Written evidence submitted by THE SENTRY (WGN0017)
This submission reflects the views of the contributor, who is responsible for the accuracy of all claims made in the submission. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign Affairs Committee. As a written submission accepted by a parliamentary committee, it is protected in the usual way by parliamentary privilege. No legal or other action may be taken against any person on any grounds arising from the fact that they have provided such material.
I. Introduction
1. In April 2022, the UK Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) launched its latest inquiry “The Wagner Group and Beyond: Proxy Private Military Companies” (Inquiry). The Sentry welcomes this Inquiry as a timely opportunity to gather evidence on the Wagner Group and proxy private military companies and to consider where the UK’s approach to stifling them can be improved.
2. The Sentry has been investigating the Wagner Group’s activities since it arrived in the Central African Republic (CAR) in early 2018 under the framework of a cooperation agreement between the governments of CAR and the Russian Federation. Since 2020, The Sentry has published investigative reports exposing mass atrocities committed by Wagner mercenaries,[1], [2], [3] which also gave rise to several reports published by other NGOs, medias, and the United Nations.[4], [5], [6], [7]
3. The Sentry’s ongoing investigative work into the Wagner Group’s activities in CAR aims to alert and inform a growing number of stakeholders about the Wagner Group’s deep motives in Africa and its modus operandi and to formulate innovative recommendations to counter the threats this transnational criminal organization represents to peace and security worldwide. This submission to the UK Foreign Affairs Committee is an integral part of that effort.
II. About The Sentry
4. The Sentry is an investigative and policy organization that seeks to disable multinational predatory networks that benefit from violent conflict, repression, and kleptocracy.
5. Launched in 2016, The Sentry produces hard-hitting investigative reports and dossiers on individuals and entities connected to grand corruption and violence. The organization advocates for the use of tools of financial and legal pressure, including anti-money laundering and illicit finance measures, targeted network sanctions, criminal prosecutions, compliance actions by banks and other private companies, and asset recovery.
6. Co-founded by George Clooney and John Prendergast, The Sentry is a strategic partner of the Clooney Foundation for Justice. Learn more at www.thesentry.org.
III. The nature of the CAR-Russia agreement and the role of the Wagner Group
7. The Wagner Group (Wagner)’s arrival in CAR is the result of a series of meetings, agreements, and initiatives that reflect the Russian Federation’s intention to expand its influence in Africa, including in CAR. The Sentry is not aware of a specific agreement between Wagner and the Central African government, however. The Russian Federation and Central African authorities have both denied the existence and presence of the Wagner in the country.
8. According to Russia’s official version, military instructors have been sent to train Central African armed forces to use weapons delivered by the Russian Federation after validation by the United Nations Security Council and within the framework of a defense agreement signed with the Central African authorities.[8], [9] Russian authorities refer to their national legislation that prohibits the activity of mercenary groups, thus denying the existence of Wagner.
9. The Central African authorities’ official version aligns with the Russian one. They deny signing any agreement with Wagner.[10] Instead, they explain that they called on their Russian partner to help in the fight against armed groups that threatened the country’s stability.[11] The Sentry observes, however, that officials do not deprive themselves of publicly showing their sympathy towards Wagner (see Annex 1: Fidèle Gouandjika’s Facebook post).
10. Based on its investigations and other documented reports, The Sentry finds that since 2018, Wagner has been operating like a transnational criminal organization.[12] It has become the symbol of Russia’s expanding influence in Africa.[13], [14]
11. In September 2020, the US Treasury took actions against “the network of Kremlin-connected Russian operative Yevgeniy Prigozhin … by targeting entities and individuals working on behalf of Prigozhin to advance Russia’s influence” in a number of African states, including CAR.[15] In December 2021, the European Council imposed sanctions against Wagner and individuals linked to this organization for serious rights abuses across Africa, including in CAR.[16] In March 2022, the UK also imposed sanctions on Wagner for participation in military operations in Ukraine.[17], [18]
A Russian oligarch said to be close to Putin, Prigozhin is known to be Wagner’s manager and financier.[19], [20] The Sentry was able to confirm that Prigozhin met with Central African stakeholders, including armed group leaders, in Khartoum, Sudan, between 2018 and 2019 as part of Wagner’s efforts to reach a deal—the so-called Khartoum agreement—between armed groups and the Central African government. This deal, according to The Sentry, aimed to trade away President Touadéra reelection while securing mining access for Wagner.[21], [22], [23], [24]
12. In CAR, Wagner’s activities focus on three main pillars: security and politics, business, and propaganda. Each component has been embodied by individuals or entities belonging to Wagner’s international network. To take root in the country, the three interconnected strands rely heavily on President Touadéra’s inner circle, which is playing the role of guarantor of Wagner’s presence and activities.
