TRADES UNION CONGRESS – WRITTEN EVIDENCE ULS0028 UK LABOUR SUPPLY

Employment, Unemployment and Inactivity

 

The pandemic and subsequent lockdowns caused a significant disruption in the UK labour market, leading to a rise in unemployment and inactivity. This followed over a decade of stagnant wage growth and deteriorating working conditions. While there has been a limited recovery from the pandemic shock to the economy, it has served to highlight many underlying weaknesses in the labour market.

 

While the employment rate has risen in the past year, it remains below its pre-pandemic peak. This has been driven by a rise in economic inactivity rather than a rise in unemployment. Inactivity remains significantly above pre-pandemic levels. Meanwhile the unemployment rate has fallen to 3.6 per cent, the lowest it has been for almost 50 years.

 

Workers have been leaving the labour market into inactivity. This has been driven in some part by significant increases in long-term health problems, and early retirement of older workers. But a rise in inactivity is not unusual given the circumstances of the last two years. Employment shocks, such as recessions, usually lead to cyclical increases in inactivity. Workers leave the labour market, only to return when labour market conditions improve. The chart below shows how reduced employment rates during recessions (most obviously in the early 1980s, early 1990s, late 2000s and the pandemic) coincide with increased inactivity rates.

There has been much talk about the ‘tight’ labour market due to the relatively high number of job vacancies. While vacancies remain elevated, they are dwarfed by the rise in redundancies during the pandemic and lockdown. A high vacancy rate is a natural response to the economy re-opening from the pandemic as businesses return to normal levels of operations.

 


Inactivity – demographics, occupations, and reasons

Older workers have been most likely to leave the labour market into inactivity. It is important to consider the demographic and other factors behind this.

BME workers are less likely to retire early than their white counterparts. Just 17 percent of BME people who are economically inactive aged 50-65 have retired, compared to 40 percent of economically inactive white people. This reflects a wide ethnicity gap in average pension wealth. Instead, those that do leave the labour market early typically do so because of poor health, and more than twice as likely to do so because of caring responsibilities.


Comparing reasons for economic inactivity between White and BME workers, aged 16-64

 

Workers in manually intensive jobs are also at a far greater risk of being forced out of the labour market early. Those working with heavy machinery and in ‘elementary occupations’ like cleaning or security are particularly vulnerable, closely followed by people in caring and other service occupations and retail and customer service. Together these occupations account for just three in ten jobs in the labour market, but almost six in ten people who leave the labour market come from these sectors. This is particularly worrying as workers in these industries tend to be relatively low paid, and therefore have low levels of personal and pension savings.

 

In terms of age, the rise in economic inactivity has been driven by older workers, especially those in the 50+ age range who are disproportionately leaving the labour market before they reach state pension age. The number of people aged 50-65 who were not actively looking for work increased by over 200,000 between 2019 and 2021. After a slight decline in the four quarters from summer 2021, it has increased significantly in the last few months.

This is a reversal of long-term trends that have seen men and women extend their working lives over the last 25 years and can be damaging for both older people as they are at increased risk of having to rely on inadequate working age benefits, as well as the wider economy which is experiencing skills and labour shortages.

Illness, injury or disability continue to be the main reasons for people aged 50–64 being economically inactive in the labour market, affecting 39.1%, or 1.4 million people. The number of people in this age group stating retirement as a reason for not seeking work is 33.4%, or 1.2 million. Nearly 760,000 people aged 50–64 are actively seeking work or are inactive but are willing to work – a fall from 810,000 in 2021.

According to recent data from the Office of National Statistics, those leaving the workforce prematurely were increasingly likely to cite stress or mental health as a key factor. Among those who would consider returning to work (58%), the most important factors when choosing a paid job were flexible working hours (32%), good pay (23%), and being able to work from home (12%).[1]

Older women have historically had higher rates of inactivity than older men. Although this gap has closed in recent decades there are still over 660,000 more women than men aged 50-65 who are economically inactive. While these men are more likely to be retired or in ill health than women, the greatest difference is in the rates of inactivity because of caring responsibilities. The proportion of women in this age group who have left the labour market for this reason (17 percent) is more than twice as high as the proportion of men (7 percent).

 

However, across the entire age spectrum, the number of workers becoming economically inactive due to caring responsibilities has fallen significantly in response to the pandemic. This may be due to increased levels of home-working and flexible working arrangements. Previous TUC analysis found that home-working has tripled since before the pandemic. This has been well-received by workers, who are broadly in favour of this development. And a survey by the Office for National Statistics shows that 24% of businesses intend to use increased homeworking as a permanent business model going forward. However, there has been evidence to suggest that a disproportionate burden has been placed on women to carry out caring responsibilities and housework while balancing home-working.

