House of Commons
Foreign Affairs Committee

Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond

Second Report of Session 2021–22

Report, together with formal minutes relating to the report

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The Foreign Affairs Committee

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Summary

The crimes being committed against the Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) are truly horrifying. The Chinese government is responsible for the mass detention of more than a million Uyghurs, for forcing them into industrial-scale forced labour programmes, and for attempting to wipe out Uyghur and Islamic culture in the region through forced sterilisation of women, destruction of cultural sites, and separation of children from families.

The UK Government is not powerless. The international system, designed in the shadow of the worst human rights violations imaginable, has built institutions such as the UN to respond to crises like this. Through regulating the private sector by implementing stricter rules for businesses that may otherwise profit from forced labour, we can help prevent abuse. By providing greater support and safeguards for Uyghur people and the preservation of their culture, we can protect them against acts which the House of Commons has stated constitute crimes against humanity and genocide. By sharpening the Government’s systems for predicting and preventing mass atrocities, we have options to stand with the defenceless against the indefensible.

The atrocities in Xinjiang are an international call to action; once again, they show that powerful actors are able to oppress people within their territory with impunity. In this report, we provide a blueprint for accountability against a major power that is committing mass atrocities. We wish to stress that the effectiveness of each action outlined in this report will be amplified greatly if taken in concert with other countries. Underpinning this whole report is the view that the Government must seek to build coalitions of action on Xinjiang through every available avenue.

After every major atrocity and tragedy, the world says, “never again”. It is happening again. It is not too late to act.
# Introduction

**Box 1: Submission from a Uyghur relative**

Around 2017, I learned from family, friends, and acquaintances that they had gradually lost contact with my family and relatives. Later I found out that some of them had been put into those facilities called ‘Vocational Training and Education Center’ and some had been sent to prison, while for others it was simply that no one knew their whereabouts.

Source: Confidential

1. This report sets out the response required of the UK Government and international partners to stop the atrocities the Chinese party-state is committing in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Under the guise of counter-terrorism, the Chinese government is committing mass atrocities and human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and other ethnic groups in Xinjiang. Reports of forced labour programmes, arbitrary detention in internment camps, cultural erasure, systematic rape, forced sterilisations, separation of children from families, and a high-technology surveillance system—all endorsed by the Chinese government’s central leadership—are strongly supported by the evidence that we have received in this inquiry.

2. These atrocities are documented in extensive detail by various NGOs, think tanks, and media organisations. Rather than recreate the details of those reports here, our focus has been on proposing recommendations that the UK Government and others can implement to improve the situation for Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang, and to hold those responsible for the most serious human rights abuses to account for their actions.

3. China is one of the world’s most powerful nations. As detailed in the Committee’s reports *A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy* and *In the Room: The UK’s role in multilateral diplomacy*, recent years have seen Beijing pursue its ambition to build China’s primacy through more assertive and at times coercive foreign policies. However, as this inquiry has found, the greatest victims of the Communist Party of China’s current policies are the citizens of China themselves.

4. The credible reports of egregious human rights abuses emerging from Xinjiang should call into question the Communist Party of China’s ability to speak of values or human rights in international organisations. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, China is a guarantor of the international system it played such a key role in creating. In recognition of the horrendous abuses the Chinese people suffered in the Second World War, China was given the honour of being the first nation to sign the UN Charter. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at the heart of the treaty, was

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1 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is the official name of the area. Many witnesses we heard from used the name East Turkistan, reflecting the belief that the region should be an independent state from China. We are not addressing such questions in this report. While we recognise that no name for the region is without ideological or political connotations, we have opted to simply use the short-form ‘Xinjiang’ in the majority of references to the region.

even crafted by a Chinese philosopher-diplomat, Peng Chun Chang. What we are seeing in Xinjiang contravenes those values, which were engraved into our history by Chinese thinkers. These abuses—if unchecked—undermine the international system itself.

Chapter 2 will address the multilateral action available to the UK, through the UN and other means, including informal coalitions. Chapter 3 explores the support needed by the Uyghur diaspora and the steps required to preserve Uyghur culture. Chapter 4 lays out measures to remove Uyghur forced labour from UK supply chains. Chapter 5 makes recommendations for the UK’s education and technology sectors, which will help ensure that UK research and technology is not used for the repression of people around the world. Chapter 6 addresses the changes needed to the UK’s atrocity prevention strategy to improve the response to future mass atrocities.

