Saferworld – Written evidence (DCC0007) 

 

Introduction

Saferworld welcomes the International Relations and Defence Committee inquiry into Defence Concepts and Capabilities. Saferworld is an independent international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. This submission builds on over thirty research studies into counter-terror interventions over two decades, and UK security assistance including through Saferworld’s Security Policy Change project, formerly Oxford Research Group’s Remote Warfare Programme.

  1. This submission focuses on five of the questions posed by the Committee in its Call for Evidence:
    1. 1) Does the Defence Command Paper respond to the goals set by the Integrated Review? Are both documents aligned? Are there areas which are not adequately addressed by the Defence Command Paper?
    2. 3) What types of warfare are the UK Armed Forces currently prepared to respond to? What is the appropriate balance between hybrid, conventional, and nuclear capabilities, based on expected future threats and challenges? Are the existing UK Armed Forces delivering on their full potential given the resources they receive, will they do so in future, and are additional resources required given the strategic environment?
    3. 7) To what extent will cultural change within the Armed Forces need to happen to assure a successful implementation of the goals set out by the Defence Command Paper? Please give examples of policies or approaches which may benefit from cultural, institutional, or procedural change.
    4. 8) How are threats below the threshold of war defined by the Government and other stakeholders? What defence/security capabilities will be required to respond effectively to these challenges, and is the UK well placed to develop and deploy these capabilities?
    5. 9) How can the UK and allies (in particular NATO and the EU) best ensure that threats remain ‘sub-threshold’, rather than escalating into violent conflict? What are the key risks and pathways for escalation from ‘sub-threshold’ hostility to open warfare? Conversely, how can conventional/nuclear capabilities deter ‘hybrid’ conflict (and escalation thereof)?

Key points

         Many past security interventions by the UK and its allies have exacerbated or failed to address the causes of conflict, such as poor governance, corruption, lack of redress for injustice and lack of services. This has left many parts of the world in a state of protracted crisis.

         The UK’s ‘persistent engagement’ strategy envisages an increased role for security assistance, including training and equipping security forces in conflict-affected environments. Yet the UK Government is decreasing its support for civilian, diplomatic and development responses to these crises. This leaves the UK’s approach as a whole out of step with its aspirations in the Integrated Review.

         The UK’s persistent engagement strategy also lacks channels for appropriate parliamentary oversight, particularly with regards to UK security assistance and Special Forces.

         The International Relations Committee should challenge the Government’s balance in the use of the military at the expense of other parts of government and push for more appropriate options for Parliamentary scrutiny.

