Written Evidence submitted by Lockheed Martin UK


  1. Lockheed Martin UK (LMUK) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, employing approximately 1,600 people in 23 locations around the country.  Lockheed Martin invests on average over £1.8 billion each year in the UK, supporting over 750 British companies (75 per cent of which are SMEs), and over 23,000 jobs in the supply chain.


  1. Lockheed Martin provides a wide range of capabilities to the UK, as well as allies in the Indo-Pacific.  These capabilities support sovereign requirements, as well as bilateral and multilateral defence relationships and missions.  Lockheed Martin’s Center for Innovation (‘The Lighthouse’) is also supporting key elements of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Combatant Command’s (USINDOPACOM) ‘Pacific Deterrence Initiative’ (PDI).  PDI includes the establishment of a ‘Pacific Multi-Domain Test and Experimentation Capability’ (PMTEC).  PMTEC will network the test and training ranges of the U.S. with those of other partners, including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, to form the largest coalition range complex globally for the purposes of simulation, virtual reality training, experimentation, and operational rehearsal over long distances.[1]  In addition to PMTEC, Lockheed Martin provides ongoing support to INDOPACOM’s tabletop and field training exercises, such as Exercise Northern Edge in May 2021.  These exercises are focused on how to achieve Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO).[2]


What challenges are there for UK Defence in its Indo-Pacific tilt, both in terms of achieving its goal and operating in the region?


  1. The Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper commit the UK to establishing a more persistent presence in the Indo-Pacific region, and to increasing its interoperability, burden sharing, and capability development with allies there (notably the U.S., Australia, Canada, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea).  The key question for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is therefore the extent to which the Indo-Pacific tilt is, or should become a force driver, and influence force structure and capability choices.


  1. The Indo-Pacific is characterised by the use of long-range sensor and weapons networks by China to create an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) environment (see Figure 1).  These seek to hinder the deployment to theatre, or operation in-theatre, of military assets, forcing those assets into a stand-off range that reduces their effectiveness or holding deployed forces at risk.




Figure 1: Chinese long-range sensor and weapon networks[3]


  1. For example:-


    1. Analysts have highlighted that China is creating an Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) beyond it shores, which poses an increasing threat to U.S. and allied military freedom of action in the Pacific, and aims to establish both maritime and aerial dominance within the First Island Chain and provide a buffer zone from which to project power’;[4]


    1. Anti-Surface Warfare operational analysis undertaken by LMUK (using open source information) identified that peer adversaries may possess longer range offensive weapons than those available to the Royal Navy; possess a comparable, or greater, offensive salvo capability than is able to be countered by the defensive armament magazines of Royal Navy vessels; and are developing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) capabilities, for which there is no demonstrable defensive system counter.  In addition, hypersonic weapons will likely provide enhanced range and survivability against current air defence systems, and electronic warfare will be used to degrade systems that support UK offensive targeting and defensive missions.  Consequently, without sustained investment in high-end capabilities outlined in paragraphs 6 and 7, the Royal Navy’s ability to conduct force projection and offensive operations will be limited; and


    1. Space systems and services underpin the deployment and application of military force by enabling decision-making, the functioning of advanced defence systems (including platforms, weapons, and mission systems), and reach-back to specialist functions.  China is investing in a range of counter-space capabilities to disrupt these key enablers.  The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) produces an annual Space Threat Assessment, which tracks developments in China’s capabilities.  CSIS notes that ‘China has very capable kinetic physical counterspace capabilities, and has proven this several times with a range of direct-ascent ASAT [Anti-Satellite] weapons tests’; is investing in non-kinetic physical capabilities including directed-energy technologies; is ‘integrating its advanced cyber capabilities with its counterspace and electronic warfare operations’; and ‘has the ability to jam common satellite communication bands and GPS signals, and it has made the development and deployment of satellite jamming systems a high priority.  China is further developing jamming systems that will be able to target a large range of frequencies of commercial SATCOM as well as U.S. military protected communication bands’.[5]  Analysis undertaken by Lockheed Martin, applying its Global Communications Model (GCM) to the South China Sea region, has identified how quickly even protected satellite communications systems can be degraded.  Open source analysis, including that commissioned by Lockheed Martin of Chinese language sources, has also assessed the challenges posed by jamming to satellite communications.[6]


