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Falanx Assynt Ltd. – Written evidence (AFG0005)
Written evidence submitted to The UK and Afghanistan Inquiry
Introduction
Falanx Assynt has been a leading global intelligence consultancy and provider of geopolitical, strategic and business risk analysis since 2003. With headquarters in London, we have a team of intelligence analysts based in Europe, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific and North America.
We monitor diplomatic engagements, foreign affairs, conflict and terrorism across fifty emerging markets globally in order to predict changes to operating and investment environments. We have monitored the complex dynamics in Afghanistan on a biweekly basis since 2009, and over the last decade have produced hundreds of expert reports on critical issues. During this time we have closely followed the internal workings of successive administrations and changes in the Taliban leadership, and covered themes vital to Afghanistan’s future, spanning the rise of Islamic State, the ongoing US military withdrawal, and the lead up to intra-Afghan talks.
Considering our collective experience and expertise, the intelligence team at Falanx Assynt is well equipped to assist the International Relations and Defence Committee in its inquiry.
This submission was written by Anna Wilton and Jonny Elswood of Falanx Assynt’s Geopolitical Intelligence team. It was delivered to the Committee on 4 September 2020, the day before the scheduled beginning of intra-Afghan talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban.
Summary
This submission will address the following seven key areas as outlined in the Committee’s call for evidence. In each area we provide a detailed assessment of the present situation, and analysis of its trajectory in the coming months and years.
Afghanistan’s Geopolitical Environment
*The Taliban is addressed in section 6 below
Afghanistan’s Domestic Context
Afghanistan’s Geopolitical Environment
1. Which regional and global powers are playing the most significant role in Afghanistan’s political and security environment? What scope is there for that role to be more positive and constructive than it has been in the past?
Numerous regional and global powers strive to play influential roles in Afghanistan’s domestic affairs, primarily because of the broader international security implications of the long-running conflict and instability in the country.
The armed non-state actors that have operated in Afghanistan in the lead up to and years since the Taliban’s removal from power in 2001, including numerous Salafist-jihadist organisations, have become major foreign policy concerns both for regional actors, such as Pakistan, and for global powers further afield. The conflict has mainly embroiled the US and its coalition partners since 2001, thus presenting an opportunity for Iran to undermine the US agenda amid tense bilateral relations. Other regional actors, particularly India and China, are also increasingly keen to expand their influence in the country, partly driven by geostrategic competition with one another.
Afghanistan’s largely untapped mineral wealth has contributed to international attention, but the country’s geostrategic setting and importance for regional security are of greater concern to international actors. Finally, Afghanistan’s ethnic and sectarian demographics continue to attract the attention of communities and private donors seeking to expand their influence and support in the country and wider region.
1 a) Regional Powers: Pakistan and Iran
Pakistan
Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan is chiefly derived through the military and intelligence services, and their indirect relationship with the Taliban. This initially evolved out of shared sympathies between the mujahedeen in the 1980s, and Pakistan’s overtly Islamist leader Zia al-Huq. Nowadays, the Taliban’s Shura Council – its highest decision-making body – is based in the Pakistani city of Quetta, and Islamist elements in the Pakistani security services sustain ties with the semi-autonomous Haqqani Network, whose senior leaders are members of this council. Besides the sectarian sympathies some members of the Pakistani security forces have for the Taliban cause, Islamabad also sees maintaining a level of influence over the group as a way of countering fears of encirclement by India, and sustaining security and financial ties with the United States.
Pakistan has periodically used these links to facilitate negotiations, such as US-Taliban talks held in Abu Dhabi in December 2018, and has hosted delegations of Taliban and Afghan political leaders in recent years. That said, the security establishment in Pakistan has been cautious not to jeopardise its strategically advantageous connection to the Taliban by exerting substantial pressure on the group. It has also been reluctant to take steps that risk provoking militant operations on Pakistani soil, such as launching concerted security crackdowns in border areas where militants, including members of the Taliban and Haqqani Network, are based.
Many of its recent interventions have come only as a result of increased US pressure, including Washington’s suspension of security funding in January 2018. This was key, for instance, to securing Islamabad’s release in October 2018 of two senior Taliban commanders, including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who has played a key role in negotiations and this year signed the US-Taliban withdrawal agreement on the Taliban’s behalf. Pakistan’s broader reluctance to exert substantial pressure ultimately limits the leverage Islamabad has over the group’s central leadership, even if there exist lines of communication between security officials and the senior members of the Taliban’s network.
Iran
Iran shares a near-1,000km border with Afghanistan, and around 3.5 million Afghans – nearly one million of them refugees – reside in the country. The two countries also share historic cultural and linguistic ties. As such, Iran has a long-held interest in its neighbour’s affairs, made more acute by the presence of US forces there.
Tehran has long sought to increase its influence in Afghanistan, illustrated most recently by a joint statement on 21 June 2020 between the two nations. In the statement, Kabul and Tehran announced they had agreed to finalise a strategic cooperation pact within the next three months, including promises to improve border security, strengthen mutual trade through Iran’s Chabahar port, and facilitate intra-Afghan talks with the Taliban.
Iran’s pact with Kabul at this time points to Tehran’s desire to shape the government’s long-awaited talks with the Taliban. In fact, the joint statement came soon after US forces said on 10 June that they had met their target of reducing troop numbers to 8,600 ahead of schedule. Having failed to impact negotiations ahead of the Taliban’s agreement with the US in February 2020 – despite having sought to do so, for instance by hosting Taliban representatives in Tehran two months earlier – Iran will hope to be more assertive in shaping the country’s future governance.
On President Ghani’s part, meanwhile, the deal with Iran came just one month after he signed a power-sharing agreement with former Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah, ending a protracted political impasse. Coming soon after Ghani secured this deal, the move to strengthen long-term economic and diplomatic relations with Iran will have been intended to assert his credibility as president. The rhetoric around involving Iran more in Taliban talks will also be aimed partly at the US, which excluded Kabul from its own negotiations with the group.
