Written evidence submitted from International Department of the Conservative Party (UKA0002)
Dr. Fernando Casal Bértoa and Dr. Edalina Sanches
Executive Summary
1. Investigating party financing matters because a proper regulatory (funding) framework can help to promote a fairer interparty competition and it involves transparency and accountability principles, that are vital for the consolidation of democracy in a country.
2.Political parties in Africa face several difficulties to become financially self-sufficient, principally where state funding is lacking or is poorly regulated. As result, in most countries, political parties (especially those in opposition) end up relying on institutional and personal networks (both national and international).
3. Money has influence in how politics is conducted in Africa, but the strength of this effect varies across countries, and interacts with other sources information citizens use to make their voting decisions.
4. Most parties are allowed to use public subsidies to fund both their electoral campaigns and ordinary activities. Most public funding regulations tend to favour parliamentary, and in particular ruling parties. In terms of disclosure and implementation, Africa houses the world’s the most opaque campaign donations regulations as well the highest levels of vote buying. Pecuniary fines are the most popular type of sanctions followed by prison, while party de-registration and loss (or suspension) of funding are much less common.
Fernando Casal Bértoa is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham (United Kingdom). He is co-director of REPRESENT: Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy as well as member of the OSCE/ODIHR “Core Group of Political Party Experts”, International IDEA collaborator and Venice Commission expert. His work has been published in Journal of Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Sociological Methods and Research, Electoral Studies, West European Politics, Party Politics or Democratization, among others. He was awarded the 2017 Gordon Smith and Vincent Wright Memorial Prize, the 2017 AECPA Prize for the Best Article and the 2018 Vice-Chancellor Medal of the University of Nottingham for “exceptional achievements”. His latest book, co-edited with Ingrid van Biezen, is The Regulation of Post-communist Party Politics (Routledge).
Carlotta Redi is the International Director of the Conservative Party, where she heads up the international work aimed at promoting good governance and the rule of law, empowering young political leaders and facilitating international dialogue and integration in partnership with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD).
Edalina Sanches is a Research Fellow in Political Science at Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa (Portugal). Her research interests comprise democratization, political institutions, elections, political parties and party systems, with a focus on Africa. Her work has been featured in Parliamentary Affairs, International Politics, Electoral Studies, Acta Politica, South European Society and Politics and Journal of Asian and African Studies etc. She is a regular contributor to the blogs Presidential Power and Africaye and has recently published the book Party Systems in Young Democracies: Varieties of institutionalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Routledge, 2018).
The International Department of the Conservative Party, in partnership with the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, has recently cooperated with Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy (REPRESENT) at the University of Nottingham and the Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Lisbon to produce a research paper on party financing regulation in 13 African countries (Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia). This submission aims to respond to the question on “How realistic are the UK's ambitions, as defined in their 'New approach to sub-Saharan Africa', and the reality of the UK's engagement on the ground?”. We are specifically focusing on how political parties, as essential for the functioning of democracy, can be key drivers to deliver a safer, healthier and more prosperous future.
As much as elsewhere state funding is quintessential for the development of African political parties and the stabilization of party systems. However, the prevalence of dominant parties in many countries means that most resources – beyond direct/indirect public funding – stay in the hands of the “hegemonic” or “dominant” party in power. This has important implications for how party politics actually develops and, consequently, for the role that money plays in it. Moreover, and what is more important, this raises essential questions about (1) how is party funding regulated? , (2) how do parties raise money?, and (3) which challenges they face in their quest for sustainability? These questions matter not only because a proper regulatory (funding) framework can help to promote a fairer interparty competition, but also because of the significance both transparency and accountability have in the institutionalization of electoral politics and, more importantly, the consolidation of democracy in a country. Given the centrality of money in party politics, and especially the generalization of party funding legislations with the expansion of democracy at the end of the Cold War, the interest of both scholars and practitioners in studying the causes and consequences of political funding regulation has increased over time.
First of all, various scholars have shown how state subsidies are a catalyst for party system institutionalization, as they help to (1) reduce the number of parties in a system, (2) close the structure of inter-party competition, making it more predictable, and (3) decrease electoral volatility. It has been found that a restrictive regime of private funding discourages the formation of new parties, but only in those regimes where states subsidies are not available. In the same line, access to public funding and bans on private funding act together to close the structure of party competition in Africa, thus enhancing institutionalization over time. But while high regulation of funding can have positive effects on the institutionalization / stabilization of inter-party competition, it has been also shown that citizens do not necessarily trust or identify more with political parties as result of more regulation. Indeed, even if state subsidies can help reduce the levels of corruption, both a high state dependency and a restrictive regime of distribution of public subsidies might have a counter-productive effect. And the same can be said of very restrictive private funding and sanctionatory regulations.
