(DTD0012)

Written evidence submitted by the Home Office, with support from the Ministry of Defence and Department for Transport

Executive Summary

Drones have the potential to be used illegally and maliciously in a range of scenarios and against a range of targets. The recent Gatwick incident demonstrated that the national security risks they pose extend beyond just terrorism and serious and organised crime.

Awareness of drones as vectors for unlawful and malicious activity is likely to rise as their capabilities improve and they increasingly permeate public life. An effective, whole-system counter-drone approach requires a mix of bespoke and general capabilities. Different sites and sectors will have different technical countermeasure requirements. Equipment to detect, track and identify (DTI) allows a range of possible responses, one of which is the use of effector equipment.

Following the incident at Gatwick, the Home Office is leading and co-ordinating the work to review domestic counter-drone approaches and develop policy over how counter-measures can be best used to respond to malicious and illegal drone use. This includes accelerating our equipment testing and evaluation programmes to ensure that sites and sectors have access to the right capabilities. It also involves clearer rules and new powers to make enforcement easier for the police and give them and other responders the ability to counter the range of challenges malicious and illegal drone use present.

We remain clear that domestic counter-drone response is a role for the civil powers, but we may draw upon defence capabilities through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities on occasion as a last resort. We will continue to collaborate with international partners to discuss common challenges, collaborate on science and technology, and share our respective thinking

Risk

How great is the risk of a drone attack in the UK, and what types of target are most vulnerable?

1. The rapid increase in the capability and availability of drones means that they also pose an increasingly diverse range of risks. They have the potential to be used deliberately and maliciously by terrorists and other criminals to cause harm. And their misuse through negligence and recklessness also poses a risk to public safety.
2. Open source reporting describes how commercially available and home-made drones have been used and modified by Daesh to conduct reconnaissance, filming for propaganda purposes, and direct attacks against Iraqi forces and Russian military bases in Syria.
3. The reported attacks carried out by Houthis in 2018 using weaponised drones in Yemen, and the attack they claimed against Abu Dhabi airport, are further examples of drone use by non-state actors. Although the range and size of some of the drones employed by the Houthis are much greater than many commercially available systems, their use of GPS pre-programming offers an insight into increasing levels of system autonomy. 2018 also saw the reported use of weaponised drones in Venezuela.
4. We are concerned that the use of weaponised drones could be transferred from the battlefield to the UK, or elsewhere overseas to be used against British citizens or assets. We have evidence of individuals in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) investigating the potential to use drones in attacks. But the risk posed by the malicious and illegal use of drones falls across a wider range of activities than just terrorism and direct attacks. The drone incursion at Gatwick in December 2018 was neither of these, and yet it was still a high-harm incident with national security implications. It demonstrated very publicly the disruptive effects that a drone can pose, and is likely to have further focused attention on their potential for malicious use.
5. Drones continue to be used to facilitate criminal acts such as the conveyance of prohibited items into prisons. The airspace around some Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) locations has also been subject to drone incursions.
6. These examples show that drones can be used to commit a wide range of violations. Our vulnerability to attacks carried out by drones is relative and varies significantly depending on the target. Government policies must therefore be responsive in the way that they deal with emerging scenarios. Understanding how these vulnerabilities are likely to change as drone technologies evolve and new laws come into effect will be key to guiding our counter-drone approach.

How feasible are drone attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents?

7. All drones have the ability to carry a payload, either out of the box or after modification. All drones are therefore able to drop hazardous materials. However, the effectiveness of an attack using that capability is dependent on the size of the payload and ease of access to the technology that facilitates it.
8. The range of drones now available means that there is one to suit every budget and requirement, from small, cheap systems that are effectively children’s toys to capable, durable machines costing thousands of pounds.
9. Drones have been adopted into a variety of industries, including photography and film-making, surveying and mapping, search and rescue, safety inspection, and agriculture. Many of these drones are larger, bespoke – and more expensive – to cope with specialist payloads and specific operating conditions.
10. As a general rule, the greater the payload, the larger the drone, and the higher the price. Several hundred pounds will purchase a drone with a payload of several hundred grams.
11. Many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drones can be modified or upgraded to improve their performance or carry certain payloads, while some users will build their system from scratch, bringing together the necessary components to meet their chosen needs.
12. Drones offer an alternative way to conduct established types of attack, but not necessarily a more effective one. For example, a drone-borne improvised explosive device (IED) could be advantageous where specific types of physical security measure such as fences or entry controls need to be overcome, but less so where a target is easily accessible. Even then, in addition to overcoming payload limitations and the accessibility of the technology that facilitates its carriage and release, an adversary must also overcome the constraints on making or procuring the explosive or hazardous material in the first place.
13.                                   We focus on reducing the availability of hazardous substances which present the most significant risk – including Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive (CBRE) materials. We work to control these substances in a number of ways including by regulating, raising awareness and working alongside businesses to be more vigilant and recognise suspicious activity.
14.                                   These restrictions on access to substances also mean that it has become harder and harder to obtain or produce the most efficient explosives, which would allow for a smaller payload and a cheaper drone. While it is still possible to create a crude, less effective home-made explosive, a significant quantity would be required to have a reasonable impact. This in turn will impact the size and therefore cost of the drone needed, creating further barriers to success.