A. Security and Politics
13. Wagner’s influence over CAR can be seen through the power its top leaders hold over the political and security apparatus, all with the blessing of the Central African presidency.
14. In the first three years of Wagner’s presence in CAR, President Touadéra appointed Valery Zakharov, Wagner’s top representative in the country, as his security advisor.[25] Zakharov’s role has been described by sources interviewed by The Sentry as similar to the position of a Russian ambassador “who keeps close links with the Russian authorities.”[26] As a result, some described leadership rivalries between Zakharov and Vladimir Titorenko, the appointed Russian ambassador to CAR at the time.[27] In the meantime, Zakharov was also representing President Touadéra in various national political and security processes with the aim of strengthening the CAR regime’s power and securing Wagner’s long-term prospects in CAR.[28]
The Sentry has documented how Wagner’s top command structure has diverted political and security processes sponsored by international donors (e.g., elections, peace agreements, disarmament programs, and UN-backed operations) to serve Russia’s geostrategic objectives and the financial interests of the organization.[29] Since 2021, Zakharov has been replaced by Vitaly Perfilev and Dimitri Sytyi.[30], [31]
15. Within four years, Wagner has successfully maneuvered to increase its grip over CAR’s national sovereignty by securing President Touadéra’s reelection and ensuring a government and parliamentary majority favorable to President Touadéra and therefore to Russia. Based on The Sentry’s investigations and other reports, this outcome was achieved using bribery, intimidation, and aggressive anti-Western and pro-Russian propaganda.[32], [33]
16. According to Russia’s official version, Russian instructors are sent to train the national armed forces and even though they should not engage in field combat or join military operations, The Sentry’s investigation finds that Wagner not only exerts control and influence over the national armed forces, but also that Wagner mercenaries have been taking part in military operations since 2018.[34], [35]
17. The control over the defense and military units in CAR by Wagner has effectively grown stronger after a coalition of armed groups threatened to overthrow President Touadéra in December 2020 and January 2021.[36] The Russian Federation immediately reacted to protect its Central African ally by deploying several hundreds of so-called instructors, which have been effectively identified as Wagner mercenaries.[37] Several Central African presidential guards deployed in military operations and interviewed by The Sentry confirmed that Wagner mercenaries gave the military orders outside Bangui.[38] According to them, the instructions consist of “cleaning” rural areas occupied by the armed groups. These military operations have led to mass atrocities being committed against any communities or individuals perceived as affiliated with the armed groups, including civilians, women, and children.[39]
18. With up to 2,300 Wagner mercenaries documented in a confidential UN report dated May 2021 and reviewed by The Sentry (see extracts of the report in Annex 3), joint military operations orchestrated by both national armed forces and Wagner mercenaries have contributed to creating a climate of terror and fear throughout the country (see Annex 2: Human rights violations).[40], [41] And according to The Sentry’s investigations, in light of the widespread killings and atrocities committed in CAR, national armed forces and Wagner mercenaries could potentially be responsible for acts of ethnic cleansing.[42]
19. In addition, Wagner mercenaries and national armed forces have been targeting and intimidating any individuals perceived as enemies, particularly members of the political opposition, journalists, civil society members, and anyone perceived as pro-Westerner.[43], [44] This has resulted in political repression aimed at forcing people into silence.[45]
B. Financing model and Wagner-linked entities
20. To finance its presence in CAR and to benefit Wagner’s international network, the organization has worked to control CAR’s most lucrative economic sectors.