Political parties in Africa face several difficulties to become financially self-sufficient, principally where state funding is lacking or is poorly regulated. As result, in most countries, political parties (especially those in opposition) have to rely on their personal and institutional networks (national and international) as well as to develop creative activities to raise money. It is commonly argued that political authority in the continent is essentially based on a reward system of giving and granting of favours, which connects representatives, local elites and constituents. In fact, practices such as clientelism, patronage, and vote buying are said to be ubiquitous in Africa, and have profound effects on the integrity of electoral politics and on the prospects for democratization. In practice however, things are much more complex. The African voting behaviour literature, presents inconclusive results about the effectiveness of vote buying as a mechanism for building support. Money has influence in how politics is conducted in Africa, but the strength of this effect varies across countries, and interacts with other sources information citizens use to make their voting decisions. Still, the incumbent parties’ privileged access to state resources, the prevalence of clientelistic practices such as vote buying, raise concerns about the fairness and transparency of political competition, the nature of political representation, and ultimately the prospects of democratization in Africa.
5. Key findings
1. Out of 13 countries, only four do not provide any type of direct political funding neither for parties nor for candidates: Botswana, Zambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone;
2. Most parties are allowed to use public subsidies to fund both their electoral campaigns and ordinary activities. The only exceptions are Namibia, Malawi and Morocco, where funding can only be employed for the latter;
3. Most public funding regulations tend to favour parliamentary, and in particular ruling parties. Only in some countries (Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Malawi and Morocco) public funding reaches smaller (and extra-parliamentary) parties. For this reason, most representatives of the (opposition) parties interviewed consider public funding inadequate and/or insufficient;
4. In terms of private funding, whereas anonymous donations are generally banned, foreign donations are allowed in most countries, together with donations from trade unions and/or private companies (some partial exceptions include Ghana, Kenya and Morocco). In this context, most opposition parties’ members stress the importance of private funding for their activities, while recognizing at the same time that individual donors often do not support their parties because of fears of backlash.
5. Party agents/activists often resort to their own personal resources (e.g. cars, gas, staples, computers) to finance campaign initiatives. Moreover, in some cases, party statutes stipulate that a share of an elected representative’s (at national and local level) salary be donated to his/her own party;
6. With very few exceptions (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Morocco), African countries tend to be very lenient on donation limits or caps, especially when compared to other world regions;
7. With even more exceptions (i.e. Tanzania, Kenya and Morocco), electoral or party spending is not at all limited;
8. In terms of disclosure and implementation, Africa has the most opaque campaign donations and the higher levels of vote buying;
9. Although vote buying is prohibited in all countries, in practice many forms of inducements and clientelism are used to buy voter support;
10. With few exceptions (i.e. Botswana, Malawi and Zambia), political parties are required to report regularly on their finance. In practice, however, there is lack of transparency and will, together with insufficient means, to oversight parties’ finance;
11. Pecuniary fines are the most popular type of sanctions followed by prison, while party de-registration and loss (or suspension) of funding are much less common.
Recommendations
1. Countries should introduce a generous regime of public subsidies, a more proportional formula (e.g. “percentage of votes”) than the usually employed “percentage of seats”. This would allow not only for a less discriminatory distribution of state funds, but also for the extension of state help to nonparliamentary parties with a certain level of support (e.g. 3 percent of the vote). With the benefits this might have for the survival of political parties, the institutionalization of the party system, the reduction of support for anti-establishment parties and, more importantly, the consolidation of democracy;
2. Earmark a proportion of public subsidies to promote the participation of women (e.g. 20%) and youth (e.g. 10%) in politics as well as the capacity building and civic education of members, followers and/or sympathizers;
3. Ban of foreign donations and those made by (public or private) companies which, tending to favour parties in power, might exercise an illegitimate influence in the outcome of the decision-making process and the adoption of specific policies;
4. Introduction of adequate and proportionate limits both for donations and spending, with the aim of reducing (1) the undue influence of wealthy individuals and (2) over-spending temptations, as well as (3) equalizing the playing field and compensating the “advantage of origin” characteristic of hegemonic and/or predominant parties;
5. Reinforcement of oversight, with the creation of independent control bodies with the effective power and resources (both human and financial) to make political parties (both in government and opposition) accountable;
6. Use of new technologies to increase the publicity, transparency and topicality of party finance reporting;
7. Introduction and implementation of credible, proportionate and discouraging sanctions, including criminal liability and total loss of public subsidies,33 for the gravest types of political finance violations;
8. Organization of workshops leading to a better training of party delegates in areas of political communication, campaign activities and, especially, fund raising.