AVP0006

Written Evidence submitted by Lockheed Martin UK

1. Lockheed Martin UK (LMUK) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, employing approximately 1,600 people over 23 locations around the country.  Lockheed Martin invests on average over £1.8 billion each year in the UK, supporting over 750 British companies (75 per cent of which are SMEs), and over 23,000 jobs in the supply chain.

3. Lockheed Martin develops, and supports, various air capabilities for the British armed forces.  It is a prime contractor for the F-35 programme, manufactures and provides aspects of the integrated operational support for the C-130J fleet, operates the UK Military Flying Training System (UKMFTS) under a joint venture known as ‘Ascent’, and provides elements of the UK’s Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capabilities.  This submission is based on Lockheed Martin’s experience in developing, delivering, and supporting these capabilities.

4. In the near term, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) will need to decide the delivery profile for its second tranche of F-35B aircraft (which may result in a slow rate of force growth), consider its future F-35 requirements beyond tranche two, and consider whether retiring the C-130J fleet could create capability gaps for air mobility missions.  It will also need to consider how to balance the funding of development programmes for air platforms and weapons systems, with the need to have sufficient budget to procure a larger number of platforms and weapons stockpiles in order to have combat mass.

5. In relation to UKMFTS, Ascent has provided written evidence to the Committee.  LMUK concurs with Ascent’s evidence: the uplifted contracts for Rotary Wing and Fixed Wing, and overall contracting mechanism, will provide sufficient capacity and flexibility for Phase 2 aircrew training to meet the MOD’s stated, and potential future, requirements.

Will the proposals set out in the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper deliver the aviation capabilities (fixed wing and rotary), combat mass and interoperability required of the UK Armed Forces, particularly in light of the changed security situation in Europe?

6. The conflict in Ukraine has focused attention on weapons stockpiles, opportunities for force enhancements (including to increase combat mass), and longer-term acquisition priorities in areas such as Integrated Air and Missile Defence.

7. As the MOD considers capability and force structure options, and within the scope of this inquiry, LMUK would highlight the capability choices being made by allies:-

1. Combat Air: by 2035, more than 500 F-35s will be stationed in Europe across NATO member bases.[1]  Norway, The Netherlands, and Italy already operate the F-35A, and the U.S. Air Force Europe is basing the F-35A at RAF Lakenheath.[2]  Germany recently announced the acquisition of 35 F-35A aircraft in response to the changed security situation in Europe, following similar acquisition decisions by Finland (64 F-35As), Poland (32 F-35As), Belgium (34 F-35As), and Denmark (27 F-35As).  Switzerland, a non-NATO member, has decided to procure 36 F-35As.  Other European countries are also exploring the acquisition of the F-35.  The Commander U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Commander Allied Air Command said that the recent and increased deployment of U.S. F-35s to Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany ‘increases the defensive posture of the NATO alliance and enhances our ability to operate together’,[3] and other units have said ‘the interoperability that we have between the United States and partner squadrons establishes a foundation for future [NATO] F-35 operations’.[4]  In the Indo-Pacific region, there will be a permanent presence of over 300 F-35s by 2035.  The Minister for Defence Procurement has commented on the ‘intrinsic international interoperability offered by the ever-expanding F-35 global fleet’;[5] and

2. Fleet Mobility: the C-130 is a primary air mobility platform throughout the world, flown by over 70 countries. It is the main tactical air mobility platform in Europe, including for specialist tasks.  Its ability to accomplish multiple missions, including air refuelling and special operations, make it the ideal low-cost choice in meeting NATO requirements. The C-130 is operated by 15 NATO members, including France and Germany through a new joint squadron (which will have 10 aircraft, including five C-130J-30s, and five KC-130Js (tanker)).  France is also in the process of modernising their existing C-130Hs.  Additionally, the C-130 is operated by non-NATO countries, such as Sweden and Austria.  The C-130’s capabilities continue to be enhanced to provide the necessary operational agility, and combat mass: compared to the earlier C-130E, the C-130J’s maximum speed is 21 per cent higher; its climb time is reduced by up to 50 per cent; its cruising altitude is up to 40 per cent higher; its range is up to 40 per cent longer; system reliability and maintainability are improved by up to 50 per cent; maintenance man-hours per flight hour are decreased by up to 68 per cent; flight maintenance manpower is reduced by up to 50 per cent (resulting in a 47 per cent lower squadron operating and support cost); and it has 30 per cent more usable volume for increased seating, litters, pallets, or airdrop platforms.[6]  Furthermore, a palletized munitions concept to deliver longer-range strike weapons – augmenting the strike capacity of fighter aircraft, and strategic bombers, to increase mass (“Rapid Dragon”) –[7] and a Maritime Amphibious Capability (MAC) are currently being developed.[8]

