Written evidence submitted by Spotlight on Corruption (VIC0050)
About Spotlight on Corruption
The scope of this submission
5.1. The UK’s stated commitment to compensating the victims of corruption
5.2. The under-implementation of the 2018 Compensation Principles
5.3. The obstacles to compensating the victims of corruption
5.4. The lessons learned from corruption cases
5.5. The proposed further measures that should be included in the Victims Bill
The UK’s stated commitment to compensating the victims of corruption
The under-implementation of the 2018 Compensation Principles
10.1. In November 2015, the first DPA was entered into by the SFO in which Standard Bank was fined US$25.2 million and required to pay the Government of Tanzania a further US$7 million in compensation.[12] This figure reflected the amount that the Government of Tanzania lost directly as a result of the corruption.
10.2. In the DPA that the SFO entered into with Amec Foster Wheeler in July 2021, the company was required to pay a financial penalty and costs amounting to £103 million in the UK, yet only £210,610 was paid as compensation to the people of Nigeria.[13]
The obstacles to compensating the victims of corruption
14.1. In the Smith and Ouzman case, the SFO did not positively pursue compensation, but the judge explained that he would in any event have declined to order it:
“In any event I have not had proper evidence put before me of a formal request for compensation from a victim, nor have I any idea whether the respective governments have taken steps to recover the sums from their own officials. I am also uncertain as to who the compensatee should be and whether in making such an order I can be confident that the sum will reach the right entity. I would have declined to make a compensation order.”[19]
14.2. In the XYZ case, Sir Brian Leveson P found that “the SFO is not able to demonstrate whether and, if so, in what sum, the various XYZ agents actually paid bribes to named or unknown individuals. Taken together, these factors amount to it not being possible to positively identify any entities as victims who may be compensated”.[20]
14.3. In the Rolls Royce case, Sir Brian Leveson P offered similar reasons for declining to order compensation. He explained that “the factual complexity of the totality of the allegations in the Statement of Facts, including the use of intermediaries, makes quantifying bribes actually paid impossible” and therefore concluded that “the SFO has not been able to identify a quantifiable loss arising from any of the criminal conduct which it is proposing to resolve.”[21]
The lessons learned from corruption cases
The bar for achieving compensation orders is high
16.1. the bribery is widespread and global;
16.2. the bribery is routed through intermediaries and payment to specific individuals is not established;
16.3. where there is no evidence of an inflated contract or substandard/unwanted product and direct loss cannot therefore be established;
16.4. there has been no compensation request from an affected party or no contact established with authorities in an affected country;
16.5. it is not clear to whom the compensation should be paid (this is particularly an issue if bribes were paid to state-owned enterprises or sub-state bodies).
The voice of victims of any definition is generally absent from overseas corruption cases
Quantification of loss and harm has generally been on a narrow basis
21.1. Serious detrimental effect on individuals (for example by provision of substandard goods or services resulting from the corrupt behaviour);
21.2. Serious environmental impact;
21.3. Serious undermining of the proper function of local or national government, business or public services;
21.4. Substantial actual or intended financial gain to offender or another or loss caused to others.
Proposed further measures that should be included in the Victims Bill
A broader assessment of the harms of corruption
23.1. Changes to Chapter 2 of the Sentencing Act 2020 (the Sentencing Code) to enable a broader assessment of the harm of corruption to be undertaken in relation to compensation orders for corporate offending. This assessment should reflect not just the bribe paid and any direct financial loss but also the broader social damage suffered as a result of corruption.
23.2. This assessment of harm must be given a full hearing at sentencing stage, following a process that enables the views of victims to be represented and considered in court as set out below.
Enhancing the recognition and representation of victims
25.1. Allowing foreign states to make representations and present evidence of harm to court, both in criminal convictions and in relation to DPAs.
25.2. Allowing impact statements to be submitted to the court from non-state actors, including victim impact statements, community impact statements, and expert witness statements.
June 2022
[1] See our website: https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/
[2] Article 32 of the UNCAC
[3] Article 35 of the UNCAC
[4] Article 53(b) of the UNCAC
[5] Article 57(3c) of the UNCAC
[6] https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/General-Principles-to-compensate-overseas-victims-December-2017.pdf
[7] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522791/FINAL_-_AC_Summit_Communique_-_May_2016.pdf
[8] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/framework-for-transparent-and-accountable-asset-return
[9] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sets-global-transparency-standard-for-asset-returns
[10] See further https://www.spotlightcorruption.org/the-uks-new-framework-for-transparent-and-accountable-asset-return-putting-this-global-precedent-into-perspective-and-into-practice/
[11] https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/22/schedule/17/enacted. The DPA Code of Practice stipulates that it is “particularly desirable that measures should be included [in the terms of the DPA] that achieve redress for victims, such as payment of compensation”.
[12] Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank Plc (U20150854): https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/sfo-v-standard-bank_Final_1.pdf
[13] Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Amec Foster Wheeler Energy Limited: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2021/07/02/sfo-enters-into-103m-dpa-with-amec-foster-wheeler-energy-limited-as-part-of-global-resolution-with-us-and-brazilian-authorities/
[14] R v Smith, Smith and Smith & Ouzman Ltd (7 January 2016): https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/54261c_9dabc24c7c134274ba0a96c3cd7e6c52.pdf
[15] Section 130 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000
[16] R v Michael Brian Kneeshaw (1974) 58 Cr App R 439
[17] R v Kenneth Donovan (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 192
[18] R v Ben Stapylton [2012] EWCA Crim 728
[19] R v Smith, Smith and Smith & Ouzman Ltd (7 January 2016) page 6: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/54261c_9dabc24c7c134274ba0a96c3cd7e6c52.pdf
[20] Serious Fraud Office v XYZ 2016 (U20150856) para 41
[21] Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce Plc 2017 (U20170036) paras 83-84: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/sfo-v-rolls-royce.pdf
[22] Article 32 of the UNCAC
[23] https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/magistrates-court/item/bribery/