Iran has also developed an important working relationship with the Taliban itself, despite historic rivalry and sectarian differences between the two. Their ties were highlighted by the death of former Taliban leader Mullah Mansour, who was killed by a US drone strike while travelling from Iran to Pakistan in May 2016. The development of bilateral relations has been facilitated by the Taliban’s shift away from attacking Afghanistan’s Shia minority in recent years, as the movement has sought to avoid undermining its claim to represent the interest of all Afghans.
The relationship partly serves as a way for Iran to secure its own future influence in Afghanistan, as it understands the Taliban will remain a strong force in the country in the coming years. Tehran has also credibly provided a level of logistical, financial and materiel support to Taliban fighters. This enables it not only to undermine the government – thus ultimately strengthening the Taliban – but also to weaken Islamic State in the border province of Farah, and to undermine the US campaign against the Taliban at a time of substantial US-Iran tension.
There are limits to how strong the Iran-Taliban relationship of convenience can grow, particularly given sectarian differences and frequent allegations of discrimination against Afghans within Iran. However, Tehran will continue its efforts to grow more influential in Afghanistan over the coming years, as it seeks to capitalise on the US withdrawal and President Ghani’s desire to assert his autonomy from Washington.
1 b) Global Powers: The US, Russia, China, and the Gulf States
The United States
The US has been highly influential in Afghanistan throughout President Ghani’s administrations and those of his predecessor Hamid Karzai, who was initially appointed as an interim premier following the US invasion but remained in office until late 2014. The US quickly asserted military dominance in the country after its invasion, and although it has dramatically reduced its presence there since the Taliban was removed from power, Washington’s desire to suppress militancy in the country has meant it continues to be Kabul’s largest and most vocal financial and diplomatic backer. Also contributing to the US’s interest in Afghanistan is its geostrategic setting (namely its proximity to Iran, China and Russia) and its largely untapped mineral resource wealth.
President Ghani – a former academic and World Bank official previously based in the US - has faced domestic criticism over the extent of influence he permits Washington to exert in Afghanistan. On two occasions, in 2014 and 2020, the US intervened diplomatically to overcome a political impasse in Kabul in the wake of contested election results. On both occasions, Ghani was elected president after a US-brokered compromise with political rivals. The US will initially have viewed Ghani as a reliable ally in Kabul, not least because his professional and academic background set him apart from political rivals with military or paramilitary backgrounds. However, Washington has shown signs of mounting frustration with debilitating infighting within the administration, for instance cutting USD 1 billion in aid in March after Ghani and Abdullah refused to support a unified government. It has also grown increasingly willing to sideline Kabul as it pursues an exit strategy, most notably signing the US-Taliban withdrawal deal in February 2020 without the central government’s involvement.
Ghani’s government has benefited enormously from its relationship with Washington in terms of military and economic support; the vast majority of Afghan public expenditure is funded via foreign donations, chiefly from the US. Nevertheless, its failure to ensure basic security for Afghans even with such backing has attracted strong criticism, including from senior politicians such as Abdullah Abdullah and Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum. Ghani's close ties to the west are also anathema to the Taliban, with which Kabul provisionally expects to begin negotiations on 5 September. The US is likely to try to sustain its strong diplomatic influence as these talks progress, in the hope of facilitating an outcome conducive to US geostrategic and economic interests. That said, Ghani’s attempts to show his autonomy from US direction will complicate these efforts, and Washington’s willingness to use aid as leverage reflects that – at least under the current presidency – its strategy is becoming somewhat less dependent on the administration’s success.
The US has meanwhile increased its direct engagement with the Taliban over the last three years, culminating in the February 2020 withdrawal agreement. After twenty years of conflict, there remains strong distrust between Washington and the group, and indeed the US repeated its rejection of the Taliban’s legitimacy in the text of the agreement. However, their negotiations have served both sides’ agendas for the time being. On Washington’s part, the agreement with the Taliban and facilitation of intra-Afghan talks has allowed the US to hasten its withdrawal from the country as its military presence there loses public support. Meanwhile, for the relatively pragmatic current leadership of the Taliban, a deal with the US has provided a path to the group’s ultimate objective – the removal of western troops from Afghanistan and the re-establishment of a Taliban government in some form.
China and Russia
Today, neither Russia nor China holds meaningful influence in Afghanistan. Russia’s reputation remains marred by the Soviet occupation of the country in the 1980s, while China has remained cautious not to involve itself substantially in Afghan affairs, having seen successive interventions by foreign powers lead to protracted, unpopular and resource-heavy engagements. Afghanistan-based militants are not considered to pose a significant security threat in either country, though Afghan security forces have identified Chinese Uighur Muslims as suspected militants in the eastern border province of Badakhshan – and indeed China has reportedly established a military outpost there.
Both China and Russia have however stepped up their diplomatic engagement in Afghanistan in recent years, seeking to exploit the anticipated US withdrawal to increase their respective regional influence. For instance, Beijing recognised the Taliban as a “political force with a legitimate role” in January 2019, in a bid to increase its role in the US negotiations, while Russia organised a Moscow summit for Afghan officials in November 2018, going on to host a Taliban delegation the next year. Visits to both China and Russia – as well as Iran – allowed the Taliban to strengthen its position while conducting negotiations with the US, but ultimately the group will be aware that neither power can directly help it reach its goals, and this will prevent them playing major roles in future talks.
In June 2020, the Taliban rejected US newspaper reports that a Russian intelligence unit had offered bounties to militants affiliated with the group, in exchange for successful attacks against US-led coalition troops the previous year. The claim, published in the New York Times, also received a mixed response from the US intelligence community despite historic US accusations that Russia has supported Taliban operations. Ultimately, while claims of occasional low-level operational assistance are somewhat credible, the Taliban is capable of operating independently of this, and alleged bounties would not have derailed US efforts to facilitate intra-Afghan talks at such a pivotal stage.
