Written evidence from Adam Smith International (UKA0007)
Executive Summary
Introduction
[1] The UK has recently expressed its new approach to Sub-Saharan Africa through both 'The UK's new approach to Sub-Saharan Africa 10 Key Messages' and the former Prime Minister Theresa May's speech in Cape Town on 28 August 2018. Key themes identified in the approach include: skill creation for inclusive economic growth; trade and investment; Africa-UK partnership and expertise sharing; governance and rule of law; universal rights; security and stability; migration; climate change; science, innovation and technology; health and modern family planning.
[2] The new approach to Sub-Saharan Africa embraces some key themes, however more detail around the practicalities of how the objectives are expected to be achieved would be prudent, to ensure that the ‘new’ approach is meaningful. It is clear what the approach is trying to achieve, fundamentally:
[3] Whilst these are important areas, and each merit analysis, this response will, in particular, focus on the effectiveness of the New Approach vis-à-vis security and stability in Somalia, an area of specialism for Adam Smith International (ASI). ASI has been involved in Somalia since 2008, and permanently operational there since 2013. ASI has been an implementing partner for HMG in Somalia, delivering technical assistance to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) in the sphere of security sector reform, countering violent extremism, and stabilisation.
[4] Since 1991, donors have invested over $60bn to enable state and peace-building efforts in Somalia. Yet conflict, under-development, and terrorism dominate the narrative about Somalia and a wide range of intractable policy problems remain. This is a challenge that cannot be addressed using linear technical solutions backed just by donor funds. HMG and the wider international community, in partnership with the FGS, continues its efforts to create a safe and secure Somalia, characterised by accountable, functioning government institutions, reliable essential service delivery, communal security, and access to livelihood opportunities. However, the effects of a weak state, ongoing political tensions within Somalia, interference by external actors, including neighbouring countries, and the ongoing internal armed conflict that has spilled into neighbouring countries, poses a security threat to the wider region. By no means is Somalia representative of the ‘Africa story’ of growth and prosperity – but Somalia poses a unique set of challenges to HMG’s conceptualisation of its engagement in the security and stabilisation sectors.
[5] ASI currently implements the following HMG security and stabilisation projects in Somalia, amongst others in a number of other sectors:
PROJECT | SECTOR | DONOR | DURATION |
Somalia Stability Fund | Stabilisation | DFID, EU and others | Oct 2016 – Dec 2020 |
Low Level Defector Rehabilitation Programme | Security | UK FCO | Mar 2015 – Jun 2021 |
Strengthening Somalia’s National Security Architecture (SSNSA) | Security | UK FCO | Nov 2018 – May 2022 |
[6] This response will apply ASI’s experience in working closely with HMG in Somalia to address the following questions:
How effectively do different UK Government departments work together to achieve UK ambitions in Africa?
[7] Somalia is an example of a country in which HMG has solidified relationships within the FGS, FMS and the international community to harness support and promote democratic governance, security, as well as skill enhancement and economic development. The British Embassy in Mogadishu (BEM) as well as the British High Commission in Nairobi (BHC) have developed excellent relationships in this process. The BEM has a positive reputation in the country, which is an invaluable asset for implementing partners such as ASI, and enables us to deliver UK policy on the ground. Nonetheless, the gaps in coordination and communication between UK departments means that there remains a risk of missing out on opportunities to maximise impact. For example, a gap recognised amongst HMG security and stabilisation programmes in Somalia delivered by ASI was the lack of coordination and communication between BEM programmes and British Military programmes. This is now being addressed through regular communication and mutual support between the two parties. Similarly, knowledge sharing between DFID and other HMG programmes has been recognised on SSF as not having been extensive and so this is currently under discussion for improvement.
[8] Within the context of security and stability, there are a number of themes which cut across security, migration and trade, and thus need attention. Tackling violent extremism, for example, would benefit from greater coordination between security-focused elements and the defence, justice, and economic development elements of HMG.
[9] Recently, HMG have worked to review the approach to security sector reform. This is an extremely positive step towards taking stock of the political landscape, reviewing UK priorities, identifying areas of policy overlap, and thereby encouraging greater collaboration between HMG departments. Additionally, HMG projects have been supporting each other with networking, technical expertise and sharing lessons learnt – an area where British organisations (NGOs and commercial organisations) can support significantly. For example, the majority of ASI colleagues working in Somalia are Somali and we have offices in Mogadishu International Airport as well as Mogadishu city with wide reach across both the FGS and FMS including offices in Baidoa, Kismayo and Garowe. The ASI Mogadishu International Airport office supports multiple HMG projects, and through our work we are able to support different arms of the HMG – for instance, DFID, FCO, Home Office – to coordinate and work together towards achieving UK ambitions in Somalia.