Is the threat posed by drones increasing, and are they a unique threat requiring bespoke countermeasures?

15. The rapid and continuing expansion of the use of drones in public and private life shows no sign of slowing. Conclusive figures for the number of drones in the UK are not available. However, it was estimated that 530,000 drones were purchased in the UK in 2014[1].
16. At the same time, awareness of their capabilities as a vector for unlawful and malicious activity is likely to become more and more apparent. Their increasing availability and use will lead to normalisation in the public conscience. A diversifying range of applications – particularly in the commercial sphere – will serve to overtly demonstrate their advancing capabilities. Improvements to drone technologies at the upper end of the market will filter down over time to cheaper drones, making previously out-of-reach capabilities far more accessible. Meanwhile, more incidents such as those seen at Gatwick, and the type of attacks reported in Abu Dhabi and Venezuela, will further focus attention on the potential for nefarious use.
17. Drones also sit within a much wider sector that includes autonomous vehicles (i.e. self-driving cars) and other unmanned systems (e.g. watercraft), which present many similar opportunities, challenges, and risks.
18. Some of the countermeasures required to mitigate malicious and illegal drone activity are bespoke, such as geofences, detect, track and identify (DTI) equipment, and effector equipment. However, these systems need to be components of a wider, comprehensive suite of interventions that include generalised, threat-agnostic measures, such as physical security, surveillance, or personnel deployments.
19. Many of these bespoke measures are also clustered around at-risk sites and are only effective once the drone has taken off, but emphasis on this style of ‘goal-line defence’ means that earlier opportunities to deter, detect or disrupt hostile drone activity are neglected. There are interventions across the national security portfolios that contribute to a whole-system counter-drone approach, including those set out within CONTEST and the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. These range from preventing individuals becoming radicalised in the first place, to general law enforcement response and recovery processes. Wider aviation and airspace safety interventions also have a role to play.

Countermeasures

Are adequate countermeasures in place to detect, track and identify drones?

What are the limitations on the deployment and use of countermeasures, and how should these be addressed?

What role does Government have in supporting the development of countermeasures, and ensuring they are deployed to protect all potential targets?

