Tulip Siddiq MP submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee’s inquiry on “The FCDO’s approach to state level hostage situations” (SLH0023)

Contents

Introduction and executive summary

1a) Missed opportunities to solve the IMS debt

1b) Secrecy around the IMS debt

1c) Impact of Ministerial mistake

1d) Stepping back from previous commitments

2a) Recognition of abuse and hostage status

2b) Failure to protect from torture

2c) Squandering of diplomatic protection

2d) Dual nationality

2e) Comparative performance of UK

3a) UK’s approach to hostage diplomacy

Conclusion

Introduction and executive summary

1. Over six years of supporting Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe as the local MP for both her and her husband Richard Ratcliffe, I observed that the UK Government (“UK”) made numerous mistakes in its handling of Nazanin’s case. These include: an inconsistent approach in its negotiating position; delay in paying the historic £400 million debt owed to Iran (“IMS debt”); deflections of responsibility including over Ministerial mistakes like that by the Foreign Secretary during a Foreign Affairs Committee (“FAC”) evidence session in 2017.

2. These mistakes contributed to Nazanin’s unnecessary detention for six years in Iran and her separation from her immediate family in West Hampstead in my constituency, where she lives. These mistakes in Nazanin’s case have also undermined the credibility of the UK Government’s consular protections and promises, which has consequences for the safety of British citizens abroad at present and in the future.

3. Nazanin’s case is also reflective of the broader failings of the UK Government’s approach to state hostage taking. The UK’s limited use of diplomatic protection status, lack of support for dual nationals and unwillingness in many cases to acknowledge hostage taking, torture and abuse to the public and Parliament have all contributed to Nazanin’s prolonged detention in Iran and exposed her and other British citizens to greater risks of torture.

4. The UK must learn from the mistakes made in Nazanin’s case and reform its approach to handling and deterring state hostage taking, including through international agreement. 

5. In this submission, I set out the UK’s failings – and some of the lessons that can be learnt for reform – in nine key areas. Though each area has relevance for all three of the questions posed by the FAC in this inquiry, I have grouped them according to their relevance to the questions set out in the call for evidence in order to assist the inquiry. They are as follows:

1)      What were the merits and mistakes made in the approach of the FCDO to the handling of the Iranian hostage situation and any other similar situations in recent years?

1. Missed opportunities to solve the IMS debt - During the six years that Nazanin was held hostage in Iran, the UK Government was presented with numerous opportunities to resolve the IMS debt. The UK’s inability to arrive at a decision on the issue of the debt and the lack of political will to settle the issue resulted in Nazanin’s detention being unnecessarily extended.

2. Secrecy around the IMS Debt - The UK Government’s lack of honesty and transparency on Iran’s negotiating strategy – which was holding Nazanin hostage to secure repayment of the IMS debt – prevented Parliament from effectively scrutinising their decision-making processes and policy choices.

3. Impact of Ministerial mistake - In 2017, Boris Johnson, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, incorrectly described the reasons for Nazanin’s 2016 visit to Iran. This mistake had a profound and negative effect on Nazanin’s case. However, the UK Government’s response to this error – failing to acknowledge that a mistake had been made and address it – was at least as damaging as the mistake itself, and it undermined the UK’s ability to negotiate with Iran.

4. Stepping back from previous commitments - The UK’s credibility as a negotiator was undermined by the Government’s inconsistent approach to its international commitments and negotiating position with Iran. The UK’s position on a range of issues – such as Nazanin’s hostage status and its commitment to paying the IMS debt – were subject to frequent change.

2)      Does the Government’s approach provide an effective deterrent to state-based hostage situations?

1. Recognition of abuse and hostage status – The UK Government’s failure to recognise Nazanin’s hostage status or the extent of the abuse that she was subjected to undermined UK and international efforts to hold Iran to account.

2. Failure to protect from torture - The UK Government’s failure to acknowledge the torture of Nazanin and other British hostages in Iran and around the world has undermined international efforts to hold rogue regimes to account.

3. Squandering of Diplomatic Protection - The UK Government failed to take full advantage of its consular protections in Nazanin’s case. The failure to utilise diplomatic protection meant that Iran faced limited consequences or disincentives for the abuse that Nazanin was subjected to during her six years of detention.

