House of Commons

Transport Committee

Major transport infrastructure projects

Second Report of Session 2021–22

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 22 September 2021

HC 24
Published on 29 September 2021
by authority of the House of Commons

Transport Committee

The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

Huw Merriman MP *(Conservative, Bexhill and Battle)* (Chair)

Ben Bradshaw MP *(Labour, Exeter)*

Ruth Cadbury MP (*Labour, Brentford and Isleworth*)

Lilian Greenwood MP (*Labour, Nottingham South*)

Simon Jupp MP *(Conservative, East Devon)*

Robert Largan MP *(Conservative, High Peak)*

Chris Loder MP *(Conservative, West Dorset)*

Karl McCartney MP *(Conservative, Lincoln)*

Grahame Morris MP (*Labour, Easington*)

Gavin Newlands MP *(Scottish National Party, Paisley and Renfrewshire North)*

Greg Smith MP *(Conservative, Buckingham)*

Powers

The committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

Committee reports are published on the Committee's website at www.parliament.uk/transcom and in print by Order of the House.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Nick Beech (Committee Clerk), Estelle Currie (Senior Media Officer), Rosalind KennyBirch (Committee Specialist), Lewis Pickett (Committee Specialist), Wafia Zia (Second Clerk), Damith Rajakaruna (Committee Operations Manager) and Mandy Sullivan (Committee Operations Officer)

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 3266; the Committee's email address is transcom@parliament.uk.

You can follow the Committee on Twitter using @CommonsTrans

Contents

Summary

The Government published the National Infrastructure Strategy in November 2020. Since the strategy's publication, the coronavirus pandemic has continued to affect travel usage patterns in the UK. The Government has not yet assessed whether the strategy will meet the needs of a post-pandemic society, accounting for the evolution of the virus over the past 10 months.

Government policy assumes that infrastructure investment can reduce regional inequalities within the UK. However, the "levelling up" concept is not supported by detailed metrics or a clear definition. Furthermore, the concept is undefined in the specific field of major transport infrastructure projects. If "levelling up" amounts to more than rhetoric, then it requires definition and metrics to identify what success looks like.

Projects that best support connectivity, growth and productivity are the ones that the Government should approve and prioritise. To ensure such projects are selected, the Government must utilise accurate analytical tools such as benefit-cost ratios. However, benefit-cost ratios do not always adequately account for regional inequalities and environmental and social factors. A benefit-cost plus system should be introduced to supplement benefit-cost ratios with geographic, environmental and social factors.

Many major transport infrastructure projects in the UK have exceeded cost and time estimates. Yet senior management of Government agencies tasked with delivering these projects are apparently unaccountable for those overruns. Incentives, for example, a formal duty to immediately notify the relevant Select Committee in cases where cost and time estimates are exceeded, may help to mitigate those issues.

Introduction

Inquiry

1. We launched our inquiry, 'Major transport infrastructure projects: appraisal and delivery', on 4 December 2020. The inquiry examined the Government's transport infrastructure strategy and priorities, including the appraisal and funding of major transport infrastructure projects, oversight, accountability and governance, and governmental capacity and workforce skills. We held three oral evidence sessions. We received 73 written evidence submissions from the public, private companies and other organisations. We are grateful to everyone who contributed to and engaged with our inquiry.

Barriers to effective project delivery

2. Successive Governments, comprised of all political parties, have launched large transport infrastructure projects before the true cost and delivery date being finalised by the agencies responsible for their construction. Delivering major transport infrastructure projects is challenging and complex. Major transport projects are vast undertakings with complex technical and operational elements. Effective delivery is contingent on their gaining and sustaining public and political support. They are often delivered to budgets and timescales set early in their lifecycle. Their delivery by the Government and its agencies is increasingly impeded by litigation (see paragraph 39). Despite those challenges, the public expect them to be delivered to pre-announced timescales and budgets. When overruns occur, politicians blame those who delivered the project, despite these delivery bodies not being responsible for setting budgets and timescales. Where such overruns are the responsibility of the delivery agency, there is little accountability or incentive for delivery to time and budget.

National Infrastructure Strategy

3. The Government has placed the construction of major transport infrastructure projects at the centre of its programme for government. It argued that infrastructure investment will support its top-level policy objectives of "levelling up" the country, reaching net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and "building back better" from the coronavirus pandemic. The Prime Minister's foreword to the National Infrastructure Strategy stated that the Government will build infrastructure to "redress long-standing inequalities, particularly in transport, between different parts of the UK" and "in the period covered by this strategy … significantly shift spending to the regions and nations of the UK".[1]

4. The National Infrastructure Strategy is the Government's plan for future infrastructure development.[2] It was published on 25 November 2020. It set out five priorities:

- recovery and rebuilding the economy;
- "levelling up" the whole of the UK;

1 HM Treasury, National Infrastructure Strategy, November 2020
2 Ibid.

- decarbonising the economy and adapting to climate change;
- supporting private investment; and
- accelerating and improving delivery of infrastructure projects.[3]

5. The strategy described a range of major transport projects aimed at supporting an "infrastructure revolution". Those projects included delivering HS2, investing some £27.5 billion in the strategic road network during the current Parliament and spending £500 million to restore railway lines lost to the Beeching cuts.[4] The Government developed the National Infrastructure Strategy to help the economy to recover from the coronavirus pandemic and "to address the long-term issues that have held back UK infrastructure".[5] Increased investment in infrastructure may spur increased economic activity by reducing costs in manufacturing industries, creating jobs and improving productivity.[6]

Coronavirus

6. On the effect of the coronavirus pandemic on transport usage, the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC), the authoritative independent advisory body on infrastructure development, cautioned that it is "too early to assume that long-term behaviour change will lead to wholly different patterns of infrastructure use". It stated that it is "far too early to draw conclusions about which behavioural trends may emerge in the long term as a result of the pandemic".[7] The Department for Transport stated that

> "it is not yet clear how individuals will respond once restrictions on travel and activities are fully lifted and whether the extent to which reductions in travel we have observed during the pandemic will persist in the medium to long-term … the uncertainty around how current trends will play out remains significant".[8]

