



House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts

Windrush Compensation Scheme

Fourteenth Report of Session 2021–22

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 22 July 2021*

The Committee of Public Accounts

The Committee of Public Accounts is appointed by the House of Commons to examine “the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before Parliament as the committee may think fit” (Standing Order No. 148).

Current membership

[Dame Meg Hillier MP](#) (*Labour (Co-op), Hackney South and Shoreditch*) (Chair)

[Mr Gareth Bacon MP](#) (*Conservative, Orpington*)

[Kemi Badenoch MP](#) (*Conservative, Saffron Walden*)

[Shaun Bailey MP](#) (*Conservative, West Bromwich West*)

[Dan Carden MP](#) (*Labour, Liverpool, Walton*)

[Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP](#) (*Conservative, The Cotswolds*)

[Mr Mark Francois MP](#) (*Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford*)

[Barry Gardiner MP](#) (*Labour, Brent North*)

[Peter Grant MP](#) (*Scottish National Party, Glenrothes*)

[Antony Higginbotham MP](#) (*Conservative, Burnley*)

[Mr Richard Holden MP](#) (*Conservative, North West Durham*)

[Craig Mackinlay MP](#) (*Conservative, Thanet*)

[Sarah Olney MP](#) (*Liberal Democrat, Richmond Park*)

[Kate Osamor MP](#) (*Labour (Co-op), Edmonton*)

[Nick Smith MP](#) (*Labour, Blaenau Gwent*)

[James Wild MP](#) (*Conservative, North West Norfolk*)

Powers

Powers of the Committee of Public Accounts are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No. 148. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

© Parliamentary Copyright House of Commons 2021. This publication may be reproduced under the terms of the Open Parliament Licence, which is published at <https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/copyright-parliament/>.

Committee reports are published on the [Committee's website](#) and in print by Order of the House.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Jessica Bridges-Palmer (Media Officer), Ameet Chudasama (Committee Operations Manager), Richard Cooke (Clerk), Rose Leach (Committee Operations Officer), Ben Rayner (Second Clerk), Ben Shave (Chair Liaison).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Committee of Public Accounts, House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 5776; the Committee's email address is pubaccom@parliament.uk.

You can follow the Committee on Twitter using [@CommonsPAC](#).

Contents

Summary	3
Introduction	4
Conclusions and recommendations	5
1 Performance of the scheme	7
Performance of the scheme	7
2 Flaws in design and implementation	9
Complexity	9
Planning assumptions	10
Operational capacity and capability	11
Formal minutes	13
Witnesses	14
Published written evidence	14
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament	15

Summary

The Home Office (the Department) promised to learn lessons from the Windrush scandal, but having failed the Windrush generation once, it appears to be failing them again. There have been fundamental problems with both the Department's design and implementation of the Windrush Compensation Scheme (the scheme) and those problems are coming home to roost. The Department designed a scheme that was too complex and difficult for the claimants to engage with and failed to launch the scheme with adequate capacity to run it, and it has played catch-up ever since. Some people have died before their claims have been dealt with, and only 412 claims out of the 2,367 submitted have received their final payment.

The Department still risks seeming indifferent to the impact it has had on people's lives. The key assumptions it has made have been wrong and claims have involved much more work than the Department imagined. We have previously reported on the Department's lack of curiosity about the impact of its policies, and the administration of this scheme is another example of this. There is a continued challenge to ensure the Department has enough caseworkers with the right experience to deal with the complex reality of applicants' circumstances. The Department has ambitious plans to change its culture, but there are still giant steps to take.

It is encouraging to hear the Department admit to some of its mistakes with the scheme, but it should not have taken two years to reach this point. Justice delayed is justice denied. When will victims of the Windrush scandal finally have redress? There is an urgent need to improve the scheme and make good on promises to right the wrongs for those who suffered.