Alignment between Integrated Review and Command Paper objectives

  1. The Defence Command Paper builds on the Integrated Review’s articulation of the ‘persistent engagement’ strategy and links to its four strategic pillars, but what it fails to do is set out where the role of defence ends and that of the FCDO begins. Some of these four pillars are more frequently articulated through the Command Paper than others. There are several references to the Integrated Review’s objective of tackling conflict and instability and indeed to ‘reduce the frequency and incidence of conflict’. That this is a whole-of-government objective is a welcome commitment. However, other goals, such as the Integrated Review’s strategic framework objective to support ‘open societies and defend human rights’, receive less mention. The International Review could have done more to reconcile potential contradictions, and not doing this may result in policy incoherence and undermining the national interest.[1]
  2. This is concerning in that many of the conflicts in which the UK military is deployed or is engaged in active security partnerships are as much governance challenges as military ones. Since 2018 the UK military and other agencies like police forces, the Home Office and the National Crime Agency have provided training or mentorship to security forces in over 30 countries, many of them affected by conflict.[2] In these contexts, insecurity, corruption and poor governance intersect. A synthesis of Saferworld research on conflicts where violent and proscribed groups are active found four frequent issues that drive conflicts:[3]
  1. violent fragmentation of order, leading to predation and consequent security dilemmas for many caught in the crosshairs
  2. kleptocratic levels of corruption
  3. large-scale injustice and the absence of channels for redress
  4. unequal access to services, opportunities and resources
  1. Addressing corruption, injustice and unequal access to services requires development and diplomatic strategies. Yet the UK Government is increasingly turning to the military, focusing on individual armed groups symptomatic of these problems or on the vaguer objective of increasing UK influence. As mentioned, the Defence Command Paper sees a strategy of ‘persistent engagement’ with deployments and security assistance to partners, including training and mentorship, as part of efforts to resolve conflicts. Examples from the Sahel, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and elsewhere have shown too often the goal of security assistance is to reinforce the capacity of partners, particularly their coercive capacity, rather than to address the underlying issues driving conflict, as mentioned above.[4]
  2. Research by Saferworld has also found that training and arms sales delivered to partner forces come with several key risks, including:
      1. that the supported force commits human rights abuses or violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)
      2. that partners pursue different objectives from those of the UK
      3. that arms are diverted to other unintended actors
      4. and that third parties including other states feel threatened and overreact to assistance.[5]
  3. During the war on terror, this sort of assistance led to abuses of human rights by supported forces and the alienation of communities by governments focused on specific armed groups, rather than the security and development of all citizens in their country.[6] This led one major UN study to conclude that, ‘in countries facing insurgencies led by violent extremist groups, community members have reported feeling more fearful of their governments’ violations of human rights and abuse by security forces than of extremist groups’.[7]
  4. In areas affected by conflict - like Yemen, the Sahel, and Libya, – Western governments prioritised counter-terrorism and curbing migration at the expense of addressing governance issues, leaving protracted crises with space for actors hostile to UK interests to step in, like the Wagner private military group in the Sahel.[8] In other conflicts, declared UK allies like the Gulf states have intervened to exploit factions within governance crises, for example in places like the Horn of Africa[9] and Libya.[10]
  5. It important to note that processes to manage risk do exist for UK interventions – including in both the FCDO and armed forces – but too often they are not used consistently, do not adequately incorporate external perspectives, including from those affected by UK interventions, and fail to put in place suitable mitigation measures.[11] For example, researchers Emily Knowles and Jahara Matisek highlighted that master’s degree-level training provided by the EU Training Mission in Mali (to which the UK was a contributor) to bolster understanding of IHL and preventing sexual violence was ‘optimistically delivered with the aim of professionalising a force with limited education levels that has been linked to numerous violations including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests’[12][13]
  6. The Defence Command Paper’s focus on building the capacities of security forces in conflict-affected parts of the world has the potential to undermine the Integrated Review’s open society and conflict resolution objectives. In the long term, failing to address conflict and build open societies may mean a failure to prevent future threats of the future allowing space for hostile actors to expand their influence.
  7.                     Meanwhile, the UK Government is downgrading its conflict prevention work. As Saferworld told the House of Commons International Development Committee:

‘Analysis of OECD-DAC figures indicates that from 2016-2019 the UK disbursed a declining share of the aid budget, culminating in less than 2%, of the total ODA budget under the OECD-DAC “Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution” coding. While in 2016 the UK was a leader in the proportion of its ODA budget spent in this way, the UK has now been overtaken by the Netherlands and Sweden who now spend a greater proportion of their aid budgets on civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution.’[14] This trend has been further worsened by the UK aid cuts.[15] This leaves the UK with an unbalanced toolkit to reduce, prevent and resolve current and future conflicts and crises.

  1.                     Neither the Defence Command Paper nor the Integrated Review properly assessed the risks of the increasing focus on persistent engagement and security assistance, alongside the declining budgetary support for civilian attempts to resolve conflict and address the governance challenges that produce threats, such as violent ‘terrorist’ armed groups. The Committee should assess whether the UK Government is taking enough measures to mitigate the risks of increasing its support to  partner forces in conflict-affected countries with significant governance, human rights and corruption challenges. The Committee should assess whether the Government has the appropriate balance of military to non-military tools for the security and foreign policy challenges of working in conflict-affected and fragile states, including preventing and reducing conflict.

 

Improving accountability of ‘persistent engagement’, UK Special Forces and Special Operations units

