INP0004

Written evidence submitted by Brett Thomas

With a general focus on the topics: ‘Importance of the Indo-Pacific, Appropriate and Achievable Goals? Additional Aspirations and Challenges for the Indo-Pacific Tilt

 

Summary:

              Addressing the focuses above, this response examines the question from a traditional security perspective, with considerations of military force at the forefront. This response suggests that the United Kingdom seek a greater forward posture in the region than currently poised to, fully integrating well-coordinated capabilities across all domains. This is not in disagreement with current policy, but rather in favour of providing necessary credibility to commitments as outlaid in the Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper. Of course, the high-intensity threat of Chinese competition and conflict, alongside a necessity of allied, primarily U.S., Integration is specifically acknowledged. A prevailing sentiment is to reinforce the importance of providing appropriate and effective means to support strategic ends – across the spectrum of security, and across all-domains and to ultimately back up our words with actions.

 

 

The Crucible:

  1. The Importance of the Indo-Pacific region is most aptly summarised within the Integrated Review itself: “It will be the crucible for many of the most pressing global challenges – from climate and biodiversity to maritime security and geopolitical competition.[2]

1.1. Many of these issues lie lower in the security-threshold, but nonetheless require robust responses that we can contribute towards. Issues of Piracy, Terrorism, Human and Drugs Trafficking etc. remain of key importance to the region[3].

1.2. Issues around climate change are long-term and likely to dramatically escalate in the coming decades, the Indo-Pacific will be particularly exposed to many of these events[4]. The human costs of this will serve as a: Crisis Multiplier… will intensity conflict drivers and threaten stability[5]. We must be ready, and positioned, to play a part in these future events.

1.2.1.    In particular: “The demand for rare earth elements… will intensity, leading to resource competition and economic coercion by China, which controls the global market.[6]”. These elements are increasingly important for investments in Green Technology, and most of the currently utilised deposits exist in the Indo-Pacific, with China controlling “approximately 85 percent of global supply[7]”.

  1. All of these issues are cast under the undeniable shadow of an increasingly capable China: “The rising power of China is by far the most significant geopolitical factor in the world today. China poses a complex, systemic challenge.[8]. China does not account for all issues present in the Indo-Pacific region, but it does account for the greatest in terms of scale.

2.1. China undoubtedly has a strong interest in extending the security of its significantly populated seaboard: “In the eyes of Chinese Strategists, no responsible leader could countenance letting outside powers take littoral metropolises hostage… China must push its defensive perimeter as far offshore as possible.[9].

2.2. China will fully engage across the entire spectrum of security, they know and fully appreciate: Facing severe traditional security threats and increasing non-traditional security threats, especially the threats from the maritime direction…[10]

2.3. Without stability on the maritime commons, our societies and economies lie vulnerable[11]. China is a normative challenger, one unafraid to establish regional hegemony through military and economic power, forcing political deference[12]. Much of this can, and may, be forwarded directly through coercive methods, as there is already much evidence for[13].

  1. The Sea is a critical domain for political and economic activity[14], some approximately 96% of global trade by weight travels via water[15], and the Indo-Pacific region is a significantly maritime environment. Many locations in the region serve both as destinations and origins of incredible amounts of seaborne commerce, but as transhipment hubs for global trade, supporting some of the greatest ports in the world served by tonnage and TEU’s[16].
  2. As a services-led and maritime trading nation, whilst at considerable geographical distance, we are no less interlinked with the effects of regional insecurity. Over the short- or long- term, affairs in the Indo-Pacific will undoubtedly impact our economy and security.

4.1. Geographical separation provides little protection against certain capabilities in the case of high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Cyber and Space capabilities can strike in strategic depth at the heart of our core infrastructure[17].

4.2. The question of whether the UK can afford greater security engagement with the Indo-Pacific is frequently posed. Given the region’s significant challenges and opportunities, the UK cannot afford but to be engaged in this economically and strategically important region.[18]

A Viable Approach?

  1. The current goals towards the Indo-Pacific, as outlaid in the Integrated Review’s Pacific Tilt Framework[19], and the Defence White Paper Indo-Pacific section[20] are sound, and clear in the ends that are to be pursued. But our actions must back up our words, and assure our allies our commitment is genuine.
  2. Our current commitment to the provision of two OPV’s and a Littoral Response Group is a balanced contribution, possessing “high operational flexibility[21]”. One well suited to fulfilling a constabulary role, assisting in assuring good order and responding to lower-threshold issues.