Introduction

In the spring of 2018, the Department acknowledged serious shortcomings in its treatment of the Windrush generation, who had suffered harm due to the Department's 'hostile environment' policies. These policies required members of the Windrush generation to demonstrate their lawful immigration status to access key public services, housing and jobs. Some struggled to do this even though they were living in the UK legally. The Department acknowledged it had treated the Windrush generation unfairly and announced a set of measures to "right the wrongs" experienced by those affected. One of those measures was the Windrush Compensation Scheme. The Department launched the scheme in April 2019 with the aim of compensating members of the Windrush generation and their families for the losses and impacts they have suffered as a result of not being able to demonstrate their lawful immigration status.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **People are still waiting far too long to receive compensation from the scheme.** The Department has been slow to process compensation claims, with some claimants dying whilst waiting for compensation. At the time we took evidence in June, the Department had made final payments to only 412 claims of the 2,367 it had received. It is unwilling to set a timeframe for making decisions on claims, leaving claimants frustrated and reflecting no sense of urgency in improving the speed of compensation. The Department has, however, set itself an internal target to conclude 90% of claims submitted before the end of 2020 by the end of August 2021, and claims to be confident it will hit it, but will need a significant improvement in performance if it is to do so. The Department claims holding approximately six months'-worth of cases is 'about the right number' of cases for it to have in the scheme. It took until December 2020 before the Department made substantial changes to the scheme, in order to fix problems with it. The Department hints that further changes to the scheme are required and that it plans to make significant ones, but has not yet confirmed what these changes might be or when they might be introduced.

Recommendation: *The Department must, as a matter of urgency, speed up its processing of payments. It should update us immediately after August on its performance to date and its progress against its internal targets.*

2. **The scheme design was too complex and made it difficult for victims to engage with.** Many of the difficulties suffered by the Windrush generation were due to insufficient documentation, and yet the Department designed a scheme which demands evidence it acknowledges many claimants do not have. It claims its approach was designed to minimise the evidence required of claimants while also doing enough to be sure that people were eligible for compensation. One area exemplifies the difficulties involved: the Department has made little progress in processing claims where people have died, causing their families further distress. At the time we took evidence, only four out of 132 claims made on behalf of the estate of someone who has died had received payment. More broadly, the Department argues that it tries to strike a balance between simplicity of process while also making the scheme comprehensive but accepts that, in retrospect, it could have done things differently at the beginning. Not administering the scheme effectively undermines the Department's perceived commitment to righting the wrongs suffered by the Windrush generation and the ambition of its transformation programme.

Recommendation: *The Department should identify aspects of the claims process which are not working as effectively as they should, for example helping to remove logistical barriers from estate claims, and set out in the Treasury Minute response:*

- *what training and other practical steps it will take to equip caseworkers to act effectively and compassionately;*
- *the changes it plans to make to simplify, improve and make the scheme demonstrably more efficient*
- *how it will measure if it is achieving its intended outcomes.*

3. **The Department's planning estimates for the scheme have been completely wrong.** When it set up the compensation scheme in April 2019 the Department made a series of key assumptions about how the scheme would work, which have not matched what has happened in practice. For example, it thought that around 15,000 people might be eligible, an estimate it revised down to 11,500 in October 2019. In fact it has only received about a fifth of even the revised estimate and is now looking to revise it again. It also thought that each case would take its caseworkers, on average, about 30 hours to process; whereas in practice it has taken them five times as long. The Department's estimate that it might pay out compensation of between £120 million and £310 million was exceedingly broad, but by the end of April 2021 it had only paid out £20.5 million. In mid-2019 the Department disagreed with this Committee's recommendation that it should do more to engage with Commonwealth citizens from countries outside the Caribbean who could be affected; in doing so it unnecessarily delayed efforts to reach more people, and now recognises it could have done more earlier.