4. Dual nationality - The UK Government devalued the protections offered by British citizenship by citing Nazanin’s dual nationality as an excuse for inaction.

5. Comparative performance of the UK – The UK Government has performed much worse in securing the release of its nationals from Iran than other countries in similar hostage situations.

3)      What efforts is the Government taking, or should take, to secure international agreement on deterring and handling state-based hostage taking?

a)      UK’s approach to hostage diplomacy - The UK has not revised its hostage policy for some years, and its structures are not fit for purpose to deal with the growth in hostage taking by states such as Iran. The UK’s “wait and see” approach resulted in Nazanin to be unnecessarily detained for six years.

1a) Missed opportunities to solve the IMS debt

6. There were a number of occasions when the UK could have resolved the IMS debt but chose not to. The fact that the debt was paid in March 2022, apparently without any changes on sanctions or other barriers previously cited by Ministers, shows that this decision could have been taken at any point since Nazanin was taken hostage in 2016.

7. The following are some of the occasions when Ministers failed to resolve the IMS debt:

• 2016 - Following the failure of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s (“FCDO’s”) first strategy - which I understand from Richard Ratcliffe was to restore diplomatic relations with Iran in September 2016 in return for Nazanin’s release (instead Nazanin was convicted at that time) - the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) clarified that Nazanin was being held specifically over the IMS debt.[1] I understand from Richard Ratcliffe that Omani officials met with Nazanin’s family to confirm this and offer to help solve her case, but that meetings with UK officials did not take place.

• 2017 - Iran applied for a licence from the Treasury for the UK to pay the money to the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) to no avail and I understand from Alistair Burt’s evidence to the FAC that Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif sent a letter to the UK Government in November 2017 saying the money could be sent to the CBI rather than Ministry of Defence and Support for Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic (MODSAF). The Quercus deal - an energy deal which I understand from Richard Ratcliffe came with the expectation of Nazanin’s release at parole in November 2017 - was undermined by the second case brought against Nazanin.[2] Following leaks that her case was actually about the debt and the then Foreign Secretary’s announcement that he would work with the Treasury to pay it, Richard Ratcliffe points out that the Chancellor seems to have set onerous legal tests to limit the possibilities for payment.[3]

• 2018 – The UK chose to extend the court dispute on the debt by contesting Iran’s right to interest on this, despite this being stipulated in the contract and the costs involved in challenging this.

• 2019 – The Government finally engaged Oman to help mediate Nazanin’s case, but the Ministry of Defence (MoD) blocked a proposal to pay the debt in humanitarian aid which prompted rows between the Defence Secretary and FCDO Ministers.[4]

• 2020 - The UK chose not to settle the IMS debt when all EU sanctions on MODSAF no longer applied at the end of January 2020. Instead, the UK chose to impose its own sanctions on MODSAF when it was under no obligation to do so. Further, they chose not to settle the debt as humanitarian aid at the beginning of the pandemic in Spring 2020.

• 2021 - The UK chose to negotiate the JCPOA return with and on behalf of the US, and, when the US backed away from a hostage deal outside of the JCPOA, the UK also chose to wait rather than make a separate agreement for the return of its hostages. At the time they wrongly briefed that they could not pay the debt due to US sanctions.[5]

8. Ultimately, the 2022 IMS settlement was mediated via Oman. It included both political assurances that the money would only be spent on humanitarian aid and the value of the disputed interest.[6] There do not seem to have been any extra limitations placed on this due to sanctions, and it is unclear why this same deal could not have been done at any time since 2016. There is little evidence to suggest that the eventual deal was materially different to the one agreed but not implemented in Summer 2021, and it seems that political will rather than logistical realities was the difference which allowed the agreement to be made.

1b) Secrecy around the IMS debt

9. Details of the IMS debt and Government policy around it - including on its costs, the rationale for not settling it, and the consequences for the safety of British citizens - was all withheld from the public and Parliamentarians like myself who were supporting constituents detained in Iran.