21. Wagner’s network is mainly operating and financed through its security and mining activities carried out under the umbrella of three identified Central African registered companies: Sewa Security Services, Lobaye invest, and Midas Resources. These Wagner-linked companies operate in total opacity, with Lobaye Invest and Midas Resources controlling important mineral deposits, including gold and diamonds, and not declaring their exports. For example, The Sentry has confirmed that Midas Resources has facilities located in the rich gold mine of Ndassima in central CAR, secured by Wagner mercenaries, and that it has prohibited the Central African mining authorities from accessing the mining site where the company operates.[46], [47]
23. Wagner has also supported legislation in favor of a monopoly, and companies such as Lobaye Invest and Midas Resources have been reportedly exploiting, purchasing, and exporting minerals—gold and diamonds, in particular.[48] The scale of Wagner’s business in CAR remains unknown, however.
24. Wagner has also made its presence felt in the lucrative border control business in CAR. In 2021, the Central African government called on the services of a mission of the Russian Federation that was operating customs services in CAR, especially at the border with Cameroon, with Wagner mercenaries.[49] The Sentry also received information that the Wagner mercenaries are involved in the exploitation and trade of timber through a company called Bois Rouge (Red Wood).[50] The Sentry has not yet obtained any documentation confirming the existence or activities of such a company.
C. The pro-Russia propaganda
25. Propaganda is an important component of Wagner’s expanding strategy. This is seen in the effort to present its members as heroes and saviors.[51] The movie “Tourist,” released in May 2021 and allegedly sponsored by Prigozhin, illustrates this tactic, glorifying Wagner mercenaries in CAR.[52]
26. The Sentry also confirmed that Wagner directly funds groups and individuals to organize protests threatening those considered a threat to the interests of Russia and Wagner in the country. The most cutting-edge actor on this issue today is unquestionably Galaxie Nationale. Led by Didacien Kossimatchi, a member of the Mouvement Coeurs Unis (United Hearts Movement, President Touadéra’s political party), the organization leads demonstrations and releases statements targeting the United Nations, the European Union, France, and the United States.[53] The organization—financed by Wagner’s top leaders in CAR—even took a position in favor of the Russian intervention in Ukraine by relaying the speech of the Russian authorities.[54]
IV. Conclusion and recommendations
27. Based on several years of investigation, The Sentry posits that CAR serves as a successful testing ground for Wagner to perfect the art of state capture with a view to outsourcing it to more vulnerable countries. The Sentry makes the following recommendations:
Annexes
Annex 1: President Touadéra’s presidential advisor Fidèle Gouandjika’s Facebook post posing with a t-shirt reading “I am Wagner”
Source: Facebook.[56]
Fidèle Gouandjika, a central figure of the Central African regime and one of President Touadéra’s close advisors, praises on social media the presence of Wagner in his country and wears clothes to the glory of the organization.
Annex 2: Human rights violations by Central African armed forces allied with Wagner Group mercenaries
This section gives an overview of some of the abuses involving Wagner mercenaries since 2020 in the Central African Republic.
Extrajudicial killing
Over the course of The Sentry’s investigations, dozens of sources confirmed that they witnessed people being targeted and killed by Central African armed forces and Russian and Wagner Group mercenaries because of their alleged affiliations with or support of armed groups considered to be enemies of the central government and the Wagner Group. There are multiple cases of people who disappeared after they were arrested. Sources interviewed also mentioned to The Sentry the existence of mass graves in different parts of the country, including in Bambari, where Wagner has its own military base, and in certain areas of Bangui.[57], [58] The Sentry could not confirm these mass graves exist. However, a presidential guard mentioned the use of military body bags to contain people alive and drown them in rivers.[59] Presidential guards interviewed by The Sentry confirmed the killing of entire communities perceived to be affiliated with armed groups, including young children, women, and the elderly. The orders are clear: “leave no trace and no witness” of these operations, the presidential guards told The Sentry.[60]
Torture
Numerous sources including NGOs, MINUSCA, civil society, and armed groups have documented the systemic use of torture by Russian mercenaries alongside the presidential guards trained by Russian instructors.[61] Torture includes the amputation of fingers, toes, and ears; electric shock; beatings; drowning; the infliction of knife wounds, and more.[62] Witnesses and presidential guards told the Sentry that torture techniques were taught to Central African armed forces by members of the Wagner Group to extract information from the victims.