8. Common capabilities across allies enable shared tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well interoperability and interchangeability.  This in turn increases combat mass.  LMUK has also previously highlighted the acquisition of common survivable weapons (including for integration on air assets, such as the F-35 and P-8), radars, mission systems, and Deep Fires capabilities by allies.[9]

9. In relation to combat mass, the delivery profile for the UK’s initial tranche of 48 F-35B aircraft has markedly slowed due to financial pressures, notwithstanding the increase in the defence budget.  It is likely that this will delay the stand up of a second frontline squadron by at least three years (to 2026).  Lockheed Martin is encouraged by the MOD’s support for a second tranche of F-35B aircraft (see paragraph 14).  The MOD will need to confirm that tranche, including its delivery profile, in the near term; there is a risk that the delivery profile will be “back-loaded” to the 2030s, resulting in a continued slow force growth rate.
10. In relation to air mobility, the MOD should keep under constant assessment whether retiring its C-130J fleet could create capability gaps for air mobility missions.  See paragraphs 17 to 19.

11. Finally, a key question that the UK will face in the mid-2020s is the extent to which it funds development programmes for air platforms (including for a Future Combat Air System (see paragraph 15), and future rotary programmes such as the New Medium Helicopter), and for weapons that can be integrated on those platforms, or collaborates with allies to access proven capabilities.  Collaboration with allies would enable the UK to leverage the investments made by them in development activities, allowing more of its budget to be spent on acquiring a larger number of platforms and stockpiles.  This would also enable proven interoperability and interchangeability.

What is the rationale behind, and what are the implications of, planned reductions to the existing fleet, including:

• Combat air, with the early retirement of the Tranche 1 Typhoons and the apparent scaling-back of commitments to purchase additional F-35B fighter aircraft.
• Fleet mobility, with regard to the early retirement of the C-130J Hercules, and the removal of the Puma and older Chinook helicopters from service.
• Airborne early warning and control, with the early retirement of the E-3D Sentry and the decision to reduce the number of E – 7A Wedgetails entering service from 5 to 3.

12. Combat Air.  The UK has an overall Programme of Record (POR) for 138 F-35 aircraft. Unlike previous defence reviews, the 2021 Defence Command Paper did not refer, or reaffirm the UK’s commitment, to this full POR.

13. The MOD has confirmed the procurement of a first tranche of 48 F-35B aircraft within its POR, of which 27 have been delivered to date.[10]  The delivery profile for the remaining aircraft in tranche one has markedly slowed due to financial pressures, notwithstanding the increase in the defence budget that was announced in November 2020.

14. The MOD has said that it expects to order a second tranche of 26 F-35B aircraft within its POR.[11]  This would take the UK’s F-35 fleet to 74 aircraft.  Lockheed Martin has assessed that 70 to 80 F-35B aircraft will be required to deliver a credible and resilient Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) capability, throughout the life of the Queen Elizabeth Class carriers (to 2068).[12]  However, as noted in paragraph 9, there is a risk of a slow delivery profile for the second tranche.

15. 138 F-35s would be required to allow the UK to deliver the Carrier Strike element of CEPP, alongside other land-based non-discretionary, and contingent, combat air tasks; the F-35 is capable of fulfilling all Typhoon missions.  The MOD has said that a decision on further buys of F-35 aircraft beyond a second tranche will depend on the progress of the Concept and Assessment phase for the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) in 2024-25 (see paragraph 11).  It has also said that a decision will depend on progress with UK weapons integration, and reductions in the sustainment costs of the F-35:-[13]

1. On weapons integration, since Lockheed Martin received contract direction in June 2021, it has worked with the MOD to identify and implement opportunities to improve the contracted timelines for SPEAR 3 and Meteor integration.[14]  This work continues under ‘Project Thunder’; and

2. On sustainment costs, between 2015 and 2021 Lockheed Martin reduced its portion of Cost per Flying Hour (CpFH) by 50 percent, and its portion of the Cost per Tail per Year (CpTpY) by 37 percent.  It projects an additional 35 percent reduction in CpFH, and 25 percent reduction in CpTpY, through 2026.[15]

16. LMUK recommends that the MOD:-

1. Confirms its intent to purchase a second tranche of 26 F-35B aircraft within its POR, and consider options for maintaining a delivery profile in production Lots 18 to 20 that does not result in a slow force growth rate; and

2. Considers and confirms its requirements for F-35, beyond tranche two, in light of the Combat Air choices being made by allies, including to enable interoperability and increase combat mass.  See paragraph 7(a).  The Government should also take into account the proven economic and intellectual property benefits of the F-35 programme to UK companies, which are supported by a robust Industrial Participation plan for the UK.

