Written Evidence submitted by Dr James Rogers (SDU / Yale University)

              Dr James Rogers is Assistant Professor in War Studies within the Centre for War Studies at SDU and Visiting Research Fellow within the Department of International Security Studies at Yale University. His work has appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, International Journal of Human Rights, International Peacekeeping, Rolling Stone Magazine, the Economist, Gizmodo, and BBC World Histories (amongst others). James has provided evidence and expert advice to the UN, MoD, and NATO. He is an expert adviser to the UK Parliament’s All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones.

Domestic Threat of Drones Inquiry

Executive Summary

The use of a ‘weaponised drone’ is now open to anyone with the ability to turn an off-the-shelf quadcopter into an air-borne IED. Such technical know-how is not as specialised as one may think. As the wide array of readily available, easy to fly, and simple to adapt industrial quality quadcopter drones, fixed wing agricultural drones, swarming control apps, high speed motors, long-distance transmitters, thermal imaging cameras, data theft/transmission software, and object release devices shows, there has been an unchecked diffusion of advanced drone technologies. These systems have already been used in nefarious or disturbing ways. The Japanese ‘atomic drones’, ‘burrito bomber’ drones, Russian and Chinese ‘data capture and transmission’ drones, or the commercially available ‘flamethrower’ drones, are all prominent examples of readily available, adaptable, diverse, yet concerning drone usage. This being said, drones are not a tactic or a strategy in themselves. Interviews with the European and U.S. SOF communities highlight the power of the drone to cause fear and chaos on the battlefield as part of a broader terrorist strategy and the potential application of this back in the UK. This report explores each of these emerging, yet very real drone threats, and the recent history behind hostile drone use. As the report explains, although the threat from drone terrorism, crime, or state sponsored ‘mischief making’ will remain, regulation on drone purchases, coordinated counter-drone policing, civil-military cooperation, and rapid response capabilities will help alleviate drone threats to UK domestic security (Kennedy, C. 2019).

Full Written Evidence

To explore this new ‘proliferated drone world’, let’s start by looking back at December 2018, to the week just before Christmas. In a field just outside Gatwick Airport – the UK’s second largest airport with over 40 million passengers per year – two small hobbyist quadcopters, or drones, were spotted flying high in the night sky. It was a security guard who is said to have spotted these toys come potential weapons. After heading home from a long shift, he saw the smallish drones, like the kind you can buy from Amazon for $50, hovering near the main runway. With their distinctive lights flashing, they danced about, and then disappeared. It was from this point onwards that the chaos began.

The sighting of two small drones, quickly turned into 92 confirmed reports of ‘industrial quality’ drones causing havoc in the skies above the airport. A game of cat and mouse ensued, and the police desperately searched for the two drones, or indeed the multiple drones, that were allegedly causing the trouble. Astonishingly, this carried on for the next 36+ hours, and by the end of a three-day period over 1,000 flights had been cancelled, diverted, or delayed. Christmas, for so many, had been ruined. But, what actually happened here?[1]

Well, put simply, it’s been almost a year since this infamous event and we still don’t know. Two people – an innocent man and woman from the nearby town of Crawley – were arrested and then released without charge. The prime minister sent in the British Army with their high-tech counter-drone technologies. And speculation ran rife, with some accusing the Russians of mischief making, others putting it down to terrorist infiltration, and a few believing there were never any drones at all – apparently it was all just mass hysteria and panic over nothing but the fear of the drone itself.

Now, we don’t know which of those explanations is true and, really it doesn’t matter. What matters is that the Gatwick debacle has shown us ‘Rogue Drones’ cannot currently be controlled. It is the ‘rogueness’ that causes the public fear and anxiety.  We fear drones in the skies above us, because we know what they are capable off and we are vulnerable. A drone can be above us, next to us, or horrifyingly outside our plane window as we are about to land at an international airport. We do not know who is controlling it, and the trouble is that there are currently few measures that can effectively trace, track, and disable these tiny drone systems. As such, we feel exposed and open to harm. This is understandable. The recent history of these drone systems shows us why the UK public should at least be a little apprehensive about just how easy these systems are to acquire or manufacture, improvise, and deploy.