10. The UK Government long knew that Nazanin and others were being held hostage in order to put pressure on them to settle the IMS debt, and indeed she was sent home as soon as it was repaid. However, Ministers hid this link from Parliament and denied it publicly:

• The denial of the link in Ministerial speeches, Urgent Questions and several other Parliamentary debates and sessions;[7]

• Omitting to tell Parliament in 2001 when they paid an extra £400m into court and in 2010 when a dividend from IMS was taken but not paid into the Consolidated Fund;[8]

• My office was advised in response to certain applications for Urgent Questions that the Foreign Office had told the Speaker’s Office that they would not respond to them as it would not help Nazanin’s case;[9]

• Attempts were made to have the IMS court case prevented from being discussed in Parliament in the November 2021 Westminster Hall debate on Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe;[10]

• The refusal to respond to specific Written Parliamentary Questions (“WPQs”) regarding the dates of the IMS trials.[11]

11. This obfuscation over the IMS debt was dangerous for Nazanin and other victims since it gave the Iranians an incentive to abuse them further in order to get media attention on this issue, and it deflected Parliament from scrutinising the risks of government policy.

1c) Impact of Ministerial mistake

12. In 2017 Boris Johnson, the then Foreign Secretary, made a mistake while giving evidence to the FAC which had a profound, negative impact on Nazanin’s case.[12] In particular, it was the UK Government’s response to this mistake – denying that it was a mistake, covering up the consequences and failing to deliver on promises that were made as a result – that made Nazanin’s case such a political football for years subsequently and impacted its handling.

The impact on Iran

13. Mr Johnson’s comments were used by the Iranian Judiciary to justify the second court case against Nazanin, and they were weaponised in the Iranian state media as both a “gaffe” and proof of her guilt throughout Autumn 2017.[13]

14. I understand from Richard Ratcliffe that, behind closed doors, the IRGC embarked on renewed efforts to get Nazanin to confess to the activities that Mr Johnson had “revealed”, claiming that he wouldn’t have made it up.

15. Extensive propaganda was made to substantiate Mr Johnson’s claims, where there had been negligible efforts to do so by Iranian media prior to this point.[14]

16. Mr Johnson’s comments continued to be cited as proof of her guilt whenever the second court case was revived for leverage, especially once he became Prime Minister. I understand from the family that these comments were even cited by the IRGC in Nazanin’s final interrogations just prior to departure from Iran in 2022.

The impact on the UK

17. At the time of Mr Johnson’s comments, there was no acknowledgement of Nazanin’s innocence and that she was being held for leverage. Instead, there were various claims in statements to Parliament that Iran’s Foreign Minister had assured the Foreign Secretary that his comments had no impact on the case against Nazanin, that he was now sure that she was there on holiday and he was sorry if anyone had misunderstood.

18. When this came up again in 2018 and 2019, the UK repeatedly downplayed the threat of the second case to the family, and even suggested it may not happen.

19. When the court case came back to trial in 2020 and 2021, the UK refused to assert its right to attend the trial to the Iranian authorities and refused to accompany Nazanin to the court despite her family’s strident requests.

1d) Stepping back from previous commitments

20. One of the key failings of the UK Government’s handling of Nazanin’s case was its repeated changing of direction, which had the result of undermining the credibility of Ministerial initiatives on this case in the eyes of Iran.

21. This was in part a result of the fact that we dealt with five different Foreign Secretaries and several Ministers for the Middle East in this time, which was a barrier to continuity and knowledge retention. The approach of the FCDO to consular cases is discretionary, so the family had to build relationships with each new Ministerial team to get promises of action.

22. I am concerned that the UK Government’s position on this case appeared to reset every time there was a Ministerial change and that new Ministers would often step back from previous undertakings:

• Under Boris Johnson – There was a public undertaking to settle the debt and expectations were raised in Iran, leading to a significant backlash when the promises were not kept. Once Mr Johnson left office, it was only when Nazanin was given a second sentence (having served out her first) that the UK moved to fulfil this promise.

• Under Jeremy Hunt - Nazanin was awarded diplomatic protection status and I understand from Richard Ratcliffe that preparations were made for both an Arria Formula Meeting at the UN Security Council on Iran’s hostage diplomacy and a case against Iran in the international courts. Richard has told me that once Mr Hunt left office, the UK downgraded the meeting to a UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) side event and from being about “hostage diplomacy” to “the human rights abuses of the Iranian judiciary”, which he argues downgraded this from an issue of international security to one of domestic human rights. Preparations for an international court case were also stalled, and the family heard from subsequent Ministers that this would not be effective.