[10] There are clear benefits of UK cooperation across projects to discuss key stakeholder meetings, key achievements, key challenges and risks, in addition to cross-cutting issues such as human rights, gender, inclusivity and conflict sensitivity.
[11] With specific focus on security and stability, the New Approach seeks to:
[Listen] when African leaders tell us they want modern ‘win-win’ partnerships that deliver mutual benefit;
and offer UK expertise in:
Security and stability as the essential foundations for growth and prosperity, tackling our shared threats by supporting African countries’ and communities’ efforts to address the underlying drivers of fragility and conflict.
[12] The framework which underpins security sector reform in Somalia – the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) – was established at the London Conference in May 2017, where the National Security Architecture was adopted, and implementation was to be guided by the CAS structure. The UK was a key actor in the agreement of this structure; however, lack of FGS buy-in has led the CAS structure to question. Recently, the FGS (through the Prime Minister’s Office) has been prioritising the implementation of their own work plans for security agencies – therefore highlighting that ‘development’ fundamentally requires government buy-in, otherwise it risks irrelevance. The UK’s ability to adapt to these shifts through its flexible approach to supporting FGS security agencies is positive and demonstrates its willingness and capacity to listen to the kind of partnerships that African leaders seek, which in turn fosters a win-win framework for mutual support.
[13] A major strength of UK engagement in Somalia has been its readiness and ability to directly address policy gaps. For example, the FCO-funded and ASI-implemented Strengthening Somalia’s National Security Architecture (SSNSA) project takes a flexible approach and as such has demonstrated FCO ability to respond to needs of the FGS. Key examples of this include, the expressed need for a Legal and Sanctions Adviser in the Office of National Security which, following an open-hire process, was rapidly recruited within a short timeframe. Further, the Ministry of Defence prioritised human rights and the SSNSA project has thus been working closely with the Stabilisation Adviser in the BHC to progress human rights technical support. The project has also organised working groups and sessions to capture synergies between institutions and the international community for effective support to the security sector in Somalia. This reflects the UK’s ability to respond urgently to policy gaps and use existing projects and expertise to avoid duplication and ensure coordination for rapid and sustainable responses.
[14] The UK’s engagement on the ground, especially in fragile contexts such as Somalia, should be informed by a robust ‘governance analysis’ across sectors ranging from humanitarian work to service delivery and prosperity. The recent DFID Position Paper on Governance ‘Governance for Growth, Stability and Inclusive Development’ calls for HMG interventions to improve on ‘thinking and working politically’.
[15] HMG programmes are recognised as being amongst some of the best externally assisted interventions. This is in large part, due to the HMG’s willingness and ability to embrace Political Economy Analysis in the design and implementation of programmes. Our experience as an HMG implementing partner, implementing programmes in the security sector across Africa, but specifically in Somalia, has shown us that an understanding of the political economy is critical for success. We have learnt, the need to deal swiftly with sensitivities, changing contexts and arising needs, and have received support from our counterparts in the HMG. To do this, we use flexible and adaptive management techniques that enable shorter feedback loops between key stakeholders and the project team, as well as robust risk management to ensure risks are flagged early and appropriate mitigation strategies are implemented. We have an effective stakeholder management approach with clear engagement responsibilities and risk management tools. ASI has developed a network of contacts in the regions in which we work including the FMS and district governments, private sector and communities. For example, in Somalia, through SSF, ASI works with over 60 implementing partners. ASI also provides political intelligence to HMG to inform strategic decision-making.
[16] In addition to Political Economy Analysis, ASI as an implementing partner has incorporated conflict sensitivity analysis and gender sensitivity in the HMG security projects it delivers in Somalia. For example, the Low Level Defector Rehabilitation Programme has human rights and gender expertise on the programme which is harnessed for technical delivery as well as monitoring and evaluation. Further, the SSNSA project has recently incorporated a Human Rights, Gender and Conflict Sensitivity checklist to ensure this thinking is incorporated into project decision-making.