  1.                     The Defence Command paper envisages a continued role for security assistance, for Special Forces in particular, and plans the creation of new units including the Ranger Regiment as part of the strategy of persistent engagement. Yet there is a gap in transparency and accountability which prevents adequate parliamentary oversight of these developments.
  2.                     The culture of blanket secrecy that shrouds the UK Special Forces – exempting them from parliamentary oversight and from freedom of information requests – must be re-evaluated to assure a successful implementation of the goals set out by the Defence Command Paper. The prospect of deploying Special Forces into high-risk areas, for longer periods of time with partners as part of the ‘persistent engagement’ strategy and with no parliamentary oversight, will at best preclude any learnings and at worst exacerbate the underlying drivers of conflict. There are plenty of circumstances where the blanket secrecy approach may be desirable – for example, short-term deployments with specific and limited objectives, where any disclosures could endanger the mission and the safety of those involved – however this argument does not hold when Special Forces engage in longer-term strategies with partners in circumstances where regular forces could perform that duty. Post-mission briefings where the media has already reported may be another circumstance where it would be beneficial for the government to set the record straight. The Committee must urge the UK Government to re-evaluate its blanket “no comment” policy on the use of Special Forces.
  3.                     A second area where even limited oversight of Special Forces could be improved is parliamentary accountability. There is of course a balance that needs to be struck between national security and the level of transparency needed for public scrutiny and debate. However, the Intelligence and Security Committee’s (ISC) oversight of highly classified intelligence activities demonstrates that such a balance can indeed be achieved. Key UK allies such as the US, France, Norway and Canada have also shown that meaningful oversight by the legislature without compromising national security is both possible and effective. Similarly, previous strategies have acknowledged the need for external oversight; for instance, the Modernising Defence Programme promised to establish the ‘Defence Policy Board of external experts, to bring fresh perspectives and challenge as the department makes policy and strategy initiative.’[16] A cultural shift towards more open dialogue with Parliament – as well as with experts and civil society organisations – could help the UK Special Forces to learn from past mistakes and draw on the best available evidence, analysis and expertise of a particular subject area.
  4.                     Expanding the mandate of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) to oversee UK Special Forces would be one way to close the cultural and political accountability gap that these forces present within the UK Armed Forces. As research from the Oxford Research Group (ORG) shows, most members of the ISC already have strong relationships within the intelligence community and benefit from past military or security experience.[17] The idea of ISC oversight of UK Special Forces has been raised in Parliament on several occasions, including recently on 6 June 2022 where one former Foreign and Commonwealth Office minister said this model would be  “appropriate”.[18] The International Relations and Defence Committee should encourage the UK Government to revise its no comment policy and give limited briefings on less sensitive Special Forces operations. It should encourage the Government to expand the mandate of the ISC to cover Special Forces or explore other means to improve parliamentary oversight.
  5.                     It is deeply concerning that the use of regular units involved in security assistance and new units developed for persistent engagement including the Rangers Regiment, Special Operations Brigade and Security Assistance Brigade[19] is not accompanied by a commensurate improvement in transparency, oversight, and accountability of such deployments. The All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones and Modern Conflict told a parliamentary inquiry that ‘Britain’s growing military capabilities and commitments are far outpacing the existing procedures for parliamentary scrutiny and oversight.’[20] A Saferworld report notes that ’since January 2019, British troops have been deployed to, among other countries, Afghanistan, Mali and, reportedly, Yemen, but these deployments are exempt from the War Powers Convention and so were not debated by Parliament [with a view to a vote]. Some were ‘train and assist’ operations and so were not designated as ‘combat missions’. This is despite the fact there is no official definition of, or a set list of criteria for, combat and non-combat operations.’[21] It is essential that Parliament is able to assess the relative successes and failures of these regular forces involved in special operations, to make an informed judgement on whether it is meeting its stated objectives and most importantly to avoid mission creep.
  6.                     With the Ranger Regiment due to take over the more covert aspects of training partner security forces from the Special Forces,[22] the risks associated with security assistance (highlighted above) therefore also apply to the Rangers.[23]
  7.                     As such, the Committee should urge the UK Government to develop internal doctrine and training for the Rangers Regiment specific to civilian harm mitigation – including, where needed, revised tactics, techniques and procedures – and this training must form part of a broader political strategy, with parallel investments in accountable institution-building and support to domestic civil society. Where the risk is deemed to be too high, activities should not move forwards.[24] If implemented, in conjunction with a parliamentary oversight mechanism, these measures would contribute to a more effective and accountable force that better reflects the UK’s leading role in both military operations and the protection of civilians worldwide.




 

About Saferworld

Saferworld is an independent, not-for-profit international organisation working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives in countries and territories across Africa, Asia and the Middle East. We work in solidarity with people affected by conflict to improve their safety and sense of security, and conduct wider research and analysis. We use this evidence and learning to improve local, national and international policies and practices that can help build lasting peace. Our priority is people – we believe in a world where everyone can lead peaceful, fulfilling lives, free from fear and insecurity.

