision for improving national media literacy capabilities. The Strategy takes a sector-focused approach, seeking to support organisations to undertake media literacy activity in a more high-quality, wide-reaching, and coordinated manner. This includes prompting these organisations to direct users towards authoritative sources of information, including fact-checking organisations.
11. The Strategy includes a series of Strategic Sector Priorities, which highlight areas where organisations across multiple sectors can take steps to improve the media literacy landscape. These include encouraging organisations to promote political literacy learning, such as understanding the importance of high-quality journalism in democratic society, and how and where to seek it out. This is especially important during periods where it is inappropriate for the Government to direct this type of learning, such as election cycles.
12. Finally, the Strategy emphasises the importance of libraries as sources of accurate information. In particular, it champions the role of public librarians in directing users towards objective sources of information. In the financial year 2021/22, we provided £20K in grant funding to upskill library staff to better support citizens’ media literacy skills.
Where do you seek authoritative information to make up your mind about matters of national debate (such as vaccines and climate change)?
13. The Government is committed to ensuring that everyone has access to accurate and authoritative information on matters of national debate. For example, throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government has sought to ensure that the information people access about COVID-19 and the vaccines are accurate, enabling everyone to make informed decisions about their health. During this time, the Government negotiated unprecedented advertising partnerships with the newspaper industry and with a number of local radio stations, particularly those aimed at ethnic minority communities. These partnerships were vital in keeping the public informed during the pandemic, and relied particularly on the local media’s role as a trusted voice and its ability to reach isolated communities. Trust in the content remained high over the two years of the partnership, averaging at 69% for that published in newspapers.
14. The Government also periodically updates the gov.uk ‘Climate Change Explained’ page to reflect the latest peer-reviewed science of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments to support the public in accessing accurate and up-to-date information about climate change.
Are you able to “do your own research” on matters of national debate?
15. The Government believes it is important that the public are able to access accurate and authoritative information on matters of national debate.
16. The Online Media Literacy Strategy encourages the development of skills that allow citizens to find trustworthy sources of information on important matters. It sets out a framework of media literacy principles that are crucial for users to navigate the online information environment and manage their online safety. This framework is intended to inform the content and delivery of media literacy initiatives. These principles include ensuring users critically analyse the information they read online and can establish when to fact-check information to determine its veracity.
17. Alongside the Strategy, we have committed to publishing annual Action Plans until 2024/25. These set out the range of government-led initiatives we are delivering each year to meet the Strategy’s ambition. In our Year 1 Action Plan (2021/23), we delivered several initiatives that supported users to critically analyse information and develop well-informed opinions on topical issues. This included providing £250k in grant funding for a range of organisations to adapt their educational resources for the benefit of teachers of students with special educational needs and disabilities, who are often particularly vulnerable to harm online.
18. There is evidence to suggest that readers are shifting towards publishers that are considered to be more reputable as concerns around disinformation grow.[1] As such, the Strategy explores the positive impact that teaching news literacy can have on press sustainability. It encourages organisations to undertake activity that supports users to build critical thinking skills; an understanding of the news-gathering process and the value of high-quality journalism; and recognition of the benefits of well-researched and accurate information.
What role should the National Academies have in being a source of authoritative, trustworthy information?
19. The National Academies are an important source of authoritative information and advice. Their primary purpose is to support excellence in research and the application of knowledge for the benefit of society.
20. The Academies receive BEIS funding for Academy programmes and activities that help deliver government priorities. They also receive funding from private sources. Some of BEIS’s funding supports the provision of advice that helps shape a broad range of public policies. For example, the Academies harnessed the collective expertise of their Fellowships and researcher communities to convene academics, policy makers, business and community leaders and provide insights that helped shape the response to Covid-19. It is a condition of BEIS support that BEIS-funded Academy outputs make clear that they are enabled by public funding.
21. The Academies’ contributions are considered trustworthy because the Academies are independent and globally respected. Their advice draws on the expertise of their Fellowships of world-leading researchers and supports more efficient, evidence-based decision making, including within government, and informs public dialogue.
Are National Academies prominent enough voices in engaging with the variety of debates on the internet?
22. The Academies are independent, self-governing bodies. BEIS makes strategic investments in Academy programmes that help deliver government priorities, primarily in research and development. Some BEIS funding is for activities designed to increase public engagement with science and to improve public understanding of the role of scientific advice in developing public policy.
23. The conditions of BEIS funding do not require the Academies to engage in specific public engagement activities but we do support a growing digital presence for the Academies. Their public profile is much greater than it was only a few years ago and their digital profile is increasing. For instance, each Academy has an active Twitter account, with over 470,000 followers between them (Royal Society 335,000). This is enabling the Academies to be more responsive to online discussions; to engage with more diverse audiences; and to provide advice that is more representative of public opinion.
24. The provision of trusted, evidence-based scientific information, suitable for a general audience, is part of the Academies’ purpose. The Royal Society, for example, publishes via its website accessible ‘explainers’ on topics such as climate change and global warming. The Academies host topical events online that are aimed at or accessible to the public, and they work extensively with schools.
