Written evidence submitted by the South East Fermanagh Foundation (SEFF), related to the effect of paramilitaries on society in Northern Ireland inquiry (PNI0020)
The South East Fermanagh Foundation (SEFF) is but one of the victims’ and survivors’ groups that forms Innocent Victims United (IVU). The IVU ‘family’ consists of 24 partner groups representing in excess of 12,500 victims and survivors in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain.
Although the Belfast Agreement was signed in 1998, terrorists/paramilitaries are still in existence and exerting control over communities. Statistics from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys 2017-2020 released by the Department of Justice in May 2022 would substantiate that fact.[1] The failure to eradicate terrorists/paramilitaries and their ongoing existence has continued to re-traumatise innocent victims. Not only do the terrorist/paramilitary structures remain, but they are involved in a high level of criminality including smuggling, fuel laundering, extortion and drug dealing.
In addition, 28 years after the initial Provisional IRA ceasefire we still have a separated prison regime which costs over £2m per year, as confirmed by Justice Minister Naomi Long in October 2020.[2] There has been encouragement and often proactive introduction of ex- terrorists/ex-paramilitaries into the mainstream political arena which has given them a certain credence within Northern Ireland (NI) society.
Their own retrospective, continued justification of violence for political ends, whether it be in defence of the Union, pursuit of a united Ireland or the supposed upholding of human rights (ironic given the substantial evidence of the habitual abuse and violation of their victim’s rights) lacks any form of remorse for the atrocities inflicted on the victims they created.
The paramilitaries/terrorist organisations have never indicated any willingness or commitment to enter fully into any truth recovery or process for dealing with legacy, therefore making the current Government proposed legislation of conditional immunity even harder to consider. These along with previous mis-intentioned programs to integrate terrorist/paramilitary members into positions of influence, (positions which many used to their own financial benefit) within the very communities they terrorised, are all major factors why terrorists/paramilitaries continue to exist and blight our society.
Mainstream politicians themselves need to be guarded in not using volatile language that suggests that the presence of terrorist/paramilitary groups is almost understandable in difficult political situations, further justifying their existence and acceptance within their community.
Only recently on 12th May 2022 the Attorney General stated in relation to the protocol, “previous advice had changed because the agreement between the UK and EU was causing social unrest.”[3] The protocol is no doubt a contentious political issue, but to highlight the fact it can be overturned by social unrest when the paramilitaries within NI has a history of being controlled and co-ordinated by terrorist/paramilitary groupings could be described as totally irresponsible. The media also sensationalise terrorist/paramilitary activity by at times giving leading terrorists/paramilitaries almost ‘celebrity status’ within their own communities, through articles that are regularly written and published within certain newspapers in NI.
In the NI Executive’s Action Plan (2016), they documented the intended way forward in Tackling Paramilitary Activity, Criminality, and Organised Crime. The UK and Irish Governments committed to carry out sections of this plan. The most recent IRC report reflects on work delivered against each aspect of the plan. Against 43 actions, it is worth noting that the IRC has categorised only 3 actions and commitments as ‘complete’. A further 2 of the 43 actions are categorised as ‘action planned’ and 38 as ‘action underway’. This serves to highlight the need for ongoing buy in and investment in tackling terrorism/paramilitarism in NI both at community and Government levels.
The lack of a recognised objective education included in the curriculum relating to the ‘troubles’ results in our post ‘troubles’ generations tending to have a distorted ‘romanticised’ perception of terrorist/paramilitary groupings, leading to a certain acceptance and tolerance of their continued existence. One issue that the three governing bodies must work together more effectively to tackle is the memorialisation of terrorism, both north and south.
Clear enforceable legislation is needed in all three jurisdictions that prevents the memorialisation of terror in any shape or form which must be implemented effectively and fairly. The ‘Stirring up Hatred’ provisions within the Public Order (NI) Order 1987 could be used much more effectively to tackle hatred of a sectarian nature and to demonstrate at a criminal justice level such behaviour will not be tolerated.
Furthermore, while murals to terrorist groupings generally and specific members are allowed to remain in situ, facilitating their glorification, the coercive control exerted through the names of these groups continues to exist. The NI Housing Executive confirmed in 2017 that over 100 illegal memorials exist to terrorists on their land which include: large stone
monuments, plaques murals and memorial gardens.[4] While the work must take place in Northern Ireland, the UK and Irish governments must also support the NI Executive by utilising legislation against the memorialisation of terror and by condemning any activity which memorialises a terror group.