• Under Dominic Raab - Nazanin’s treatment was acknowledged as amounting to torture and promises of action were made.[15] Mr Raab also promised her that he would publicly recognise her as a hostage and expressed readiness and interest in imposing Magnitsky sanctions on those involved in hostage taking. Once Mr Raab left office, follow up with Iran on torture allegations did not appear to take place, requests to call her a hostage were resisted and action on the Magnitsky file they were presented with was stalled.[16]

23. This practice of repeatedly resetting the UK’s position with the arrival of new Ministers had negative consequences for the credibility of the UK’s deterrence, as Iran could wait them out and rely on unwillingness by the Government to act. This allowed Iran to periodically escalate Nazanin’s situation for political purposes without fear of genuine reprisals.

24. The UK Government’s failure to maintain a strong position against Iran’s hostage taking and repeated walking back from previous commitments has made UK citizens less safe.

2a) Recognition of abuse and hostage status

25. It was a long battle to get the UK government to acknowledge the full extent of abuse in Nazanin’s case, and its acknowledgement remained incomplete until the end. This reluctance to recognise honestly the severity of Nazanin’s situation, especially in the most dangerous early phase of her detention, made the situation worse and made her less safe.

26. My constituent Richard Ratcliffe confirms that:

• Until November 2017, there was no proper recognition in public of any injustice in Nazanin’s case or criticism of the Iranian authorities’ treatment of her. Parliamentary answers said that they were asking Iran for more information on her case.[17]

• Until Autumn 2018, there was no acknowledgement of Nazanin’s innocence publicly, despite the UN having ruled that she was arbitrarily detained in September 2016.

• Until January 2019, the Iranian Ambassador had never been summoned on her case to complain about the abuse.

• Until March 2019 (and the invoking of diplomatic protection), there was no acknowledgement of Nazanin’s detention as arbitrary and contrary to international law. This was also the first acknowledgement that she was being held for leverage.

• Ministers only publicly condemned her detention as arbitrary and acknowledged that she was being held as leverage after the second set of proceedings against her had been brought to fruition between Autumn 2020 and March 2021.[18]

• The UK did not publicly acknowledge the illegality (under Iranian law) of Iran’s decision to withhold clemency from Nazanin in Spring 2020 when thousands of other prisoners who met the same eligibility criteria were granted it, despite repeated requests from the family.

• Until May 2021, the UK did not acknowledge that the cruel treatment of Nazanin amounted to torture.[19] This acknowledgement was not included in public statements by Ministers, and WPQ answers and written correspondence appeared to avoid this also.

27. However, there was one key recognition that the Government avoided until the end: they never acknowledged Nazanin to be a hostage - despite this being an explicit request from the family since 2018 and a recommendation of the FAC since 2020.[20] The last three Foreign Secretaries all acknowledged her hostage status privately to Nazanin’s family, and Dominic Raab explicitly promised to Nazanin that he would say so publicly - he came close to doing this in May 2021, but he did not do so explicitly before he was replaced.[21]

28. Despite the family detailing clearly to the FCDO in correspondence the dangers of downgrading Iran’s hostage taking by insisting on misdescribing it, WPQ answers attempted to fudge the issue.[22] The Government told the family repeatedly that their rationale was always that they did not want to offend Iran or do anything that would jeopardise their sensitivities during negotiations. This whole approach indulged what Richard Ratcliffe describes as Iran’s DARVO tactics and undoubtedly made it more dangerous for Nazanin.

2b) Failure to protect from torture

29. The UK Government’s approach to reports that Nazanin had been tortured appeared to be to look the other way and pretend it does not see – an approach which I believe has increased the risk for victims.

30. 10 years ago the UK Government revised guidance and reporting on torture prevention, saying that it took this issue seriously. As a result, the FCDO Annual Human Rights and Democracy Report lists torture initiatives and records 100 cases per year of British citizens who report torture and abuse to UK embassies.[23]

31. However, for these cases, there does not appear to be evidence of any impact from FCDO interventions. Ministerial answers to WPQs have not revealed independent investigations, in-country or UK criminal prosecutions, or independent medical assessments following FCDO intervention.

