(DTD0008)

Written evidence submitted by Airport Operators Association

Introduction

1. Founded in 1934, the Airport Operators Association (AOA) is the trade association representing the interests of UK airports, and the principal such body engaging with the UK Government and regulatory authorities on airport matters. The AOA’s members include over 50 airports and 160 Associate Members, made up of companies representing a wide range of suppliers in the aviation industry.

2. The AOA is a partner in ‘Our Future Skies’, an industry campaign group making the strategic case for airspace modernisation. The management of both the upper and lower portions of the UK’s airspace is of critical importance and concern for UK airports, including the integration of new technologies such as drones into that airspace.

3. The AOA welcomes the opportunity to respond to the Defence Committee’s inquiry on drones. The AOA’s position and evidence are set out in the paragraphs below.

Background

4. The AOA and its member airports accept that the prevention of further incidents, such as those witnessed in December 2018 and January 2019 at Heathrow and Gatwick, is the responsibility of all stakeholders in the aviation policy sphere: including airports, government, regulators, airlines, drone manufacturers and law enforcement. Aviation is a ‘safety-first’ industry which prides itself on an impeccable record, however, in order to continue this, the industry requires the correct legal framework in which to operate.

5. The AOA supports the need for further legislation pre-empting and controlling the future proliferation of small unmanned aerial vehicles. The airspace around airports and across the country is set to become increasingly occupied by a variety of vehicle types; ensuring all of these vehicles can operate in a safe, secure and efficient manner must be a priority.

6. The AOA also supports the need for airspace modernisation. Airspace is a key part of the UK’s national infrastructure and there is an urgent need to modernise airspace across the whole of the UK to handle the forecast levels of traffic without significant delays. Modernised airspace will enable us to further improve the capacity of the UK to adapt to the increasing numbers of vehicles in the air, from current drone usage to the prospective medium-term innovations in urban air mobility. Larger UK airports are committed to educating stakeholders on the need for airspace modernisation and engaging with local communities and stakeholders to find innovative solutions to manage traffic around aerodromes and reduce the impact of aviation.

6.1     Modernised Airspace should be accompanied by the implementation of revised rules of the air. These would identify separation standards that should be applied between manned and unmanned vehicles in different categories of airspace.

6.2     Ideally, airspace modernisation will be complemented by the development of an unmanned traffic management (UTM) system. There are already a number of nascent attempts to prove and introduce UTM technology at UK airports and key overflown conurbations. These include Operation Zenith[1], a partnership between NATS, Altitude Angel and Manchester Airports Group. A sophisticated national UTM will, in time, be as essential to national infrastructure as en-route air traffic control.

The Risk of Drones

7. Given the prevalence of the civilian use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the United Kingdom, the availability and affordability of drone technology, and the relative immaturity of counter-drone solutions currently availability, the AOA would assess the risk of the misuse of drones to be high. Beyond this, the AOA will leave it to better informed Government stakeholders to inform the committee on the feasibility of drone attacks and the unique threat presented by drones.

Current Regulation & Government Proposals

8. The recently introduced restriction zone coincident with the Aerodrome Traffic Zone (ATZ) around a protected aerodrome, with a 5km extension out from the runway edges, is a welcome change to the original 1km zone established by the Government.  

8.1     Maps of agreed restriction zones should be available online on easily accessible websites for drone users to consult. These maps will usually be made available on airport websites and should be collated by the DfT and CAA. While the UK Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) may be the natural place for these maps to be available online, there is uncertainty in the industry whether non-commercial drone operators will frequently consult this service. The NATS Drone Safe website is an easy-to-use alternative source of relevant restriction zones for drone users. This is complemented by the NATS Drone Assist mobile application.

8.1.1. Any website or application used must remain up-to-date and show accurate data about Flight Restriction Zones (FRZ) around airports and other sensitive sites. Aeronautical Data Quality should be taken into account before any provider publishes information publically.

9. Despite the amendments to the Air Navigation Order 2016 (ANO) in 2018 and 2019, airports often find that the enforcement of legislation is difficult. The speed of response, or diligent follow-up investigations, are particularly important to deterring future incidents and combating illegal activity. 

9.1     The AOA welcomes the Government proposal to give the police further powers to confiscate and investigate suspicious drone activity. The AOA continues to believe that enforcement authorities should be given all necessary powers to assist them in tackling the safety and security concerns related to drone usage around airports. Furthermore, there should be clear protocols in place that give a mandate to airport police to operate drone disruption technology when there is a critical incursion of an airport’s airspace.

9.1.1. Future protocols and crisis management processes need to take account of several layers of accountability and responsibility: firstly the defence of the air, delegated to the Royal Air Force; secondly the safety of the air, usually delegated to a local airport Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) or the en-route provider; thirdly the security of the airport, managed by airport operators with support from the local police.