The Paramilitary Crime Task Force is currently not “proactively investigating” the IRA.[5] The PCTF’s remit is to focus operational activity against terrorist/paramilitary groups which are assessed not to present a threat to national security. The activities of the Provisional IRA and associated groupings are monitored primarily by MI5 as the Provisional IRA still pose a threat to National Security and must be dealt with by MI5 in conjunction with the PSNI Terrorism Investigations Unit. This in turn means that the Policing Board does not have oversight of the gathering of intelligence on the Provisional IRA as MI5 is not accountable to the Policing Board. Investigation by MI5 characterises the PIRA as a solely terrorist organisation and does not take into account the organised crime element which now forms the basis of paramilitary activity generally in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, two separate investigative strands through two separate agencies could result in no one agency having a holistic view over all paramilitary/terrorist activity. In addition, if dissident republican activity remains solely under the MI5 remit, the organised crime used by these groupings in the ‘traditional’ manner to fund terrorist activity could be missed.
Active instances of criminality such as paramilitary style punishment attacks are left unpunished. These include beatings, shootings, and attacks on property.
In the Queens Speech on 10th May 2022 the UK Government announced legislation proposing a conditional immunity from prosecutions for perpetrators of troubles related incidents that engage in a truth recovery process. This is a variance on the Government Command paper published in July 2020, which in line with the Conservative manifesto at the last general election, suggested a statute of limitations that in legality would have to be extended not only to British military personnel but also to loyalist and republican paramilitaries.
The existence of such processes does not act as a deterrent to terrorists/paramilitaries, knowing similar processes may be presented as a similar incentive to later renounce violence.
Parliament should not overestimate the incentive that this conditional immunity will provide for paramilitaries to tell the truth while there is no manner of corroborating their evidence, they are unrepentant, and their violent actions are not universally condemned within NI society. In addition, the so called ‘On-the-run’ letters which were granted behind closed doors have allowed perpetrators to evade justice in the Courts and receive immunity from arrest.
These letters support paramilitarism and should be rendered legally invalid through new legislation. The NI Executive must continue to be consulted throughout any process and decision making should not come from British Government alone.
In 2003 in HMP Maghaberry, terrorist/paramilitary linked prisoners within the prison began protesting to request separated status from ‘ODC’s’ (Ordinary Decent Criminals). Prisoners linked to Dissident Republican groupings embarked on a dirty protest, resulting in pressure being applied to the Government to address the situation.
In response a short review of conditions in the prison was commissioned, led by John Steele, a former head of the Northern Ireland Prison Service which concluded that a degree of separation was required to protect terrorists/paramilitaries of opposing factions from each
other and to protect the ‘ordinary’ prisoners from the paramilitaries as a whole.[6] This recommendation was accepted despite warnings that separation would not result in greater safety either for prisoners or staff and that paramilitaries would take control of the separated areas as they had previously done at HMP Maze.
The ultimate goal of eliminating terrorist/paramilitary activity must be made a priority in Government planning. The Fresh Start Agreement (2015) went some way to tackling terrorism/paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. Recently the Tackling Paramilitary Activity, Criminality and Organised Crime Programme has successfully highlighted aspects of terrorist/paramilitary activity though a media campaign aimed at ‘ending the harm’ and in doing so, emphasises one of the main socio-economic issues associated with terrorism/paramilitarism; financial strain and hardship.
This visual campaign should continue into its second phase as it tackles the issue of illegal money lending which impacts on the most vulnerable people in our society. In addition, the New Decade, New Approach (NDNA) that restored Stormont in January 2020 committed to a ‘targeted and specific focus across government to tackle paramilitarism’.
Deproscription would be totally unacceptable to innocent victims and must not be used to cosmetically remove terrorists/paramilitaries from Northern Ireland society, their legalisation would only further retrospectively justify their use of violence during the troubles and could be then used by current groupings to justify their current campaigns of violence.
Projects addressing other socio-economic such as educational under-achievement, poor employment prospects, drugs, addiction, poor mental health and poverty have all received funding through Government initiatives, greater long-term commitment is required if the needed socio-economic change is to be achieved.
Terrorism/Paramilitarism was not born overnight and the solution to end it will take time, money and buy in from the public, voluntary and community sector. Although the NDNA agreement highlights the requirement to tackle paramilitarism, it does not go far enough to give specific details such as timeframes and targets which can be identified and addressed. NDNA fails to identify methods of disbanding terrorist/paramilitary groupings, disrupting their structures, and setting a date to end separated prison status.