17. Fleet Mobility.  Air mobility and transport operations vary in scope, requiring a mix of capabilities ranging from extremely long range, high load carrying aircraft to smaller and more survivable systems.  It is necessary for countries to maintain a suitable force mix to avoid capability gaps.

18. In the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the Government expressed an intention to retire the Royal Air Force’s C-130J Hercules fleet from service by 2022 – 10 years earlier than planned – on the assumption that its roles and missions, including specialist roles, could be transitioned to another aircraft by that time.  By the 2015 SDSR, it had become apparent that such a transition would not be possible, and the Government announced that it would upgrade and extend the life of the C-130J fleet to allow it to support a range of operations until 2035.  The 2021 Defence Command Paper subsequently announced that the C-130J fleet would be retired by March 2023 – 12 years earlier than planned. 

19. The MOD should keep under constant assessment whether the roles and missions of its C-130J fleet can be transitioned to other assets by March 2023, and in a cost effective way.  It should also be noted that the C-130J fleet is complimentary to the larger A400M: the C-130J performs tactical missions at reduced cost per flying hour, uses less space at remote airfields, and has more specialist capabilities than the A400M.  It saves the A400M’s lifespan and availability for strategic airlift missions.  The C-130J fleet could continue to make a meaningful contribution to national, and allied,[16] tasks beyond March 2023.  The performance of the C-130J during Operation PITTING demonstrated the aircraft’s availability, deployability, and readiness.[17]

20. Airborne Early Warning and Control.  The Royal Navy’s enduring requirement for Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capabilities is currently provided by the Merlin Mk2 helicopter fleet.  It is generally accepted that the fleet, which operates separate radars and mission systems for AEW and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), is not sufficient to sustain the demands of both missions.  The MOD is exploring future capability options and fleet mixes, as part of its Future Maritime Aviation Force (FMAF).

21. LMUK has previously recommended that the MOD undertake Operational Analysis, in collaboration with industry, to identify the optimum balance between manned and unmanned aerial assets, other force assets (such as undersea vessels), and associated payload and sensor characteristics.  It also recommended that the Royal Navy introduce a single radar and mission system onto the Mk2 helicopters, as part of a Life Extension Programme.[18]

Will the uplifted contracts for both rotary and fixed wing Military Flying Training effectively and rapidly resolve capacity issues?

22. The UKMFTS for Phase 2 aircrew training is delivered by Ascent Flight Training (Management) Ltd.  Ascent is operated as a Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, and Babcock International Group.

23. Ascent has submitted written evidence to the Defence Select Committee’s inquiry.  LMUK concurs with the evidence submitted by Ascent:- 

1. UKMFTS achieved Full Course Capability, across all of its Phase 2 training services by April 2020, to meet the requirements of the 2010 SDSR;

2. UKMFTS will meet the increased requirements from the 2015 SDSR by April 2025, having been contracted for those additional elements in December 2019 (Rotary Wing uplift) and September 2021 (Fixed Wing uplift);

3. Based on the first year of the Rotary Wing uplift contract, Ascent assesses that there is sufficient capacity and flexibility within UKMFTS Rotary Wing service to meet the MOD’s stated requirements;

4. The first year of full capacity for the Fixed Wing service, in line with the uplift contract, is scheduled for 2025-26. Ascent is already delivering in excess of the overall total capacity specified by the MOD, in its Statement of User Need (SUN) based on the 2010 SDSR; and

5. If the MOD’s requirements change in future years, the UKMFTS programmes can accept a revised SUN to meet these new capacity requirements.  This could be enacted via a change to the respective UKMFTS contracts.  Outside of contract changes, MOD can manage year-to-year changes via the annual Flying Training Plan (FTP) process, within the SUN capacity.

6th May 2022

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