Recommendation: *The Department should use its experience to date and knowledge gained from its community engagement work to formulate, as soon as possible, a new assessment of how many people it now thinks are eligible, which will in turn improve its estimate of the overall amount of compensation required and help structure realistic caseworking requirements to meet. It should write to us once this work is completed to explain its new estimate, the basis of the assumptions it has used in formulating this estimate and how it will monitor how well this estimate matches reality.*

4. **The Department launched the scheme without the caseworkers it required to deliver the complex scheme it designed and has never had the operational capacity it needs, leaving people waiting for decisions.** When it launched the scheme, the Department had only six caseworkers to deal with processing claims, compared to the 125 it considered it would need. It has never caught up and appears to still be significantly understaffed. While it has also been taking caseworkers far longer than expected to deal with each individual claim, there have been errors and inconsistencies in the way claims have been processed, with quality assurance checks often finding that cases need revisiting and work repeated. The Department says it now has plans to review its training for caseworkers with a view to improving the process. It is also looking at how it can restructure the way it organises its caseworkers across all areas of the Department to bring together expertise.

Recommendation: *The Department should write to the Committee within one month setting out its plan to improve its caseworking operations, including:*

- *whether it has successfully increased the number of caseworkers for the scheme as planned and whether it will need to recruit any more caseworkers;*
- *what further support it will provide to individual caseworkers, including training mentoring and guidance; and*
- *the plans in place to improve consistency and productivity in caseworking.*

1 Performance of the scheme

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Home Office (the Department) about the Windrush Compensation Scheme.¹
2. In 2018, the Department acknowledged serious shortcomings in its treatment of the Windrush generation, who had suffered harm due to the Department’s ‘hostile environment’ policies. These policies required members of the Windrush generation to demonstrate their lawful immigration status to access public services, housing and jobs. Some struggled to do this even though they were living in the UK legally.²
3. The Department announced a set of measures to “right the wrongs” experienced by those affected. One of those measures was the Windrush Compensation Scheme (the scheme). The scheme aimed to compensate members of the Windrush generation and their families for the losses and impacts they have suffered as a result of being unable to demonstrate their lawful immigration status.³ The Department launched the scheme in April 2019. In December 2020, it announced changes to the scheme, including the introduction of preliminary payments to claimants who have demonstrated they have suffered harm as a result of difficulties in demonstrating their status.⁴ By the end of March 2021, the Department had spent £8.1 million on running the scheme compared to its original budget of £15.8 million.⁵

Performance of the scheme

4. We asked the Department for its latest position on scheme performance and noted that it has been slow to process compensation claims made to the scheme.⁶ By the end of April 2021 (the latest data at the time we took evidence), the Department had received 2,367 claims for compensation. It had paid £20.5 million to 687 individuals, although some of these people may receive further payments.⁷ The Department told us it had made what it considered to be a final decision on 900 claims, concluded 626 claims, paid full and final payments to 412 claims and awaited an appeal decision on an additional 106. The Department is still considering the remaining claims.⁸ The Department claimed its slow progress was in part as a result of its efforts to seek to offer appropriate compensation while also ensuring it is paying only those who are eligible and entitled to it.⁹
5. The National Audit Office report noted that for claims received after March 2020 (the only data for which the Department had detailed process data) only 10% (102 claims) had reached payment approval stage. These 102 claims took on average 177 days to reach payment approval, with half of the cases requiring between 109 and 250 days. These figures excluded older cases which may have taken longer.¹⁰ The Department explained that cases often took significant amounts of time because of the need to obtain supporting

1 C&AG’s Report, *Investigation into the Windrush Compensation Scheme*, Session 2021–21, HC 65, 21 May 2021

2 C&AG’s Report, para 1

3 C&AG’s Report, para 1

4 C&AG’s Report, para 2

5 C&AG’s Report, para 4.2

6 Q27, 29

7 [Windrush Compensation Scheme data: May 2021 – GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/data-collections/windrush-compensation-scheme-data), accessed 29 June 2021