During this inquiry, we took oral evidence over six sessions between December 2020 and April 2021. Besides representatives from the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), we heard evidence from campaigners in the international Uyghur community, world-leading atrocity prevention experts, industry bodies, NGOs, and experts in international human rights law. In addition to this, we received 86 submissions of written evidence. We would like to extend our gratitude to all those who provided oral and written evidence.

Many of these written submissions came from members of the overseas Uyghur community, who contacted the Committee to share their stories about missing family members. Many of them had not heard from their relatives in years; others had heard from them only under conversations strictly monitored and controlled by Communist Party officials. In most cases, those giving evidence believed that those family members with whom they had not had contact had been subjected to detention and ongoing surveillance by the Chinese Government. For safeguarding reasons, we made the decision to keep the majority of these submissions confidential.

In coordination with the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Committee, we contacted and received responses from 20 UK companies about the state of forced labour in their supply chains. We were pleased to see that the majority of companies reported that they do not knowingly source materials directly from Xinjiang. Our concern remains that, indirectly or inadvertently, materials gathered through Xinjiang slave labour are still present in UK supply chains. We will address this in Chapter 4.

We contacted many organisations, including universities, research bodies, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and the International Labour Organization (ILO). In various responses from UK universities, we were surprised to learn that many institutions were unaware of what is happening in Xinjiang. There is no excuse for ignorance about an issue as widely reported as this. We were particularly disappointed by UNESCO and ICOMOS. UNESCO provided us with a wholly inadequate response to our concerns about cultural destruction in Xinjiang. ICOMOS ignored us entirely.

The Chinese government argues that it is countering terrorism, separatism and extremism in Xinjiang in an attempt to legitimise its actions there. We invited the then-Chinese Ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, to give evidence to the Committee. The
Chinese embassy declined this invitation, choosing instead to deride the processes of parliamentary scrutiny and accusing the Committee of believing the “lies of the century”. We note the embassy’s response, but we are disappointed that the Chinese government did not choose to explain its actions, nor provide evidence to support its case, when invited to do so.

11. We regret that discussions about the actions of the Chinese government too often lead to an increase in anti-Asian racism and discrimination in Western countries. We ask readers to remember the distinction between the Chinese government and Chinese people.
2 The multilateral system

Box 2: Submission from a Uyghur relative

Both of my parents are University graduates, they don’t need any ‘education’. Both of them have been working in their respective workplace for over 25 years … they don’t need ‘vocational training’. My parents speak fluent Mandarin … they don’t need to ‘learn Mandarin’.

Source: Confidential

Overview

12. China’s influence is global, and it commands a great deal of support through formal international institutions and informal coalitions. The voice of the Chinese people is essential in a connected world and the role of Chinese diplomats and civil actors is essential in charting a shared future. This should not allow the Communist Party of China to reject the rights that were crafted by previous representatives from Beijing. Nor should it mean that multilateral organisations, including the UN, are unable to act on Xinjiang. The evidence we heard indicates that, while many options are limited, there are viable avenues for holding the Chinese government to account. In many cases, the influence of China and the nature of its relationship with multilateral institutions will require a more creative and innovative approach from the UK Government.

13. China’s refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, its right to veto in the United Nations Security Council (see Box 3), and its reservation against Article IX of the Genocide Convention mean that the Government’s longstanding policy that international courts have sole responsibility to determine genocide is ineffective in addressing the most serious crimes. Frustration with the paralysis of the international legal system has led legislators in the US, Canada, the Netherlands, the UK, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic to make declarations of genocide of their own. The Government should accept Parliament’s view that Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang are suffering genocide and crimes against humanity, and take action to bring these crimes to an end.


The most powerful branch of the United Nations, the Security Council, has five ‘Permanent Members’: the UK, United States, France, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China. All five Permanent Members have the right to veto, meaning that they can automatically vote down any Security Council resolution or decision. This leaves the prospect of action through the Security Council highly unlikely. However, there are other UN mechanisms which may be used.


5 Under Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), any state accused of failing in its responsibility to prevent and punish genocide may be referred to the International Court of Justice by another state party to the Genocide Convention. China has made a reservation against Article IX, meaning it does not consider itself bound by this article.