Due to ongoing uncertainty caused by coronavirus, the NIC recommended that infrastructure policy should focus on "low regrets interventions" that address public need regardless of how particular patterns of travel change as a result of the pandemic.[9] Institution of Civil Engineers fellow Jonathan Spruce explained that as a result of the coronavirus pandemic, "priorities will change … it is how you might accelerate certain things, like active travel, to help achieve your net zero ambitions. Just because a strategy is set does not mean that the programme of delivery should be set".[10]

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. The 'Beeching Cuts' refer to the closure of approximately 8,000 kilometres of rail track and over 2,300 stations in the 1960s, following the publication of 'The Reshaping of British Railways', one of the two-part Beeching Reports.
5 Ibid.
6 Rafiu Dimeji Seidu, B.E. Young, Herbert Robinson and Michael Ryan, "The impact of infrastructure investment on economic growth in the United Kingdom", Journal of Infrastructure Policy and Development, vol 4 (2020); Alicia H. Munnell, "Infrastructure Investment and Economic Growth", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol 6 (1992); Tatyana Palei, "Assessing The Impact of Infrastructure on Economic Growth and Global Competitiveness", Procedia Economics and Finance, vol 23 (2015)
7 National Infrastructure Commission, Behaviour change and infrastructure beyond Covid-19 (May 2021), p 6
8 Department for Transport, Appraisal and Modelling Strategy: TAG update report, May 2021, p 13
9 National Infrastructure Commission, Behaviour change and infrastructure beyond Covid-19 (May 2021), p 4
10 Q9 [Mr Spruce]

7. Despite the coronavirus pandemic, the NIC stated that the "importance of a continued commitment to infrastructure remains high", particularly in the contexts of achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 and of balancing economic growth across the UK.[11] The NIC concluded that "the potential impacts of behaviour change on infrastructure demand are likely to be less significant than changes from other trends over the past thirty years", such as urbanisation.[12] The Secretary of State for Transport advanced a similar argument, highlighting that "neither the two world wars, the recessions and depressions or the Spanish flu—none of these things—stopped the inexorable growth in the need, ultimately, for people and goods to travel".[13]

8. In response to the ongoing uncertainty caused by coronavirus, the NIC recommended building "optionality" and "flexibility" into transport infrastructure investment by adopting a portfolio of infrastructure investments to encourage "balance across different levels of risk" and by creating "a complementary mix of programmes which cover different scenarios as well as low regrets options applicable across multiple scenarios".[14] To account for contingencies in a transport context, the Department published an "uncertainty toolkit" for transport modelling and appraisal.[15] Such a toolkit will be crucial in evaluating business cases for major transport infrastructure projects as the UK recovers from the coronavirus pandemic.

9. **Subject to devolved responsibilities, the National Infrastructure Strategy's top-level objectives of supporting the UK economy after coronavirus, addressing regional inequalities and facilitating adaptation to climate change are welcome. However, the Government is yet to articulate the detail on how it will achieve those objectives.**

10. ***The Government may need to amend the National Infrastructure Strategy to account for the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic in the 10 months since the strategy's publication. To assess whether and how the strategy requires revision, the Government must examine whether the major transport projects in the strategy will still deliver their intended strategic benefits and the Government's policy objectives, particularly in the context of declining public transport usage, higher levels of home-working and resulting shifts in travel patterns.***

11 National Infrastructure Commission, Behaviour change and infrastructure beyond Covid-19 (May 2021), p 6
12 Ibid.
13 Q137 [The Secretary of State for Transport]
14 National Infrastructure Commission, Behaviour change and infrastructure beyond Covid-19 (May 2021), p 33
15 The Department for Transport, Uncertainty Toolkit, May 2021

1 Levelling up

Definition

11. In the National Infrastructure Strategy, the Government pledged to deliver major infrastructure investments across the country, "prioritising those areas that have received less support in the past" as part of its commitment to "level up" the UK.[16] Regardless of where they are constructed, major transport infrastructure projects can create jobs, because individual project spend occurs across the country according to "where the supply chain is".[17] In addition, major projects often involve components that have been assembled off site.[18] Of the contracts monitored by Crossrail from the start of the Crossrail project in 2009 to 2013, 43% of businesses that won work were based outside London and the South-East and 62% were based outside London.[19]

12. The National Audit Office (NAO) observed that the extent to which the scope of a project aligns with its strategic objectives is a key indicator of success in the delivery of major projects.[20] If a policy priority, such as levelling up, cannot be defined, a project risks changing scope, because its objective is obscure. The NIC's annual monitoring report stated that although the Government highlighted the role for infrastructure investment in rebalancing regional growth, it "has yet to set out a sufficiently ambitious long-term plan to achieve this".[21]

13. Informed witnesses highlighted the importance of defining "levelling up".[22] Siemens Mobility told us that "if we have a definition, we can make sure that we meet the requirements" to deliver on the Government's policy objectives.[23] Midlands Connect stated that a definition will ensure that businesses "can all work off the same instructions".[24] The Secretary of State for Transport defined "levelling up" in a transport context as being "about making sure that [people in constituencies outside of London and the South-East] have reasonably comparative opportunities, in transport terms, to move around and travel as if they were living in London and the South-East".[25] He added that "it should be things that [people in constituencies outside London and the South-East] notice. It should be things that they feel make the quality of their life, their work and social environment better, because they are able to get around their town or location better".[26] It is difficult to conceive how London Underground might be replicated in rural Britain. High-capacity, rapid transit is financially viable only in urban conurbations. The Secretary of State for Transport did not set out metrics to underpin that definition and did not articulate how transport infrastructure development supports the Government's "levelling up" agenda.