8 Qq 27–28, 36–37

9 Q 29

10 C&AG’s Report, para 4.9

information from other government departments but recognised it took a long time to ‘get going’ on claims.¹¹ In April 2021, the Department announced that 21 people had died after submitting a claim but before receiving compensation.¹² We questioned, therefore, whether there had been sufficient urgency to make changes given that people were dying while waiting for the completion of their claims.¹³

6. The Department recognised that its processing of claims was not always quick and that it had not yet done enough to reduce the time it takes to process them. It claimed that it now has ‘the right plans in place’ to speed them up.¹⁴ It repeatedly underlined its desire to make any further changes necessary to improve performance of the scheme, whatever the cost.¹⁵ It stated these changes could include increasing the workforce and simplifying its existing processes.¹⁶ It did not confirm exactly what further changes it would implement or when, but suggested some were imminent.¹⁷

7. The Department expressed confidence that the scheme would be quicker and less demanding thanks to the changes it implemented in December 2020.¹⁸ We asked what the Department believed was an acceptable period to process claims and heard that it avoided setting such targets as it believes this would create unhelpful incentives for its caseworkers and would overlook the complexity of cases it dealt with.¹⁹ However, the Department confirmed its belief that six months of cases awaiting a decision was ‘about the right number’ for it to hold.²⁰ The Department also reiterated its commitment to paying out 90% of claims submitted before the end of 2020 by August 2021.²¹ The Department told us it was ‘on track’ to meet this target but admitted that this would require a ‘significant uplift in output and productivity’.²²

11 Q 29

12 [Written answer from the Home Secretary, 29 April 2021](#)

13 Q 35

14 Qq 25, 74

15 Qq 25, 29, 34, 74

16 Qq 29–30

17 Qq 26, 74

18 Q 74

19 Q 60

20 Q 60, C&AG’s Report, para 4.13

21 Q 58, C&AG’s Report, para 4.13

22 Q 58

2 Flaws in design and implementation

Complexity

8. The Department claimed that the scheme was unprecedented, but that it had spoken to ombudsmen across government in its efforts to design an effective scheme.²³ Following the session, the Department wrote to us and described how it drew on the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman’s *Principles for Remedy* guidance, the National Audit Office’s briefing *Administration of time-limited compensation schemes* and unspecified ‘good practice from the Home Office and other government departments’.²⁴ The Department acknowledged the design was complex but claimed it attempted to find a balance between a scheme that was comprehensive and one that was easy to understand and apply to.²⁵ The Department told us it did not always achieve this balance, especially at the beginning of the scheme. It also stated that it could have explained some aspects of the scheme better to applicants and that it would consider changes to the guidance it sent them.²⁶ It told us that it was still working to improve that balance through its planned changes to the scheme.²⁷

9. The Department asserted that no-one eligible to receive compensation should fail to receive it because they could not provide evidence to support their claim.²⁸ The Department claimed it designed the scheme to minimise the amount of evidence required, although the National Audit Office reported that initially some areas, for example claims for loss of access to employment, had stringent evidence requirements.²⁹ The Department lowered the burden of proof for some areas of claims within the scheme in October 2020.³⁰ The Department recognised that it would still be very difficult for some to obtain documentary evidence and that in such cases the Department often needed to work with the applicant, former employers or other government departments, such as HMRC and DWP, to obtain that evidence.³¹ Even then, the Department stated that many applicants felt the scheme required too much documentation. It assured us that it would continue to review whether the demands placed upon applicants were realistic.³²

10. We noted that it has been especially difficult for some types of claimants to see progress with their claims.³³ The National Audit Office reported that more than one-third of claims on behalf of the estate of someone who has died had not moved past the initial registration stage of the compensation process and at the time we took evidence only four of 132 such claims had received a payment.³⁴ The Department told us this was because some of the people submitting these claim do not have probate or a letter of administration, and it understood that claimants had been advised that they did not require a grant of probate,