  1. In order to operate effectively in the Indo-Pacific, whether on a contingent or persistent basis, the UK will therefore need to have capabilities that are regarded as credible by its allies – and by potential adversaries – rather than contribute forces that potentially represent a liability or can only adopt defensive postures.  Capabilities would be required that can establish a deterrent, address incoming threat systems (which otherwise could saturate defensive capabilities), and enable power/force projection.  For example, in relation to the Royal Navy, the First Sea Lord recently said: ‘We need to be ready. This is about being a ready Navy, where our lethality is available at our fingertips. We're less wedded to defensive systems, much bolder with our transition to effective offensive systems’.[7]  See Figure 2, for LMUK’s high-level analysis of what this should mean.


Figure 2: Anti-surface warfare requirements to enable force projection


  1. In this respect, it is notable that allies in the Indo-Pacific are investing in:-


    1. Fifth Generation Air Assets.  Larger numbers of Fifth Generation air assets that can penetrate, gather intelligence, and deliver effects in A2/AD environments.  The Commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces said in relation to the F-35: people often underestimate the strategic importance and operational benefits of allies operating the same system’.[8]  Strengthening global F-35 alliances is the most cost-effective way to pace the rapidly growing scale of adversaries, and operate in expansive regions such as the Indo-Pacific, and amplifies deterrence.  For example, Japan has increased its F-35 programme of record to 147 aircraft, and will now become the second largest operator after the U.S., and Australia’s programme of record is 100 aircraft;


    1. Survivable Weapons.  Longer-range strike weapons that are survivable, have increased probability of hit and kill, and have more autonomous attributes.  For example, Australia and Japan have acquired, or have plans to acquire, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), the JASSM Extended Range (JASSM-ER), and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) – proven weapons systems already used by the U.S. armed forces.  JASSM-ER and LRASM will also be integrated onto the F-35.  Australia has also signed a Memorandum of Understanding that facilitates participation in the U.S.’ Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) programme, and the UK has recently indicated similar intent;[9]


    1. Radars and Mission Systems.   The procurement of common radars (e.g. SPY-7), and common combat mission systems (e.g. Aegis);


    1. Novel Weapons. Novel and disruptive weapons, including as part of layered approaches to defence, such as Directed Energy, and hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;


    1. Air Mobility.  Enhancing the capabilities of the main air mobility platform in the Indo-Pacific to provide the necessary operational agility and combat mass.  For example, a Maritime Amphibious Capability (MAC) is being developed for the C-130J, which would provide unlimited operational access to waterways to distribute forces.[10]  And Lockheed Martin has been working on a palletized munitions concept, using the C-130J (and C-17) to deliver longer-range strike weapons.  Through this ‘Rapid Dragon’ initiative, mobility aircraft will be able to augment the strike capacity of fighter aircraft and strategic bombers to increase mass;[11] and


    1. Resilient Space Systems.  International partners will increasingly expect each other to have resilient and assured space systems to enable coalition architectures and burden sharing (as expressed in the recent ‘Combined Space Operations Vision 2031’).[12]  In relation to communications, the UK is already partner on the U.S.’ Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system for protected satellite communications.  Its Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers are fitted with AEHF terminals to support U.S. operations, and which outperform current UK systems such as Skynet 5.  Australia’s Department of Defence has a programme of work on resilient space systems and concepts.  Lockheed Martin has recommended that the MoD should develop a ‘Theatre Entry Standard’ for its systems deployed in space, including the Skynet 6 military satellite communications programme, to ensure that they meet a minimum standard of protection.[13]  The existing UK industrial base is not able to provide the technologies required for this, so will require knowledge and technology transfer through inward investment. 


In relation to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), it is notable that allies and potential adversaries are investing in resilient architectures, including by deploying assets in Geostationary Orbit to complement those in Medium Earth Orbit (MEO).  This allows Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) signals to be transmitted at a higher power to overcome localised jamming.  China’s Beidou system operates a GEO layer for this purpose.  Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System, known as Michibiki, includes four satellites in GEO and Geosynchronous Orbit to enhance the U.S. GPS. Analysis by the U.S. Air Force has identified the resilience benefits of a GEO layer for GPS.  The UK could consider offering a GEO layer to existing allied GNSS systems, such as GPS, to create a more resilient architecture for the UK and allied forces, as it progresses its Space-Based PNT Programme (SBPP).