Progress has been made on the two-pronged approach in the Fresh Start Agreement but more work remains to be done in implementing subsequent recommendations. Bespoke Organised Crime Legislation, including the introduction of new offences of directing and participating in serious organised crime must be fully delivered on, as should the implementation of the outcome of the sentencing review carried out by the Department of Justice.
The recent introduction of The Criminal Finances Act in June 2021 to Northern Ireland provides powers around seize and arrest in executing Unexplained Wealth Orders and Account Freezing Orders. Consideration should be given to granting the request from Naomi Long, to allow full reallocation of civil recovery and cash forfeiture receipts back into Northern Ireland.[7]
This re-investment into the communities most affected by terrorism/paramilitarism and organised crime will have a full circle effect. Policing and justice measures are vital in this process along with initiatives to tackle socio-economic issues at community level and it is evident that neither strand works well in isolation.
Ongoing investment in and additional resourcing of the PSNI is essential to increase public confidence in policing and justice. This will help promote engagement with policing and work towards the goal of increasing lawfulness. The IRC recommendation of a dedicated transition process should be explored as a way of ending recruitment to terrorist/paramilitary groups, paramilitary style attacks and supporting truly remorseful ex- prisoners to integrate back into their community. Methods of disarming groups and allowing members to leave terrorist/paramilitary groups without fear of consequence must also be discussed.
The presence of terrorists/paramilitaries in Northern Ireland has produced a climate of fear and intimidation for residents. The fear of being watched, listened to, and potential attack has left residents going about their daily activities in a state of paranoia. Their presence also creates a general atmosphere of insecurity as violence may erupt at any time and accordingly lead to the negative socio-economic impacts highlighted below:
1. Mental well-being
When people live in a state of fear and insecurity, their mental-wellbeing is negatively affected. The struggle for personal safety and survival undermines innovation and leads to a decline in productivity and an overall decrease in local economies. The continued presence of paramilitaries creates a further traumatic psychological impact and a sense of helplessness for families of victims and survivors of the Troubles who are yet to obtain justice for their deceased.
2. Expression of rights
The state of insecurity has affected freedom of movement, right to play and engage in leisure activities and the right to safety. Some areas are designated ‘no go’ due to strong terrorist/paramilitary presence and control. This has caused internal displacement and disrupted local economic activities in those areas.
3. Family and community life
The atmosphere of mistrust, fear and anxiety has affected family and communal life. There is less interaction amongst people and even ordinary conversations are undertaken with ‘caution’ for fear of being watched and listened to by terrorists/paramilitaries.
4. Cost of defence and security
In an attempt to tackle paramilitaries, defence expenditure over the years has been exorbitant in comparison to other sectors of the economy. Businesses and organisations increase internal security in workplaces and individuals are forced to purchase costly security equipment for their homes.
5. Foreign/Local investment and tourism
Foreign investors lack confidence in investment in an unsafe environment thus causing a decrease in foreign direct investments. Local residents also do not also want to make long-term investments, huge financial investments or even purchase properties due to fear of loss if violence erupts. There is reduced tourist attraction.
6. Public confidence in government and law enforcement
There is diminished public confidence in the government and law enforcement agencies. People do not feel safe to report attack or intimidation from paramilitaries to the police. When there is lack of trust and breakdown of the relationship between government, police and citizens, the amount of unlawful activities will continue to rise. Consequently, terrorists/paramilitaries appear as self-designated protectors of their communities, gain more support, increased social standing, and generate sympathy to their cause.
7. Divided communities
The presence of terrorists/paramilitaries undermines any prospect of peacebuilding and strengthening divided communities in Northern Ireland. People do not feel safe to participate in government efforts at integrated programs and facilities for fear of being targeted by terrorist groups/paramilitaries and thus the division remains.
Any dedicated formal process of engagement with terror groups/paramilitaries which is aimed at their disbandment should be carried out with the utmost care and respect towards the needs of their victims throughout the years. A justice and victim centred approach will be essential if a line is to be drawn under the past and allow the communities in Northern Ireland to move forward.
In that sense, a key commitment would have to be made by those current/ex-paramilitaries engaging with the legacy process, in whatever shape it takes to do so in an honest and open manner. Realistically this honest and open engagement will be very unlikely to be found in the earlier stages of the formal process, it would seem more likely to occur after a dedicated process of systemic change within NI society reducing both the retrospective and current justification for terrorist/paramilitary activity.
We would agree that prior to current/ex terrorists/ex-paramilitaries being able to engage in this open and honest manner, this societal change would have to be brought about through the milestones of the formal process of engagement suggested in the Independent Reporting Commissions’ Fourth Report.