Is the provision of authoritative information responsive enough to meet the challenge of misinformation that is spread on social media?
25. The Government recognises that promoting authoritative information can have a strong positive impact on combating the spread of misinformation and disinformation. However, authoritative information cannot solve this problem alone, and there are many reasons why people may adopt and sustain beliefs despite being challenged, or why they may continue to believe or share false information despite corrections or exposure to authoritative information. The ‘Wall of Beliefs’ toolkit, developed by the Government Communication Service, explores this in greater detail.
26. Indeed, the Government believes that the threat of misinformation and disinformation cannot be addressed by a single strategy or sector alone, instead requiring a multi-faceted, whole of society approach that addresses the environment in which misinformation and disinformation spreads, disrupts those who seek to spread it, and builds resilience amongst audiences.
Legislative action
27. The groundbreaking Online Safety Bill will protect users from the most egregious online harms associated with misinformation and disinformation by requiring all companies to tackle illegal misinformation and disinformation in scope of the Bill. This includes misinformation and disinformation content which contains direct incitement to violence, such as encouraging violence or harassment of public health officials on the false premise that COVID-19 is a hoax, or incitement to violence toward electoral candidates on the basis of an egregious lie.
28. An amendment has recently been tabled to the National Security Bill to ensure that the new foreign interference offence it creates will be a priority offence under the Online Safety Bill. This will force service providers to take action on a wide range of state-sponsored disinformation. This includes covert attempts by foreign state actors to manipulate our information environment to interfere in UK society and undermine our democratic, political and legal processes.
29. The Online Safety Bill will also require services that are likely to be accessed by children to put in place measures to protect underage users from harmful misinformation and disinformation. This will include, for example, content which encourages children to engage in dangerous diet fads through the use of incorrect scientific data.
30. The Bill will also increase transparency over companies’ enforcement of terms of service, and ensure these are easy for users to understand. The Bill will require Category 1 platforms (high reach services with high risk functionalities) to ensure their terms of service relating to user safety are clear to users and properly enforced. Most major social media platforms already have terms of service in relation to misinformation and disinformation content, for example anti-vaccination falsehoods.
31. Ofcom will also be required to establish a cross-sector expert advisory committee on disinformation and misinformation, bringing together tech companies, civil society organisations and subject matter experts. The committee will provide advice on how regulated services should deal with disinformation and misinformation, as well as how Ofcom should exercise its transparency reporting and media literacy functions in this regard.
Building public resilience
32. As well as ensuring companies take action to keep users safe through the Online Safety Bill, we are taking steps to educate and empower users with the skills and knowledge they need to make safer choices online through our work on media literacy.
33. The Online Media Literacy Strategy sets out the role that key stakeholders can play in tackling the challenge of online misinformation. This includes calling on social media companies to invest in platform-design choices that promote media literacy by prompting users to consider the quality of the information they are consuming online. Studies into the effectiveness of these interventions have demonstrated positive findings, and we are encouraging tech companies to build this evidence base through the Strategy.
34. Strategic communications are also important for curbing the spread of online misinformation and disinformation. The government has previously run the ‘Don’t Feed the Beast’ communications campaign, which encouraged citizens to think critically about content online. The government has developed and published the SHARE checklist which provides users with several steps they should take to verify information before sharing it with others. The government has also published the RESIST toolkit, which provides expert guidance on using comms to respond to disinformation.
Operational response
35. The DCMS Counter Disinformation Unit (CDU) leads the domestic response to disinformation for the UK Government. The CDU seeks to understand the scope, scale and reach of misinformation and disinformation which impacts UK citizens, and works with a range of partners, including other Government Departments, social media platforms, civil society groups, and academia to tackle it.
36. The CDU has led the response to events with an acute disinformation risk such as COVID-19 pandemic; the COP-26 summit; local, devolved, and general elections, and most recently the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
37. When false narratives are identified, the CDU works with other Government departments to deploy the appropriate response, for example, a direct rebuttal on social media or awareness raising campaigns to promote the facts. The CDU also works closely with the major social media platforms to encourage them to cooperate at speed to swiftly remove harmful disinformation and coordinated inauthentic or manipulated behaviour where it goes against their Terms of Service.
38. The CDU currently works closely with the Government Information Cell (GIC) which was established specifically in response to Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine. The GIC’s core objective is to develop communications to expose and counter false Russian claims, including calling out the Kremlin’s playbook of deception and reducing its potential for harm. It is actively countering the disinformation that the Kremlin uses to undermine democratic societies and obscure the truth from its own people.
Partnerships
39. Tackling misinformation and disinformation cannot be done by Government alone and requires a whole of society response. DCMS meets regularly with social media platforms both bilaterally and as part of an industry group. Our engagement is focused on:
40. Misinformation and disinformation is a global issue that sees no borders. That is why we have a robust international response and work with like-minded partners to tackle this issue collaboratively. At the US hosted Summit for Democracy in December 2021, the UK committed to sharing best practice with like minded partners on approaches to countering disinformation.
Conclusion
October 2022
[1] ‘Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019’, Reuters, 2019, page 31