Received 17 June 2022 


 

[1] Brooks L, Watson A (2021), ‘The UK Integrated Review: the gap between the Review and reality on conflict prevention’, Saferworld, 18 March (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/952-the-uk-integrated-review-the-gap-between-the-review-and-reality-on-conflict-prevention)

[2] Saferworld (2021), ‘Persistent engagement, persistent risk: the impact of UK Security assistance on rights and peace’, Infographic briefing, October (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1373-persistent-engagement-persistent-risk-the-impact-of-uk-security-assistance-on-rights-and-peace)

[3] Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to security: learning from responses to armed conflicts with proscribed groups’, Saferworld, May, pp. 7-12 (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security)

[4] Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to security: learning from responses to armed conflicts with proscribed groups’, Saferworld, May, pp. 29-31 (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security)

[5] Brooks L (2021), ‘Playing with Matches? UK security assistance and its conflict risks’, Saferworld, October, pp 27-31 (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1374-playing-with-matches-uk-security-assistance-and-its-conflict-risks)

[6] Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to security: learning from responses to armed conflicts with proscribed groups’, Saferworld, May (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1389-no-shortcuts-to-security)

[7] Attree L, Street J (2022), ‘No Shortcuts to security: learning from responses to armed conflicts with proscribed groups’, Saferworld, May, p 27 citing UN General Assembly Security Council (2018), ‘General Assembly Seventy-second session Agenda item 65 Peacebuilding and sustaining peace’ (https://zdoc.pub/general-assembly-security-council8637995e66ea 6daccaca2c95bdbbf42564209.html)

[8] Mutsvairo B, de Bruijn M, Orgeret K S (2022), While the focus is on Ukraine, Russia’s presence in the Sahel is steadily growing, Guardian, 3rd February (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/feb/03/while-the-focus-is-on-ukraine-russias-presence-in-the-sahel-is-steadily-growing); Krieg A, Sandor A, Olsen H (2022), ‘The rise of private military and security companies’, Saferworld’s Warpod episode 13, June (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/multimedia/saferworldas-warpod-episode-13-the-rise-of-private-military-security-companies)

[9] Crisis Group (2019) ‘Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact’, report no.206, September 2019, (https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/206-intra-gulf-competition-africas-horn-lessening-impact)

[10] Orsini C (2022), ‘Enshrining Impunity: A Decade of International Engagement in Libya’, Lawyers for Justice and Saferworld, February (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1386-enshrining-impunity-a-decade-of-international-engagement-in-libya)

[11] Brooks L (2021), ‘Playing with Matches? UK security assistance and its conflict risks’, Saferworld, October, pp 35-43 (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1374-playing-with-matches-uk-security-assistance-and-its-conflict-risks)

[13] Knowles E, Matisek J (2019), ‘Western Security Force Assistance in Weak States: Time for a Peacebuilding Approach’, Rusi Journal 164 (3), pp 16–7 (https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/western-securityforce-assistance-weak-states-time-peacebuilding-approach)

[14] Saferworld (2021), Submission to the International Development Committee Philosophy of Aid Inquiry, September, para 11, pp.4-5 (https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/39415/pdf/)

[15] Worley W (2022), ‘Impact of CSSF funding cuts to CSSF revealed‘, Devex, 7 January (https://www.devex.com/news/impact-of-funding-cuts-to-uk-s-cssf-revealed-102386 )

[16] Ministry of Defence (2018), Mobilising, Modernising and Transforming Defence, A Report of the Modernising Defence Programme, p. 17 (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/931705/ModernisingDefenceProgramme_report_2018_FINAL.pdf)

[17] Walpole L, Karlshoej-Pedersen M (2018), ‘Britain’s Shadow Army: Policy Options for External Oversight of UK Special Forces’, Oxford Research Group, April (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1278-britainas-shadow-army-policy-options-for-external-oversight-of-uk-special-forces)

[18] David Davis (2022), HC Deb, 6 June 2022, c615, (https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2022-06-06a.568.0&s=%22special+forces%22+%22%22special+forces%22%22#g615.2)

[19] UK Army (2021), ’Future Solider: Transforming the British Army’, 25 November (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-soldier-transforming-the-british-army)

[20] Watson A (2021), ‘Different strategy, same mistakes? The UK persistent engagement strategy’, Saferworld, (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1375-different-strategy-same-mistakes-the-uk-persistent-engagement-strategy) citing House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (2019), ‘The Role of Parliament in the UK Constitution: Authorising the Use of Military Force’, p37 (https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmpubadm/1891/1891.pdf)

[21] Ministry of Defence (2021), ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’, March p.52, (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf)

[22] Ministry of Defence (2021), ‘Defence in a Competitive Age’, March p.52, (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf)

[23] Watson A (2021), ‘Different strategy, same mistakes? The UK persistent engagement strategy’, Saferworld, (https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1375-different-strategy-same-mistakes-the-uk-persistent-engagement-strategy)

[24] Watson A et al (2021), ’The UK’s Ranger Regiment: An Opportunity’, The Wavell Room, 14 October (https://wavellroom.com/2021/10/14/the-uks-ranger-regiment/)