23 Qq 31–32

24 Letter from Home Office Permanent Secretary to the Committee, 22 June 2021

25 Qq 24, 26

26 Qq 26, 33

27 Q 26

28 Q 40

29 C&AG’s report, para 1.8

30 Qq 40, 74; C&AG’s Report, para 4.11

31 Qq 29, 40–42

32 Qq 40, 42–43

33 Qq 26, 72

34 C&AG’s Report, para 4.8, [Windrush Compensation Scheme data: May 2021 – GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/data-requests/windrush-compensation-scheme-data), accessed 29 June 2021

causing them to be ‘stuck in a situation where the claim cannot be progressed because we [the Department] cannot confirm that the person had that authority’.³⁵ The Department said it has tested this requirement with its legal advisers, and that grants of probate are legally required, but it said it would shortly bring forward a range of measures that it hopes may resolve some of these issues.³⁶

11. The Department underlined its determination to right the wrongs it has inflicted on the Windrush generation. It stated that this is why getting the compensation scheme right is absolutely essential.³⁷ The Department repeatedly committed to maximising applications to the scheme and ensuring that people get the maximum amount of compensation they are entitled to.³⁸ It told us that the scheme complements its wider plans to change the culture of the Department and make it more open to people who are directly affected by its policies and operations.³⁹ It stated that this transformation was a long-term project on which it had much further to go.⁴⁰ We asked what practical impacts this cultural change may have on staff but in our view did not receive any clear answer.⁴¹

Planning assumptions

12. We asked whether the Department had been too optimistic in setting out its initial assumptions.⁴² The National Audit Office reported that the Department originally estimated it would pay between £120 and £310 million to an estimated 15,000 claimants.⁴³ In October 2019, the Department reduced this estimate to between £60 million and £260 million to 11,500 individuals.⁴⁴ The Department acknowledged that its original forecasts of 15,000 applicants were ‘definitely wrong’ despite being based on its own analysis and census data. It went on to state that, having received only 2,369 applications (see footnote), it was likely to reduce its revised estimate of 11,500 further.⁴⁵ At the time we took evidence in early June, it reported having paid only £20.5 million in compensation.⁴⁶

13. The Department told us it wanted to ensure all those potentially eligible to apply to the scheme could do so.⁴⁷ This committee recommended in March 2019 that the Department extend its historical reviews “beyond Caribbean Commonwealth nationals to include other Commonwealth nationals who may have been wrongfully detained, removed or sanctioned under the compliant environment”. But, in June 2019, the Department rejected this recommendation and referred to it having already ‘conducted extensive outreach’ to raise awareness.⁴⁸ Despite the Department’s apparent efforts, The National Audit Office reported in May 2021 that, in a survey by the Department, more than half of respondents

35 Q 72

36 Qq 72–73

37 Qq 23, 33

38 Qq 25, 29, 43, 49, 53, 57, 60

39 Qq 19–20, 68

40 Qq 18–19

41 Qq 18–19

42 Q 25

43 C&AG’s Report, para 9

44 C&AG’s Report, para 1.11

45 Q 25 (although the department stated 2,369, we understand it would have meant 2,367, which was the latest figure at the time according to [Windrush Compensation Scheme data: May 2021 – GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/windrush-compensation-scheme-data-may-2021), accessed 29 June 2021)

46 [Windrush Compensation Scheme data: May 2021 – GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/windrush-compensation-scheme-data-may-2021), accessed 29 June 2021

47 Qq 46, 49

48 HM Treasury, *Government response to the Committee of Public Accounts on the Eighty-Second and the Eighty-Sixth to the Ninety-Second reports from Session 2017–19*, CP 113, June 2019

thought the scheme was relevant only to those from the Caribbean.⁴⁹ We heard that the Department had started its community fund to support outreach work only in December 2020, and therefore asked why there had been such a delay.⁵⁰ The Department recognised that, in hindsight, it ‘could have been quicker off the mark’ with its efforts to engage with other affected communities.⁵¹ It assured us it was actively looking to ensure it promoted the scheme across a broader range of communities, such as those from South Asia and West Africa, through its outreach events and community fund.⁵² The Department claimed that the number of applications from these areas was still relatively small but did not specify how many applications that amounted to or how many it expected.⁵³