Sexual violence
Sexual violence appears to be widespread and systematic. It raises the question of whether sexual violence is used as a weapon of war in the Central African conflict. An NGO source confirmed that in the center of CAR, they’ve observed mass rapes committed by armed groups, Russian mercenaries, and national forces. A source who lives in Bambari said, “We don't even count anymore.”[63] A woman testified that she was gang-raped by five men—three were “white” mercenaries and two were national forces. A CPC combatant said that he was raped by two white mercenaries—one was speaking Russian, the other was speaking Arabic—near Bossangoa after they had captured him and killed other combatants. Both victims suffered from long-term health issues resulting from the violence.[64]
Looting
Numerous villages around Bambari were looted and burned, sources told The Sentry. This was confirmed by UN reports. Russian mercenaries and national forces systematically steal gold, diamonds, food (pigs, goats, and cows), money, and more, creating even greater poverty in rural areas. Crop fields are destroyed, and the rural population is targeted so that they don’t go to their fields. This exacerbates food insecurity and starvation. In Bambari, the Bornou, Adji, and Elevage neighborhoods were specifically targeted.[65] Motorbikes are systematically stolen by national forces and Russian mercenaries who then used them to move from village to village. This situation has created an even more difficult situation for the population who need to access to social services, such as hospitals, as transport is cut between villages.
Ransom
Extortion and racketeering also appear to be very central to the predatory behavior of the national forces operating jointly with the Russian mercenaries. Several witnesses and victims confirmed that, in order to be freed, they had to pay up to one million CFA francs per person. The Muslim community, especially the Fulani, is particularly targeted, and families often have no choice but to sell the little they still own (houses, cows, etc.), which increases the level of poverty of the population living in rural areas.[66]
30 June 2022
15
[1] Nathalia Dukhan, “State of Prey: Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic,” The Sentry, October 2020, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/StateofPrey-TheSentry-Oct2020.pdf
[2] Tim Lister, Sebastian Shukla, Clarissa Ward, “It Was our Children They Killed: Russian Mercenaries Implicated in the Torture and Killing of Civilians in the Central African Republic,” CNN, June 15, 2021, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/15/africa/central-african-republic-russian-mercenaries-cmd-intl/index.html
[3] The Sentry, “Investigative Report by CNN with The Sentry: Wagner Group Atrocities,” June 2021, available at: https://thesentry.org/reports/cnn-central-african-republic/
[4] Radio France Internationale, “En Centrafrique, des victimes des exactions russes brisent la loi du silence" (In the Central African Republic, Victims of Russian Abuses Break the Law of Silence), May 3, 2021, available at: https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210503-en-centrafrique-des-victimes-des-exactions-russes-brisent-la-loi-du-silence
[5] Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia’s Linked Forces,” May 3, 2022, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces
[6] United Nations Working Group, Mandates on the use of mercenaries, March 24, 2021, available at: https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26305
[7] United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020),” June 25, 2021, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/126/24/PDF/N2112624.pdf?OpenElement
[8] United Nations Special Procedures, “CAR: Russian Wagner Group Harassing and Intimidating Civilians – UN experts,” Press Release, October 27, 2021, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/car-russian-wagner-group-harassing-and-intimidating-civilians-un-experts
[9] United Nations Security Council, “Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2399 (2018),” July 23, 2018.
[10] Matthieu Oliver, “Faustin-Archange Touadéra : ‘Je n’ai rien à cacher au sujet des Russes’" (Faustin-Archange Touadéra: ‘I Don’t Have Anything to Hide Regarding the Russians’), Jeune Afrique, September 20, 2021, available at: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1234706/politique/faustin-archange-touadera-je-nai-rien-a-cacher-au-sujet-des-russes/
[11] Official letter issued by the Central African government to the United Nations, reviewed by The Sentry.
