Written evidence from Yousuf Al-Shehhi (AFP0025)

Overview

This submission has been prepared by Yousuf Al-Shehhi, a member of the minority Shuhuh tribe from the Musandam region of Oman.

Mr Al-Shehhi is currently seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom following the arbitrary arrest and life imprisonment of six of his family members and fellow tribesmen in Oman, in a trial that Amnesty International has described as “grossly unfair” and motivated by discrimination against the Shuhuh tribe.

The charges against Mr Al-Shehhi’s family related to their online browsing habits with regards to Shuhuh culture and their communication with outside human rights organisations, with convictions based on confessions extracted through torture.

Oman as an autocratic monarchy

Oman is an absolute monarchy in the medieval sense of the term. All power is vested in the hereditary Sultan, Qaboos bin Said al Said.

The Sultan serves as both head of state and head of government, as well as commander of the armed forces, prime minister, and as minister for defence, foreign affairs, finance, and chair of the central bank. The Sultan rules through a closed circle of advisors and family members, several of whom also hold ministerial positions. Appointment to public bodies is at the sole prerogative of the Sultan.

Although there is a bicameral representative body, it is purely advisory. The upper chamber is entirely appointed by the Sultan, whereas the elected lower chamber can only suggest changes to new laws. Political parties are banned and organised political protest is ruthlessly suppressed. A 2014 law allows for the revocation of citizenship for anyone who joins an organisation deemed “harmful to national interests”. All public gatherings require official approval.

There is no freedom of expression in Oman. Any criticism of the Sultan is prohibited. The authorities monitor private telecommunications and internet use; anyone who expresses dissent is liable to be arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned.

While private media outlets exist, they take instructions from the state, practice self-censorship and face punishment for reporting in the wrong way. The Government of Oman has the authority to close media outlets, block websites and revoke broadcasting licenses for content violations. Newspapers which report on corruption or abuses of power have been shut down and their journalists imprisoned, often on spurious and opaque public order grounds.

Although arbitrary arrest is formally prohibited, in practice it is widespread. Defendants in politically sensitive cases can face harsh treatment in pre-trial detention, long periods being held incommunicado with no legal representation, and lengthy, punitive sentences following unfair trials for crimes of speech of conscious. In numerous cases, judges will refuse to call defence witnesses or allow the defendants’ legal team to be present. Prisons are not open to inspection by human rights organisations, with former inmates reporting a culture of beatings and other abuse.

In recent years there have been a number of high profile prosecutions of human rights activists and minority groups in Oman. In 2016 Abdullah Habib, a popular writer and human rights activists was sentenced to three years in prison for a series of Facebook posts on political and human rights issues. The following year, writer and researcher Mansour bin Nasser al-Mahrazi was sentenced to three years in prison for publishing two books that identified official corruption and other abuses.

Discrimination and persecution of minority groups in Oman

Human rights abuses are not restricted to those caught up in political cases. Omani society is largely tribal. Although the majority of Oman’s population follows the Ibadi school of Islam, there is significant discrimination against its minority tribes, particularly the Shuhuh tribe which makes up the bulk of the population in the Musandam enclave in the north of the country.

The Shuhuh have their own tribal dialect of Arabic and are culturally distinct from the rest of Oman, with a separate way of dress, folklore and culture, with a unique economy based on seasonal agriculture.

Since Oman acquired the Musandam enclave in 1971, it has waged a systemic campaign of discrimination and persecution against the Shuhuh tribe designed to eradicate traces of their culture by forcing them out the region or banning certain practices. Shuhuh tribe members are frequently detained and imprisoned for using Google and Twitter to search for or discuss the history of Musandam. Mass arbitrary arrests are common. In 2016 a local folk music group was detained for performing traditional Shuhuh songs.

Today, what was once over 100 inhabited Shuhuh towns is now under 20 due to Oman’s actions to force Shuhuh people from their homes and encourage them to emigrate. Those who return are often prevented from entering their homes, or have had their land sold to Iran for military installations. Shuhuh cultural artefacts, monuments and buildings are routinely destroyed by the Omani authorities. The Shuhuh have no representation in the national government or the regional government of Musandam.