32. For Iran, there is only one torture case recorded in the FCDO statistics in the past 5 years, despite clear evidence that this issue was impacting multiple British citizens.

33. While the FCDO annual report records how many new cases are reported each year to UK embassies and there is an annual review of open cases, there is no information available about what happened in these cases.

34. The evidence that Nazanin was tortured in Iran has already been set out clearly elsewhere.[24] Though shocking, what happened to Nazanin is less surprising in context of the UK’s downplaying and gradual neglect of torture reports. When I met the Iranian Ambassador in November 2021, he outright denied the torture and insisted no such torture happened in Iranian prisons – a brazen claim which has never been properly challenged by the UK Government.

35. If we are to ensure that Nazanin’s treatment cannot happen to other British citizens, there must be a review of the UK’s approach to protecting its citizens from torture overseas, better reporting to Parliament and revised guidance so that there are stronger protocols for high-risk countries.

2c) Squandering of diplomatic protection

36. The UK’s assertion of its consular protections in Nazanin’s case, including those relating to diplomatic protection status, was feeble at best. I understand from Nazanin’s family that they perceived a direct link between that timidity and the emboldened abuse of the IRGC. The hollowing out of the credibility of the UK’s consular protections has made it more dangerous for British citizens in countries with rogue regimes.

37. I understand from my constituent Richard Ratcliffe that the UK Government made minimal efforts to gain consular access to Nazanin when she was in prison in the following ways:

• It never visited her or the Prosecutor’s Office (responsible for access to prisoners) in Evin Prison;

• It only wrote letters to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting access, and it was never made clear when it first wrote such a letter or whether and when it got formal responses to these requests;

• There is no evidence that it requested to attend her first trial, appeal hearings or Supreme Court review;

• The only visit to Evin Prison it ever made for Nazanin’s sake was to attend a publicity tour in July 2017 organised by the Iranian authorities, which is widely understood to have been an attempt to whitewash claims of abuse and was heavily criticised at the time;[25]

• The UK refused to assert its right to consular access to Iran even after it invoked diplomatic protection;

• The British Embassy refused to visit Nazanin for the entirety of her first sentence - even after she was at home and on an ankle tag - and they only visited after that sentence was fully expired and before she had been given the next sentence;

• For Nazanin’s second court case, the British Embassy did not request to attend any of the pre-court sessions in 2017, 2018 or 2019 and only requested to attend the court hearing in Autumn 2020 the day before, after an explicit request from the family;

• For the court hearing in March 2021, the British Embassy refused to accompany Nazanin to court or to stand outside the courtroom;

• The only time that Nazanin was invited to the British Embassy to meet the UK Ambassador was more than five years into her ordeal on 25 December 2021, after her appeal on the second case was lost and “pending implementation”.

38. The UK Government handled Nazanin’s diplomatic protection extremely irresponsibly:

• Nazanin was granted diplomatic protection in March 2019 by the then Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, after some 18 months of lobbying, and it required the family to prove that Nazanin was subject to an injustice under international law, that she had exhausted all remedies in Iran and that she was predominantly British. The FCDO had resisted this, though when it was granted FCDO lawyers told the family they were committed to acting on it and the travel advice for UK citizens travelling to Iran was strengthened;[26]

• Subsequent to Mr Hunt leaving office, the Government began to act as though diplomatic protection had never been granted at all, with FCDO Ministers dropping mention of this status from all Parliamentary statements on her case;[27]

• I understand from Nazanin’s family that the Government attempted to dissuade the families of other British citizens held hostage in Iran from applying for diplomatic protection and refused to grant it to those who did, arguing - as they had for Nazanin in 2018 - that it would be dangerous to do so;

• When Nazanin’s family challenged this in 2020 and 2021 and demanded Ministers set out in Parliamentary debates the steps they had taken on the basis of diplomatic protection, they were unable to point to anything and instead declared it to be a failure;

• The family have openly expressed their suspicions at the rationale for this, particularly in light of the fact that the UK later took Nazanin to the IRGC to sign a forced confession for the crimes she was wrongly accused of, and required her to sign this and a request for clemency before she was allowed to board the plane out of Iran;

39. The effect of the UK’s approach on consular support and diplomatic protection was the worst of both worlds – Nazanin’s value to the IRGC as an asset increased while their estimation of the UK’s likelihood to take meaningful action against them decreased as a result of this approach.

