(DTD0001)

Written evidence submitted by ADS

 

 

ABOUT ADS

 

  1. ADS is the trade association advancing the UK’s Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space industries. ADS has over 1,000 member companies across all four sectors, with over 950 of these companies identified as Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs).

 

  1. The UK is a world leader in the supply of aerospace, defence, security and space products and services. From technology and exports, to apprenticeships and investment, our sectors are vital to the UK’s growth – generating £74bn a year for the UK economy, including £41bn in exports, and supporting around 1,000,000 jobs.

 

  1. ADS operates the Drone Platform and Counter-Drone (DPAC) Special Interest Group, which represents around 60 organisations who are engaged in all aspects of remotely operated and autonomous platforms operating across the land, sea and air environments, including build and operational technology, legislation, training, and countermeasures.

 

  1. ADS also operates the Special Interest Group CBRN-UK, the national supplier organisation representing UK industry’s CBRN capability to government, emergency responders, the military and Critical National Infrastructure operators. With around 50 members, CBRN-UK works to ensure that the UK’s CBRN industry can deliver the capabilities that the UK needs to reduce the likelihood of such an attack and, in the event of an attack, respond effectively and safely.

 

  1. Finally, ADS operates the Counter-IED UK Special Interest Group, which represents the UK’s Counter-IED supply chain, working closely with Her Majesty’s Government, British Army and security forces to deliver integrated solutions to enable partners to counter the threat of IEDs. 

 

How great is the risk of a drone attack in the UK, and what types of target are most vulnerable?

 

  1. Advancements in drone technology mean that drones are increasingly easy and cheap to buy on the open market. While the usual amateur drone can fit into the palm of the hand, there are now commercial drones available that are over 20kg in weight and can therefore carry more significant payloads. In Syria and Iraq ISIS has also successfully demonstrated that drones can be used to deliver explosives on the battlefield, which has provided a proof of concept for use in other theatres. The main targets could be major events, Critical National Infrastructure (such as power plants) and public institutions (such as Parliament). However, it is worth noting that there are significant technical challenges in using drones to deploy munitions, which pose increased risks to the operator. In any case, the drone itself can have a damaging effect, separate from any payload it carries, just like we recently saw at Gatwick. Finally, a wider range of the population have gained experience with drones, meaning there is a larger pool of potential operators.

How feasible are drone attacks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents?

  1. Spray systems and commercial drones fitted with them for agricultural purposes are available in the market. However, it is worth noting there are legal restrictions on carrying out aerial spraying of pesticides and other substances in the UK. It is also technically complex to disperse agents from a drone and there are simpler ways to disperse CBRN material, such as through the postal system. Regarding radiological and nuclear agents there is precedent in this area - in Japan a drone was used to land on the Prime Minister’s roof with samples from the Fukushima power plant and this was not detected for nearly a month. Finally, it is also conceivable that a drone could be used to release a harmless, but unknown, substance over a crowded area to cause panic.

Is the threat posed by drones increasing, and are they a unique threat requiring bespoke countermeasures?

  1. Drones uniquely offer the option of stand-off airborne delivery, with no immediate risk to the operator, although we have not yet seen the successful terrorist use of drones outside of the Middle East. Moreover, the drone threat has not yet outstripped the counter drone technologies available on the market. Any risk they pose should therefore be put in context alongside the many other threats and, despite the public interest in their use due to the Gatwick incident, the UK’s response should be tempered. It is worth noting that if a drone is captured there will be forensic evidence available, including digital information, to support subsequent investigations. Nonetheless, it would be proper for the Government and key stakeholders in the CNI to work together to develop and acquire effective countermeasures through a risk-based approach.

Are adequate countermeasures in place to detect, track and identify drones?

  1. There are effective detector systems available in the market to provide full Detect, Track and Identify (DTI) capabilities against most commercial drones, including radar, electro-optical camera systems and Radio Frequency (RF) detector and direction-finding systems. Their usage is not yet widespread, but we are seeing deployment of them at more airports now after the Gatwick incident. It is worth noting that DTI systems, in and of themselves, can act as an effective deterrent if they increase the chances of operator arrest and prosecution, but without integrated Deter/Destroy capabilities they cannot directly impede an attack.

 

  1. There are CBRN stand-off detection systems available on the marketplace, but the much-needed integration of counter-drone DTI capabilities with CBRN detection capabilities is still ongoing. This will be a necessary part of the response to the potential threat from drones with a CBRN payload.

 

What are the limitations on the deployment and use of countermeasures, and how should these be addressed?

  1. There are legal issues hindering the deployment of effector drone countermeasures within the UK. It is currently illegal to interfere with a flying aircraft in the UK, as per the Air Navigation Order 2016, and drones are counted as such. Also, it is illegal to jam commercial RF bands and GPS under the Wireless Telegraphy Act. There are also legal restrictions on interception systems that may be considered a form of wiretapping. It may be worth considering whether within restricted airspace there could be a more permissive legal framework for deploying counter-drone technologies.