6 HC Deb, 22 April 2021, col 1211 [Commons Chamber] “Resolved, That this House believes that Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are suffering crimes against humanity and genocide; and calls on the Government to act to fulfil its obligations under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide and all relevant instruments of international law to bring it to an end.”
14. Whether genocide, crimes against humanity, or crimes of any other name, the atrocities in Xinjiang represent an international crisis of profound urgency, making it unconscionable for any civilised government to look the other way. Minister for Asia, Nigel Adams MP, has expressly stated this view. In January 2021, the Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons:

It would frankly be absurd for any Government to wait for the human rights situation in a country to reach the level of genocide, which is the most egregious international crime, before halting free trade agreement negotiations. Any responsible Government would have acted well before then.

15. In the Government’s own words, there is a serious need to act even in the absence of a genocide determination. Both the UK and the wider international community have a responsibility to hold the Chinese government to account for its inhumane and abhorrent actions against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups. Doing so will require action through the UN system, through public and private diplomatic pressure, and by building coalitions to support the Uyghurs and other groups facing repression in Xinjiang.

The United Nations

Box 4: UK Statement at the UN Human Rights Council, 30 June 2020

A number of the signatories to this statement submitted a letter last year to express concern about arbitrary detention, widespread surveillance and restrictions, particularly targeting Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang. These deep concerns have been reinforced by additional information now in the public domain. We urge China to allow the High Commissioner [for Human Rights] meaningful access to Xinjiang at the earliest opportunity.

Source: Gov.uk, UN Human Rights Council 44: Cross-regional statement on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, 30 June 2020

16. Representatives of the UK and other countries have made a number of statements at the UN condemning the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang. We welcome the fact that international support for such statements is growing (see Table 1).

Table 1: Growing support for statements condemning policies in Xinjiang at the UN

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Source: Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (XIN0059) para 5; Gov.uk, UN Human Rights Council 47: Joint statement on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, 22 June 2021

7 Q258 [Nigel Adams MP]  
8 HC Deb, 12 January 2021, col. 164 [Commons Chamber]
17. The UK’s use of the UN as a platform to call out these actions is commendable but has proved ineffective so far. More frequent, more sustained, and more targeted pressure is needed to deliver greater impact, both in terms of maintaining pressure on the Chinese government and keeping public attention on the issue. The only acceptable outcome of these efforts is the complete dissolution of the re-education camps, the dismantling of the ethnically targeted surveillance state in Xinjiang (explored further in Chapter 6), and an end to the forced labour programmes. **The UK should call directly for the immediate disbandment of the internment camp system in Xinjiang, the cessation of forced sterilisation of women and separation of children, and an end to mass forced labour programmes such as Xinjiang Aid.**

18. While we have no doubt that mass atrocities are occurring in Xinjiang, some states unfortunately say that they require further proof. We believe that calling on the Chinese government to accept international observers and investigations remains an effective way of applying pressure. Public criticism of the Chinese government’s Xinjiang policy has led to a changing narrative—while at first the government denied the existence of the camps, it later changed its story to describe them as ‘re-education centres’. It is an unreliable witness to its own abuses. **The UK Government should increase pressure on the Chinese government to allow international observers access to Xinjiang, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Government should use every opportunity it has at UN organs, summits, and treaty bodies to raise the issue. To do this, the UK should engage more closely with partners and those nations not currently taking action to ensure support on UN votes and statements.**

19. Even if the Chinese government continues to deny international observers access to Xinjiang, there is a great deal of evidence that can be used to verify the extent of the crimes being committed there, as shown by the volume of evidence we received from Uyghurs as well as the recent hearings of the Uyghur Tribunal. Sophie Richardson, China Director at Human Rights Watch, suggested the possibility of an investigation continuing outside of China. The UK can also use its Human Rights Council seat to push for other types of investigations, such as a Commission of Inquiry. **If the Chinese government continues to stall and prevent in-country investigations, the UK should propose a Human Rights Council motion that the High Commissioner for Human Rights conduct an investigation into the atrocities in Xinjiang from outside of China. The Government should also explore the prospect of a Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry.**

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9 Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (XIN0059) para 8
10 Uyghur Tribunal, About, accessed 7 June 2021: “an independent people’s tribunal to investigate ‘ongoing atrocities and possible Genocide’ against the Uyghurs, Kazakhs and other Turkic Muslim Populations.”
11 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (XIN0047) para 4.4
12 Q171 [Sophie Richardson]
13 A Commission of Inquiry is a UN mechanism used to investigate serious violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law. Commissions of Inquiry have previously been established to investigate issues in Burundi and Syria.
14 Uyghur Human Rights Project (XIN0071) p 1
15 Anonymous (XIN0079) para 1
Box 5: Explainer: UN Treaty Bodies

The United Nations human rights treaty bodies monitor countries’ work to protect the human rights of certain groups (e.g. children) and on certain themes (e.g. protection from torture). Many have the ability to hear and assess complaints against the states which are committing human rights violations.