14. We asked the Secretary of State for Transport to cite an example of an infrastructure intervention that helped to "level up" a region of the UK. He did not cite an example of

16 HM Treasury, National Infrastructure Strategy, November 2020, p 11
17 Q19 [Mr Smallwood]
18 Ibid.
19 Crossrail, £5.5bn of Crossrail contracts creating jobs and business opportunities around the UK (March 2013)
20 National Audit Office, Lessons learned from Major Programmes (November 2020), p 9
21 National Infrastructure Commission, Annual Monitoring Report 2021 (February 2021), p 22
22 Q83–Q85 [Mr Statham, Ms Humphrey, Mr Baldwin]
23 Q84 [Ms Humphrey]
24 Q83 [Mr Statham]
25 Q141 [The Secretary of State for Transport]
26 Ibid.

a major transport infrastructure project in his response.[27] Instead, he explained that the Government had reversed a Beeching cut by reopening the railway station at Horden, County Durham. The Secretary of State for Transport said that reopening Horden station "has a massive ability to re-link that area". He asserted that the station will help to serve "tens of thousands of people… in the immediate catchment area".[28] He did not provide quantitative evidence of the economic or social benefits that this rail station will bring to the local region.

15. The Department's director general of corporate delivery, Nick Joyce, cited Mersey Gateway as an example of an infrastructure intervention that "levelled up" a region of the UK. He said that "people who live on one side can get more easily to the opportunities on the other, and families are not disconnected".[29] The bridge opened in the autumn of 2017 and tolls are currently being levied to pay for the project. Halton Borough Council chief executive, David Parr, asserted that the bridge has been a "really big success", because "there's an awful lot of private investment coming into the area and we don't think that's a coincidence".[30] However, he acknowledged that ensuring that people from Halton can access jobs generated by such investment is a challenge. He explained that the council is working to upskill local residents to meet the requirements of businesses in the conurbation.[31] The Mersey Gateway Group stated that the project will create 4,640 permanent new jobs and will generate £61.9 million a year in gross value added from the new jobs by 2030.[32] Those projections are currently untested.

16. Transport infrastructure projects do not necessarily drive prosperity, especially if one takes account of the costs of construction and operation. Funding a major transport infrastructure project that does not deliver intended benefits can also have adverse consequences, such as increasing greenhouse gas emissions, misallocating taxpayers' money and wasting Government resources.

Case study: Humber bridge

17. We examined the example of the Humber bridge to see how transport infrastructure can affect local economies. The Humber bridge connects Hull with the East Midlands. It commenced construction in 1966 and opened to traffic in 1981.[33] It cost £385 million to build at 2021 prices. It was financed by Government loans, which accrued interest. Those loans have yet to be fully repaid despite a toll being levied on bridge users. In 2012, former Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne reduced toll charges on the bridge from £3 to £1.50 each way for cars and removed motorcycle tolls. The lower tolls were introduced following the Government's writing down almost 50% of the outstanding £330 million

27 According to the Infrastructure and Projects Authority's (IPA's) Annual Report on Major Projects 2020–21, major projects on the Government Major Projects Portfolio are "typically those where approval is required from HMT, either because the budget exceeds a department's delegated authority level and/or because the project is novel, complex, contentious, or requires primary legislation". Projects on the GMPP receive independent scrutiny and assurance from the IPA.

28 Q146 [The Secretary of State for Transport]

29 Q147 [Mr Joyce]

30 "Mersey Gateway has been a 'really big success' two years after opening, says council boss", Cheshire Live, 10 November 2019

31 Ibid.

32 "Benefits of the Mersey Gateway Project", The Mersey Gateway, Accessed on 27 July 2021

33 "Bridges and bypasses win votes—but their ability to 'level up' Britain is less certain", The Guardian, 1 July 2021

debt.[34] Today, Hull has one of the highest unemployment rates in the country.[35] Although the bridge reduced journey times for the local population and connected families and businesses, it did not produce tangible economic returns.[36]

18. The Government's forthcoming "Levelling Up White Paper" must clarify how major transport infrastructure projects can contribute to levelling up.[37] The Department plans to develop proposals for the "robust assessment and presentation of distributional and place-based impacts to support decision makers in better understanding impacts on priorities such as levelling up".[38] It is also reviewing its "rebalancing toolkit" and wider strategic case guidance to correspond with the 2020 updates to the Green Book.[39] If those reviews are to be meaningful, the Department will need to define the "levelling up" policy agenda in a transport context in order to set a benchmark against which to test business cases.

19. ***To allow Parliament and the public to judge the effectiveness of the Government's infrastructure plans, the Government must publish detailed metrics that define and measure the "levelling up" concept.***

20. **We are concerned that the Department did not explain how the construction of major transport infrastructure projects can support the "levelling up" policy agenda.** ***We would be reassured if the Department were to set out a worked example illustrating how investment in major transport infrastructure projects drives growth and productivity.***

34 "Osborne predicts boost from Humber Bridge lower tolls", BBC, 2 April 2012
35 Office for National Statistics, Claimant count by sex and age, via Nomis
36 "Humber Bridge", Institution of Civil Engineers, Accessed on 27 July 2021
37 "Government to publish Levelling Up White Paper", Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet Office, 4 May 2012
38 The Department for Transport (MTP0045) para 47
39 The Department for Transport (MTP0045) para 48. The Department for Transport's rebalancing toolkit provides guidance to help authors of strategic cases describe the impact of a project or programme on rebalancing growth across the country. It is optional and aimed at projects and programmes where rebalancing is an objective.

2 Appraisal

Costs and timescales

21. Departments compete with each other to gain approval for projects by designing business cases at the lowest possible cost and with the most favourable benefit-cost ratios (BCRs). Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Lord Hammond of Runnymede told us that "keeping costs down to get a project into the programme is an essential part of the game-playing in Whitehall … if you go in with too high a cost estimate at the outset, there is a real danger that it will not make it into the programme at all".[40]

22. The National Audit Office (NAO) highlighted the benefits of establishing floors and ceilings for costs and timescale, rather than setting individual targets.[41] However, it added that "because programmes have often exceeded these targets, there remains a need to interrogate what a range is based on, and what risks and uncertainties could cause a programme to exceed the range".[42]

Case study: HS2

23. The first estimates for the cost of HS2 were published in the February 2011 HS2 economic case. Phase One costs were estimated to be £19.6 billion, with the full network estimated at £37.5 billion.[43] Phase One from London to Birmingham is now estimated to cost between £31 billion and £40 billion, an increase of between 14% and 47% from the £27.1 billion funding allocated in 2013.[44] A target cost for Phase One has been set at £36 billion, or £40 billion in 2019 prices.[45] Originally due to open in 2026, the full opening of the Phase One into Euston station is now expected between 2031 and 2036, although services from Old Oak Common are due to commence between 2029 and 2033.[46]