What does this mean for the United Kingdom?

Oman is described by the Government as a “longstanding British ally… with shared interests across diplomatic, economic and security matters.”

The country has long been an important partner for the UK, with a strong relationship going back 250 years. In recent times this relationship has been cemented by the role that the British Government played in helping Qaboos bin Said al Said come to power in the 1970 coup.

The UK provides significant economic aid to Oman, and there is a major British military and intelligence presence the country, which plays a crucial role in safeguarding the passage of international shipping and the 30% of globally bound oil which passes through the Strait of Hormuz every day. Oman is a major procurer of British defence exports.

In February 2018 Foreign Secretary Gavin Williamson signed a new Joint Defence Agreement with Oman, which will see the creation of a new joint military training facility and Britain’s continued use of the strategically important logistics support base and port in Duqm, in Central Oman. This will house a permanent British naval presence and two Royal Navy aircraft carriers, with an airport and runway large and connected to the region through the Gulf Rail Project.

Underpinning the close security, intelligence and economic relationship between the two countries is the perceived stability that Oman brings to the Middle East. However, Oman’s stability is not guaranteed, and there are real risks that the social tensions caused by the repressive nature of the regime could see the country fracture.

The policy of “Omanisation”, of using repressive and abusive practices against minority peoples and seeking to eradicate regional and tribal identities, in particular has created a groundswell of discontent in many areas. This is not limited to the Musandam region, where the Shuhuh people are subjected to ill treatment, but other areas of the country such as Dhofar in the south of Oman, where separatist sentiment has previously been popular. Serious thought must be given to the wisdom of the UK’s major investment in a regime whose sustainability is enforced through repression and arbitrary arrests, and whose long-term viability after the Sultan passes is uncertain.

Despite the UK’s global leadership role on human rights, the Government has been reluctant to acknowledge abuses committed by the Omani authorities or to make representations on this subject. Indeed, the opposite has been the case, with establishment figures lavishing praise on the Sultan. In 2014, Foreign Office Minister Baroness Warsi praised the Sultan’s “wise leadership”. In 2019 the Foreign Secretary confirmed in response to a Parliamentary Question that no representations had been made about the Shuhuh 6 case highlighted above. Earlier this year, Oman hosted a delegation of representatives from the House of Lords. Human rights concerns appear to have been absent from their discussion.

The unconditional support the Sultan receives from the British Government also exposes the UK to popular discontent as an “enabler” of a regime which commits significant abuses against its own people. In 2013, Khalfan al-Badwawi, an Omani human rights campaigner who was forced to flee the country after police harassment, stated that the role of British military and intelligence in propping up the Sultan’s dictatorship was “a major obstacle to human rights campaigners in Oman”.

The British Government’s unequivocal support for the Sultan undermines the UK’s global diplomatic leadership in standing up to abuses in other countries. It also undermines broader international action on human rights by exposing the Government to charges of hypocrisy in that those countries which enjoy good economic or military relations with the UK escape censure or representations about abuses committed against their citizens.

The Government has stated that “We’ll stand up for human rights by working with international bodies and priority countries, not just because it’s the right thing to do, but because a safer, more prosperous world is in the UK’s national interest.”

The UK is in a unique position to influence Oman’s treatment of its people and minority tribes for the better. It can and should use this goodwill to be a force for good in the region.

Recommendations

• The Government should assess the medium-term stability of the Oman regime, and the wisdom of significant economic and military investment in a country whose sustainability is uncertain.

• The Government should use its close relationship and goodwill with the Omani authorities to advocate more forcefully on human rights issues, particularly the persecution and arbitrary arrest of those from minority tribes. This will boost UK respect and prestige amongst the people of Oman after the Sultan has gone, and will promote stability in the country and wider region.

• The Government should demonstrate human rights leadership by making specific representations to the Omani authorities about the case of the Shuhuh 6.

• The UK’s diplomatic presence in the country should ensure it is appraised of the situation and strength of feeling amongst Oman’s persecuted minority tribes, particularly in the Musandam region.

April 2019

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