6.1. Offshore patrol vessels and support ships with marines and army units are ideal choices to address issues that are relevant to daily risks to regional order: fishery patrol management, sub-threshold maritime coercion, disaster relief, crimes at sea, and humanitarian support.[22]

6.2. A Caribbean style of forward presence, relying on allied access agreements rather than sovereign bases in close-proximity to potential ‘hot-spots’ is sensible[23] and not necessarily an issue for signalling commitment[24].

  1. Our current naval strategy of ‘Surging’ to the Indo-Pacific in cases of conflict is sensible and effective. Concerns over time and geographical space to get in-theatre are warranted, but may be lessened by other tools of national power.

7.1. Any naval forward-presence chiefly calibrated to warfighting would likely be unfeasible under current conditions, and ineffective if pledged to independent action, and not as part of directly embedded U.S. Armed Forces structures[25].

7.2. Our core naval capabilities, including the Carrier Strike Group, must of course retain a primary focus on the North Atlantic. Issues in the ‘High North’ will likely only intensify in the coming decades, where opportunities are forecast and our geopolitical rivals are already advancing rapidly[26]

  1. Conflict and Competition are not solely self-referential activities[27]. We must always give mind to the fact we are but one amongst many and would do well to retain a general focus on supportive, rather than independent, action.

8.1. “Historical record illustrates categorically how frequently politicians and soldiers neglect to take due account of the possible choices and probable preferences of the enemy.[28]

  1. Our own ‘Integrated Operating Concept’ supports our current objectives, signalling relevant considerations on the utility of force. It includes notable elements that allude to the requirement to bolster the necessary tools to effectively fulfil those objectives:

9.1. The ability and willingness to commit hard capability to fighting wars, up to and including declared war in a NATO Article 5 context, is the foundation of our influence and deterrence. Above all we must never lose sight of always being prepared to fight the war we might have to fight[29]

9.2. Only through a more confident, consistent and active approach will we enhance deterrence and be able to seize opportunities as they arise… This will a require a force that is agile, resilient and ‘front-footed’ in mindset and posture.[30]

  1. A more ‘active’ approach is the right one and our current means are fine for most lower-scale challenges. Yet, current capabilities are likely insufficient to achieve our more ambitious goals.

10.1.                   “Relative weakness in military means is entirely capable of rendering even prudent policy and cunning strategy futile.[31]

Regional Challenges:

  1. Challenges are many in the region, too many to list within this submissions scope, but four are critical: The Nature of High-Intensity Conflict, The Rise of China, Establishing Credibility and the Importance of a Multi-Domain response.
  2. High Intensity conflict against a peer-adversary will likely be startlingly fast in escalation and lethal in character. We must be aware of the requirements and necessary preparations to assure resilience in the face of devastating attacks across different domains, simultaneously or in rapid succession[32].

12.1.                   A whole domain response is necessary: “the victors on the next battlefield will fix and fracture their adversary with quick, decisive, and lethal effects across the entirety of the battlespace and immediately consolidate gains to make any military response politically unpalatable.[33]

12.2.                   Relevant to the region is the risk of a ‘Fait-Accompli’ conflict, where the dilemma is not in the prevention of initial enemy victories, but in reversing them with an escalated commitment.

  1. China is the primary geopolitical challenger in the region. Alongside significant conventional capabilities, they possess numerous ways to challenge regional interests below the thresholds of conflict.

13.1.                   China wields its power in the maritime domain across the entire spectrum of security, having no lack of means or ways to enforce its will: “China’s national fleet is a composite of navy, coast guard, and maritime law enforcement shipping. These official components of the fleet operate in conjunction with unofficial components such as merchantmen that double as minelayers or intelligence-gathering assets and a maritime militia situated within the fishing fleet. If it floats and flies a Chinese flag, it is probably part of Chinese sea power[34]. Such means provide significant ability to disrupt UNCLOS and ‘Good Order at Sea’[35].

13.2.                   As a firm user of coercive diplomacy, through exploitation of “asymmetric economic interdependence[36]” or engaging with the potentially “neglected[37], the Chinese have secured a number of naval bases across the Indo-Pacific. Built under the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ initiative, these bases often are of ‘Dual-use’ in being able to support ‘enhanced military presence’ if required[38].

