Written evidence submitted by Ria Ivandic, Professor Tom Kirchmaier, Professor Stephen Machin, London School of Economics and Political Science (HCL0053)

 

 

Overview

 

  1. We welcome the opportunity to contribute to the Home Affairs Committee’s important and timely inquiry into Islamophobia. The inquiry coincides with major new research from LSE’s Centre from Economic Performance (CEP) which uses data from the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) to determine the effects that international terror attacks, and media reporting of them, have on reported Islamophobic hate crime at the local level. We would be happy to discuss the research in greater detail with the Committee.

 

  1. The new, large-scale quantitative evidence offers a relatively long time window, allowing us to reliably appraise the effects of ten separate jihadi attacks over a ten year period on local hate crime in Manchester, and accurately measure the subsequent effects of ongoing media reports of those attacks. The research also looks at the demographic profile of perpetrators of hate crime, and finds clear patterns that need to be fully understood and acted upon by policy makers.

 

  1. The evidence considers the effects of ten jihadi attacks between 2008 and 2018: the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013; the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in 2015; the Sousse attack in Tunisia in 2015; the attack on Paris in November 2015; the Brussels attack in 2016; the Nice attack in 2016; the Berlin attack in 2016; the Westminster attack in 2017; the Manchester concert attack in 2017; and then London Bridge attack in 2017.

 

  1. In total, over the course of the research timeline, 2,522 Islamophobic crimes and incidents were recorded in the Greater Manchester area. 1,924 were classified as crimes. While many directly followed terrorist attacks, and disproportionately so as spikes in incidents demonstrate, others appear to have been unprovoked. 

 

Increase in Islamophobic Hate Crime

 

  1. Jihadi attacks are shown to have a statistically significant effect on Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents. The data shows a significant spike in reported crimes in Manchester in the week of a jihadi attack, and that these effects persist, remaining significantly higher than pre-attack levels three weeks after the attack took place.

 

  1. The mean of monthly hate crimes and incidents in Manchester was stable at around 15 from 2008 – 2015, while in the period after 2015 it doubled to an average of 30 hate crimes a month. The 2017 attacks in Manchester (22nd May) and London Bridge (3rd June) led to two further spikes, quadrupling Islamophobic crimes in the weeks following the attacks. Cumulatively, Islamophobic hate crime remains at a higher level than before an attack occurs.

 

  1. More recent jihadi attacks are connected to bigger and more persistent rises in hate crime. This requires urgent understanding and consideration. By 2018 there are around four times more Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents in Greater Manchester than in 2008.

 

The Effects of Media Magnification

 

  1. The way in which the media reports on terrorism, and its effects on individual behaviour, is highly sensitive and controversial. Several studies have considered this, including looking at the amount of coverage of jihadi attacks in the US in contrast to other terrorist attacks (Kearns, Betus and Lemieux, 2017), and the exposure and reaction of perpetrators of hate crime to crime-focused media (Surette, 2013 and others).

 

  1. Our research showed a clear correlation between media coverage and increases in Islamophobic hate crime. We assembled data on the amount of UK media attention each of the ten jihadi attacks received, taking into account the most commons terminology used in media reports. The data confirmed, unsurprisingly, that in the weeks where the terror attacks occurred, newspaper coverage of key terms and issues relating to terrorism increased, and peaks in articles about jihadi terrorism corresponded to jihadi attacks which either occurred in western Europe or some of whose victims were British citizens, such as in Tunisia.

 

  1. There is a positive and statistically significant association between the media measures and the number of Islamophobic hate crimes and incidents. More media coverage is found to be directly connected to a higher rate of Islamophobic hate crime. In the week of the peak in newspaper articles, there is a sizable percentage increase of Islamophobic hate crimes, which persists in the following two weeks as media coverage continues.

 

  1. Our data allows us to further hone in on the daily patterns in the number of hate crimes and incidents reported to the GMP and the number of articles pertaining to terrorism and related issues in the UK national newspapers.

 

  1. The data shows that, after the initial spike in Islamophobic hate crimes after a jihadi attack, crimes continued to increase over the next few days.

 

  1. Our research clearly visually shows that peaks in Islamophobic hate crimes occurred after the peak of media coverage in the first few days following the Lee Rigby, Charlie Hebdo, Paris and Brussels terror attacks. We formally find evidence that media Granger causes hate crime in the case of Lee Rigby, Charlie Hebdo, Tunisia, Paris, Brussels, Manchester and London Bridge attacks. This data backs up the theory that some Islamophobic hate crime is a response to media reporting rather than directly in response to a jihadi attack itself.

 

  1. It is worth briefly noting the effects of other jihadi attacks not included in our study, as they took place further way from the UK. The 2016 and 2017 attacks on Istanbul and the 2017 attack on St Petersburg did not result in any deaths of people from Western Europe, and all three attacks garnered significantly less media interest in the UK than the ten attacks we studied. While media reporting did increase on the day of each of those three attacks, it was by much less, and they did not cause an increase in Islamophobic hate crime.

 

  1. Islamophobic hate crime is shown to be exacerbated and catalysed by media coverage. This poses significant policy questions about how politically sensitive events are reported, and what if any regulation might be appropriate in the future. It also has significant ramifications for future community cohesion, which should be addressed in future Government thinking.

 

Victims and Perpetrators

 

  1. Our research showed that Islamophobic crimes were highly concentrated, and occur disproportionately, in neighbourhoods with a significant Muslim presence. Looking deeper, we found that Islamophobic crimes and incidents happen primarily in less-populated suburban areas with a higher share of Arab and Muslim populations (and lower British and White populations). These areas are characterised by high levels of social deprivation and more limited employment, higher incidents of unemployment and single households.

 

  1. Our unique access to offender data allowed us to also study the characteristics of perpetrators of Islamophobic crimes. From the data available, we considered 473 offenders who committed 416 crimes, looking at their home addresses to gain insight into their socio-economic circumstances.

 

  1. The data showed that offenders are concentrated in certain areas of Greater Manchester – generally deprived areas outside the city centre, close to the areas with a higher share of Muslims, but not the same places. 60% of offenders live within 2km of the location of the crime committed, while they tend not to live in the actual neighbourhood they do not travel far to commit their crimes. Offenders are also more likely to be older and white, and on average they commit crimes in slightly larger groups than are assembled for other types of crime.

 

  1. This evidence should inform discussions about what mitigation efforts need to be put into effect, both at the local and national levels, to help prevent Islamophobic incidents in the event of future jihadi incidents.

 

 

May 2019