[17] HMG benefits from this comprehensive approach to programming on the ground. This would include the networks, political intelligence, access and influence that HMG are privy to through ASI for sustainability such that impact can be long term and the governments can consequently take ownership of national development.
Which countries outside of Africa are most influential in the continent? How do they achieve their influence? Should the UK be learning from these countries’ approach or trying to counter it?
[18] There are a number of countries which are influential in Somalia. This can be divided into traditional and non-traditional donors. Traditional donors include the obvious players such as the UK, the USA; as well as European countries; however there are also more recent strong influencers, non-traditional actors, such as China, Russia and the Gulf States as well as Turkey, which plays a big role in Somalia. This section will explore the role of non-traditional donors in Somalia.
[19] China’s history in Somalia is a long one. Most recently, a number of agreements were signed between China and Somalia including for oil exploration in 2007, a five-year national recovery plan in 2013 for reconstruction of several major infrastructure landmarks in Mogadishu and elsewhere, including the National Theatre, a hospital, and the Mogadishu Stadium, as well as the road between Galkayo and Burao in northern Somalia. In 2015, the two countries signed a bilateral agreement, which strengthens diplomatic relations and cooperation including reconstruction and development initiatives in the economy, health, education and infrastructure sectors. Cooperation in the security sector discussed in 2013/2014 has declined more recently. Meanwhile, Russia has been in negotiations with Somaliland over establishing a naval base.
[20] Gulf States invested $13bn in the Horn of Africa between 2000 and 2017 according to a study by the Clingendael Institute. In December 2018, representatives from Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia met in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to discuss the creation of a new Red Sea security alliance. In addition to efforts supporting anti-piracy in the waters surrounding Somalia, Gulf states have enhanced their military influence by building bases, military partnerships and intelligence sharing relationships as well as peacekeeping and counterterrorism more recently. For example, the UAE is building a military base in Somaliland.
[21] Meanwhile, there is a battle over influence between the Gulf States with Qatar and Turkey backing the uprisings and the Islamist political parties that rose with them whilst the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia opposed the uprisings and the Islamist parties. Qatar and the UAE have both sent money and weapons to Somalia. There are also large commercial interests, for example an Emirati company manages the port in Bosaso. Meanwhile, over time, Qatar have promised large amounts of infrastructure, education and humanitarian assistance to Somalia.
[22] Simultaneously, Turkey’s influence has moved from humanitarian and economic to strongly military. During the famine in 2011, Turkey donated substantial humanitarian aid, followed by extensive commercial investment. Then, in 2017, Turkey established a large military base to train Somali soldiers in Mogadishu. The military base costs an estimated $50m and can train about 1,500 Somali soldiers at one time to help combat Al-Shabaab. Turkey has military entrenchment throughout the Horn of Africa, from Libya to Sudan and Somalia. Turkey has made its mark by fostering close relations with Somalia’s government and securing contracts for Turkish firms, ensuring ongoing economic as well as military influence.
[23] A number of other actors have not been described here but merit further exploration. For example, Somalia has held bilateral relations with Japan since the 1960s and development funds have been provided on and off since the early 1990s. From 2013/2014, Japan enhanced its bilateral support for development initiatives worth $40m, including vocational training for youth and women, maritime and fisheries training, fisheries and agricultural infrastructure development, and communication and information technology support. India has also been involved in foreign aid, scholarships for higher education, anti-piracy and bilateral trade. Bilateral trade from 2014-2015 between India and Somalia totalled $391.05m.
[24] This demonstrates how potential limitations of traditional donors can lead to the FGS engaging bilaterally with non-traditional donors, who may offer large funds or quick fix solutions. As political developments in recent months and years have shown, some of the engagements by non-traditional donors have exacerbated conflicts between different political formations. This risks undermining the investment and political capital that the UK has spent on establishing and supporting frameworks. Traditional donors such as the UK should stand firmly committed to certain principles of engagement, such as fostering local ownership, alignment to national development priorities, building institutional capacity to improve law and order, anti-corruption, and to be non-partisan even when striving for a better balance of power and accountability amongst the multiple political actors in a country such as Somalia. Consequently, implementing partners such as ASI can support by using comprehensive, adaptive and flexible management as well as harnessing networks and experts to establish impactful and sustainable programmes as well as relationships of trust with key Somali stakeholders.