  1. Our allies must see credible commitment to the region in how we act, and what with[39]. Our words are often ambitious, but, like the Americans, our regional allies rightly judge our credibility: “Not on… vision, but it’s execution.[40].
  2. All domains possess relevance to ongoing issues in the Indo-Pacific. The solutions to our strategic quandaries do not lie in singular-domain answers and promises.

15.1.                   Seapower often reigns supreme as the ultimate enabler of action in the region, even if modern challenges lower the prominence with which it is given attention. Naval forces remain a critical element of power-projection capabilities, flexible response and logistical lift capacity[41].

15.2.                   Landpower will remain critical, not least as the leading domain for delivering strategic effect[42]. Landpower is a crucial, enduring element to provide effective deterrence and provide key force multipliers:

15.2.1.                        “Army landpower affords the entire military the ground network of logistics, protection, intelligence, fires, and command and control necessary to fight a modern conflict.[43]

15.2.2.                        Landpower based on modern capability, forward posture, and synchronization with sister services and through partners and allies is the key to enduring U.S. military deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.[44]

15.3.                   Cyber is a critical domain, one that is significantly less affected by the restrictions of time and geographical space[45]. It provides us with significant reach and a domain critical to exploit due to how it “touches every walk of life – from critical infrastructure to the economy.[46]

15.4.                   Aerial assets, notably including unmanned aerial vehicles remain critical to providing mobile firepower and powerful reconnaissance capabilities. Current capabilities can be extremely potent in ‘reconnaissance-strike contests’ against traditional manoeuvre forces[47].

 

Establishing Credible Presence:

  1. In order to establish a credible presence in the Indo-Pacific, we should establish a greater forward-positioned, multi-domain force capable of operating across the security spectrum – integrating military and civil elements. This would ideally be of a roughly “Battlegroup” size. Whilst a limited force – considering the many limits feasibility dictates – it should include sufficient capability to provide strategic effect and back up our ambitious ends with genuine means.

16.1.                   Such a force provides all-around utility, possessing a degree of warfighting-relevance, whilst being significantly useful to our defined ‘Protect’, ‘Operate’ and ‘Constrain’ tasks[48]. It also provides additional ways to respond to varied, non-linear challenges in a timely and relevant fashion.

16.2.                   A limited force will not be of negligible deterrence value. A “Sufficiently Substantial[49]combined force would provide resilience in cases of sudden shocks, and be easily integrated into greater allied efforts[50]Such a force provides credibility through capability and commitment both - for a persistent presence is necessary for our ambitions to see any fruition[51].

16.2.1.                        if decision-makers are motivated to deter aggression abroad, they should recognize that successful deterrence requires more substantial foreign troop deployments.[52]

16.2.2.                        Only through a truly persistent, presence will we build the true understanding, expertise and frameworks necessary to successfully operate in the region[53].

16.3.                   Organizing such a force would be in-line with our current ‘Multi-Domain’ aspirations and concepts[54]. It is a key opportunity to provide practical insights and tests on challenges such as pursuing synergistic effects’ and harmonising cross-domain battle rhythms[55].

16.4.                   As part of this, an examination and at least deconfliction, of service culture should be sought. With such jointery, ideally all branches should agree upon a particular vision, rather than producing their own in isolation[56].

  1. The manner in which our capabilities are managed are as critical as its presence. A consistent strategic dialogue must be maintained to assure political leadership plays a rightfully involved role[57].

17.1.                   We must ensure our actions are strategically guided to ensure our actions deliver on ultimately political ends: “Strategy is the only bridge built and held to connect policy purposefully with the military and other instruments of power and influence.[58]

  1. Alongside close-bilateral arrangements with regional allies, we should give particular attention to operating closer with the United States on high-threshold issues. The U.S. holds full intention to “Increase the scope and complexity of our joint exercises and operations, and pursuing diverse force-posture opportunities.[59]

18.1.                   A closer alignment with U.S. strategy is feasible, and may be desirable, in light of a lack of a detailed strategy of our own for the region as yet[60]. We already share values on the grander vision for the region: “Free, Open, Connected, Prosperous, Secure, and Resilient.[61]

18.2.                   We must seek integration with American forces as a matter of practical necessity towards high-intensity conflict[62], a lack of sufficient support assets will be a prevailing issue without concerted action[63].