  1. Allies in the Indo-Pacific view these capabilities as credible, and the UK has options to invest in them.  Having commonality of systems with allies will also enable interoperability and interchangeability, the benefits of which were demonstrated by the deployment of U.S. F-35s as part of the UK’s Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21)This will give the UK mass, and help achieve Multi-Domain Integration (MDI).  The Defence Command Paper said ‘we will need to live up to the concept of allied by design both in how we build capability and how we operate’,[14] and the MoD should therefore consider how to collaborate with the capability initiatives outlined in paragraph 7.


  1. Finally, persistent presence will require investment in the tools that enable ‘deployed sustainability’ for both personnel and equipment.  This was demonstrated during CSG21, during which the use of Deployable Mission Rehearsal Trainers (DMRT),[15] and embarked spares support packages ensured readiness and availability rates for the F-35 fleet of up to 90 per cent.  Increased manpower, and embarked fault finding equipment such as the ‘electronic Consolidated Automated Support System’ (eCASS) would further improve the availability of F-35 and Merlin helicopters.


What does AUKUS mean for UK defence industry and for UK supply chain resilience?


  1. Given the nature of the threats facing them, similar capability requirements exist between Australia, the U.S., and the UK.  The three governments have identified nuclear powered submarines, other underwater battlespace capabilities, cyber, artificial intelligence, and quantum technologies as priority areas for collaboration under AUKUS.  Other capability areas are also being explored.[16]


  1. Given the scale of investment required to maintain an edge in these areas, and the need to rapidly field capabilities, collaboration with allies is important.  The countries will need to draw on the respective strengths of their industrial and academic bases, including through knowledge and technology transfer.


How will the UK manage or balance resourcing, in particular deployment of personnel and capabilities, the tilt to the region alongside NATO and other commitments?


  1. It is not the role of industry to make force structure and capability decisions, though it can inform and support these decisions through operational analysis, wargaming, and experimentation.  As noted in paragraph 3, a key question for the MoD is the extent to which the Indo-Pacific tilt is, or should become a force driver compared to its NATO, Euro-Atlantic, and other commitments.  The conflict in Ukraine may influence this assessment, as the UK reconsiders how effectively to contribute to collective security.  Here it is worth noting that, as part of the Defence Command Paper, the decision was made to cancel the Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP)despite upgraded armoured infantry being the most credible contribution to conventional deterrence such as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.[17]  The decision was also made to retire early the C-130J fleet, which could make a meaningful contribution to national tasks as well as the capacity of NATO’s Airlift Management Program (NAMP).


  1. Lockheed Martin would highlight that the threat environments in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions share common characteristics.  For example, both are characterised by long-range weapons and sensor networks that create A2/AD and enable grey zone activities (including IADS, expanding and increasingly complex missile capabilities, and electronic warfare), and increasingly high levels of underwater activity.  In this respect, whatever the decisions on actual force deployments, having common capabilities that are relevant in both regions – and to allies in both regions – will give the UK flexibility.  Lockheed Martin would highlight the utility of the following capabilities in both regions:-


    1. F-35.  By 2035, more than 500 F-35s will be stationed in Europe across NATO member bases.[18]  Recently, the Commander U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Commander Allied Air Command said that the increased deployment of U.S. F-35s to Spangdahlem Air Base ‘increases the defensive posture of the NATO alliance and enhances our ability to operate together’,[19] and other units have said ‘the interoperability that we have between the United States and partner squadrons establishes a foundation for future [NATO] F-35 operations’.[20]   In the Indo-Pacific region, there will be a permanent presence of over 300 F-35s by 2035.  The UK has an F-35 Programme of Record (POR) of 138 aircraft that can contribute, and a recommitment to that POR would send a strong signal;


    1. Radars and Mission Systems. The UK is committed to a Ballistic Missile Defence Ground Radar.  This would significantly improve the capability of regional defence assets in Europe, addressing gaps in the NATO BMD System; the UK would be the first nation other than the US to contribute to upper tier BMD.  It would also share common software with countries in the Asia Pacific region.  It is therefore an opportunity for the UK to increase its international influence in missile defence (and other relevant radar missions).  As the UK considers its future specifications for a Future Air Defence System (Type 83) to replace the Type 45 destroyer, it should also consider investing in common radars with allies (many naval partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are procuring the SPY-7), and common combat mission systems to enable interoperability (notably Aegis).  Finally, space-based sensors will play an increasingly important role in missile defence, particular given the evolution of hypersonic threats;


