Written evidence from APPG for Sudan and South Sudan (UKA0008)

 

This submission to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Inquiry ‘Beyond Aid: The UK’s Strategic Engagement in Africa’ is on behalf of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Sudan and Sudan. The APPG for Sudan and South Sudan has closely monitored HMG’s strategic engagement in Sudan and South Sudan over many years. The APPG has also engaged with all Sudanese parties since the beginning of the Sudanese revolution in December 2018. This submission was made following eight months of regular meetings with senior officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, representatives of a very wide range of Sudanese political parties, Sudanese civil society groups, Sudanese protestors, NGOs, academics, and journalists. The APPG for Sudan and South Sudan also invited the Sudanese Ambassador to participate in giving evidence although he was unavailable.

The APPG for Sudan and South Sudan is comprised of Parliamentarians with decades of experience of working on Sudan, including in the Foreign Office and on many visits to the country. The APPG also visited Sudan in 2018 in order to gather further evidence on the situation and in 2017 it ran an inquiry into UK-Sudan relations.

 

The main recommendations are;

 

Which countries outside of Africa are most influential in the continent? How do they achieve their influence?  Should the UK be learning from these countries approach or trying to counter it?

 

  1. The Gulf has recently had significant influence in Sudan and it has significantly increased its presence since the April 2019 overthrow of Omar al-Bashir. The UK is well placed to use its exceptional relationships with Gulf States to influence their policy towards Sudan and the wider Horn of Africa region. The UK should seek to persuade these Governments that democracies in their African neighbours can in fact be beneficial for their economic investments.

 

  1. The Horn of Africa is of considerable strategic importance to Gulf countries and the UK should aim to persuade these nations that democracies in the Horn pose no threat to their own Governments. Since the overthrow of President Bashir they have significantly increased their role in the region through economic, humanitarian and military aid. While the UK need not necessarily counter this influence, it should appeal for changes to their relationship. For example, the Rapid Support Forces send troops to the conflict in Yemen which includes child soldiers. The UK must make representation to both sides to alter their arrangements so that no child soldiers are used in conflict.

 

  1. Yassir Arman, the Deputy Head of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) group, has a strong personal relationship with several Officers of the APPG for Sudan and South Sudan. When Yassir Arman was arrested earlier this year Officers called for the Government to use their influence through diplomatic and intelligence channels in both Sudan and the Gulf to push for the release of Mr Arman. While Mr Arman publically thanked the APPG afterwards it is difficult to fully evaluate the effect of these representations by the UK.

 

  1. US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale spoke on the 4th June with Saudi Deputy Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman about the brutal crackdown against peaceful protesters by Sudan’s Transitional Military Council on the 3rd June.  Under Secretary Hale noted the importance of a transition from the Transitional Military Council to a civilian-led government in accordance with the will of the Sudanese people. By comparison, HMG’s representations to the Gulf on this issue were far more muted in public. We encourage the Foreign Office to evaluate the effectiveness their representations to the UAE and Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan during 2019. We particularly encourage them to consider the possibility of a stronger and more public approach in future.

 

In countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, has the UK done enough to support and promote democratic transitions of government?  What more could it do to assist? How can we build longer term partnerships?

 

  1. Since the protests began in Sudan in December 2019 the APPG for Sudan and South Sudan heard from many members of the Sudanese diaspora in the UK and from a very wide range of representatives of Sudanese political parties and Sudanese civil society. In addition to this the APPG had regular meetings with current and former senior FCO officials and experts on Sudan from around the world. We found that since protests began in Sudan in December 2018 the UK has been widely seen to be behind the curve and was perceived to have ‘jumped on the bandwagon’ when it was clear that Omar al-Bashir was going to fall. It appears to many of the Officers of the APPG that senior officials in Whitehall did not predict the fall of President Bashir until weeks, if not days, before he was ousted in a military coup.

 

  1. It is clear that during the Sudanese revolution many in Whitehall had well-founded fears of Sudan becoming a failed state or entering a protracted civil war. Unfortunately the initial reluctance to support the protesters has damaged the UK’s image as a supporter of democracy. The APPG for Sudan and South Sudan heard from members of the Sudanese diaspora that they were extremely disappointed at the “weak language” used by the Foreign Office while the Government of Sudan was using extreme violence against peaceful protestors. The APPG spoke with many Sudanese observers who did not believe that HMG supported the peaceful protesters until it was clear that Bashir going to be overthrown. Foreign Office officials responded by saying that this was the strongest diplomatic language they are able to use.

 

  1. Members of the APPG were pleased to see Ambassador Irfan Siddiq engaging with protestors in Khartoum following the downfall of President Bashir. While members were concerned for his safety, they saw that his presence on the streets during April and June 2019 was a clear and visible sign of the UK’s support for a transition to democratically elected, or civilian led, government.

 

  1. If the UK-Sudan Strategic Dialogue is resumed then HMG  should  ensure  that  the  UK-Sudan  Strategic  Dialogue  is  backed  up  by  rigorous,  transparent  benchmarks, which allow for scrutiny and regular progress reviews by external actors. HMG should place international human rights and democratic values at the heart of the UK-Sudan Strategic Dialogue, insisting on clear evidence of progress before any further engagement. In parallel with the UK-Sudan Strategic Dialogue, HMG should broaden its engagement with a wide range of Sudanese civil society groups, both within Sudan and in the UK, including from the conflict zones.

 

  1. In order for our partners to see that the UK supports Sudan’s transition into a democracy, aid should be linked to the country’s progress towards a transition to democratically elected institutions. This may be by funding programs up until the 2022 deadline for elections, or by applying alternative benchmarks. There should be a formal review of Sudan’s progress towards democracy in 2022 and any continued aid should be based on significant progress being made towards elections and steps being made towards reforming the military and intelligence apparatus.

 

  1. Aid should be focused not only on humanitarian and economic grounds, but should also aim to foster institutions such as free press and a functioning legal system through training programmes. Future economic investment could also be used strategically to foster the democratic transition. Avenues should be explored to see what possibility there is to encourage investment in telecommunications networks in Sudan. A plurality of internet service providers in Sudan could make it more difficult for the military and intelligence services to block democratic movements by disconnecting the internet.

 

 

August 2019