We can look back to the 1990’s, and Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese doomsday death cult, for a pertinent reminder of what nefarious drone systems can do if people are so inclined.[2] This terrorist group took small remote-control drones, added liquid storage tanks and ventilation fans, and made plans to fly them high above some of Japan’s largest cities, dispersing chemicals and biological agents as they flew. In the end, the group went with a low-tech option, and released bags of liquid nerve agent on the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people and injuring over 5000. Thus, the warning signs about drones have been around since at least the 1990s. They carried on appearing in the early 2000s. According to declassified CIA reports, Saddam Hussain began to develop a similar idea, although in this case drones were being developed by a state actor (Iraq). The plan, according to the CIA, was to use the unmanned systems to deploy biological and chemical weapons on American allies. The CIA’s report on ‘Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (2002) argued that “Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbours, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to, or into the United States, the US homeland”.[3] In reality, this was not probable or intended by Saddam. We know that there were many myths propagated about the ‘imminent’ Iraqi threat and about WMDs during this period, many of which led the United States and its allies into the Iraq war. The ‘Saddam drone story’ is but one example of this. It is true that Saddam started a drone programme called the Al Quds UAV Program, but it was largely aimed at copying the Israel and American capabilities of the early 1990s – that is to jam communications via drone, and to use them for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition – like had been used so effectively against Saddam’s own forces during the First Gulf War.[4] (The state use of drones to spy on another state is a pertinent threat and issue to which we will return later.) Nevertheless, the idea of Saddam’s deadly drone fleet became a useful part of the intelligence community’s tapestry as it attempted to persuade Congress of the fears posed by the Iraqi regime. Indeed, the CIA’s attempts to implant this message into the minds of congressional representatives were successful with one senator, Ben Nelson, recalling that;

“I, along with nearly every Senator in this Chamber, in that secure room of this Capitol complex, was not only told there were weapons of mass destruction--specifically chemical and biological--but I was looked at straight in the face and told that Saddam Hussein had the means of delivering those biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction by unmanned drones, called UAVs, unmanned aerial vehicles. Further, I was looked at straight in the face and told that UAVs could be launched from ships off the Atlantic coast to attack eastern seaboard cities of the United States. Is it any wonder that I concluded there was an imminent peril to the United States?”.[5]

So, during the early 2000’s the threat of a drone by an unpredictable, hard to control, and rogue state actor, heightened fears - especially in wake of 9/11 when there was already great anxiety about threats from the air. The fear of rogue drones did not stop here, however, with drones continuing to feature in our consciousness throughout the 2000s and into the 2010s.

There were a number of occasions where drones were used for nefarious means during this period. Even if we are to subtract the all-pervasive American, British, French, Israeli, and Italian use of drones, we can turn to the use of drones by Hezbollah for an important reminder of how the threat of drones has emerged. Since 2004 Hezbollah has used Iranian drone technologies to spy on Israel, attack al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Syria, and (in 2017) to launch weaponised drone strikes against ISIS. Yet, it wasn’t just in the Middle East that drones made an impact. With the proliferation of small, yet effective, hobbyist drone technologies (and the misuse of drones in Washington D.C. and Tokyo, alongside the threat of drone atrocious by ISIS in Europe) a wider threat emerged, and a wider public audience began to develop a consciousness to the drone threat.