[12] Nathalia Dukhan, “State of Prey: Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic,” The Sentry, October 2020, p. 6, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/StateofPrey-TheSentry-Oct2020.pdf
[13] US Department of State, “Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa,” May 24, 2022, available at: https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/wagner-group-yevgeniy-prigozhin-and-russias-disinformation-in-africa/
[14] Christopher Faulkner, “Undermining Democracy and Exploiting Clients: The Wagner Group’s Nefarious Activities in Africa,” CTC Sentinel, 15.6, June 2022, available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/undermining-democracy-and-exploiting-clients-the-wagner-groups-nefarious-activities-in-africa/
[15] US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Increases Pressure on Russian Financier,” September 23, 2020, available at: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1133
[16] Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021,” December 13, 2021, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021D2197
[17] Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “Foreign Secretary Announces 65 New Russian Sanctions to Cut off Vital Industries Fuelling Putin’s War Machine,” Press Release, March 24, 2022, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-to-cut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine
[18] This follows the designation by the UK of Prigozhin in 2020 for the involvement of Wagner in Libya. See: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, “The UK Sanctions List,” available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list
[19] US Department of State, “Wagner Group, Yevgeniy Prigozhin, and Russia’s Disinformation in Africa,” May 24, 2022, available at: https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/wagner-group-yevgeniy-prigozhin-and-russias-disinformation-in-africa/
[20] Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021,” December 13, 2021, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021D2197
[21] Nathalia Dukhan, “State of Prey: Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic,” The Sentry, October 2020, p. 6, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/StateofPrey-TheSentry-Oct2020.pdf
[22] The Sentry interviews with witnesses and sources with firsthand information in Bangui, including foreign diplomats. The Sentry also confirmed at least two other visits by Prigozhin to the Central African capital Bangui in 2021.
[23] Africa Intelligence, “Nouvel ambassadeur, réorganisation de Wagner et soft power : Moscou affine ses plans" (New Ambassador, Wagner Reorganization and Soft Power: Moscow Refines Its Plans), December 12, 2021, available at: https://www.africaintelligence.fr/afrique-centrale/2021/12/24/nouvel-ambassadeur-reorganisation-de-wagner-et-soft-power--moscou-affine-ses-plans,109713136-eve
[24] A source close to president Touadéra confirmed that Prigozhin was hosted inside the Russian Embassy, where President Touadéra had reportedly been making frequent visits.
[25] Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021,” December 13, 2021, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021D2197
[26] Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/2197 of 13 December 2021,” December 13, 2021, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021D2197
[27] The Sentry interviews with Central African sources and foreign diplomats between 2018 and 2022.
[28] Nathalia Dukhan, “Central African Republic: Ground Zero for Russian Influence in Central Africa,” Atlantic Council, October 22, 2020, available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/central-african-republic-ground-zero-for-russian-influence-in-central-africa/
[29] Nathalia Dukhan, “State of Prey: Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic,” The Sentry, October 2020, p. 6, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/StateofPrey-TheSentry-Oct2020.pdf
[30] Matthieu Olivier, “CAR-Russia: Who is Vitaly Perfilev, Wagner’s boss in Bangui,” April 7, 2022, available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/191669/car-russia-who-is-vitali-perfilev-wagners-boss-in-bangui/
[31] Radio France Internationale, “L’emprise des mercenaires russes Wagner en Centrafrique" (The Influence of Russian Wagner Mercenaries in the Central African Republic), February 6, 2022, available at: https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20220206-en-centrafrique-les-mercenaires-de-wagner-ne-se-font-pas-que-des-amis
[32] Nathalia Dukhan, “State of Prey: Proxies, Predators, and Profiteers in the Central African Republic,” The Sentry, October 2020, p. 6, available at: https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/StateofPrey-TheSentry-Oct2020.pdf
[33] Carol Valade, “Comment la Centrafrique est devenu le laboratoire de la propagande russe en Afrique" (How the Central African Republic Has Become a Russian Propaganda Lab), Le Monde, June 8, 2022, available at: https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2022/06/08/comment-la-centrafrique-est-devenue-le-laboratoire-de-la-propagande-russe-en-afrique_6129431_3212.html
[34] The Sentry interviews with witnesses and sources with firsthand information.
[35] United Nations confidential reports reviewed by The Sentry, 2021-2022.
[36] United Nations Security Council, “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020),” June 25, 2021, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/126/24/PDF/N2112624.pdf?OpenElement
[37] Agence France Presse, “Russia Confirms 600 More Instructors in C. Africa,” The Moscow Times, July 1, 2021, available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/07/01/russia-confirms-600-more-instructors-sent-to-cafrica-a74405
[38] The Sentry interviews with several national armed forces members deployed in military operations outside Bangui alongside Wagner Group mercenaries.
[39] The Sentry interviews with several national armed forces members deployed in military operations outside Bangui alongside Wagner Group mercenaries.
[40] The Sentry interviews with multiple victims and perpetrators between 2021 and 2022.
[41] United Nations confidential reports reviewed by The Sentry.