24. The estimated cost of Phase 2a has also increased from £3.5 billion in 2013 at 2015 prices, to between £4.5 billion and £6.5 billion, an increase of between 29% and 87%.[47] Phase 2a is now due to open between 2030 and 2031, three to four years later than expected.[48] The cost of Phase 2b is now estimated to be between £29 billion and £41 billion, an increase of between 15% and 63% on the £25 billion previously allocated in 2013, and three to seven years behind schedule.[49] The current estimate is for services to open between 2036 and 2040, compared with the original target date of 2033.[50] Those statistics suggest that initial costs and timescales were not properly assessed. The various Ministers with responsibility for HS2 who signed off those estimates have not been held to account for their miscalculations at taxpayers' expense.

40 Q43 [Lord Hammond]
41 The National Audit Office, Lessons learned from major programmes (November 2020), p 13
42 Ibid.
43 Department for Transport, Economic Case for HS2 The Y Network and London—West Midlands, February 2011. 2009 prices.
44 National Audit Office, High Speed Two: A progress update, HC 40 Session 2019–20, 24 January 2020. 2015 prices.
45 Department for Transport, Full Business Case: High Speed 2 Phase One, April 2020
46 National Audit Office, High Speed Two: A progress update, HC 40 Session 2019–20, 24 January 2020
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. 2015 prices.
50 Ibid.

Benefit-cost ratios

25. BCR is defined as the ratio of the present value of benefits relative to the present value of costs.[51] BCRs are helpful tools for assessing in monetary terms the UK-wide benefits of particular projects and programmes. However, Her Majesty's Treasury's 'Final Report of the 2020 Green Book Review' found that because BCRs "focus on benefits that it is easy to put a monetary value on", it "creates an incentive for proposers to artificially boost the BCR with such benefits that are unlikely to be realised, as well as suggesting a level of certainty around the value of those benefits that is not merited by the evidence".[52]

26. Her Majesty's Treasury's 'Final Report of the 2020 Green Book Review' concluded that those drafting appraisals have often failed to engage properly with the strategic context in which their proposal sits, including failing to account for a proposal's specific contribution to the delivery of the Government's intended strategic goals and the social and economic features of different places.[53] The review also found that the selection of a preferred intervention option is heavily reliant on a benefit-cost ratio (BCR), which is not aligned to decision-makers' objectives.[54]

27. The Government's move away from taking a purely cost-benefit approach to assessing the value of major transport projects in the 2020 update to the Green Book has merit. A benefit-cost approach may not capture a project's social and environmental benefits and shifting to assessments based on the strength of the strategic case could help to prevent a race to the bottom on project cost. At the same time, HM Treasury must maintain its focus on value for money for the taxpayer to ensure that the Government does not oversee the construction of white, or even green, elephants.

Framework for analysing strategic interventions

28. A new framework for assessing strategic benefits of transport project proposals would help to assess social benefits alongside efficiency and value for money, quantify environmental and regional considerations and identify how an intervention will affect various communities. NIC commissioner Bridget Rosewell told us that "models based only on past data and a reliance on those models is one of the ways in which we go wrong when we do the analysis of our projects".[55] For example, past models may not take account of contemporary metrics, science, international treaties and policies on decarbonisation. Lord Hammond told us that

> "we do not have rigorous tools with which to assess the strategic benefits of strategic projects because, by definition, they are blue-sky projects. We are trying to envisage a world that will be fundamentally transformed and see the benefits that will flow from that fundamental transformation".[56]

29. The Department has been updating the transport analysis guidance (TAG), which provides direction on the requirements transport interventions must fulfil in the appraisal process. To develop this guidance, the Department adopted the Office for Budget

51 HM Treasury, The Green Book (2020), December 2020, p 50
52 HM Treasury, Green Book Review 2020: Findings and response, November 2020, p 4
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Q27 [Ms Rosewell]
56 Q36 [Lord Hammond]

Responsibility's (OBR's) March 2021 forecasts of economic growth.[57] The Department stated that the adoption of these forecasts will "reduce forecasts of future travel demand which underpin appraisal", as the OBR's revised long-term economic outlook "suggests there will be less emphasis in the future on investment being justified on the basis of high rates of economic growth".[58]

30. On 19 May 2021, the Department published a progress report on the TAG appraisal and modelling strategy.[59] The progress report announced that the Department will provide scope within TAG for appraisals to include benefits and costs beyond 60 years as an "indicative monetised benefit where it is a material consideration, presented within a business case as a sensitivity test and used to inform the overall value for money assessment".[60] The report acknowledged that respondents were "sceptical" about this change.[61] Although many supported the idea of considering long-term benefits "in principle", the report identified a "near consensus that producing credible appraisal estimates post sixty years is extremely challenging".[62] Some respondents recommended prioritising the development of sensitivity analysis and scenarios over 60 years, "rather than extending the uncertainty further".[63] Other respondents explained that "if a scheme needed benefits beyond 60 years to make the case, then it may not be the best option".[64]

31. As a result of this feedback, the Department will allow a sensitivity test to be applied to schemes with a "long asset life" where benefits and costs are "extrapolated beyond sixty years".[65] Benefits and costs beyond this 60-year threshold will be included in the indicative monetised category for Value for Money (VfM) assessment only, and not initial or adjusted BCRs. That approach recognises the "very high level of uncertainty associated with these longer-term benefits".[66] Such schemes will be considered on a "case-by-case basis" as to whether undertaking the sensitivity test is "appropriate and beneficial for decision-making".[67]

32. Assessing long-term benefits could help to evaluate the strategic case for particular transport interventions. Without accurate analytical tools, however, estimating benefits beyond the 60-year mark may distort a project's value. In addition, it is difficult to predict what other innovations or crises may change the public's transport requirements over that extended timeframe. Unpredictable factors such as a pandemic, the introduction of new technology or a sudden decline in birth rates may distort previously evaluated outcomes.

