Supplementary written evidence from Serco plc (PPG0042)
At the JSC Prison Governance Hearing involving private operators on 5th June 2019, you asked us to re-submit our evidence specifically on an improved model of prison control
Executive Summary
In July 2017 we discussed with MoJ the urgent need for the role of the private prison Controller to be reviewed. We proposed a new control regime, based on a ‘three lines of defence’ model, which aligned with the following principles:
Culturally the MoJ should seek to ‘trust’ the operator of the prison more
Independent monitoring, audit and performance management is vital, and the need for it fully accepted and supported by the operator.
In September 2017 Serco submitted to the MoJ our assessment and recommendations in relation to a future model of private prison control. We proposed a new approach that would revitalise the contract management process in the custodial sector, whilst also realising significant financial savings to HMPPS.
Introduction - Governor Empowerment
Serco wholeheartedly agrees with the principle that prison Governors should be empowered, because there is no doubt that the leadership tone and performance of any individual prison is driven and impacted by the Governor.
To reference Lord Ramsbotham, MoJ/HMPPS is becoming very input-based on the ‘How’ (input specification) things are to be done, rather than clearly annunciating the ‘What’ (output specification) that needs to be delivered, leaving the ‘How’ to Governors who can then exercise their powers of leadership over local initiatives and how services are delivered within the prison. Part of this culture is entrenched by the existing model of prison control and oversight exercised by HMPPS.
Following 20 years of monitoring and control, we find that the role of the Controller enforces the sense of micromanagement of the ‘How’ and very often creates a non-value add obstacle to the introduction of new ideas or solutions. Whether by accident or design, these roles seem to reinforce a ‘No’ culture rather than an ‘Ok, but prove it’ one.
Revised Prison Control Proposal
Serco therefore proposes the following solutions to address these issues.
Each prison is required to have an Independent Monitoring Board (IMB) that has reporting powers direct to the Secretary of State. IMBs play a critical role in providing independent oversight of prison conditions and assurance for the proper standards of care and decency of prisoners. However, we consider that the efficacy of the IMBs have diminished over the years and as such we would question if they are all taking a strategic/national approach to the challenging issues and topics of the day.
We recognise that all IMBs are volunteers but we remain concerned as to the frequency and level of training they currently receive.
The most powerful voice from an inspection and credibility perspective across the custodial sector is the one undertaken by the Chief Inspector of Prisons team. We would propose that the Chief Inspector of Prisons supports the training of IMBs to develop skills to measure their establishment continually against the Healthy Prisons Test, the centrepiece of all Chief Inspector’s reports (safety, respect, purposeful activity and resettlement).
The benefits of this proposal are that IMB monthly reports and oversight responsibilities will more effectively align with HMIP reports. The ‘mini IMB inspections’ against the Healthy Prison tests would provide for HMIP a fuller picture of the establishment’s overall activities and challenges enabling HMIP to undertake more thematic reviews of the major areas of operations. The IMBs will thus become the first line of defence.
The proposed withdrawal of Controllers at contract level is not intended as their demise but rather the creation of a smaller regional peripatetic Controller function that visits all establishments (across the public/private sector estate) for research, observations or for any contractual purpose. The peripatetic controllers will become the second line of defence. We have seen the benefit in overseas territories (in this case, Australia) of replacing Controllers with a system-wide audit team who sample and review independently across both public and private estate, rather than being present 24/7 just on private contracts. This allows for the identification of barriers across all establishments and better sharing of best practice across providers, as well as providing a truer comparator of public/private performance.
The HMPPS Audit Corporate Assurance teams (ACA) and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons (HMIP) remain, as they do now, the third line of defence.
It is worth noting that each private provider supports these three lines of defence with their own reporting, risk management, governance and audit activities.
Buy-side savings potential
The majority of private prisons have at least one full-time controller, with an assistant controller too, who are supported by a full-time administrative resource. Controllers tend to be public sector HMPPS Senior Manager Grades beneath that of Deputy Governors, although this can vary in certain instances.
Whilst we are unable to be exact in our estimations of costs on an individual or site basis, it would be conservative to estimate that salaries plus on-costs could equate to c£50k pa per controller, and c£25k pa for administration grade support. With 13 private prisons, up to 26 full-time controllers, with an additional 13 administrators, this oversight model could be costing MoJ £1.625m plus annually. Given their unintended consequences to performance and innovation, we question whether HMPPS are now receiving appropriate value for money as we move into a 3rd decade of private prison operation.
Recommendations
a) The Authority should consider a more holistic supplier/Director management model. It should remove the role of in-house prison Controller to create a more effective method of audit and contract management, utilising better the existing IMB resource.
b) The Authority should redefine the role of the IMB under the supervision of the Chief Inspector of Prisons, to act as the first line of defence. The aim will be to create a professionally skilled, rejuvenated team of volunteer inspectors monitoring individual prisons against the Healthy Prison test on a monthly basis.
c) The Authority should create a new function of a small, national peripatetic Controller team (or teams working regionally) with powers to visit any establishment for research, observations or any contractual purpose, as a second line of defence.
d) The Authority and Providers need to create a mechanism of joint working so that ideas can be shared, promising innovative pilots approved quickly, results measured and best practice spread effectively. It would be very helpful if a governance schedule with clearly delegated authorities was published.
e) The Authority and Providers need to develop a mechanism to pool research, and to progress a methodology for how suppliers can provide greater risk assurance while receiving more autonomy on the operating model.
f) Private Sector Directors have access to greater organisational reach-back and are able to pilot and innovate far more quickly than prisons in HMPPS. MoJ could strive to encourage more this source of ideas and solutions, and consider addressing its approach to mitigated and proportional risk.