14. The Department acknowledged it took longer to process claims than it had expected.⁵⁴ The National Audit Office calculated that claims took an average of 154 staff hours to process to payment, five times more than the Department originally estimated.⁵⁵ The Department could not explain how it made its original caseworking estimates but assured us it made them ‘with the best of intentions’.⁵⁶ It recognised it had misunderstood how complex cases would be and how long it may take to gather information on behalf of claimants from employers and other government departments.⁵⁷

Operational capacity and capability

15. The National Audit Office reported that the Department originally planned to have 125 caseworkers, but at the launch of the scheme it only had six.⁵⁸ The Department told us it had entirely rebuilt its capacity plan since ‘October or November’ 2020.⁵⁹ However, the National Audit Office reported that, at March 2021, the Department struggled to provide a clear picture of the caseworkers it needed and this capacity plan differed from the figures presented to the scheme’s senior management team.⁶⁰ The Department explained that, at the end of March 2021, it had 53 caseworkers working on the scheme with plans to recruit another ten. It went on to tell us that it now had plans to recruit another 15 caseworkers, of whom five had arrived, with an additional five in training and 20 ‘in the pipeline to arrive’.⁶¹ Despite having fewer caseworkers than it requires for the scheme, the Department told us it did ‘not have too much of a problem’ recruiting caseworkers. However, it pointed out that it had identified the retention of people with caseworking skills as a major risk.⁶²

16. The Department told us it has a lengthy and comprehensive training course for caseworkers followed by mentoring to ensure that caseworkers formulate awards accurately.⁶³ The National Audit Office noted that, as of March 2021, the Department was aware of six overpayments, totalling £38,292 in value.⁶⁴ Based on a review of a small

49 C&AG’s Report para 2.7

50 Qq 46–48

51 Qq 47–48

52 Q 46

53 Q 46

54 Q 29

55 C&AG’s Report, para 4.4

56 Q 31

57 Qq 29, 31, 55

58 Q 52, C&AG’s Report, para 4.3

59 Q 52

60 C&AG’s Report, para 4.3

61 Q 30

62 Qq 66–68

63 Q 54

64 C&AG’s Report, para 4.17

sample of casework, the National Audit Office found that the Department's quality assurance processes are not picking up all errors.⁶⁵ It also reported that the scheme's quality assurance managers return more than half of claims they review to a caseworker for further work.⁶⁶ The Department said that this was sometimes because not everything had been done to maximise compensation for the claimant, but acknowledged it wants to reduce the number of cases returned to caseworkers.⁶⁷ The Department told us it is reviewing its guidance and processes for its relatively junior caseworkers to make them simpler and reduce the risk of making errors.⁶⁸

17. The Department noted that it was exploring options to obtain additional caseworking support for the scheme from elsewhere within the Department.⁶⁹ In the longer term, it is examining how it can restructure the way it organises its caseworkers across all areas of the Department as part of its transformation programme.⁷⁰ It stated this would bring together caseworking functions and expertise into a single career structure.⁷¹ It claimed this would be specifically designed to make it easier to learn lessons from different schemes, for example the Passport Office, which the Department could then apply within its Windrush response.⁷²

65 C&AG's report, 4.18

66 C&AG's report, 4.15

67 Q 53

68 Q 53

69 Q 30

70 Qq 17–18

71 Qq 18, 44, 68

72 Q 44

Formal minutes

Thursday 22 July 2021

Virtual meeting

Members present:

Dame Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown	Anthony Higginbotham
Mr Mark Francois	Kate Osamor
Peter Grant	Nick Smith

Draft Report (*Windrush Compensation Scheme*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 17 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourteenth of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Thursday 9 September at 9:15am