18.2.1.                        This includes basing, airlift, logistics, aerial refuelling, suppression of enemy air defence, electronic warfare, CBRN, medical support[64] and (particularly) long-range fires.

  1. Heavier capabilities must be invested in, and forward-deployed to provide resilience, sustainability of presence, and lethality in warfighting. Forward-positioned heavier capabilities remain key, additionally to assist in mitigating dangers to rapidly inserted lighter-forces if/as the situation escalates[65]. Alongside greater integration, deployment of heavier capabilities will alleviate at least some of the critical weakness we have in operating in the region[66].

19.1.                   Critical weaknesses in our approach have been noted, ‘heavier capabilities’ in particular refer to greater long-range fires, reconnaissance, air defence and logistical capabilities.

  1. Such a force need not be confused for one that is geographically concentrated, or reliant on one core base. Such a force in practice would undoubtedly be further divided into smaller task-orientated groupings relevant to missions throughout the region.

20.1.                   There are ongoing discussions concerning the virtues (particularly resilience) of dispersed forces and distributed capabilities in the face of high-intensity challenges[67]. With such a force, we can stand to provide our own judgements and operational frameworks on this practice.

20.2.                   A dispersed presence undoubtedly will require significant regional consent, (a carefully managed condition amidst great power competition) in order to gain and maintain political access of our presence[68]. But connections such as the Commonwealth Network provide us viable avenues to explore such increased possibilities[69].

  1. Even a limited force, due to the nature of the geographic environment, and logistical burden, would require closely coordinated, and significant, maritime and aerial lift capacity. Whilst there are current ongoing efforts to improve in this regard, greater effort may be required to support such a proposal, or even sufficiently support ongoing commitments.
  2. Civil elements must be fully integrated alongside any military deployment[70], for there are challenges civil components are better suited to tackle. To operate in true strategic fashion in the region, and produce strategic effect, we must concern ourselves with far more than the use and direction of force alone[71].

22.1.                   Issues such as ‘Strategic Communications’ and ‘Information Operations’ are missions where civil elements can undoubtedly produce significant effect. Mastering the narrative, countering hostile disinformation and providing successful communications are critical, and are elements we have significantly ignored[72]. These weaknesses play a larger part in undermining our national resilience[73], and are avenues of opportunity our likely opponents are sure to exploit[74].

22.2.                   Such a force provides a genuine opportunity to act as a ‘total national enterprise[75]

  1. Cyber (and Space) capabilities, both offensive and defensive, must be a core-element of our approach going forward. This is in order to deliver effects and “near-instantaneous impacts with little concern for geographic space and political boundaries[76]”.

23.1.                   Building on our national strength in the Cyber domain, our capabilities to support regional allies and aid capacity-building in this domain should be a prominent element of any approach, and could be particularly effective.

 

Recommendations:

2nd March 2022


[1] C. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice. (United States: Oxford University Press, 2010). p.18

[2] HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, (2021). CP 403. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/global-britain-in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.66

[3] W. Reynolds, The Review, Defence and the Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’: Constraining and Engaging in the Region, (2021). Available Online: https://www.kcl.ac.uk/the-review-defence-and-the-indo-pacific-tilt-constraining-and-engaging-in-the-region [Accessed 02/03/22].

[4] A. Patalano, Why is a British Carrier Strike Group Heading to the Indo-Pacific?, (2021). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/why-is-a-british-carrier-strike-group-heading-to-the-indo-pacific/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[5] M. Brodka, Arctic Competition, Climate Migration, and Rare Earths: Strategic Implications for the United States Amidst Climate Change, (2021). Available Online: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/1/arctic-competition-climate-migration-and-rare-earths-strategic-implications-for-the-united-states-amidst-climate-change [Accessed 02/03/22].

[6] Ibid

[7] J. Nakano, The Geopolitics of Critical Minerals Supply Chains, (2021). Available Online: https://www.csis.org/analysis/geopolitics-critical-minerals-supply-chains [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.1

[8] Ministry of Defence, Defence In A Competitive Age, (2021). CP 411. Available Online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.5

[9] T. Yoshihara, & J. R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Second Edition. (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2018). p.69

[10] Xiao Tianliang et al, National Defence University (China). Translated by China Aerospace Studies Institute, Science of Military Strategy: 2020, (2022). Available Online: https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/ [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.3

[11] A. Patalano, Why is a British Carrier Strike Group Heading to the Indo-Pacific?. (Link Previous)

[12] G. Bartle, Beijing’s Strategic Ends: Harmony through Hierarchy and the End of Choice, (2020). Available Online: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/9/1/beijings-strategic-ends-harmony-through-hierarchy-and-the-end-of-choice [Accessed 02/03/22].