9.2     These powers should also be clearly communicated to police forces across the country, with education between forces encouraged, to improve their understanding of the options available to even the most remote aerodromes during an incident.

10. The AOA believes that a compulsory registration regime for drone operators and drones, due to be effective from November 2019, is an effective measure which increases safety and educates the public on the dangers of using drones. This data should be accessible by an appointed body and for crime prevention, detection and investigation purposes.

10.1 While, of course, a compulsory registration of drone operators, in and of itself, is not an effective deterrent to a terrorist actor with malintent, it would form one element of a regime to identify authentic, legal drone usage more swiftly. This identification would help to discount scenarios as accidental and leave law enforcement resources more free to address scenarios of serious concern or questionable intent.

11. The AOA agrees with the Government’s response to its Drones consultation[2], in which it states that a legal framework for the testing and evaluation of counter-drone technology in a civilian context must be a priority. The faster this framework can be established, and technology tested against it, the better for the safety and security of all critically important national infrastructure sites. If airports are to be required to invest in counter-drone equipment, then they should be able to have confidence in the effectiveness of those solutions.

11.1 Once a Government-backed framework for the acquisition of counter-drone technology is in place, this should be updated on a rolling-basis as drone technology advances. The AOA believes that the Civil Aviation Authority should play a central role in the future of the advice and recommendations given to airports. The regulator should recommend trusted suppliers or develop a licensed supplier regime for counter-drone equipment to ensure that airports are investing in the most appropriate technology.

11.2 The AOA is very much aware of the costs of some of the counter-drone technological solutions present in the market. While it is the prerogative of any airport to invest in the security and safety equipment, they believe to be necessary, the AOA is wary of any regulation which would explicitly demand or require the use of specific counter-drone technology at all UK airports.

11.2.1.   Costs incurred by airports in mitigating against the disruption possible through the use of drones should be proportional to the risk those airports are exposed to. While larger airports may choose to invest in technological solutions to make certain this disruption is limited, this burden should not necessarily be extended throughout the UK airports system.

11.2.2.   Many UK airports have taken other steps to prevent and mitigate potential disruption or incursions by drones in their ATZs. Airports have established drone hotline numbers through which sightings can be reported to the airport authority and many have setup community watch groups amongst willing residents. Beyond this, taking lessons from Her Majesty’s Prison Service, airports conduct patrols on their perimeter and identify common or likely launch sites for drones within a discernible distance of the aerodrome. While airports will usually have a larger perimeter than prisons, measures such as this combined with public education will likely prevent the great majority of accidental drone misuse cases.

11.3 The AOA is not necessarily in an informed enough position to present an opinion on the worthiness or applicability of the current counter-drone technology market; other respondents will likely be able to speak to this better. However, as far as we understand, the great majority of this technology was developed in a military context, for use in operations in radically different environments to a civilian aerodrome. Adapting the technology to work seamlessly in an airport environment is just one reason that there is no “silver bullet” to the drone disruption issue. Rather, any permanent solution needs to be multi-layered, easily integrated with existing ANSP operations, and combine community outreach and education with increased security and technological approaches.

11.4 The Air Traffic Control (ATC) environment may not be the correct place for counter-drone detection and disruption technology to be based. Airports may decide that security or control centres away from the ATC are the best place to integrate counter-drone technology into airport operations. Those supervising such technology should also be given the correct level of training in order to make informed decisions on the nature of the threat detected.

12. Counter-drone technology shows great promise, however the legal ambiguities surrounding its use still cause serious concern for UK airports. The issues of operator liability, insurance, operating parameters, decision triggers and decision-making responsibility are present throughout these legal ambiguities. Investment in technology alone will not allow UK airports to robustly respond to the malicious use of drones in their restriction zones. The legal framework for the use of counter-drone technology is in urgent need of clarification. The use of drones and counter-drone technology could, conceivably, be covered by numerous layers of interlocking present legislation, regulation and international treaty, some of these are outlined in Annex A.

Future Regulation

13. The AOA continues to call for the introduction of mandatory geo-fencing to reduce the likelihood of accidental incursions into an airports ATZ. Geo-fencing consists of software built-in to drones with GPS capability to prevent them from flying near certain pre-programmed geographical areas. This software can be updated as needs be and can provide a certain level of protection to durable national infrastructure from the accidental misuse of drones. While, as previously stated, there is no “silver bullet” in countering the misuse of drones, geo-fencing would drastically reduce the number of unintended incursions in an airports ATZ and allow airport operators and law enforcement to divert more attention to those incursions which are intended and more malicious in nature.

14. Alongside geo-fencing, the AOA believes that a single Flight Information and Notification System (FINS), providing a ‘one-stop shop’ for drone operators would help to increase safety across the country, not just around airports and other critical sites. Such a system could be operated by NATS.