Let’s look at the Tokyo case in more detail. This time a so-called ‘radioactive drone’ made its mark. On this occasion a Japanese environmental activist vowed to commit an act of terror against his government. His name was Yasuo Yamamoto and he was dismayed at his government’s decision to reopen its nuclear power facilities after the devastating effects an 9.0 magnitude earthquake in 2011 that shook Japan, lead to a devastating Tsunami, and caused “[d]amage to the reactors at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant…contaminating a wide area”.[6] As a means to illustrate his fears to the powers at be, he decided to go to the contaminated Fukushima Prefecture and collect radioactive soil from the region. He then returned to his home and began work on fitting this material to the bottom of a drone he had recently acquired. In the end, Yamamoto went with a relatively simple option and filled a container with his radioactive waste. He painted his drone black, making sure to cover the lights with thick black paint.[7] He then placed a large radioactive warning sticker on top and tied his container of waste to the bottom of the drone. From this point he set about the next stage of his plan. The destination for the drone was to be the front door of Shinzō Abe (the Japanese Prime Minister). Yamamoto tried unsuccessfully on at least two occasions to fulfil his mission. He had to withdraw due to poor weather. On his final attempt he succeeded; well in part at least. Due to a handling error which made him loose control, Yamamoto ended up crash-landing the drone on the roof of the PM’s residence. Astonishingly, here it sat radiating for over two weeks before anyone noticed. During this period Yamamoto even posted on his blog that he was surprised (even annoyed) that none of the Japanese press had covered his attack, and so he began to prepare a second drone. Yet, before this was able to be deployed, the first drone was found, Yamamoto gave himself up, and he was subsequently sentenced to two years in prison, suspended for four years. Such a sentence is perhaps lenient for an act by an ‘activist’ with the self-stated claim to use commercial drones in a terroristic manner. However, for the Japanese security forces, the most important legacy from this breach of airspace security was the wakeup call it gave them. It also sent a wakeup call to other national security forces and national militaries around the world. Such a threat is likely to become increasingly potent as commercial technologies evolve in sophisticated ways. One group that noted this utility was ISIS. Their use of drones over the last five years provides us with a window through which we can glimpse at new trends and threats in war fighting and national insecurity.

Terrorist Drones and Western Warfighting.

“About five or six months ago, there was a day when the Iraqi effort nearly came to a screeching halt, where literally over 24 hours there were 70 drones in the air”

Gen. Raymond Thomas, US Special Operations Command.[8]

Western military personnel have already fallen victim to improvised precision strikes. The ISIS use of drones against US troops in Syria (June, 2017) is but one example. US Special Operations Forces deployed around Raqqa and Mosul came under sustained continued attack by small, hard to spot, weaponised drone systems. Armed with small mortar rounds or improvised shells, and sometimes with HD quality live video streaming, ISIS were able to release munitions with considerable accuracy. Videos of these strikes have been posted on YouTube by ISIS to promote their new capabilities. Yet, this is not the only evidence of this type of activity.

One striking case comes from the use of a so-called Trojan Horse weaponised drone. Deployed by ISIS for use against Kurdish military personnel and French special forces, the aim was to deliberately allow for the drone to be shot down, taken away for inspection, and then to detonate when examined. The plan worked. The resulting explosion cost the lives of two Kurdish fighters and caused injury to two French military personnel. This was an important turn. Whereas drones once allowed a state military or intelligence agency to strike down suspected terrorists, a new generation of terrorists were now using armed drones to lure in military forces and deploy their own form of deadly precision against the forces of a state. Since this time, the threat has spread.

The Threat back Home

In 2018, ISIS released propaganda that suggested Western cities would be next on its list of drone targets.[9] Indeed, this is when much of the European and American anxiety about drones began to become increase. No terrorist drone use has been confirmed in the West, yet, but there have been some worrying lapses in security. In Washington D.C. a drunken hobbyist managed to breach White House security and crash a drone onto the president’s lawn. Not only this, but in the last 24 months drones have been used in attempts to assassinate presidents, to supply contraband into prisons, to swarm the FBI, to attack police, and even to harass U.S. military sites and the Pentagon over 100 times.[10] So, the question is, do we in Europe and the USA have a reason to be fearful about the future of drones?

Well the answer is yes. ‘Rogue Drones’, either launched by terrorists, trouble makers, or hapless hobbyists will continue to cause chaos in the years to come. They are small, easy to modify, hack, weaponize, and are hard for the authorities to track and bring down. The threat posed by weaponised drones is increasing. As Nicholas Rasmussen, US National Counterterrorism Center Chief, clearly stated to US Senators, drones are “a real problem”.[11]

Nevertheless, drones are not a tactic or strategy in themselves. Extensive interviews with European and US Special Operations Forces (SOF) have highlighted the power of the drone to cause fear, panic, and casualties. ISIS successfully coordinated drone overflight (often 10, 20, or up to 100 drones in the air over a short period) with sniper fire, VBIEDs, and suicide bombers during intense fighting to scare, scatter, and fatally target troops. Yet, this modus operandi is no longer just in the hands of ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria. Provisional reports from Nigeria, Israel, Palestine, Yemen, and Mali – as well as the rise of online tutorials, propaganda, and threats against Western cities – show that knowledge on simple terroristic drones use, but also swarming deployment, has spread.[12] In the UK, a basic off the shelf drone, equipped with a container of unspecified (even inert) white powder, could be used to induce panic as part of a broader coordinated terrorist / suicide attack. Still, the threat of drones goes beyond the purely explosive.