However, the ability to work from home varies significantly by sector, During the height of the pandemic in 2020, 62 per cent of workers in the information and communication industry worked from home, compared to 19 per cent of transport and storage workers. Workers in the highest paid industries were the most likely to work from home[2]. This contrasts with key workers who mainly worked outside the home during the pandemic. Four out of ten of these workers earned less than £10 per hour[3].

There is also a regional component, with workers in London (57 per cent) more likely to work from home compared to those in other regions, such as the West Midlands (35 per cent). Further analysis from ONS shows the percentage of workers in some areas was considerably lower, for example only 19 per cent of workers in Wolverhampton did any work from home in 2020[4].

 

There has also been an increase in inactivity at the younger end of the age spectrum. This can partially be explained by the growing number of young people delaying joining the labour market to stay in education. Indeed, in 2022 a record number of school leavers went to university. However there remains a worrying trend of those not in employment, education or training (NEETs). While the number of women who are NEETs has fallen steadily, this has been more turbulent for young men. The number of young men who were NEETs rose rapidly during the pandemic and remains high.

However, while inactivity has increased, the number of people working longer hours is also increasing. There has been a fall in part-time work and a significant rise in those working full-time. In addition, the number of people working two jobs has increased over the past two years, with Royal London finding that 1.2 million workers in the UK were working two jobs. This reflects the rising cost of living, with CPI inflation currently standing at 10.1 percent.

There has also been speculation that inactivity has been heightened as workers face health conditions but struggle to get treatment. The TUC has been investigating the impact of Long Covid in particular. We undertook an online, non-representative, survey of those experiencing Long Covid in the summer of 2021. Over 3,500 people who had had Covid-19 responded: around 3,300 of whom self-reported having Long Covid. The majority of these were key workers (79 per cent); people who faced higher levels of exposure to Covid-19 while keeping the country running during the pandemic.  

 

Almost three in 10 respondents (29 per cent) had been experiencing Long Covid symptoms for 12 months or more.  Workers reported experiencing a range of symptoms. On average each respondent reported having nine of the 21 Long Covid symptoms we asked about and described the severity of their cumulative impact. Nine out of ten respondents experienced fatigue, with other common symptoms centred around problems with brain fog (72 per cent), shortness of breath (70 per cent), difficulty concentrating (62 per cent) and memory problems (54 per cent). Over four in five respondents (83 per cent) reported experiencing at least one of a range of pain-related symptoms with around one third (32 per cent) experiencing depression.  

 

Respondents also described the poor treatment that they experienced at work because they had Long Covid. Over half (52 per cent) had experienced some form of discrimination or disadvantage. Workers were faced with disbelief and suspicion, with around one fifth (19 per cent) having their employer question the impact of their symptoms and one in eight (13 per cent) facing questions from their employer about whether they had Long Covid at all. Respondents were also concerned about what the future might hold for them at work given the amount of sick leave they had been forced to take due to their Long Covid symptoms. For around one in six respondents (18 per cent), the amount of sick leave they had taken had triggered absence management or HR processes and one in 11 respondents (9 per cent) had used up all of their sick leave and had been told there would be negative consequences if they took more. One in 20 respondents (5 per cent) had been forced out of their jobs because they had Long Covid.[5] 

 

Labour market “tightness” is not leading to wage growth

A “tight” labour market is significant as several key bodies, including the Bank of England, expect this to drive wage growth. In reality, we are seeing real wages plummeting, and no clear link between labour market tightness and wage growth. Unionised workers are winning pay rises where they are enter into industrial disputes, but employers are reluctant to raise wages otherwise. Real wages in July 2022 were £87 a month less than at their peak in 2008.

Industries which have high levels of vacancies are often those in which unions have been reporting poor pay and conditions for years. Accommodation and food services has by far the highest vacancy ratio at 7.7 vacancies per 100 employees. This is well above the average of 4.2. This is also the industry with, by far, the highest proportion of jobs paid below the real Living Wage at 69.7% in April 2021, well above the 17.1% overall average.[6] Zero hours contracts are also most prevalent in accommodation and food services, covering 26.4% of the workforce compared to 3.2% of all workers.[7]

Low pay and poor terms and conditions go a long way to explaining the heightened vacancy levels in sectors like hospitality, social care and the arts. Industries with lower pay tend to have more vacancies. The charts below shows that this was true before the pandemic, and remains true now. In turn this means that industries with low pay and poor terms and conditions are most susceptible to labour shortages. It is imperative that these industries make improvements to pay and working conditions in order to attract workers.