20. Overseas defence and UK domestic counter-drone approaches are similar in many respects. They both adopt a multi-layered approach to try and disrupt hostile drone activity at the earliest opportunity, ideally before the drone has taken off. However, the main difference between to two approaches hinges on the risk appetite for collateral impact in each environment. Some of the interventions that might be proportionate for overseas force protection – such as jamming GPS or using firearms to interdict a drone – would not be as appropriate within the UK operating environment.
21. In both environments, DTI equipment is more important than effector equipment. Early and accurate warning of a drone incursion through the use of DTI equipment enables the initiation of a range of responses to achieve a successful outcome (e.g. sending security personnel to apprehend the operator, or relocating possible targets). The use of effector equipment is just one of these possible responses.
22. The DTI market and the technology it produces is more mature than that for effectors. Many of the DTI systems available use a combination of methods as part of their operation to maximise their effectiveness. These can include radar, electro-optical, acoustic or radio frequency (RF) detection.
23. Different sectors and sites have different operating needs based on a number of factors, such as where they are located (e.g. urban/rural), their size, and how permanent they are. Airports might also require DTI for safety in addition to security purposes. Each site will therefore require varying combinations and distributions of DTI equipment to ensure adequate coverage and assurance.
24. The central pillar of a combination DTI system is usually either a radar or an RF detector, augmented by one or more other sensors. RF systems detect control signals between the drone and the operator and compare them against a library of known signals to identify the drone. Keeping these libraries up-to-date given the rapid entry of new drones into the market is difficult, and the resulting gaps in RF detector capabilities mean that while they are adequate for safety purposes, they do not provide sufficient coverage for security purposes. Radars on the other hand are manufacturer and system-agnostic, and are consequently the preferred central DTI pillar for security applications.
25. However, the overall immaturity of the DTI market means that initial characterisations of even the very best manufacturer-agnostic systems suggest that they fall short of our aspirations around detection ability. Our DTI testing and evaluation programme has been expedited and for the first time we have shared our specific requirements with industry to allow them to focus their efforts on delivering the capabilities we need.
26. Once a drone has been detected, there are a number of ways to disrupt it or to mitigate its presence. General interventions could include arresting the perpetrator or using an effector system. Site-specific measures could include an airport altering flight operations, or the recovery and confiscation of contraband dropped into a prison.
27. Available effector systems fall into one of three broad categories. Property interference uses kinetic methods (guns; nets), but is limited in range and accuracy. Equipment interference involves hacking the drone to take command of it, but is highly specific and requires detailed knowledge of the target drone’s operating systems. Wireless interference involves jamming or spoofing, but has wide collateral impacts.
28. The actual result of all three interference techniques on the drone can be hard to predict. The wide variety of drones on the market mean that effector systems are likely to have only been tested against a small proportion of them, so we cannot be confident of their effectiveness against all drones. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that many drones can be programmed by the user to undertake certain actions in the event of interference or a loss of a control signal. This could include proceeding to a specific GPS destination (which could be the target), or immediately dropping its payload.
29. These challenges are only likely to intensify in the future. As drones become more autonomous, encrypt their control architecture, and switch it to the 5G network, opportunities for equipment or wireless interference will diminish. Advances in drone interoperability to allow swarms and flocks will mean that counter-drone systems will have to deal with multiple targets simultaneously.
30. We have prioritised the testing and evaluation of DTI systems over effector systems. We feel that this prioritisation is right at this stage given existing resource constraints, the relative immaturity of effector technologies, and the fact that effectors are a singular response, as opposed to DTI, which is an enabler for a range of responses.
31. Effector testing and evaluation will require an understanding of the collateral implications to a far greater extent than our testing of DTI will. ‘Collateral’ in this context includes not just collateral damage, but also the collateral intrusion from equipment and wireless interference that may infringe on the privacy of citizens and their daily lives.
32. These risks mean that in practice the domestic deployment and use of counter-drone effectors will be limited, with the police having the primary role in providing a UK-wide response capability. Designated personnel at certain sites will also have the ability to use effector equipment.
33. The mechanisms by which the police and third parties can be authorised to use intrusive counter-drone effector technologies are subject to a high level of scrutiny under the Police Act 1997 and the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. We are concerned however that these processes could eventually prove to be overly burdensome as we will need to increasingly employ them in the future, so are looking at how they could be improved.
34. We are continuing to investigate other counter-drone interventions to broaden our approach and ensure a whole-system response to the challenges we face. At the same time we must preserve the freedoms to engage in lawful and responsible drone use, and promote the prosperity benefits that derive from that use.

Are plans for the registration of civilian drones in the UK from November 2019 an effective countermeasure to the terrorist threat, or could they be improved?

35. The registration of civilian operators for drones of weight 250g and above will set in place the foundation for a future framework for drone regulation, creating a culture of accountability amongst drone users. As well as registering, remote pilots will also need to undertake a mandatory online test. Both registration and the test will promote sensible drone use, educate drone users on regulations and make it easier to identify a drone if there is a threat.

Wider issues

Are adequate systems and processes currently in place for the UK authorities to respond quickly and appropriately in an emergency arising from a drone attack?