33. As well as identifying changes to TAG, the Department is evaluating how such guidance can be applied more flexibly, particularly in relation to the "wider economic

57 The Office for Budget Responsibility's (OBR's) forecasts from the 3 March 2021 Budget estimate that the UK economy is predicted to be around 29% smaller in 2070 compared with pre-March 2020 forecasts. This comprises a 23% reduction in projected GDP per capita and an 8% fall in forecast population by 2070, compared with previous forecasts.
58 Department for Transport, Appraisal and modelling strategy: TAG update report, May 2021, p 10
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.

impacts of transport investment at both a local and national level".[68] We welcome this evaluation and look forward to examining how it builds on the Department's publication of the 'Appraisal and modelling strategy: TAG update report'.

34. **The Government must utilise accurate, sensitive analytical tools to ensure that the projects that best support connectivity, growth and productivity are the ones that get built. In that context, benefit-cost ratios are useful, but they fail to capture regional inequalities and environmental and social factors.** ***The Government must replace benefit-cost ratios with a "benefit-cost plus" system, which not only takes account of costs and benefits and therefore ensures value for money for the taxpayer, but captures regional inequalities and environmental and social factors.***

35. ***To facilitate transparent, honest and constructive public and political engagement with the economic and engineering realities of delivering major infrastructure projects, the Government should establish floors and ceilings for project costs and timescales defining the range within which projects are scheduled for delivery rather than setting single specific targets, which are invariably unhelpful and inaccurate. Any breach of a project's cost and/or time ceilings should be communicated to the appropriate Select Committee by a formal mechanism, which should trigger intense parliamentary scrutiny to protect the public purse and to support effective project delivery.***

36. **Government agencies have repeatedly delivered major transport infrastructure projects that exceeded the specified cost and/or delivery date. Senior management of those Government agencies were apparently unaccountable for such overruns.** ***Senior management of Government agencies with ultimate responsibility for project delivery must be incentivised to avoid cost and/or time overruns. The senior management of Government agencies with responsibility for delivering major infrastructure projects should be subject to a formal duty immediately to notify the relevant Select Committee in cases in which cost and/or time ceilings will be exceeded.***

68 The Department for Transport (MTP0045) para 46

3 Delivery

37. The NIC welcomed the National Infrastructure Strategy but stated that the Government must focus on outlining how the strategy will be delivered.[69] The Department currently has 24 major projects in the Government Major Projects Portfolio (GMPP) with a total budgeted whole-life cost of £115.5 billion.[70] Although the Department's Outcome Delivery Plan stated that 82% of its projects on the GMPP are on track to delivery, only seven of the Department's projects are ranked as either "green" or "amber/green" on meeting their expected whole-life cost and delivery timescale in the Infrastructure and Project Authority's Annual Report on Major Projects.[71] The delivery of major transport infrastructure projects could be substantially improved by avoiding cost overruns and project delays. In that context, we note the Infrastructure and Projects Authority's publication of 'Transforming Infrastructure Performance: Roadmap to 2030'.[72]

38. The NAO identified recurring problems in four key dimensions of the appraisal and delivery process: first, defining and retaining clear scope for a project; secondly, developing a realistic plan for delivery that recognises precise cost and schedule estimates; thirdly, efficiently managing interdependencies; and, fourthly, creating transparent systems for governance and oversight.[73] Informed commentators from both the private and public sectors highlighted those factors as critical to ensuring the successful delivery of major transport infrastructure projects.[74] The Secretary of State for Transport explained that the Department is "working with the implementation and delivery unit across Government … looking at how to improve delivery and accelerate the sharing of insights from across Whitehall".[75] To that end, the Department examined the conclusions of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy's delivery transformation board.[76]

Case study: A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down

39. In 2020, the Government approved plans to construct a two-mile road tunnel near Stonehenge.[77] The tunnel is part of National Highways' scheme to overhaul eight miles of the A303, creating a new dual, two-lane carriageway between Amesbury and Berwick Down.[78] Campaigners launched a legal challenge against the Secretary of State for Transport's decision to grant consent for the A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down scheme.[79] In July 2021, the High Court ruled that the Secretary of State for Transport acted unlawfully

69 Q2 [Ms Rosewell]
70 Infrastructure and Projects Authority, Annual Report on Major Projects 2020–21 (July 2021), p 10. Of the 24 projects that are led by the Department for Transport, 22 are Infrastructure and Construction projects and two are Transformation and Service Delivery projects.
71 Department for Transport, Department for Transport Outcome Delivery Plan, July 2021; Infrastructure and Projects Authority, Annual Report on Major Projects 2020–21 (July 2021), p 43–46
72 Infrastructure and Projects Authority, Transforming Infrastructure Performance: Roadmap to 2030 (September 2021)
73 National Audit Office, Lessons learned from Major Programmes (November 2020)
74 Jacobs, Major Programmes: Lessons Learnt 10 years on from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games (December 2020); Q4 [Mr Spruce]; Q26 [Mr Smallwood]; Q39 [Lord Hammond]; Q51 [Lord Hammond]; Q60 [Lord Hammond]
75 Q191 [The Secretary of State for Transport]
76 Ibid.
77 National Highways, A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down (March 2019)
78 "A303 Stonehenge (Amesbury to Berwick Down)", National Highways, Accessed on 6 September 2021
79 "Stonehenge tunnel: Campaigners launch legal challenge", BBC, 23 December 2020

when he approved the project, upholding two of the 10 grounds submitted.[80] The ruling rested on the Secretary of State's failure properly to consider alternative schemes and to address the effect of the scheme on each individual asset associated with Stonehenge. A consequent Order of the High Court quashed the development consent for the proposed A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down scheme.[81] This case shows how litigation can delay major transport infrastructure schemes.

40. Delivering major transport infrastructure projects quickly minimises costs, decreases disruption caused by construction and allows local communities to benefit from links sooner. We note that the Government announced Project Speed and that the Department set up the Acceleration Unit to increase the pace of project delivery.[82] However, the publication of the National Infrastructure Strategy was not accompanied by a detailed delivery plan.