India
India’s core interest in Afghanistan stems from its concerns about militants’ operations in the country and the potential for these to develop into a broader regional threat. These concerns will become increasingly valid in the coming years, in the wake of the Taliban’s agreement in February to prevent foreign militants from using Afghan territory as a hub for international operations.
The UN reported in July that as many as 6,000 Pakistani militants in Afghanistan have links to – or are members of – IS. It is therefore plausible that there will be an influx of militants to border areas of Pakistan as the Taliban increases pressure on these militants – ostensibly to fulfil its pledge to the US, but largely to secure its own control over Afghan territory. In turn, India will be concerned that any rise in India-Pakistan tensions could increase the threat of attacks within India – primarily in Kashmir. Delhi likely fears that the Pakistani security forces will ease their crackdown on militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan should bilateral tensions rise, allowing non-state groups greater freedom of operation.
IS also has a longstanding intention of capitalising on developments in Kashmir, given that these are particularly emotive for Muslims in the region. Its previous propaganda has for instance seized on allegations that the Indian government is seeking to alter the demographics in country’s only Muslim-majority region. IS will hope to capitalise on anger among local jihadists to increase recruitment, including by conducting attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir, and its ability to do so is likely to rise if fighters currently based in Afghanistan relocate.
India‘s competition with China also drives Delhi’s involvement in Afghanistan. Under a special economic zone agreement with Iran, India has operated the Iranian port of Chabahar since 2018. Its investment there is partly motivated by a desire to operate trade routes northwards into Afghanistan, particularly as China secured a similar deal over the Gwadar port in Pakistan two years earlier. For its part, the US sees India as an increasingly important partner in countering China’s military, economic and technological ascendency in the region. As Washington aims to counterbalance this Chinese influence, it is increasingly likely that it will support India in stepping up investment in Afghan infrastructure.
The Gulf States
In the 1980s, wealthy sympathetic individuals in the Gulf provided crucial sources of revenue for the mujahedeen in their resistance against Soviet forces. Saudi Arabia then became one of only three countries – along with the UAE and Pakistan – to recognise the Taliban government’s legitimacy, and provided it in the 1990s with funding and equipment. This initially increased the influence in Afghanistan of prominent adherents to Wahhabism, a Sunni Islamic doctrine that is common in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and shares aspects with the Deobandi movement of the Taliban.
Riyadh severed diplomatic relations with the Taliban in September 2001 and has increased its criticism of countries that continue to provide a level of support for the movement – chiefly Iran, Qatar and Pakistan – since Mohammed bin Salman was appointed as Crown Prince in 2017. This is primarily intended to undermine Tehran and Doha and to strengthen Saudi ties to the US. Saudi funding has therefore grown far less significant over the last 20 years. This has however had limited impact on the Taliban, which is able to raise revenue from its network of supporters in Pakistan - as well as from some remaining private Wahhabi donors in the Gulf – and through taxation and the illicit drug trade.
Despite Saudi efforts to undermine Qatar’s influence, including by attempting to host US-Taliban talks, Doha has long played a mediating role in the Afghanistan conflict, and of the Gulf countries it maintains the strongest influence in Afghan affairs. Doha allowed the Taliban to open a political office in Qatar in 2013 and has facilitated backchannel – and later open – discussions between Kabul, Washington and the Taliban since 2016. This is partly intended to ensure continued US support for the Qatari government, which remains under an economic and diplomatic blockade by other Gulf countries, but nevertheless Doha has proven to be a credible mediator, which the Taliban considers more neutral than other regional actors.
1c) Conclusion
The landmark withdrawal agreement between the US and the Taliban in February demonstrated there exists some scope for constructive negotiations between actors in Afghanistan. Qatar is likely to continue to play an important role as a neutral third-party mediator in coming years, facilitating further talks, though reaching any negotiated settlement will remain extremely difficult. Considering Afghanistan’s geostrategic importance and its symbolic place amid some of the world’s most fractious rivalries, the prospects for substantial improvements in national stability, security and development in the next two to five years are limited. It is however plausible that regional competition for influence, as well as US pressure, will drive infrastructure investment from various parties, including China, Pakistan and India, within this timeframe.
2. What are the prospects for the implementation of the peace agreement between the US and the Taliban signed in February? To what extent have its provisions been implemented, and what are the principal challenges?
The US withdrawal is not predicated on intra-Afghan talks reaching a conclusion and a comprehensive ceasefire being signed. It is therefore more appropriate to describe it as a step towards a deal than as a peace agreement in and of itself.
The deal reached in February stipulates that the US will withdraw its forces from Afghanistan within 14 months, in exchange for the Taliban promising to prevent Afghan soil being used to threaten the security of the US and its allies; agreeing to begin talks with the Afghan government on 10 March 2020; and discussing a permanent ceasefire, to be announced when a political roadmap for Afghanistan’s future has been agreed upon.
2a) To what extent have its provisions been implemented?
Some short-term provisions of the agreement have already been implemented. The US met – and exceeded – its commitment to draw down forces to 8,600 and withdraw from five military bases within 135 days of signing the deal. The Taliban met its commitment to release 1,000 imprisoned Afghan security personnel, while Kabul has at the time of writing released 4,993 of the 5,000 Taliban prisoners it must free before intra-Afghan talks begin. The remaining seven, whose release western powers has objected to given the detainees’ roles in insider attacks against coalition troops, are to be transferred to Doha. The Taliban has also conducted operations against Islamic State (IS) in Kunar province, claiming in mid-March to have ousted the group from the area – though this was overstated – and has thus made some progress towards weakening a key threat to US security and that of its allies.
Other key short-term provisions have not yet been implemented. Most importantly, intra-Afghan talks, originally due to be held on 10 March 2020 according to the agreement, have not yet been held. They have been delayed chiefly as a result of Kabul’s reluctance to release the high-profile prisoners named by the Taliban, a difficulty that arose primarily because Kabul was not party to the February agreement. With the prisoner release now having been implemented, at the time of writing a first round of talks is anticipated to begin on 5 September or shortly thereafter.