40. The squandering of the credibility of the UK’s protections through its waste of diplomatic protection is an under-recognised aspect of the Government’s mishandling of her case, and it will have a negative impact on the safety of British citizens far beyond Iran in future.

2d) Dual nationality

41. I believe the UK has devalued the protections associated with British citizenship in its handling of Nazanin’s case by using the excuse of dual nationality to hide its inaction from Parliament. There are three main aspects of this:

• Firstly, it led to a form of victim blaming where Ministers effectively blamed the failure to solve Nazanin’s case on her second passport.[28] This resulted in the unusual situation of the UK government making Iran’s case for it by arguing that Nazanin was not being released because Iran did not recognise dual nationality. This was cynical when Ministers knew that Nazanin had been arrested because of her British passport.

• Secondly, it has created in practice two tiers of British citizenship – one for those who solely have British citizenship and another with fewer protections for those who are dual nationals.

• Thirdly, it did not make sense following the invoking of diplomatic protection where the Foreign Secretary had formally recognised Nazanin as predominantly British. The Government re-emphasising Nazanin’s dual nationality following the change in Foreign Secretary in 2019 served to undermine the credibility of the UK’s diplomatic protection status and to signal to Iran that Nazanin was expendable.

42. It has not been widely appreciated how destructive this emphasis on dual nationality was, and the importance for the safety of British nationals of committing to protect all of them.

2e) Comparative performance of UK

43. While no state does a good job at dealing with hostage diplomacy, the UK’s performance is amongst the worst. There are several lessons that the UK could learn from others.

44. Honest Acknowledgement of Hostage Taking - A key problem with the UK’s approach was its long pretence that Nazanin and others were not the victims of state hostage taking. By contrast, the US formally keeps a list of those it regards as hostages or wrongfully detained, whose cases are handled by the office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Hostage Affairs. While the US has annual reports to Congress on the progress of cases on this list and tracks how long US citizens are held, the FCDO does not formally track how long British citizens are held (either individually or on average), does not regularly report on progress in hostage cases to Parliament, and has no KPIs or targets for its performance in hostage recovery (e.g. average time taken to get people home).[29]

45. Consular Protection - Richard Ratcliffe confirms that the British Embassy in Tehran, since it reopened, has never attended or stood outside court hearings for Nazanin or other British hostages; by contrast, the German Government does attempt to attend the trials of its citizens at the Revolutionary Court, often standing for a vigil outside when access is not granted. I understand from the families of victims that the UK has never successfully visited a British prisoner inside Evin Prison, while the German Embassy has made monthly visits and meets with the Deputy Prosecutor in charge of prisoner welfare when not permitted to meet its citizens. Richard Ratcliffe tells me that unlike for British citizens in Iran, there are no reports in recent years of German citizens suffering permanent impairment as a result of physical abuse they received in Iranian custody.

46. Recovery rates - The UK remains one of the worst performers at getting its citizens home. It took six years to get Nazanin home. In that period, the US, France and Australia all got citizens home in less time; Canada, Germany and others have also done this more quickly.[30]

47. Accountability - The UK has not imposed any substantive cost on Iran for the hostage taking of innocent British citizens. The Foreign Secretary has been provided with a list of proposed Magnitsky sanctions for individuals identified as directly involved in the different stages of Iran’s hostage diplomacy, yet no action has been taken. This contrasts to the US, which has sanctioned individuals for their involvement in Iran’s hostage taking of US citizens and developed mechanisms for victims to launch civil actions to claim compensation from Iran for acts of hostage taking, which acts as a deterrent.

3a) UK’s approach to hostage diplomacy

48. The UK Government has not revised its hostage policy for some years, and its structures are not fit for purpose to deal with the growth in hostage taking by states. Recent experience shows that it will require regular reporting to and scrutiny from Parliament, as well as international coordination, to improve the UK’s approach to dealing with this. A new approach must include accountability and disincentives for hostage takers.