Case study: Crossrail

41. Crossrail is a major transport infrastructure project. It involved the construction of a suburban passenger service running across London from west to east. The project was approved in 2007, and construction began in 2009.[83] Crossrail was scheduled to open in December 2018, but the current estimate for full opening has slipped to mid-2022.[84] Crossrail will cost £18.25 billion, more than £2 billion over budget.[85] Although the work on the 26 miles of new tunnels was completed in 2015, the project has experienced software problems with the new signalling system.[86] At the same time, work on the Bond Street and Whitechapel stations took longer than planned.[87] Major transport infrastructure projects, such as Crossrail, involve more than heavy engineering, such as tunnelling. Crossrail illustrates the virtues of a joined-up, system approach to delivery in preventing delays and increases to project costs.[88] The Government and its delivery agencies must ensure that digitisation and system delivery are factored in at the start of major transport projects and not at a stage when failure can, as Crossrail demonstrated, cause delays and cost overruns. Important lessons can be learned from Crossrail to inform future major transport projects. In that context, the Crossrail Learning Legacy programme is a positive example of the collation and dissemination of good practice and lessons learned.[89]

Skills

42. Government Departments are responsible for the management of individual major projects. Pledging to deliver too many ambitious projects will spread scarce departmental resources too thinly, resulting in delays and cost overruns. In February 2021, the Institute for Government found that "central Government Departments have capability but

80 "Stonehenge tunnel campaigners win court battle", BBC, 30 July 2021
81 Ibid.
82 "Transport Secretary launches new Acceleration Unit to speed up transport infrastructure projects and build back better from COVID-19", Department for Transport press release, 21 August 2020
83 "Europe's biggest railway infrastructure project", Crossrail, Accessed on 20 September 2021
84 The National Audit Office, Crossrail—a progress update (July 2021), p 4; "Crossrail project update", Crossrail, Accessed on 20 September 2021
85 The National Audit Office, Crossrail—a progress update (July 2021), p 4
86 The National Audit Office, Completing Crossrail (May 2019), p 6; The National Audit Office, Crossrail—a progress update (July 2021), p 8
87 The National Audit Office, Completing Crossrail (May 2019), p 16
88 Q38 [Mr Meggs]
89 "Learning legacy themes", Crossrail, Accessed on 20 September 2021

capacity is stretched", including in the DfT.[90] The Institute for Government concluded that the DfT's central analytical teams are overstretched, which "limit[s] their ability to contribute fully to policy making".[91] In particular, the evaluation and transport modelling teams have limited ability to contribute across the Department.[92] The report asserted that "without greater capacity, policies and projects will either be delayed or will proceed without the benefit of analysis and evaluation".[93] Such capacity limitations are a barrier to the Government's objectives of "levelling up" the country to tackle regional inequalities and of achieving net zero.

43. Ensuring the UK workforce has the transport construction skills that major transport infrastructure projects require is key to delivering those projects on time and to budget. Witnesses told us that developing a long-term programme for infrastructure projects allows companies to plan ahead and invest in developing the required skills for a project in its early stages. Institution of Civil Engineers fellow Jonathan Spruce explained that because the UK did not have a long-term plan for electrification of the rail network, skills "disappeared from this country" and as a consequence "restarting that programme was really difficult".[94] He added that an infrastructure "needs assessment" will be key to industry for "getting people of all shapes, sizes, genders and ethnicity ready to deliver the infrastructure we need to deliver a net carbon future".[95]

44. Infrastructure and Projects Authority chief executive, Nick Smallwood, explained that although there is "sufficient capacity [to deliver major transport infrastructure projects] in the near term", as a result of the coronavirus pandemic and a resulting reduction in private sector projects, a shortfall in key craft, engineering, leadership and project management skills is expected in the "middle of the decade".[96] The National Infrastructure Strategy set out a long-term outline of priority projects, which allows companies to plan relevant training and apprenticeship programmes for project delivery. However, the Infrastructure and Projects Authority warned that without investment in apprenticeship schemes and training programmes, the UK "will run into difficulties and resource shortfalls" that will make delivering the ambitions in the National Infrastructure Strategy "quite a challenge".[97]

45. Ensuring the UK's construction capabilities are modernised will be key to delivering projects to time and cost. Mr Smallwood told us that the UK infrastructure sector has "languished" compared with other sectors in the UK that have modernised and digitised.[98] He explained that the infrastructure sector could harness the potential of modern construction methods. Digitising and modernising working practices would potentially improve productivity by decreasing construction times.

46. Crossrail utilised Building Information Modelling (BIM) to "generat[e], build and manag[e] data through the life of the project".[99] BIM incorporates physical, environmental

90 Institute for Government, How governments use evidence to make transport policy (February 2021), p 58
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Q31 [Mr Spruce]
95 Q32 [Mr Spruce]
96 Q4 [Mr Smallwood]
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 "Driving industry standards for design innovation on major infrastructure projects", Crossrail, Accessed on 7 September 2021

and commercial data "on every element designed for Crossrail".[100] Crossrail stated that it hoped to use BIM to expedite delivery and to drive design innovation in the construction industry. Crossrail asserted that long-term cost savings can be realised through the BIM model "by providing accurate information that can be handed over to the operators of the railway for managing Crossrail's assets post-completion".[101]

47. The DfT's director general of corporate delivery, Nick Joyce, explained that the transport sector is adopting new working models to improve digitisation. He cited National Highways' adoption of a rapid engineering model.[102] The model involves developing the initial design stages for a project, such as a new road, through machine learning. Mr Joyce explained that that "takes the initial design phase down from months to weeks".[103] He highlighted that

> "the people who … came up with that idea were not engineers or designers; they were data analysts and machine learning folks. It was bringing those skills in from different sectors and combining them with the engineering expertise that started to give examples where real benefits flow".[104]

48. Skills also risk being lost if programmes are subject to a "start-stop" approach. Rolling programmes allow for skills to be retained. For example, the Rail Industry Association previously warned the Committee that skills and experience may be lost if there was a delay in the electrification of the rail programme.[105] This view was supported by Network Rail.[106]