[42] The Sentry’s conclusions based on the review of multiple sources, including UN confidential reports and public reports, and interviews with Central African armed forces members, victims, and civil society members.
[43] United Nations confidential report dated May 2021, reviewed by The Sentry.
[44] The Sentry’s investigation has included interviews of victims, Central African presidential guards, and individuals close to President Touadéra and to the Wagner Group’s top commanders.
[45] United Nations Security Council, “Central African Republic: Report of the Secretary General,” June 16, 2022, available at: https://minusca.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/s_2022_491_en.pdf
[46] The Sentry interviews with officials familiar with mining operations in CAR.
[47] The UN Panel of Experts on CAR has found that Midas funded the Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (Union for Peace in CAR, or UPC), one of the most violent armed groups in the country. United Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 27 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2536 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council,” January 27, 2021, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N21/007/99/PDF/N2100799.pdf?OpenElement
[48] Africa Intelligence, “Bangui Sparks Fears of Russian Hand in Planned Diamond Trade Nationalisation,” July 14, 2021, available at: https://www.africaintelligence.com/central-africa/2021/07/14/bangui-sparks-fears-of-russian-hand-in-planned-diamond-trade-nationalisation,109679673-art
[49] Radio France Internationale, “Centrafrique : Les autorités ne reconduisent pas la coopération douanière russe” (Central African Republic: Authorities Do Not Renew Customs Cooperation), October 9, 2021, available at: https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211009-centrafrique-les-autorit%C3%A9s-ne-reconduisent-pas-la-coop%C3%A9ration-douani%C3%A8re-russe
[50] The Sentry interviews with Central African sources and a foreign diplomat, 2022.
[51] Benjamin Roger, Georges Dougueli, “Russia-Africa: Behind the Scenes of Moscow’s Soft Power,” The Africa Report, July 29, 2021, available at: http://www.theafricareport.com/112950/russia-africa-behind-the-scenes-of-moscows-soft-power
[52] Sebastian Shukla, “Russian Mercenaries Get the Big Screen Treatment. The Reality Behind the Film Is as Murky as the Plot,” May 28, 2021, available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/05/28/africa/wagner-mercenaries-tourist-film-car-cmd-intl/index.html
[53] Nathalia Dukhan, Twitter profile, post dated May 8, 2022, available at: https://twitter.com/NathaliaDukhan/status/1523276311048843264?s=20&t=HsFAopB64u1aFwhw2I8wzw
[54] Oubangui Médias, “Centrafrique : La Galaxie Nationale prend position sur le conflit russo-ukrainien" (Central African Republic: Galaxie Nationale Takes Position on the Ukraine-Russia Conflict), March 17, 2022, available at: https://oubanguimedias.com/2022/03/17/centrafrique-la-galaxie-nationale-prend-position-sur-le-conflit-russo-ukrainien/
[55] UK National Crime Agency, “Amber Alert: South Sudan Illicit Finance Risks,” March 2020, available at: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/who-we-are/publications/428-amber-alert-south-sudan/file
[56] Fidèle Gouandjika, Facebook profile, post dated December 25, 2021, available at: https://web.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=3176589692557283&set=pb.100006188490224.-2207520000&_rdc=1&_rdr
[57] MINUSCA internal reports reviewed by The Sentry.
[58] The Sentry interviews with several victims, witnesses, NGO workers, members of armed groups, and community leaders in 2021 and 2022.
[59] The Sentry interview with a presidential guard, 2021.
[60] The Sentry interviews with several presidential guards, 2021-2022.
[61] MINUSCA internal reports and The Sentry interviews with victims, witnesses, an NGO worker, a member of an armed groups, and a community leader.
[62] The Sentry interviews with people who were themselves tortured or who witnessed others being tortured or injured, 2021.
[63] The Sentry interviews with NGO workers, witnesses, inhabitants, a community leader, and a member of an armed group.
[64] The Sentry interviews with two victims, 2021.
[65] MINUSCA internal reports and The Sentry interviews with victims, witnesses, an NGO worker, a member of an armed group, and a community leader.
[66] UN internal reports and The Sentry interviews with a community leader of Bambari, a source close to the Muslim community in Bambari, an NGO worker, inhabitants of the area, and several sources close to or members of armed groups active in rural areas.