2b) What are the prospects for the implementation of the peace agreement, and what are the principal challenges?
Agreeing on a political roadmap acceptable to both Kabul and the Taliban will pose the principal challenge, and there is no prospect of a permanent ceasefire being secured before a political framework is agreed upon. The Taliban’s strategy of relying on its military strength to secure concessions has proven successful, and it refused to offer major compromises even when it was in a substantially weaker position than it is at present. It thus has no incentive to change tactics, and will continue to withhold a ceasefire until it achieves its political goals.
As far as the implementation of the US commitments is concerned, a change of US administration poses the main potential challenge. While a Biden-led administration is unlikely to overturn the present deal on principle, it is likely to delay the pull-out beyond the stipulated 14-month timeframe while it examines the security implications of withdrawing US forces (see Question 3). Such a delay would reduce the Taliban’s incentive to comply with its own obligations, potentially stalling intra-Afghan dialogue as well as fuelling a renewed increase in the threat to US interests in Afghanistan.
3. What will be the likely direction of the Trump Administration’s policy to Afghanistan up until the election? What might US policy to Afghanistan look like under each of the US presidential candidates?
3a) What will be the likely direction of the Trump Administration’s policy to Afghanistan up until the election?
The current US administration has prioritised creating conditions under which it can withdraw US forces from Afghanistan and thus fulfil a key promise of President Trump’s 2016 electoral campaign. This objective will remain the main driver of the US approach to Afghanistan ahead of November’s polls. Since it secured a withdrawal deal with the Taliban in February, the US has put pressure on Kabul to release 5,000 Taliban prisoners - a precondition for intra-Afghan talks - and resolve the post-election standoff between President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, which among other things prevented Kabul forming a coherent negotiating team. Kabul has now approved the final prisoner releases, with a first round of discussions between the government and Taliban delegations in Doha now expected on 5 September or shortly thereafter according to government sources. Brokering intra-Afghan talks was a key goal of the Trump administration, as February’s agreement made a further US troop withdrawal contingent on such negotiations beginning.
If a first round of talks is held on 5 September as planned, Trump will withdraw further US forces before the vote, aiming to repatriate as many as 4,600 personnel in line with a statement he made in late July. Washington will also pressure Kabul to agree to further talks following the first round, although this is likely to be contentious and will not make tangible progress, to avoid jeopardising the withdrawal of the remaining US forces by April. The Taliban will be willing to accept further talks to avoid jeopardising the withdrawal process, but should Kabul be seen as preventing progress in the coming months Washington may renew threats to withhold aid funding, which it issued in response to the dispute between Ghani and Abdullah in March.
3b) What might US policy to Afghanistan look like under each of the US presidential candidates?
Should Trump secure another term in office he will continue to prioritise a withdrawal. It is therefore likely that the drawdown will continue on schedule over the next eight months, despite the friction this will cause with other NATO members and partners with forces currently deployed under Operation Resolute Support. A lack of progress in intra-Afghan talks is unlikely to slow the pace of the drawdown, though a major Taliban attack on US personnel could prompt a halt. If the pull-out proceeds as planned it is likely that the administration will seek to maintain a limited presence in the form of special operations personnel capable of conducting targeted operations against actors still considered to pose a threat to US security, chiefly IS and al-Qaeda. Indeed, on the day the US-Taliban agreement was signed, Washington and Kabul signed a joint declaration of US support for the Afghan security forces and ongoing military cooperation against international terrorist groups, reflecting the continued focus on this objective despite the promised drawdown. Enduring security concerns mean the administration will not prioritise fulfilling its February agreement to review sanctions when intra-Afghan talks begin, or its pledge to begin engaging with UNSC members over lifting sanctions on Taliban members.
Democrat candidate Joe Biden’s position on US deployments in Afghanistan has varied during his political career. However, he has expressed a similar desire to withdraw US forces and criticised the Pentagon’s previous focus on the Taliban, arguing that efforts to combat al-Qaeda ought to be prioritised. Since Biden and Trump are somewhat aligned in their ambition to repatriate US personnel, a Biden administration is unlikely to abandon the incumbent administration’s withdrawal deal automatically. Biden’s campaign statements also show he is ambivalent about the survival of the Kabul government, and he has explicitly said he does not consider the US to have a “nation-building” role in Afghanistan. As such there is no indication that he would consider it necessary for a US deployment to remain in the country to prevent the Taliban ultimately returning to power in place of the current administration.
That said, a change of presidency will slow the withdrawal process, as the new administration will be keen to re-examine the domestic security implications of exiting, particularly focusing on the potential implications for the international threats posed by IS and al-Qaeda. Afghanistan would not be a policy priority in the short term, so it is unlikely that the new government’s approach would be defined before the summer of 2021, and US forces would remain in Afghanistan at least until that point. Beyond then, a Biden-led administration would hope to repair relations with international partners, meaning any withdrawal would be conducted in consultation with other countries operating in Afghanistan. Biden would also likely heighten engagement with Pakistan – which the Obama administration recognised as the most significant source of international influence over the Taliban – and increase pressure on India to provide aid and infrastructure support, particularly as the latter would also help counterbalance China’s growing regional influence, which will be a vital strategic consideration for any US administration in the coming years.
4. Which non-state actors are most active in Afghanistan, and how significant a role are they playing? What is their relationship with foreign and domestic political actors?
The Afghan government said in 2018 that 21 militant groups opposing the government were active in the country at that time. However, the majority of these have only limited membership and lack influence in the country at large. With the exception of the Taliban, which is by far the largest and most influential non-state actor in Afghanistan, no non-state actor has demonstrated significant influence or structural integrity in the country in recent years.
The Taliban’s geographic reach, objectives and capabilities are analysed in greater detail in Section 6 below. Aside from the Taliban, the two highest-profile non-state actors are al-Qaeda and Islamic State Khorasan Province (herein referred to as IS). In addition, several small Pakistani militant groups operate in the country, but do not hold long term political ambitions relevant to Kabul.