Transport Infrastructure Skills Strategy

49. The Department for Transport stated that it will refresh the Transport Infrastructure Skills Strategy (TISS), first published in 2016, by the spring of 2021.[107] In September 2021, the refreshed TISS has still not been published. The updated plan will cover apprenticeships and outline how employers can support people to upskill in priority growth sectors such as construction.[108]

50. The DfT's director general of corporate delivery Nick Joyce stated that the Department had made "a huge investment in further skills in the core Department in the last two years", including creating "a central portfolio office headed by a portfolio director, and three further project directors are responsible for major programmes".[109] He added that the Department has a series of project delivery skills and development programmes, including for senior responsible owners' accreditation systems. He concluded that although the Department has "done a lot", "we still have more to do. The portfolio continues to get bigger and more complex".[110]

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Q180 [Mr Joyce]
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Transport Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2019–21, Trains fit for the future?, HC 876, para 48
106 Network Rail, Traction Decarbonisation Network Strategy—Interim Programme Business Case, September 2020, p34
107 The Department for Transport (MTP0045) para 90
108 Ibid.
109 Q191 [Mr Joyce]
110 Ibid.

51. The refreshed TISS must be published as a priority to provide a strategic lead on the development of the key construction and management skills required to underpin the Government's broad infrastructure strategy. The Secretary of State for Transport told us that the updated TISS will be published as a discussion paper "later in the year".[111]

52. **A discussion paper is an insufficient response to the challenge of ensuring that the UK has the skills to deliver the Government's ambitious infrastructure agenda. A detailed skills strategy is required.** ***As part of the refresh of the Transport Infrastructure Skills Strategy, the Department must develop a future skills plan in consultation with public and private sector employers to identify and address skills gaps that might delay major projects. Such a strategy should be accompanied by a financial commitment from the Government aimed at addressing specific skills gaps, such as in transport engineering and project management, through apprenticeships and training programmes.***

53. ***To ensure that the National Infrastructure Strategy supports (a) the "levelling up" agenda, (b) achieving net zero emissions by 2050 and (c) economic recovery after the coronavirus pandemic, the Government must publish by 25 November 2021 a delivery plan setting out how its transport infrastructure commitments will be implemented to support the National Infrastructure Strategy.***[112]

111 Q190 [The Secretary of State for Transport]; Q192 [The Secretary of State for Transport]

112 The National Infrastructure Strategy was published on 25 November 2020. 25 November 2021 is one year on from this date.

Conclusions and recommendations

Introduction

1. Subject to devolved responsibilities, the National Infrastructure Strategy's top-level objectives of supporting the UK economy after coronavirus, addressing regional inequalities and facilitating adaptation to climate change are welcome. However, the Government is yet to articulate the detail on how it will achieve those objectives. (Paragraph 9)

2. *The Government may need to amend the National Infrastructure Strategy to account for the evolution of the coronavirus pandemic in the 10 months since the strategy's publication. To assess whether and how the strategy requires revision, the Government must examine whether the major transport projects in the strategy will still deliver their intended strategic benefits and the Government's policy objectives, particularly in the context of declining public transport usage, higher levels of home-working and resulting shifts in travel patterns.* (Paragraph 10)

Levelling up

3. *To allow Parliament and the public to judge the effectiveness of the Government's infrastructure plans, the Government must publish detailed metrics that define and measure the "levelling up" concept.* (Paragraph 19)

4. We are concerned that the Department did not explain how the construction of major transport infrastructure projects can support the "levelling up" policy agenda. *We would be reassured if the Department were to set out a worked example illustrating how investment in major transport infrastructure projects drives growth and productivity.* (Paragraph 20)

Appraisal

5. The Government must utilise accurate, sensitive analytical tools to ensure that the projects that best support connectivity, growth and productivity are the ones that get built. In that context, benefit-cost ratios are useful, but they fail to capture regional inequalities and environmental and social factors. *The Government must replace benefit-cost ratios with a "benefit-cost plus" system, which not only takes account of costs and benefits and therefore ensures value for money for the taxpayer, but captures regional inequalities and environmental and social factors.* (Paragraph 34)

6. *To facilitate transparent, honest and constructive public and political engagement with the economic and engineering realities of delivering major infrastructure projects, the Government should establish floors and ceilings for project costs and timescales defining the range within which projects are scheduled for delivery rather than setting single specific targets, which are invariably unhelpful and inaccurate. Any breach of a project's cost and/or time ceilings should be communicated to the appropriate Select Committee by a formal mechanism, which should trigger intense parliamentary scrutiny to protect the public purse and to support effective project delivery.* (Paragraph 35)

7. Government agencies have repeatedly delivered major transport infrastructure projects that exceeded the specified cost and/or delivery date. Senior management of those Government agencies were apparently unaccountable for such overruns. *Senior management of Government agencies with ultimate responsibility for project delivery must be incentivised to avoid cost and/or time overruns. The senior management of Government agencies with responsibility for delivering major infrastructure projects should be subject to a formal duty immediately to notify the relevant Select Committee in cases in which cost and/or time ceilings will be exceeded.* (Paragraph 36)

Delivery

8. A discussion paper is an insufficient response to the challenge of ensuring that the UK has the skills to deliver the Government's ambitious infrastructure agenda. A detailed skills strategy is required. *As part of the refresh of the Transport Infrastructure Skills Strategy, the Department must develop a future skills plan in consultation with public and private sector employers to identify and address skills gaps that might delay major projects. Such a strategy should be accompanied by a financial commitment from the Government aimed at addressing specific skills gaps, such as in transport engineering and project management, through apprenticeships and training programmes.* (Paragraph 52)

9. *To ensure that the National Infrastructure Strategy supports (a) the "levelling up" agenda, (b) achieving net zero emissions by 2050 and (c) economic recovery after the coronavirus pandemic, the Government must publish by 25 November 2021 a delivery plan setting out how its transport infrastructure commitments will be implemented to support the National Infrastructure Strategy.* (Paragraph 53)

Formal minutes

Wednesday 22 September 2021

Members present:

