Written evidence from Independent Monitoring Boards (IMBs) (PPG0031)
Introduction
1. The Prison Act 1952 requires every prison to be monitored by an independent Board appointed by the Secretary of State from members of the community in which the prison is situated.
The Board is specifically charged to:
(1) satisfy itself as to the humane and just treatment of those held in custody within its prison and the range and adequacy of the programmes preparing them for release.
(2) inform promptly the Secretary of State, or any official to whom he has delegated authority as it judges appropriate, any concern it has.
(3) report annually to the Secretary of State on how well the prison has met the standards and requirements placed on it and what impact these have on those in its custody.
2. To enable the Board to carry out these duties effectively, its members, who are all public appointees, have right of access to every prisoner and every part of the prison and also to the prison’s records. There are currently over 1300 IMB members who carry out over 50,000 visits to prisons every year and deal with around 30,000 individual applications from prisoners.
3. The IMBs are part of the UK’s National Preventive Mechanism set up under the Optional Protocol to the UN Convention against Torture (Opcat).
Oversight of prisons
4. This submission addresses the second limb of the Committee’s current inquiry: the effective oversight of prisons. It is understood that the main thrust of the inquiry is into the oversight carried out through HMPPS and the Ministry of Justice: those with direct responsibility and accountability for the performance of prisons and prison managers. However, as Opcat recognises, independent oversight is an essential complement to good internal leadership and management, with the ability to challenge and cast a fresh light on developments and practices.
5. The IMBs are an important part of that independent oversight, complementing the work of the Prisons Inspectorate and the Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, with whom we are in regular contact. It is a model of public and community accountability that has been used as an example of good practice internationally.
6. IMBs are a regular presence in prisons, including rota visits, scrutiny of prison records, attendance at segregation reviews, and receiving applications from individual prisoners. This means that they are well placed to identify and give early warning of issues of concern both in general (for example, the failings of the new maintenance contracts, lengthy periods in segregation) and in specific prisons (for example, Bedford and Birmingham). They regularly raise issues of concern identified during their visits with prison management teams and in monthly meetings with the Governor. If serious and unresolved, issues can be escalated to HMPPS centrally and ultimately to Ministers. Board evidence therefore provides crucial independent information to managers, ministers and the public, and is now fed into assessments of prisons’ performance.
6. The National Chair and Management Board (see below), along with a small Secretariat, provide central leadership and support. The national annual report, published earlier this month, brings together the findings of individual boards to the end of 2018 and points to some critical issues within prisons, many of which are ongoing. It clearly shows the scope, scale and value of the work that boards do. The National Chair also meets with Ministers and senior officials on a regular basis to brief them on emerging issues. Further national thematic work and quarterly updates on Board findings are planned.
7. The Committee will be aware of the new governance structure agreed by Ministers for the IMBs, including a national chair and national management board. These arrangements are set out in the protocol with the MOJ which was sent to the Committee chair in April 2019. This new structure is an important step forward in developing strategies and policies to support the work of individual boards and in maximising the collective impact of Board findings by raising issues of concern at a national level. However, there are two crucial issues that limit the impact and potential of the IMBs’ contribution to prison governance and oversight, which remain to be resolved.
8. First, the new structure has no statutory basis. Each IMB remains a separate and independent statutory body. It is therefore not possible for the IMBs as a whole to have a corporate existence as an independent arms’ length body, capable of employing staff and with direct responsibility for its own budget. Nor is there a formal report to Parliament. Currently, IMBs and the new governance structure are supported by a secretariat composed of Ministry of Justice civil servants. Because they are not independent of the department, it has been agreed that they should not make substantive decisions in relation to members or IMB policies; these are now made within the new governance structure. However, this is not a long-term solution. The new structure lacks statutory authority, and is over-reliant on the work and goodwill of volunteers.
9. Second, the extensive work done by unpaid public appointees needs a much stronger financial base. In any week there are around 950 monitoring visits to prisons in England and Wales. Other organisations that rely on unpaid volunteers to carry out technical or statutory work recognise that this requires sufficient central support: to recruit and retain members, support board leaders and members, deliver and update training and provide accurate and current information. Currently this is done within a budget of £1.6 million, which covers both central support and the travel and subsistence expenses of the members. This is an insufficient resource to support the scale and scope of monitoring being carried out: to assist with recruitment, provide the support and advice that unpaid board members should expect, and ensure that their findings can be of maximum benefit to Ministers and HMPPS. The Committee may wish to note that the equivalent organisation in Scotland has a ratio of paid staff to unpaid members of 1:37, compared to the ratio of 1:78 for IMBs in England and Wales.
10. In conclusion, IMBs can evidence a long history of contributing to the independent oversight of prisons through regular weekly on-the-ground monitoring and reporting. To maximise impact and accountability, and derive the greatest benefit, a firmer statutory and financial basis is required.