4 a) Al-Qaeda
The US military has indicated it suspects the emir of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to be based in eastern Afghanistan. It is unlikely that this claim would be made public without credible intelligence supporting it, and the assertion therefore points to the continued presence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. However, the group’s size has proven difficult to quantify. For instance, the US estimated in 2010 that al-Qaeda in Afghanistan numbered between 50 and 100 fighters, but this was shown to be significantly conservative after a joint US-Afghan military raid on a base in Kandahar in 2015, during which US officials estimated more than 160 members of the group were killed.
Attempts to assess al-Qaeda's numbers in Afghanistan are further complicated by the fact it is allied with numerous other jihadist groups, and, likely at the Taliban’s request, has rarely highlighted its own presence in the region in public statements. Regardless, the group is certainly significantly smaller than it was before the 2001 invasion, and since then its reach and organisational structure have been severely reduced by coalition operations, including drone strikes.
Al-Qaeda's decline in size in Afghanistan is partly attributable to the fact the country is no longer the most prominent theatre in the global jihadist movement. Previously, individuals seeking to travel abroad to join the jihadist movement, particularly Arab fighters, would have entered Afghanistan more frequently, especially given the region’s symbolic significance in Islam. However, conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Sahel are now more accessible, higher-profile, and involve larger factions of the al-Qaeda network. Its factions in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic Maghreb, for instance, are now significantly larger, and al-Qaeda now has limited influence in Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda nevertheless maintains its historic relationship with both the Haqqani Network and the Taliban, whose current leader Haibatullah Akhunzada the group describes as the legitimate leader of the global jihadist movement. It is therefore credible the group may grow in size again in the coming years. While the Taliban has nominally agreed to expel foreign groups from Afghanistan, its efforts to date have focused on its rival, IS, rather than al-Qaeda. The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan – combined with the prospect of a strengthened Taliban – raises the risk that al-Qaeda could gradually rebuild its organisational capacity. The group is unlikely to use Afghanistan to plan attacks on US interests in the next two years, as this would risk jeopardising the planned withdrawal and weakening the al-Qaeda-Taliban relationship. It may however use the country as a safe haven from which to support the activities of its global affiliates and branches, including the Yemen-based AQAP, which remains the most internationally-focused group and the faction most capable of targeting the West.
4 b) Islamic State
IS first developed a foothold in Afghanistan in 2015. It views South Asia as an increasingly important region as it shifts its tactics towards encouraging local insurgencies, following the loss of its self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Syria. Outside its stronghold in Nangarhar province, the group maintains offensive capabilities in the capital, and periodically launches attacks on security forces, civilian targets, western assets and minority groups there.
IS’s efforts to establish direct control over territory putit at odds with the Taliban’s own ambitions of re-establishing official control over Afghanistan, and has prompted a rivalry between the groups. Indeed, IS’s current strategy has sought to attract defections from hard-line Taliban members who oppose the latter’s engagement with the US, and its success in doing so has contributed significantly to its capabilities, particularly in Kabul. In response, the Taliban has sustained pressure on IS in its eastern strongholds over the last two years, and ultimately claimed to have defeated the group in Kunar province after a 14-day operation in March 2020. While a complex IS attack on a prison in Jalalabad five months later demonstrated the group’s continued presence in eastern Afghanistan, its operational capabilities have somewhat declined in recent years as a result of simultaneous (but uncoordinated) efforts by the US and the Taliban.
IS in Afghanistan maintains links with militants in western Pakistan, and there is a risk that its capabilities will grow following the US withdrawal. However, the coming years will also see the Taliban commit to demonstrating its dominance in the country, limiting the space into which IS can expand. Moreover, enduring concerns about the possible international threat from IS mean countries including the US are likely to attempt to secure an arrangement whereby a small number of special forces personnel can remain in the country to continue targeted operations against the group.
4 c) Pakistani Militant Groups
Pakistan has played a critical role in Afghanistan’s recent history, and indeed the original founders of the Afghan Taliban emerged from conservative Islamist institutions (madrasas) in rural Pakistan to become influential in the country in the late 1980s.
Today, several Pakistani militant groups operate to some extent inside Afghanistan, which they have used as a base from which to launch operations inside Pakistan. The border between the two sovereign states is of little symbolic or practical consequence to them. Members of Pakistani militant groups often cross into Afghanistan and embed themselves among the Pashtun community there, beyond the jurisdiction of the Pakistani security forces.
The most important Pakistani militant group active in Afghanistan is the Haqqani Network, which is often considered integrated into the Taliban. While its senior members sit on the Taliban’s Shura Council, and indeed its leader Sirajuddin Haqqani is also the deputy emir of the Taliban, the Haqqani Network also has some level of autonomy. It has been credibly blamed for some of the bloodiest attacks in Afghanistan, including Kabul, in recent years, in part because the group is less in favour of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the US and is therefore less averse to provocative attacks. For instance, the Haqqanis were likely involved in a vehicular explosive attack on Kabul’s diplomatic quarter in June 2017 that killed at least 90 people. It has been credibly reported that the Pakistani security services have had ties to the Haqqanis since the 1980s, but this is officially denied.
A separate entity, the Pakistani Taliban (also known as Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan, or TTP), comprises several armed anti-government resistance groups operating in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. The relatively loose organisation has been weakened by numerous factional splits since the death of then-leader Hakimullah Mehsud in 2013, as well as defections to IS, Pakistani military operations, and targeted US drone strikes that have killed successive TTP leaders. Such operations have significantly reduced the core group’s capabilities and the overall tempo of its activities since 2014. However, two key splinter groups re-joined TTP in August, most likely as a result of the withdrawal deal between the US and TTP’s Afghan counterpart. The factions likely judge that they stand to benefit from the expected strengthening of the Afghan Taliban, and may further coalesce in the coming year. UN and US reports indicate there are several thousand TTP members based inside Afghanistan, but the Pakistani state and occasionally US-led coalition logistics convoys remain their primary targets. The organisation holds very little influence in Afghanistan, and is unlikely to become an important actor there in coming years even if it gains strength domestically.