[13] A. J. Blinken, & L. J. Austin III, Opinion: America’s partnerships are ‘force multipliers’ in the world, (2021). Available Online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/14/americas-partnerships-are-force-multipliers-world/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[14] D. Jordan et al, Understanding Modern Warfare, Second Edition. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016). p.322

[15] US Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare (2010), p.14.

[16] T. Yoshihara, & J. R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, p.56

[17] D. Barno, & N. Bensahel, The Headwinds Looming for the U.S. Army, (2020). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2020/10/the-headwinds-looming-for-the-u-s-army/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[18] L. Kuok, From Withdrawal to Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’: Southeast Asia welcomes enhanced British security presence, (2021). Available Online: https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/08/southeast-asia-british-security-presence-indo-pacific-tilt [Accessed 02/03/22].

[19] HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, pp.66-67

[20] Ministry of Defence, Defence In A Competitive Age, (2021). CP 411. Available Online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/974661/CP411_-Defence_Command_Plan.pdf [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.32

[21] A. Patalano, Why is a British Carrier Strike Group Heading to the Indo-Pacific?. (Link Previous)

[22] Ibid

[23] R. Baletta, The Royal Navy in the Indo-Pacific: Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut, (2021). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/the-royal-navy-in-the-indo-pacific-dont-use-a-sledgehammer-to-crack-a-nut/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[24] W. James, There and Back Again: The Fall and Rise of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ Basing Strategy, (2021). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/there-and-back-again-the-fall-and-rise-of-britains-east-of-suez-basing-strategy/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[25] R. Baletta, The Royal Navy in the Indo-Pacific: Don’t Use a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut. (Link Previous)

[26] M. Brodka, Arctic Competition, Climate Migration, and Rare Earths: Strategic Implications for the United States Amidst Climate Change. (Link Previous)

[27] C. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy. (United States: Potomac Books Inc., 2009), pp.66-69

[28] C. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, p.33

[29] Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, (2021). Available Online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1014659/Integrated_Operating_Concept_2025.pdf [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.16

[30] Ibid, p.15

[31] C. Gray, Strategy & Defence Planning: Meeting the challenge of uncertainty. (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014). p.155

[32] M. Priebe, A. J. Vick, J. L. Heim, M. L. Smith, (RAND Corporation). Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation, (2019). Available Online: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2959.html [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.xiii, p.9

[33] K. McCoy, The Road to Multi-Domain Battle: An Origin Story, (2017). Available Online: https://mwi.usma.edu/road-multi-domain-battle-origin-story/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[34] T. Yoshihara, & J. R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy, p.99

[35] United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Available Online: https://www.unclos.org/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[36] T. S. Allen, Don’t Bring a Knife to a Gunfight with China, (2020). Available Online: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/6/2/dont-bring-a-knife-to-a-gunfight-with-china  [Accessed 02/03/22].

[37] L. Keenan, The Lion and the Mouse: The Need for Greater U.S. Focus in The Pacific Islands, (2021). Available Online: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/9/2/the-lion-and-the-mouse-the-need-for-greater-us-focus-in-the-pacific-islands [Accessed 02/03/22].

[38] M. J. Green, & A. Shearer, Countering China’s Militarization of the Indo-Pacific (2018). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/countering-chinas-militarization-of-the-indo-pacific/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[39] L. Kuok, From Withdrawal to Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’: Southeast Asia welcomes enhanced British security presence. (Link Previous)

[40] Z. Cooper, Words Verus Deeds in Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, (2022). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2022/02/words-versus-deeds-in-bidens-indo-pacific-strategy/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[41] C. Gray, Modern Strategy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). p.220

[42] Ibid, p.259

[43] C. Flynn (Lt. Gen.), & L. Potter (Lt. Gen.), Strategic Predictability: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific, (2021). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/strategic-predictability-landpower-in-the-indo-pacific/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[44] Ibid