    1. Deep Fires.  The recapitalisation of UK Artillery provides enhanced deep fires systems through extended range munitions.  The intent to procure the PrSM, with a range of 499km, is a step change in capability for land-based precision fires.  It adds mass for striking in the deep, and is complimentary to air delivered strike weapons.  Alongside Australia, the UK is currently the only other nation with clear intent to procure PrSM; it will provide increased deterrence and capability in both the Indo-Pacific and Europe;


    1. Strike Weapons. Strike weapons will be critical in both the Indo-Pacific and European theatres for deterring adversaries, whether carried in the air or launched from the sea.  They must have a range of specialist attributes to break into, and operate in denied environments, as well as defeat targets.  If the UK is to operate in multiple theatres in relatively small numbers, this type of strike weapon, and interoperability between them, become force multipliers.  There needs to be confidence that the systems will provide a genuine deterrent capability, or, if that fails, that they will defeat the most protected targets when needed; and


    1. Resilient Space Systems. CSIS notes that Russia has invested in all types of counter-space capabilities, including ASAT systems, co-orbital technologies, and non-kinetic weapons such as lasers and cyber.  Russia has also ‘become one of the world’s greatest perpetrators of electronic counterspace warfare, jamming and spoofing PNT and communications satellite signals in conflict zones, nearby territories, and within its own borders’.[21]  The need for resilient space systems therefore exists in the Euro-Atlantic, as well as Indo-Pacific regions, as a key enabler of UK Defence and allies.


  1. Finally, persistent presence – whether in the Euro-Atlantic or Indo-Pacific regions – requires investment in the tools that enable deployed sustainability, through high levels of readiness and availability.  See paragraph 9.



4th March 2022



[1] See Thomas G. Mahnken and Regan Copple, ‘Bring US operational training and experimentation into the 21st century’, Defense News, 23 November 2020 ( 

[2] See

[3] From Bryan Clark et al., Winning in the Gray Zone: Using Electromagnetic Warfare to Regain Escalation Dominance, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2017, p. 7.

[4] Justin Bronk, Modern Russian and Chinese Integrated Air Defence Systems: The Nature of the Threat, Growth Trajectory and Western Options, Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), January 2020, p. 22.

[5] Todd Harrison et al., Space Threat Assessment 2020, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2020, pp. 11-18.  See also Space Threat Assessment 2021, April 2021, which noted China’s efforts to integrate counterspace weapons into its forces and operational plans (including its irregular warfare and tactics), as well as develop dual-use capabilities.

[6] For example, Liang C. Chu, Preliminary Study on Chinese Jamming and Detecting Techniques and Operations against Military Communications, February 2015.

[7] See, 11 February 2022.

[8] See

[9] See

[10] See and

[11] See

[12] The vision was produced by members of the Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative.  See (22 February 2022)/

[13] Ministry of Defence, Defence Space Strategy, para 21(b).

[14] Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP 411, March 2021, p. 12.

[15] See

[16] Some announcements suggested interest in Deep Fires, strike weapons, and hypersonics.  See, which refers to JASSM-ER, LRASM, PrSM, and hypersonic missiles.

[17] Analysis undertaken by RAND found ‘consistent evidence for the deterrent effects of heavy ground forces and air defense capabilities, especially when deployed in the general theater of interest but not necessarily on the front lines of a potential conflict.  RAND found no evidence that light mobile forces have a deterrent effect, and assessed that light ground forces are often associated with an increased likelihood of militarised disputes.  It also found that forces deployed rapidly in response to a crisis can help limit escalation but ‘do not readily translate into bargaining leverage or improved long-term positions for partner states’.  See Bryan Frederick et al., Understanding the Deterrent Impact of U.S. Overseas Forces, RAND Corporation, February 2020.  On the deterrence of sub-threshold activities and benefits to public opinion of forward deployments, see Keir Giles, Russia’s ‘New’ Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow’s Exercise of Power, Chatham House Research Paper, March 2016, p. 68, and

[18] See

[19] See

[20] See

[21] Todd Harrison et al., Space Threat Assessment 2020, p. 28.