During the period of this formal process of engagement, victims must be constantly given assurance of the commitment to the continuance of the legacy process and progress must be made on investigating the murders of their loved ones.
Attention must also be paid to organised crime which has formed hybrids with terrorism/paramilitarism in Northern Ireland. The reality stands that in Northern Ireland, “small groups of individuals who acquired kudos and skill sets as members of a terrorist/ paramilitary organisation during the Troubles engage in organised criminal activity for personal profit under the banner of the original paramilitary organisation, taking advantage of the fear that their association with the terrorist group can generate.”[8]
Their abilities within organised crime were originally developed to fund terror related activities and presently, while the focus is on the continuance of said organised crime, these groupings retain their ability to mobilise for ‘official’ terrorist/paramilitary activity. It will be challenging to have a formal process of engagement without also tackling the much larger issue of organised crime due to its symbiotic relationship with terrorism/paramilitarism.
The process of engagement will also have to take place in tandem with systemic change to improve quality of life in under resourced communities and a push within the criminal justice system to build confidence in policing bodies and the state to represent the interests of these communities and protect them, both against ordinary crime and against repercussions that they might face during the disbandment process.
In loyalist communities especially, the UK Government needs to seriously address the sense of abandonment felt by those communities post-Brexit and the strain that many are feeling on their sense of identity.
If the “existential risk”[9] to community and identity that some see the protocol and Irish Sea Border as being are not taken seriously, in tandem with outstanding issues of segregation
and under resourcing within communities, the chances of individuals turning towards the terrorist/paramilitary-organised crime hybrid seem more likely.
In summary, Northern Ireland and its’ people deserve better, almost a quarter of a century beyond the signing of The Belfast Agreement it is intolerable that communities remain under the grip of terrorists/paramilitaries where young people are effectively groomed by leeches and then used as cannon fodder in advancing the interests of terror/paramilitary godfathers.
The lingering unwritten policy of the UK Government back in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s of an “acceptable level of violence”[10] and a place for “internal housekeeping”[11] reverberates to this day. The manifestation of this position has been the diversification of ‘political terrorists’ to that of broader ‘criminal terrorists/paramilitaries.’
We need acknowledgement from the UK Government that the policy of appeasement enacted for well over a quarter of a century has failed and that it has created the circumstances we now face, a new approach is required and there can be no more delay, it’s literally costing lives.
Pre-1998 the predominance of the death rate was carried out through the barrel of a gun or the detonation of a bomb, now the predominance of death is caused by the shooting up of heroin, the snorting of cocaine.
We say, no more can this be tolerated.
May 2022
[1] Department of Justice, Perceptions of Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland: Findings from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2017 to 2020 (Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and Resarch Agency, 2022).
[2] Enda McClafferty, “Northern Ireland: Prison segregation costs more than £2m a year,” BBC News, October 6, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-54439849 (accessed June 8, 2022).
[3] “The Northern Ireland Protocol Explained,” The Week, May 12, 2022, https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/politics/953561/northern-ireland-protocol-will-the-uk-trigger-article-16 (accessed May 26, 2022).
[4] Adrian Rutherford, “Illegal paramilitary memorials on Housing Executive land in Northern Ireland," Belfast Telegraph, April 22, 2017, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/illegal-paramilitary-
memorials-on-housing-executive-land-in-northern-ireland-35640868.html (accessed June 8, 2022).
[5] “Paramilitary Activity Update,” PSNI, accessed June 8, 2022, https://www.psni.police.uk/news/Latest- News/030621-paramilitary-activity-update/.
[6] Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Separation of Paramilitary Prisoners at HMP Maghaberry (London: The Stationary Office, 2004), 6.
[7] Independent Reporting Commission, Fourth Report (Dublin, 2021), 78
[8] John Jupp and Matthew Garrod, “Legacies of the Troubles: Links between Organized Crime and Terrorism in
Northern Ireland”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 45 no. 5-6 (2022): 9.
[9]“The Northern Ireland Protocol Explained,” The Week, May 12, 2022, https://www.theweek.co.uk/news/politics/953561/northern-ireland-protocol-will-the-uk-trigger-article-16 (accessed May 26, 2022).
[10] Mo Mowlam, Secretary of State’s Judgement on Alleged Breach of Cease-Fire, (Belfast: Northern Ireland Office, 1999), 2.
[11] John Mullin, “Mowlam Plays for Time on IRA,” Guardian, August 18, 1999, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/aug/18/northernireland.johnmullin (accessed 27 May 27, 2022)