[45] C. Gray, Modern Strategy, p.43

[46] J. Senstak, The U.S. Navy’s Loss of Command of the Seas to China and How to Regain It, (2021). Available Online: https://tnsr.org/2020/11/the-u-s-navys-loss-of-command-of-the-seas-and-how-to-regain-it/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[47] J. Hurst, Disaggregate to Win: Living with the Imbalance between Fires and Protection, (2021). Available Online: https://mwi.usma.edu/disaggregate-to-win-living-with-the-imbalance-between-fires-and-protection/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[48] Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, pp.13-15

[49] D. Reiter, & P. Poast, The Truth about Tripwires: Why small force deployments do not deter aggression, (2021). Available Online: https://tnsr.org/2021/06/the-truth-about-tripwires-why-small-force-deployments-do-not-deter-aggression/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[50] C. Flynn (Lt. Gen.), & L. Potter (Lt. Gen.), Strategic Predictability: Landpower in the Indo-Pacific, (Link Previous)

[51] W. Reynolds, The Review, Defence and the Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’: Constraining and Engaging in the Region, (Link Previous)

[52] D. Reiter, & P. Poast, The Truth about Tripwires: Why small force deployments do not deter aggression, (Link Previous)

[53] G. Hendell, Do the Reading, Do the Math: Lessons for the Military for an Uncertain Strategic Future, (2021). Available Online: https://mwi.usma.edu/do-the-reading-do-the-math-lessons-for-the-military-for-an-uncertain-strategic-future/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[54] Ministry of Defence, Multi-Domain Integration, (2020). JCN 1/20. Available Online: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/multi-domain-integration-jcn-120 [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.iii-iv

[55] S. Lingel, et al (RAND Corporation), Joint All-Domain Command and Control for Modern Warfare: An Analytic Framework for Identifying and Developing Artificial Intelligence Applications, (2020). Available Online: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4408z1.html [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.34

[56] J. Watling, The British Army Restructures for Persistent Deployment, (2021). Available Online: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/british-army-restructures-persistent-deployment [Accessed 02/03/22].

[57] J. Kelly, & M. Brennan, Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy, (2009). Available Online: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2009/ssi_kelly-brennan.htm [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.viii

[58] C. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, p.25

[59] The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, (2022). Available Online: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf [Accessed 02/03/22].

[60] D. Hutt, The UK Should Align with Biden in the Indo-Pacific, (2021). Available Online: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/uk-should-align-biden-indo-pacific [Accessed 02/03/22].

[61] The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, (Link Previous)

[62] J. Stohs, How High? The Future of European Naval Power and the High-End of Challenge, (2021). Available Online: https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/publications/how-high-the-future-of-european-naval-power-and-the-high-end-challenge/ [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.77

[63] S. G. Jones, R. Ellehus, & C. Wall, Europe’s High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, (2021). Available Online: https://www.csis.org/analysis/europes-high-end-military-challenges-future-european-capabilities-and-missions [Accessed 02/03/22]. pp.34-35

[64] Ibid

[65] B. Mainardi, Remembering the Geography in Geopolitics and Indo-Pacific Discourse, (2021). Available Online: https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2021/7/7/remembering-the-geography-in-geopolitics-and-indo-pacific-discourse [Accessed 02/03/22].

[66] S. G. Jones, R. Ellehus, & C. Wall, Europe’s High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, p.16

[67] D. H. Berger (Gen.), & R. Evans, Gen. David H. Berger on the Marine Corps of the Future, (2022). Available Online: https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/general-berger-on-the-marine-corps-of-the-future/ [Accessed 02/03/22].

[68] M. Priebe, A. J. Vick, J. L. Heim, M. L. Smith, (RAND Corporation). Distributed Operations in a Contested Environment: Implications for USAF Force Presentation, p.xi

[69] V. Nouwens, Re-Examining the UK’s Priorities in the Asia-Pacific Region, (2020). Available Online: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/re-examining-uks-priorities-asia-pacific-region [Accessed 02/03/22].

[70] Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, p.10. For Examples, see Figure 2.

[71] C. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace and Strategy, p.82

[72] H. Strachan, & R. Harris, (RAND Corporation), The Utility of Military Force and Public Understanding in Today’s Britain, (2020). Available Online: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA213-1.html [Accessed 02/03/22]. p.1

[73] Ibid, p.24

[74] Xiao Tianliang et al, National Defence University (China). Science of Military Strategy: 2020, p.30

[75] Ministry of Defence, Integrated Operating Concept 2025, p.10

[76] K. McCoy, The Road to Multi-Domain Battle: An Origin Story, (Link Previous)