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 7 June 2021

Matthew Rycroft CBE, Permanent Secretary, Home Office; **Tom Greig**, Deputy Director of Windrush compensation scheme, Home Office; **Paul Lincoln**, Director General Border Force, Home Office; **Charu Gorasia**, Director General, Capabilities and Resources, Home Office

[Q1-157](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

HOR numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Refugee Council ([HOR0001](#))
- 2 London Borough of Hackney ([HOR0003](#))
- 3 Chinegwundoh, Miss Gertrude ([HOR0004](#))
- 4 Vernon OBE, Dr Patrick ([HOR0005](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Session 2021–22

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Low emission cars	HC 186
2nd	BBC strategic financial management	HC 187
3rd	COVID-19: Support for children's education	HC 240
4th	COVID-19: Local government finance	HC 239
5th	COVID-19: Government Support for Charities	HC 250
6th	Public Sector Pensions	HC 289
7th	Adult Social Care Markets	HC 252
8th	COVID 19: Culture Recovery Fund	HC 340
9th	Fraud and Error	HC 253
10th	Overview of the English rail system	HC 170
11th	Local auditor reporting on local government in England	HC 171
12th	COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update	HC 173
13th	Initial lessons from the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic	HC 175
1st Special Report	Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts	HC 222

Session 2019–21

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Support for children with special educational needs and disabilities	HC 85
2nd	Defence Nuclear Infrastructure	HC 86
3rd	High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update	HC 84
4th	EU Exit: Get ready for Brexit Campaign	HC 131
5th	University technical colleges	HC 87
6th	Excess votes 2018–19	HC 243
7th	Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people	HC 134
8th	NHS capital expenditure and financial management	HC 344
9th	Water supply and demand management	HC 378
10th	Defence capability and the Equipment Plan	HC 247

Number	Title	Reference
11th	Local authority investment in commercial property	HC 312
12th	Management of tax reliefs	HC 379
13th	Whole of Government Response to COVID-19	HC 404
14th	Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak	HC 405
15th	Improving the prison estate	HC 244
16th	Progress in remediating dangerous cladding	HC 406
17th	Immigration enforcement	HC 407
18th	NHS nursing workforce	HC 408
19th	Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster	HC 549
20th	Tackling the tax gap	HC 650
21st	Government support for UK exporters	HC 679
22nd	Digital transformation in the NHS	HC 680
23rd	Delivering carrier strike	HC 684
24th	Selecting towns for the Towns Fund	HC 651
25th	Asylum accommodation and support transformation programme	HC 683
26th	Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20	HC 681
27th	Covid-19: Supply of ventilators	HC 685
28th	The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's management of the Magnox contract	HC 653
29th	Whitehall preparations for EU Exit	HC 682
30th	The production and distribution of cash	HC 654
31st	Starter Homes	HC 88
32nd	Specialist Skills in the civil service	HC 686
33rd	Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme	HC 687
34th	Covid-19: Support for jobs	HC 920
35th	Improving Broadband	HC 688
36th	HMRC performance 2019–20	HC 690
37th	Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19	HC 655
38th	Managing colleges' financial sustainability	HC 692
39th	Lessons from major projects and programmes	HC 694
40th	Achieving government's long-term environmental goals	HC 927
41st	COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme	HC 689
42nd	COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal Protective Equipment	HC 928
43rd	COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1	HC 930
44th	Excess Votes 2019–20	HC 1205

Number	Title	Reference
45th	Managing flood risk	HC 931
46th	Achieving Net Zero	HC 935
47th	COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1)	HC 932
48th	Digital Services at the Border	HC 936
49th	COVID-19: housing people sleeping rough	HC 934
50th	Defence Equipment Plan 2020–2030	HC 693
51st	Managing the expiry of PFI contracts	HC 1114
52nd	Key challenges facing the Ministry of Justice	HC 1190
53rd	Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown	HC 938
54th	Improving single living accommodation for service personnel	HC 940
55th	Environmental tax measures	HC 937
56th	Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund	HC 941