Finally, several smaller militant groups have a minor footprint in eastern Afghanistan, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Similarly to TTP, there will be members of such groups living within Afghanistan’s borders, but their main focus is on grievances specific to Pakistan, such as India’s actions in Muslim-majority Kashmir. Such groups have little to no influence in Afghan affairs.
4 d) Other Groups
There exist other small militant groups inside Afghanistan whose operations in the wider region have attracted attention from government and coalition forces. These groups pursue agendas in neighbouring countries, and beyond their symbolic affiliations with al-Qaeda and pledges of allegiance to the Taliban are not considered significant groups within Afghanistan.
The most well-known is the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which is active along Afghanistan’s border with North Waziristan, Pakistan. It advocates for separatism for the Muslim Uighurs of western China, and has claimed numerous attacks within China. The TIP’s leadership has known links to al-Qaeda and by extension the Taliban, for instance its emir was formerly a military commander for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. As with most militant groups in the border region, however, its capabilities and command structure have been severely weakened by counter-terrorism efforts, and it holds negligible political influence in Afghanistan more broadly.
The same can be said for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its splinter faction Islamic Jihad Union, several of whose leaders have been killed in drone strikes in the Afghan-Pakistani border region in recent years. The Taliban has previously conducted attacks in northern areas such as Balkh province in the hope of increasing support among Uzbek and Tajik jihadist groups, including IMU, which was previously aligned with the Taliban but divided into rival factions loyal to the Taliban and IS. This has not been a focus recently, but the Taliban may aim to conduct further major attacks in the north should IS show signs of gaining strength there.
Afghanistan’s Domestic context
5. What is the outlook for the May 2020 power sharing deal between President Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah? Can Afghanistan successfully operate as a multi-ethnic state?
5a) What is the outlook for the May 2020 power sharing deal between President Ashraf Ghani and Dr Abdullah Abdullah?
The power-sharing agreement faces substantial challenges as a result of the longstanding rivalry between Ghani and Abdullah, who has unsuccessfully run for the presidency three times since 2009. This rivalry led to eight months of political deadlock in Kabul following the September 2019 presidential election, in which both claimed to have secured a majority. Ghani and Abdullah finally signed a power-sharing agreement in May 2020, largely as a result of intense US pressure, which helped broker a similar deal after 2014 elections. However, disputes between them, and their respective political support bases, continue to severely undermine domestic governance. A cabinet has still not yet been formed, and disputes have also hindered vital provincial government appointments.
The agreement is however unlikely to collapse in the coming 6-12 months, despite these challenges. Indeed, tensions between Ghani and Abdullah were high for several years ahead of the 2019 election, and while disunity significantly weakened the government’s ability to make progress on key issues such as tackling poverty, improving security and reducing corruption, they were insufficient to cause the 2014 deal to break down. US pressure on both parties, including threats to withhold aid, was a key factor in preventing this, as maintaining a national unity government was vital to making progress towards Kabul-Taliban talks. This remains the case for now – though the US’s decision to use aid funding as leverage this year reflects increasing frustration with Kabul infighting – and similar pressure is therefore likely to preserve the deal in the short to medium term.
Infighting is however likely to result in resignations and factionalism that will continue to significantly undermine governance. Abdullah maintains presidential ambitions and will likely seek, as head of the High Council for National Reconciliation, to minimise Ghani’s role in intra-Afghan talks intended to create a roadmap for a new political system. The appointment in May of former general and Vice President Abdul Rashid Dostum as marshal of the Afghan armed forces will also cause tension and further divisions. Dostum retains significant support among Uzbek communities in the north and has consistently criticised Ghani for failing to improve security there in recent years. His continued use of this tactic will fuel existing ethnic tensions, within both the government and between minorities and the Pashtun-majority population.
The likelihood of a breakdown will increase in the longer term, particularly if a sharp reduction in the US military presence strengthens the Taliban’s negotiating position. While Abdullah is of mixed Tajik and Pashtun ethnicity he is widely seen as a representative of the Tajik community, and the Taliban views his political faction as a key rival. The Taliban is far from aligned with Ghani’s faction, but as a movement that originated in southern and eastern Pashtun areas it will be somewhat more willing to hold discussions with political figures it judges will prioritise Pashtun interests, and may be more willing to offer concessions in this context. It is therefore plausible that the Taliban will demand Abdullah’s role is reduced as a condition for talks following a US withdrawal. Any perception that Ghani is considering offering such a concession to facilitate progress would risk causing a major split in the government.
Failure to make progress towards a political settlement that includes the Taliban will also risk increasing tensions in the long term, as the Taliban will seek to strengthen its position by expanding its military control in the north, primarily at the expense of Abdullah and his allies. Afghan security forces will struggle to respond effectively to an increased Taliban campaign in the north – particularly in the absence of US military support – meaning any such campaign would resurrect longstanding accusations that Ghani prioritises security in Pashtun-dominated areas.
5b) Can Afghanistan successfully operate as a multi-ethnic state?
Progress in this area will ultimately require the development of a new constitution and representative electoral system, agreed upon in consultation with the Taliban, which would need to accept the representation of non-Pashtun groups in government. It is therefore simply implausible that the country will take major steps towards functioning successfully as a multi-ethnic state, at least in the next two years.
Ghani has made some effort to limit political tensions by nominating cabinet ministers from key political factions that did not support him ahead of last year’s election, including backers of former president Karzai and an opposing presidential candidate. Hanif Atmar, whom Ghani appointed as acting foreign minister in April. However, most of these figures are ethnic Pashtuns. Ghani may have taken these steps in the expectation that the cabinet will contain representatives of other major ethnic groups as May’s power-sharing deal gave Abdullah’s coalition control over half the cabinet posts. Regardless, his own appointments reflect little commitment to improving the balance of ethnic political representation. Ghani, Abdullah and Dostum have strong Pashtun, Tajik and Uzbek political support bases, respectively, and in the absence of a cohesive, stable government there is an enduring risk that each of these key figures will prioritise appealing to their own supporters.