14.1 At present if an unpermitted/notified drone is spotted then there is no means of communicating with the operator. Subsequently, in the worst case, airspace may be closed to protect aircraft safety leading to significant operational disruption. If there was an opportunity for aerodromes, ATC or the police to have access to the FINS system then this provides a means of two-way communication with drone operators should there be a safety concern.

15. The AOA has a number of concerns with the process of giving permission for drone operators to use their vehicles within the restriction zones. In the absence of a mandatory FINS or a nationally responsible body for processing applications to operate within restricted areas, airports may be required to shoulder this burden. Airports should not, in ordinary circumstances, be expected to field requests for permission to fly drones within the FRZ. Furthermore, in busy urban environments such as Greater London, where civil and military airports and heliports may have overlapping FRZs, there is no clear single process that covers all suitably.

15.1 The AOA would emphasise that airport businesses should not have to bear the costs for policing and enforcing a system of permission applications for private/third-party drone operators. Currently already, airports are contributing to the regulatory cost of a nascent industry through airports’ funding of relevant Civil Aviation Authority responsibilities. While some of this is funded direct by Government, other costs are spread across the wider aviation industry. This undermines the CAA’s usual “user pays” principle, where airports are charged for airport-related costs, airlines for airline-related costs, etc. This is already a sub-optimal situation and should not be further exacerbated.

15.1.1.   If this task was delegated to airports: in the case of airports in significantly built-up areas, it could mean the business having to process numerous requests, for private drone operators to use their vehicles at low height, away from final approach paths, on their own private property.

15.1.2.   It is unlikely that smaller aerodromes would be able to adequately resource a permission or approval process for drone operations within their restriction zones. The consequence could be that drone operators decide to subvert an under-resourced process and operate illegally.

15.1.2.1.          One of our smaller airport members recently trialled drone detection equipment, with it monitoring the perimeter and the FRZ. In a one-month period they identified 400 individual drone incursions. Were the airport authority required to process approvals for just half of this activity, it would have created a significant administrative burden.

15.2 Should the process be left in the hands of individual aerodromes, many members of the AOA would have additional concerns around liability. From a safety and security perspective, airports would prefer to have zero non-airport related drone activity within their FRZ and close to their final approaches.

16. Given that some sort of permissions process/UTM/drone registration is likely to be implemented, a robust communications effort should be undertaken in parallel in order to alert drone users how they can register or receive permission and under what circumstances they should do so.

16.1 It will be important to outline to all users of a FINS system whether providing notification of an operation will have any impact on other air traffic within the airspace. Some airports have found that drone users believe that simply by notifying an aerodrome of their activity means that all air traffic will avoid their area of operation.

17. Future regulation will need to clearly consider all of the growth options that are reasonably foreseeable in the future. This includes overcoming certain challenges, particularly: how will emerging innovations such as spaceflights and urban air mobility be incorporated into any further Government response? The Government needs to set out how their interests will be incorporated and managed. Many of these innovations are being pioneered by small, start-up companies which don’t necessarily have the capacity play a full and meaningful role in the design of a new national UTM and wider airspace settlement.

18. The DfT should ensure that any legislative proposals on drones should be aware of, and developed with reference to, the CAA’s Airspace Modernisation Strategy[3] and the wider progress of airspace modernisation efforts in the UK.

Lessons from other countries

19. While the United States and Ireland have drone registration schemes similar to the regime which is due to be introduced in the United Kingdom, Singapore[4] is the jurisdiction often cited to the AOA as an exemplar of a well-designed counter-drone enforcement and policing regime. Should the committee be seeking best-practice from third countries, it is suggested that they start their efforts there.

10 May 2019

Annex A: Legislative & Regulatory implications of Drone & Counter-Drone Technology use

        The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention): Article 8 and Article 12 put obligations on contracting States to ensure the airspace is safe, if that State permits the flight of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or drones).

        The Air Navigation Order 2016: Article 240 and 241 refer to the reckless or negligent endangerment of an aircraft, or endangerment of a person by an aircraft. These articles are, however, inapplicable to small unmanned aircraft below 20kg.

• This point could be negated by Article 249 of the ANO which states that the rules of the air can be breached for the avoidance of immediate danger.

        The Criminal Damage Act 1971: Sections 1 could be relevant in a case where counter-drone technology was used to disable or destroy a drone and hence cause property damage to the drone user.

• Section 5 of the Act could form justification for the property damage if the property or the property of another (e.g. an aircraft approaching a runway) was in immediate need of protection.

        The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000: Sections 1 and 2 concern the interception of communications and the requirement to have a warrant to do so.

        The Investigatory Powers Act 2016: Builds on the offence established in RIPA by including communications stored in or by the telecommunications system before transmission.

        The Computer Misuse Act 1990: Holds a person liable for impairing the operation of any computer or committing any unauthorised act in relation to a computer. The definition of computer being loose, one could make the argument that many advanced UAVs are computers, especially when considered in conjunction with their control system.