49. The UK needs to start explicitly calling this issue hostage taking and encouraging others to do the same. These cases are covered by the UN Hostages Convention, though the Government has tried to deflect this to justify its inaction in the past. Hostage taking is already a violation of international law, however it is clear that new mechanisms to strengthen enforcement around this should be considered, including:

• Organising an Arria Formula meeting at the UN Security Council to discuss this;

• Developing an Action Plan and Protocols for response via the Canada Declaration, including mutual defence agreements in response to hostage taking;[31]

• Deterrents and accountability for hostage takers using existing mechanisms including Magnitsky sanctions for individuals, individual prosecutions under the Taking of Hostages Act 1982, the International Court of Justice and supporting civil actions.

50. Currently the Government refuses to accept it has an obligation to get UK citizens home in state hostage cases.[32] This is unfair and causes needless suffering, and it has led to a situation where, paradoxically, those who ignore FCDO advice appear to be best protected. The Government should consider:

• A new FCDO hostage policy which sets out what its obligations are and are not vis-a-vis protecting UK citizens held hostage and getting them home – this must explain the rationale for any continuing advice to suppress publicity and persuasion of families to keep quiet, and it should detail the FCDO’s approach to deterrence and accountability;

• An equivalent of the US’ Special Presidential Envoy on Hostage Affairs, who liaises across government to resolve the cases and acts as a reference point for family support and advocacy, rather than responding ad hoc to families’ protests as the UK does now;

• Legislation empowering the Government to resolve hostage cases, to seek justice and accountability for hostage takers, and to require regular updates to Parliament on the successes and lessons of the Government’s efforts, akin to the Levinson Act in the US;[33]

• Better and fixed annual reporting to Parliament, including on the numbers of UK citizens being held hostage by foreign governments or by terrorist groups, and honesty about scale of the problem which is currently hidden from the UK public and Parliament.

Conclusion

51. The failings in Nazanin’s case are symptomatic of outdated cultures, structures and approaches taken across government. The UK Government’s “wait and see” attitude, inability to provide a consistent approach to negotiations with Iran under different Foreign Secretaries, and failure to recognise Nazanin’s hostage status, abuse and torture all contributed to Nazanin’s unnecessary imprisonment and appalling treatment in Iran.

52. However, the FAC’s inquiry must extend beyond the intuitional failings of the FCDO – ultimately, it is the political leadership of the UK Government that was responsible for the failings in Nazanin’s case. There are three fundamental mistakes – all of which had a profound and negative impact on Nazanin’s case – that the Government has yet to acknowledge.

53. The first was the lack of transparency of successive UK Government Ministers regarding the UK’s approach to Nazanin’s case, the IMS debt and Iran’s negotiation strategy of holding Nazanin hostage to secure repayment of that debt.

54. During the six years of Nazanin’s imprisonment, I tabled well over 200 Parliamentary Questions and made over 30 Parliamentary interventions - including eight Urgent Questions and three Prime Minister’s Questions – in the House of Commons regarding Nazanin’s case and the IMS debt. In response to these interventions, the Government failed to acknowledge and, in some cases, outright denied the link between Nazanin’s detention and the IMS debt. This is despite Iranian interrogators making the connection between the two issues clear to Nazanin early on. This lack of transparency prevented Parliament from effectively scrutinising the Government’s decision-making process and policy choices.

55. Second, Boris Johnson, when he was Foreign Secretary, incorrectly described the reasons for Nazanin’s 2016 visit to Iran which was weaponised against Nazanin. A less forgivable mistake was the now Prime Minister’s denial that his error had in any way impacted upon this case.

56. Third, every new Foreign Secretary during Nazanin’s six years of detention was accompanied by a reset of the UK’s negotiating position and international commitments. The institutional failings and lack of political leadership resulted in an inconsistent approach to Nazanin’s case which undermined the UK Government’s negotiating position with Iran.

57. It is in the interests of present and future British hostages of hostile states that the UK Government is held to account for its mistakes in relation to Nazanin’s case. I believe that the FAC’s inquiry will provide serving and previous members of the Government with an opportunity to acknowledge and take responsibility for these failings and will help to ensure that they can never happen again, as well as providing a roadmap for the necessary reform to the UK’s approach to dealing with state hostage taking.         

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