Some groups – such as the Shia-majority Hazara, the third-largest ethnic group – will remain significantly underrepresented at a national level in coming years. Hazara leaders have demanded to be included in any negotiations with the Taliban, having been severely persecuted under the Taliban’s rule on both ethnic and sectarian grounds, and tensions will therefore rise if they are poorly represented in intra-Afghan talks. Leaders of northern Uzbek and Tajik communities, meanwhile, criticised Ghani’s previous administration for allegedly prioritising Pashtun interests. Grievances among these groups are particularly likely to rise if the Taliban launches a major offensive in the north to strengthen its positions in negotiations, leading former warlords in these areas, such as Tajik warlord Ismail Khan or former Balkh governor Atta Mohammed Nur, to mobilise their own militias to compensate for inadequate support from the overstretched central security forces.
6. What is the current strength and geographic reach of the Taliban? What are its aims and underlying motivation, and how united is it as a group? What are its links to non-state actors such as al Qaeda and to external powers?
6a) What is the current strength and geographic reach of the Taliban?
The most recent publicly available data on enemy-initiated attacks, covering the last three months of 2019, showed that more attempted and successful attacks – those that caused casualties – occurred in the Q4 2019 than in any other fourth quarter since recording began in 2010. NATO’s Operation Resolute Support has since halted the publication of this quarterly data. However, no major new offensives have been launched against the group since the US-Taliban deal was signed in February, meaning its strength is unlikely to have declined over this period. In fact, the Taliban will likely have been strengthened by Kabul’s release of almost 5,000 Taliban prisoners since the end of February, including members accused of planning and coordinating major attacks, and the simultaneous withdrawal of an estimated 3,400 US troops. It therefore almost certainly remains strong enough at present to sustain a higher tempo of successful attacks than it has in the last decade.
In terms of the Taliban’s geographic reach, a study conducted by the BBC between August and November 2017 found the group had full control of 14 districts and an active physical presence in a further 263, or 66% of the country. These figures reflected a significantly greater presence than previously estimated. Full government control – reflected by the absence of an open Taliban presence – existed in only 122 districts, chiefly in the centre, north and north-east. The group has captured several further districts since the BBC study was released, including several in the north-western province of Faryab and the north-eastern provinces of Baghlan and Takhar. Afghan forces however claimed to have recaptured 13 districts across the country in 2019, suggesting the BBC figures still provide a broadly accurate representation of the group’s presence.
6b) What are its aims and underlying motivation?
The Taliban’s objectives when it emerged in the mid-1990s were to restore security and the rule of law, which had deteriorated following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent conflict between warlords driven by personal and ethnic tribal agenda; to reduce the rampant corruption seen under then-president Rabbani; and ultimately to enforce Sharia once in power, having promoted its aim of restoring peace and stability based on the principles of Islam.
Its current short-term aims are to secure the release of Taliban prisoners and more importantly the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country. It meanwhile aims to continue undermining Afghan support for foreign troops and the Kabul administration, including by providing public services in Taliban-held areas, and to maintain a parallel administration to effectively portray itself as legitimate alternative government. To this end the group’s Shura council oversees nine commissions similar to the ministries that were in place during the Taliban’s prior rule, which focus on areas including economics, education and health. It also operates a shadow government through three administrative organs, while the military commission appoints shadow governors and commanders for each province.
In the long term, its aims are to regain full control over the country and to re-establish Islamic government based on Sharia. Under this system of governance, it would aim to reduce the importance of tribal structures and promote senior religious figures, rather than tribal elders, as the key political leaders in society. This partly reflects a continuation of the agenda that brought the Taliban to power in 1996 but will also be based on the judgement that the withdrawal of foreign forces risks further decreasing stability and heightening competition between ethnic groups. This will in turn undermine the Taliban’s ability, as a group with Pashtun origins, to attract support outside Pashtun-dominated areas, as locals increasingly align with local tribes or ethnic communities. Weakening tribal structures will therefore be key to increasing the Taliban’s ability to govern the country. This would however require the drafting of a new constitution based on Islamic law, and the group will also seek to replace the current voting system with a more consultative, Shura-based system.
6c) How united is the Taliban as a group?
At present the vast majority of the group is united behind the leadership and objectives of Haibatullah Akhunzada. Internal splits and defections significantly weakened the group after it emerged in 2015 that the Taliban’s leadership had concealed the death of founder Mullah Omar for several years, and appointed his deputy, Mullah Mansour, as a replacement. Mansour’s appointment initially prompted criticism from Mullah Omar’s family members, who claimed Omar should have been succeeded by his son, Yaqoob, and the group split four months later in an indication of broader discontent within the movement over how the succession was handled. These divisions have however been largely repaired under Akhunzada, who succeeded Mansour in May 2016 and has appointed a cadre of influential “old guard” Taliban commanders, such as Mullah Baradar to senior positions, to help contain splits between factions. This has in turn allowed the group to take a more pragmatic approach towards talks with the US.
However, some Taliban hardliners, including Yaqoob, fundamentally oppose the prospect of legitimising the US’s presence in Afghanistan by participating in negotiations. However, Akhunzada has sought to minimise internal dissent by refusing to compromise on long-held “red lines” without first securing major concessions – for instance refusing to engage with Kabul until all 5,000 named prisoners are released – thus reassuring these figures that the group remains committed to Mullah Omar’s ideology despite engagement with the US. Akhunzada also appointed Baradar – a highly influential figure who had a close relationship with Omar – to head the group’s political office and lead negotiations in January 2019, and named Yaqoob as head of the Taliban’s military faction in July, to further reinforce his commitment to the group’s founding ideals. These efforts have been largely successful, though a small number of hardliners continue to oppose any US talks and will be increasingly likely to break away from the group, with some defecting to IS, if the Taliban is seen to offer even minor concessions when talks with Kabul begin.