Huw Merriman, in the Chair

Mr Ben Bradshaw	Karl McCartney
Ruth Cadbury	Grahame Morris
Simon Jupp	Gavin Newlands

Draft Report (*Major transport infrastructure projects*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 53 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 19 October at 3.00 pm

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 17 March 2021

Jonathan Spruce, Fellow, Institution of Civil Engineers; **James Heath**, Chief Executive Officer, National Infrastructure Commission; **Bridget Rosewell CBE**, Commissioner, National Infrastructure Commission — Q1–32

The Rt Hon Lord Hammond of Runnymede; **Tony Meggs CB**, ex-Chairman, Crossrail Ltd, former Chief Executive, Infrastructure and Projects Authority — Q33–64

Wednesday 12 May 2021

Nick Smallwood, Chief Executive Officer, Infrastructure and Projects Authority; **Jon Loveday**, Director for Infrastructure, Enterprise and Growth, Infrastructure and Projects Authority; **Elliot Shaw**, Executive Director for Strategy and Planning, Highways England — Q1–66

Graham Richards, Director of Planning, Office of Rail and Road; **Simon Statham**, Chief Technical Officer, Midlands Connect; **Ruth Humphrey**, Head of Business Development and Strategy, Siemens; **Alistair Baldwin**, Author, Institute for Government, Senior Specialist Planner, Newcastle City Council — Q67–127

Wednesday 07 July 2021

Rt Hon Grant Shapps MP, Secretary of State, Department for Transport; **Nick Joyce**, Director General, Corporate Delivery Group, Department for Transport — Q127–203

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

MTP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1 Armes, Mr William (Retired, Cambridge Approaches); and Harrold, Dr William (MTP0039)

2 ASLEF (MTP0017)

3 Action for Yorkshire Transport (MTP0014)

4 Airport Operators Association (MTP0074)

5 Alstom UK & Ireland (MTP0077)

6 Angel Trains (MTP0057)

7 Association for Consultancy and Engineering (MTP0078)

8 Berkeley, Lord Tony (member, House of Lords) (MTP0051)

9 Bodman, Mr Andrew (MTP0007)

10 Brayford, Mr Tim (MTP0004)

11 British Ports Association (MTP0027)

12 Burton, Mrs Angela (MTP0001)

13 Byng, Mr. Michael (Chartered Quantity Surveyor, Director, MBPC Infrastructure Limited) (MTP0044)

14 Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation (MTP0037)

15 Civil Engineering Contractors Association (MTP0008)

16 Crawley Borough Council (MTP0062)

17 Department for Transport (MTP0045)

18 Dixon, Mr Stuart (Freelance Business Analyst, SDPlus Ltd) (MTP0010)

19 England's Economic Heartland (MTP0028)

20 Fowles, Mr Mark (Managing Director, Nottingham City Transport Ltd) (MTP0006)

21 Goodwin, Professor Phil (Emeritus Professor, and Senior Fellow, UCL and UWE; also Foundation for Integrated Transport) (MTP0052)

22 Green Alliance (MTP0055)

23 HADRAG: The Halifax & District Rail Action Group (MTP0065)

24 Hampshire County Council (MTP0020)

25 Heathrow Southern Railway (MTP0013)

26 High Speed Rail Group (MTP0018)

27 Highways England (MTP0067)

28 Highways England (MTP0079)

29 IFM Investors (MTP0003)

30 Ient, Victor (MTP0053)

31 Institution of Civil Engineers (MTP0043)

32 LGTAG (MTP0069)

33 Liverpool City Region Combined Authority (MTP0042)

34 Local Government Association; and Association of Directors of Economy, Environment, Planning & Transport (MTP0023)

35 Logistics UK (MTP0034)

36 London Borough of Lewisham Council (MTP0033)

37 London Borough of Lewisham Council (MTP0031)

38 Mace (MTP0061)

39 Metz, Dr David (Honorary Professor, UCL Centre for Transport Studies) (MTP0005)

40 Midlands Connect (MTP0022)

41 Mineral Products Association (MTP0021)

42 Porterbrook (MTP0071)

43 Price, Mr Kevin (MTP0002)

44 Rail Working Group (MTP0075)

45 Railfuture Ltd (MTP0063)

46 Railway Industry Association (MTP0070)

47 Railway Industry Association (MTP0035)

48 Ray Chapman Associates (MTP0024)

49 Ray Chapman Associates (MTP0025)

50 RiverOak Strategic Partners (MTP0047)

51 Robinson, Mr Alan (MTP0059)

52 Siemens Mobility Limited (MTP0019)

53 Solent Local Enterprise Partnership (MTP0048)

54 Stone Railhead Crisis Group (MTP0015)

55 Sustrans (MTP0058)

56 Tarmac Group (MTP0080)

57 Thames Crossing Action Group (MTP0030)

58 Transport Futures East Sussex (MTP0082)

59 Transport Planning Society (MTP0081)

60 Transport for Greater Manchester (MTP0060)

61 Transport for West Midlands (TfWM) (MTP0041)

62 Transport for the North; Midlands Connect; Transport for South East; Transport East; Western Gateway; Peninsula Transport; and Englands Economic Heartland (MTP0032)

63 TravelWatch NorthWest (MTP0066)

64 TravelWatch NorthWest (MTP0026)

65 UK Civil Aviation Authority (MTP0016)

66 Urban Transport Group (MTP0038)

67 Wagland, Kay (Chair, Arundel Scate) (MTP0083)

68 Wellings, Dr Richard (Head of Transport, Institute of Economic Affairs) (MTP0009)

69 West Yorkshire Combined Authority (MTP0072)

70 York Bus Forum; York Civic Trust; and York Environment Forum (MTP0056)

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee's website.

Session 2021–22

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Zero emission vehicles	HC 27

Session 2019–21

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Appointment of the Chair of the Civil Aviation Authority	HC 354
2nd	The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the aviation sector	HC 268
3rd	E-scooters: pavement nuisance or transport innovation?	HC 255
4th	Road safety: young and novice drivers	HC 169
5th	The impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the aviation sector: Interim report	HC 1257
6th	Trains fit for the future?	HC 876
7th	Safe return of international travel?	HC 1341