 

  1. Individual counter-drone technologies cannot respond to every kind of malicious, or inadvertent, drone threat. For instance, while one system may be able to effectively deal with a single drone intrusion, it may struggle to deal with a swarm of drones. In other cases, they may be inappropriate for use in built-up areas, because of concerns about the impact on third parties. Whether they are passive, reactive or active-counter systems, the deployment of counter-drone technologies shouldn’t be done on a generic basis, as the risks arising from drones and the effectiveness of a response will vary in each case. Indeed, in some circumstances it may not be worthwhile for cost reasons to deploy counter-drone technologies, if the drone intrusion poses no threat to life and limited battery life means it may only last a short while (although reliably identifying this at range could be challenging). ADS therefore recommends a risk-based approach that determines the appropriate measures, including response procedures, to be used in each case.

 

  1. Given the rapidly evolving nature of the sector (both the drone threat and the counter-drone response), buyers should adopt a ‘evergreening’ technology strategy that ensures that procurement of counter-technologies does not over-commit to responses with a short shelf life, but instead prioritises flexible and adaptive solutions.

 

  1. Effective counter-drone systems should provide a layered defence, with detector and effector systems integrated to provide a complete response (Detect, Track, Identify, and if necessary, Deter, Capture or Destroy). Integrated responses can also then minimise the risk of collateral damage in the surrounding area, for instance to stop a drone falling on people and property nearby using a combined jammer and net launcher with an in-built parachute.  Whilst mitigating threat to life is paramount, preservation of electronic storage in the drone should also be a primary objective in order that digital evidence can be exploited from the captured drone.

 

What role does Government have in supporting the development of countermeasures, and ensuring they are deployed to protect all potential targets?

  1. Through CPNI, the UK Government’s technical authority for physical security, as well as other agencies, the Government has a major role in setting standards and validating the effectiveness of countermeasures (please refer to point 9). As part of this, the UK Government’s Centre for the Protection of the National Infrastructure (CPNI) has been carrying out an assessment programme to provide CNI operators with an informed view of the effectiveness of these DTI systems. This will then encourage the private sector to acquire appropriate countermeasures. The Government should also be working directly at key sites, both with the CNI and wider private sector, to ensure there are countermeasures in place.

 

  1. There are questions within industry about the role of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), which in 2018 absorbed the former staff of the Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST). CAST was previously the primary delivery organisation for the Home Office’s science and technology requirements, and as part of its work it used to undertake validation work, including for counter-drone technologies. It is important that DSTL engages with industry on the security aspects of counter-drone technologies, not solely focus on the military aspects of counter-drone technologies. It should also consider how to exploit the synergies of the two sectors.

 

 

Are plans for the registration of civilian drones in the UK from November 2019 an effective countermeasure to the terrorist threat, or could they be improved?

  1. ADS strongly supports the plans for the registration of civilian drones in the UK, and furthermore supported the government ’s proposals for a Flight Information and Notification System (FINS), which was regrettably withdrawn in the government’s response to the Future of Drones consultation in January 2019. While none of this can prevent a determined operator from circumventing such controls, these steps will help mitigate inadvertent risks. This should also be supported by the appropriate use of geofencing and a focus on education, as per the Dronecode campaign.

 

Are adequate systems and processes currently in place for the UK authorities to respond quickly and appropriately in an emergency arising from a drone attack?

  1. The challenge is that legal powers to use jamming technology are currently only held by the police, military and intelligence agencies, and only in limited circumstances (generally, a direct threat to life). This means that while there are a range of counter-drone technologies that can effectively mitigate the risk of drones, these systems can often only be used if there is a law enforcement presence nearby and ready to respond, causing potentially life-threatening delays in certain circumstances. Speed is central to an effective national response and the Police must be able to deploy Deter/Capture/Destroy capabilities rapidly, if they continue to retain the primary legal power to deploy them. This needs to be supported by significant cross-agency cooperation, given that the timescales for response may be very limited.

 

Is responding to the threat posed by the terrorist use of drones a military role, or rather a responsibility for domestic powers with occasional military aid to civil authorities?

  1. This should remain a responsibility primarily for law enforcement, under Counter Terrorism Policing, but the military should stand ready to provide advanced capabilities as it did at Gatwick before Christmas.

 

What can the UK learn from other countries about countering the terrorist threat of drones?

  1. In many other countries the legislative environment takes a more permissive approach to the deployment of counter-drone technologies. While it is vitally important that the UK’s high privacy standards, environmental standards and restrictions on the use of force by the State are not undermined, the government should foster two-way dialogue with industry to develop defeat mechanisms that are politically acceptable.

 

13 May 2019