6d) What are its links to non-state actors such as al Qaeda and to external powers?
The Taliban has strong religious and ideological ties to al-Qaeda, and there is an established relationship between both groups’ leaders – including current leader Haibatullah Akhunzada – with al-Qaeda having recognised former Taliban leader Mullah Omar as the leader of the global jihadist movement. Al-Qaeda strongly supports the Taliban’s efforts to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, not least because a drawdown will relieve pressure on its own fighters. A withdrawal will also help advance the group’s long-term agenda by increasing the likelihood that the Taliban will return to political dominance in Afghanistan, which al-Qaeda will hope allows it to use the country as a safe haven from which to support the activities of its global affiliates and branches, including the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which remains the most internationally-focused group and the faction most capable of targeting the West. It therefore issued a statement welcoming the Taliban’s “victory” over the US after the signing of the US-Taliban deal in February. This came despite the Taliban’s agreement, in return for the US withdrawal, to prevent any individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the US or its allies.
The Taliban is unlikely to expel al-Qaeda from Afghanistan over the next year, given the longstanding ties between the two, and will prioritise targeting IS as this would fulfil the US’s requirements while weakening a Taliban rival. However, its ties to al-Qaeda now bring fewer practical advantages than they did when its strength was greater and the group was capable of fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan. This ultimately reduces the Taliban’s incentive to protect bilateral relations. The Taliban is also no longer fully supportive of al-Qaeda’s global jihadist agenda and is unlikely to support its use Afghan territory to coordinate attacks in the West. It may therefore be willing to conduct limited operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan in the long term to further its agenda of forcing a US withdrawal and securing its own future as a political group. That said, it is most likely to attempt to facilitate the movement of al-Qaeda militants into border areas of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan beforehand, as this would allow it to conduct limited operations without undermining its relationship with al-Qaeda.
The group maintains communications channels with various countries, including Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, as a result of its current political activities and a legacy of its rule in the 1990s (see section 1). Of the Gulf states Qatar has the strongest direct ties, as it hosts the Taliban’s political office and is considered a neutral third-party facilitator of negotiations Saudi Arabia and the UAE have however also played a greater role in the peace process in recent years, reflecting US efforts to increase their role in facilitating talks. Abu Dhabi for instance hosted a Taliban-US meeting in December 2018, with Saudi representatives also in attendance. Pakistan maintains links to the group primarily because the Haqqani Network, whose leaders sit on the Taliban’s Shura Council, is based in the country and has credible links to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency.
However, none of these international actors has sufficient influence over the group to force it to change its military approach or compromise on key points of its agenda. Indeed, the US attempted unsuccessfully to force a change of approach by unexpectedly suspending talks in September 2019, after the Taliban admitted killing a US soldier. The Taliban responded by stepping up attacks on US forces and ultimately secured the US release of three prominent imprisoned members of the Haqqani Network as a goodwill gesture, before Washington restarted talks in December.
7. What is the outlook for talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban following the US-Taliban peace agreement? What role can or should the Taliban play in government?
NB: At the time of writing, intra-Afghan talks between the government and the Taliban were expected shortly.
7a) What is the outlook for talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban following the US-Taliban peace agreement?
The Taliban will hold initial talks with Kabul now the prisoner release is completed, with a first round is expected to begin on 5 September – though there is precedent for last-minute delays. While this would represent substantial progress, it remains highly implausible that the Taliban and the current government will be able to reach agreement on a political roadmap and permanent ceasefire in at least the next two years.
The Taliban has little genuine interest in negotiating with Kabul, seeing this chiefly as a way of securing prisoner releases and full US withdrawal. It will be aware that its long-term goal of re-establishing Islamic government based on Sharia is incompatible with the Kabul administration’s objectives. It will therefore anticipate talks breaking down when such demands come under discussion. It will however work to secure a full US withdrawal before this point, which will increase its already substantial ability to weaken the government’s hold on power by seizing control of new territory.
Talks will however be held between now and April if the Taliban believes the US remains committed to withdrawing by that point. The potential for a breakdown in the next eight months will therefore be slightly lower if President Trump secures a victory November’s election than if the polls produce a change of administration. They are however likely to fall apart before next April if the US signals it is no longer willing to withdraw according to the terms of the February agreement.
Should Washington fulfil its promise to end its presence in the country there is also a high likelihood of talks disintegrating next year, as the Taliban would then have little incentive to continue discussing complex issues such as a new constitution, on which there is little prospect of making progress. Under such circumstances the group would likely increase its military campaign against Afghan security forces and government interests in the hope of rendering the current administration’s position untenable.
7b) What role can or should the Taliban play in government?
It will inevitably be necessary for the Taliban to play a role in government, as it will not be possible for an Afghan government to succeed unless the Taliban supports the political system. The Afghan security forces are not capable of significantly reducing the Taliban’s military control, the current political system is not capable of improving living conditions sufficiently to dramatically reduce support for the group, and there is very little appetite for a renewed foreign intervention given the financial and human cost of campaigns to date. The Taliban is therefore in a strong position to demand a substantial role, and security will not improve until it secures this.
A government with significant Taliban representation will not fully accommodate western demands over political processes and safeguards for human rights. However, renewed international pressure, for instance in the form of sanctions, trade embargos, the withdrawal of aid funding and withholding of diplomatic recognition, may succeed in securing limited Taliban compromises, for instance on issues of women’s rights and education. This will also somewhat reduce the likelihood of the group resuming a radical sectarian or ethnic agenda, for instance returning to persecuting Shia Hazara as it did during its period of rule in the 1990s. Ultimately, however, the group will judge a second western intervention to be highly unlikely unless the security of western interests comes under direct threat. It will thus have little incentive to offer major compromises having secured a withdrawal.
Received 4th September 2020