36. Prior to Gatwick, police and airports had planned for how they would respond to negligent uses of drones near airports. The government has been working with industry for some time to test and evaluate counter-drone technology, but our understanding of equipment suitable for civil use lags behind Defence’s understanding of what could be used overseas. Airports had been investing in technology to detect and deter drones in their airspace, guided by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). The police also had access to a range of counter-drone equipment.
37. Gatwick was an inflection point and clearly demonstrated the extent to which economic disruption at a critical infrastructure site could constitute a national security risk.
38. Since then, the Home Office has been leading and co-ordinating work across government to review domestic counter-drone approaches and develop policy over how countermeasures can be best used to respond to malicious and illegal drone activity.
39. Part of this work involves understanding the full range of counter-drone systems that are entering the market, and testing and evaluating the most promising of these so that they can be incorporated effectively into wider counter-drone approaches.
40. We are also working to ensure that there is an adequate testing and licensing regime to evaluate and accredit counter drone technologies. A number of military and civilian sites are currently being considered for the testing of counter drone technology.
41. We are continuing to work closely with UK critical infrastructure, including airports, to determine how they can be best protected. New emergency protocols developed by the Home Office and Department for Transport will help our airports in particular recognise a potential copycat and respond quickly and effectively.
42. Clearer rules and new powers will make enforcement easier for the police and give them and other responders the ability to counter the range of challenges drones present. Following the disruption at Gatwick and Heathrow the government has extended – to 5 km – the area around airports and runways in which the flying of drones is prohibited. This builds on the government’s changes to the law last year, which made it illegal to fly a drone above 400 feet or within 1 km of an airport.
43. The government also recently announced a Drones Bill, which is currently being drafted and will be introduced later this year. It will include new powers for the police to require someone to land their drone, and to obtain a warrant to enter and search property and seize drones where it is believed an offence has been committed. As well as this, the police will be given the power to require someone to produce their drone registration and operator competency documents, which are themselves obligations that will come into force in November 2019. It will also include new stop and search powers for the police around aerodromes if they suspect a person has broken drone laws.

Is responding to the threat posed by the terrorist use of drones a military role, or rather a responsibility for domestic powers with occasional military aid to civil authorities?

44. We are clear that the domestic counter-drone response is a role for the civil powers. Terrorist incidents involving drones are the responsibility of Counter-Terrorism Policing.
45. We are extremely grateful however for the support and capabilities provided by the military during the Gatwick and Heathrow incidents, which were instrumental in ensuring that the disruption caused was not prolonged further.
46. While we consider drawing on defence capabilities through Military Aid to the Civil Authorities a last resort, we view that support as necessary until we have sufficient confidence in our own civil counter-drone capabilities. The importance of resolving drone incidents swiftly and effectively was clearly highlighted by the events at Gatwick. We would therefore expect to continue to request the deployment of Defence capabilities alongside our police for planned high profile public events where we deem drones to be a particular threat.
47. The Defence Warning and Reporting Flight (DWaRF), formed prior to the Olympics in 2012, is manned by counter-drone experts from the RAF Regiment.  Notwithstanding the unit’s primary role supporting research and development, the DWaRF is now held at high readiness to provide counter-drone capability to key Defence sites across the UK. Currently capable of DTI using radar and high-power cameras, the unit’s two systems will receive a series of enhancements.
48. Prior to the incident at Gatwick, the unit’s counter-drone capability had been deployed on pre-planned operations to support the security of a number of national iconic events (such as National Remembrance and the Royal Wedding), but was not formally declared at readiness to the Home Office. In light of the Gatwick incident, HMG recognised the wider utility of the DWaRF, and maintains the unit at readiness to also support police nationally (in extremis) through the Military Aid to the Civil Authorities process.
49. Our testing and evaluation programme and the development of an ‘approved catalogue’ of counter-drone systems will be a catalyst for stimulating the rapid advancement of capabilities for the domestic sector. Following the deployment of appropriate civil capabilities, we would anticipate requiring access to Defence counter-drone capabilities only in extremis.

What can the UK learn from other countries about countering the terrorist threat of drones?

50. Prior to Gatwick, we had been speaking to international allies about their counter-drone approaches for some time, in order to discuss common challenges, collaborate on science and technology, and share our respective thinking.
51. Since Gatwick, many of most like-minded allies including in Europe and more widely overseas have also sought understand how we were able to respond so robustly to the incident. The overwhelming perception is that none of our partners are confident that they could have responded more effectively or efficiently than we did.
52. Marshalling our collective resources and building consensus will be crucial to developing a truly enduring counter-drone capabilities. We intend to continue engagement with our closest partners, both bilaterally and multilaterally (e.g. EU, NATO, IATA). This will include working to understand threat and risk, share the burden of science and technology research, and harmonise international approaches and standards. Some of these things we can do independently, but with others the benefits will be significantly greater if we tackle them together.

10 May 2019