 

 

However, we are not seeing the kind of wage growth we need to in sectors which are struggling to recruit. The chart below shows that industries with bigger increases in the vacancy rate are not putting up pay any more than other industries. If vacancies were driving pay growth you would expect to see positive correlation, rather than the weak negative correlation that has emerged.

 

 

 

Instead, real pay is declining faster than at any point on record, falling by 4.0% on CPI and 6.0% on RPI. Nominal pay growth is 5.2%, more than wiped out by inflation. These figures refer to the change in May-July 2022 relative to the same period a year before.

 

 

 

 

And this real pay collapse is taking place across every industry in the economy. The biggest collapse is in arts and entertainment, where real pay is declining by 11.8 per cent despite some of the highest vacancy rates.

 

 

 

High rates of vacancies are not leading to employers putting up wages. Instead, workers are having to fight for pay rises. Where unionised workers are engaging in disputes we are seeing some examples of good pay awards. These industries need to improve their terms and conditions, but are reluctant to do so unless pushed to by trade unions. The conditions for collective bargaining need to be improved so that employers respond appropriately to signals from the labour market.

 

Examples of Recent Union Pay Deals

Employer

Standard Increase (%)

ICTS Glasgow Airport

20.3

Stagecoach Guildford

12.6

DHL (Sainsbury's TU) Bedford

11.7

Suez (Kirklees Council)

11.1

Haldane Fisher

10

Birtley Group/Bowater Doors

9

First Hydro

8.2

G4S Cash Solutions (UK)

7.5

Merseyrail (Managers)

7.1

Dale Farm

6.6

Bluestar

6.4

Source: LRD Payline

 

Recommendations

 

Labour supply issues should be addressed through better pay, stronger workers rights, a long term skills strategy and support for workers at risk of leaving the labour market.

Better pay

A plan for wage growth

The government must deliver:

 

A plan for a £15 minimum wage

 

Strengthen worker’s rights

Collective Bargaining

To ensure that more workers can benefit from collective bargaining:

 

Upgrade rights and protections

In addition to new collective rights to enable workers to deliver decent work through their trade unions, we need a significantly strengthened set of employment protections. These must include:

Stronger enforcement

For rights to be effective, they require enforcement. To tackle the challenges faced by workers the enforcement system needs further long-term resources, to end the counterproductive relationship with immigration enforcement which scares workers from reporting exploitation, and to make use of more innovative methods of enforcement, which are becoming common in other countries. 

Government should:

 

A new lifelong learning and skills strategy for all workers

The TUC is calling for a new national lifelong learning and skills strategy based on a vision of a high-skill economy, where workers can quickly gain both transferable and specialist skills to build their job prospects. Delivering this would require:

 

Support for workers at risk of leaving the labour market

Older workers

Ensuring that older people who want to can remain in the labour market requires ensuring that they feel safe at work, investing in skills, strengthening flexible working rights, and ensuring that the pensions and social security systems protect all older people against poverty.

Government should:

 

Workers who have experienced Long Covid

To support workers who have experienced Long Covid, government should:

 

 

3 October 2022


[1] https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/articles/reasonsforworkersagedover50yearsleavingemploymentsincethestartofthecoronaviruspandemic/wave2

[2] https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/labourproductivity/articles/homeworkinghoursrewardsandopportunitiesintheuk2011to2020/2021-04-19 

[3] https://www.tuc.org.uk/blogs/new-class-divide-how-covid-19-exposed-and-exacerbated-workplace-inequality-uk 

[4] https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/labourproductivity/adhocs/13196homeworkingintheukbrokendownbyunitaryandlocalauthoritydistricts2020 

[5] See TUC (2021) Workers’ experience of long covid https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/workers-experiences-long-covid

[6] Living Wage Foundation, Employee jobs paid below the Living Wage, 2021

[7] ONS, EMP17, Zero Hour Contracts, Apr-June 2022

[8] See https://www.mbie.govt.nz/business-and-employment/employment-and-skills/employment-legislation-reviews/fair-pay-agreements/

[9] Further details are set out here: https://www.tuc.org.uk/blogs/po-private-schools-protect-workers-hire-and-fire-culture

[10] See TUC (2017) Shifting the risk: Countering business strategies that reduce their responsibility to workers - improving enforcement of employment rights at https://www.tuc.org.uk/sites/default/files/Shiftingtherisk.pdf

[11] DWP, New package of support to help over 50s jobseekers back into work, July 2022 - https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-package-of-support-to-help-over-50s-jobseekers-back-into-work

[12] TUC 2020, Getting every adult to level 3- https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/getting-every-adult-level-3

[13] See TUC, Second State Pension age review submission, May 2022 - https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/second-state-pension-age-review