Unarmed ‘rouge drones’ have the ability to halt vital UK strategic infrastructure: such as airports in the Gatwick case. Yet, airports are not the only vital infrastructure that are vulnerable. Nuclear power plants, high-speed train lines (HS2 or Eurostar), schools, military bases, GCHQ, banking districts, and prisons (to name but a few) are all susceptible to hostile drone actives. This includes weaponised use, but also data theft and threatening/fake news message transmission drones. Suspicions are rife about Huawei and the Chinese drone manufacture DJI’s data harvesting,[13] but after the infamous Salisbury poisoning incident, Russia has also become a worry when it comes to drone aggression. There are reports of drones being used by Russian backed forces in Ukraine, alongside ground based systems, “to conduct electromagnetic reconnaissance and jamming against satellite, cellular and radio communication systems along with GPS spoofing and electronic warfare attacks”.[14] The aim here is to jam drones operated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but also on occasion to send menacing messages to the troops on the ground, or messages that urge defection. Drones, are therefore, useful for disinformation and fake news. One final point here is that as drone technologies are embraced and form their own vital infrastructure for hospital bloods and organ transport, commercial delivery, and data transmission, what would be the economic and social impact of grounding the UK’s civil drone capacity when the drone infrastructure is compromised by just such a case of nefarious drone usage? Counter drone systems, and improved regulatory and policing measures, are just some of the ways we can mitigate against the occurrence of this sort of event.

Countering Weaponised Drones

There is no single ‘quick fix’ to the drone issue. It may seem simple. Why not just shoot down the drones? Shotguns or modified anti-missile systems could, in some cases, provide a sufficient countering capability. Yet, unfortunately it’s not that easy. As the case of the Trojan Horse drone demonstrated, sometimes terrorists want a drone to be shot down. For example, if a drone was to be packed with a noxious gas or hazardous powder, it would be preferable for the system to be destroyed in mid-air, or forced to crash to the ground.[15] So, there are no quick fixes, but more considered options are being developed (see Countering Weaponised Drones for more details on specific counter drone tech).  Nevertheless, within this report, it is impossible to cover all the additional measures required to control the drone threat. Due to the recent and novel nature of the threat, may of the regulatory, legal, and policing ideas are at a conceptual stage. However, to provide a glimpse at some of the ideas being considered a list has been compiled below. This list outlines some ideas worthy of discussion by the committee.

1. After the case of Basil Hassan in Denmark (who sent hi-tech drone components to ISIS from Denmark) it is important to consider how the UK regulates the sale of high-end drone components or tracks the sale of components to and from the UK. These drone technologies were bought from a high-street hobbyist shop and sent abroad, helping ISIS with thermal imaging and long-range strike capabilities.[16]

2. Rapid response counter-drone policing is another issue to be discussed. There are a number of forces that use drones or are experimenting with counter-drone equipment in the UK, but they are disparate and disconnected. What are the UK police doing to coordinate this effort and document lessons learnt? In addition, how is the UK documenting and learning from the military experience?

3. In a related question, is there enough counter-drone equipment in the UK if drones were to be used in 5s or 10s – or even 70s as with ISIS – at multiple sites in the UK? A similar scenario has already been threatened at Heathrow Airport by Extinction Rebellion. Do we need rapid response counter-drone policing teams?

4. One final point in terms of regulation and countering. How will the UK approach the dominance of foreign actors in the UK drone market and the risk of data harvesting, data theft, or fake news transmission? As externally manufactured drones become ever more present above our homes and cities how will their use be regulated in law and how will our data be protected?

Overall, there is no quick-fix and no single system that can currently counter the full spectrum of threats posed by drones. Yet, as the measures highlighted above show, some promising options are being developed. When these measures are further combined with the preliminary list of regulatory, legal, policing, and civil-military measures, it is hoped that the UK can safely embrace the positives that drones can bring to society.

15 August 2019