20. Besides the primary UN organs, the Government should consider using UN treaty bodies as avenues of accountability. While the Chinese government does not accept the authority of the dispute resolution procedures of most UN treaty bodies,16 Beijing has not entered a reservation against the dispute resolution mechanism (Article 11) of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.17 The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination provides a viable avenue through which the UK Government, with others, may hold the Chinese government accountable, and another forum through which likeminded countries can draw attention to and pursue accountability for human rights abuses in Xinjiang. We recommend that the Government urgently raise a complaint against China to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

21. There are further measures that can be taken through the multilateral system. Special sessions of the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council have provided fora for the discussion of the most pressing issues of our times, including Apartheid in 1989, HIV/AIDS in 2001, and Covid-19 in 2020.1819 While Beijing can veto resolutions and votes at the Security Council, it has no such power at the General Assembly or the Human Rights Council, where resolutions are agreed by simple majority. The Government has not ruled out the possibility of a special session, and should translate the growing support for its UN statements into action.2021 We recommend that the UK moves for special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Council to find solutions to the crisis in Xinjiang.

Accountability

22. The Government should explore the viability of holding the Chinese government accountable through the international legal system, through institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC). We have heard that, although accountability options through the ICC are limited due to China not being a state party to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor22 may initiate an investigation on their own volition (called a proprio motu investigation), if the Court finds it has the territorial jurisdiction to do so.23 We recommend that the Government engages in dialogue with the International Criminal Court about the feasibility of a proprio motu investigation into crimes committed against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and beyond.

16 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (XIN0083) para 9
17 Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (XIN0083) para 10
18 General Assembly of the United Nations, Special Sessions, accessed 27 May 2021
20 Q260 [Nigel Adams]
21 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (XIN0047) para 4.4
22 The ICC officer responsible for investigating crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity.
23 Global Rights Compliance (XIN0065) p 2
23. The collection and preservation of evidence will be essential for future accountability for these crimes. We recommend that the Government allocate funding for the creation of an international mechanism for collecting evidence on the crimes in Xinjiang, and provides further resources to help locate and record the details of those who have gone missing under the Chinese Communist Party’s internment system so that they do not remain nameless victims.

Building coalitions

24. Any action taken through multilateral institutions and agreements should be done in concert with likeminded countries. We welcome the 2021 Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué in which member states committed to calling on China to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in Xinjiang.24 The UK should continue to undertake such work through the G7 and other multilateral networks such as the Commonwealth. This will improve the chances of having an impact on a country as large and influential as China and avoid running a “one-country crusade”.252627 The ‘D10’ model of democratic countries is a good starting point for coalition-building but cannot be the limit—significant diplomatic efforts should also be focused on states in Africa, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The Government should lead efforts to create a more consistent coalition of democratic countries to coordinate action on Xinjiang through the UN and other institutions.

25. Many countries, including a significant number from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, do not speak out against the atrocities in Xinjiang due to their economic relationships with the Chinese government.28 We welcome the G7 announcement of the Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative, a global infrastructure development project based on values and good governance. This alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative offers an excellent opportunity to counter the Chinese government’s illiberal influence and to uphold decent working conditions for all. We recommend that the Government commits financial and bureaucratic resources to ensuring future Build Back Better World projects meet all internationally recognised standards, including on labour rights, environmental measures, and transparency.

2022 Beijing Winter Olympics

26. As part of its efforts to accumulate global power and influence, the Chinese government seeks international recognition.29 Condemnation of the atrocities in Xinjiang poses a credible threat to China’s prestige and soft power, evidenced by the Chinese government’s changing narrative on the camps. Public condemnation, not closed-door diplomacy, will have the greatest impact.30 The Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics offer another opportunity to question the Chinese government’s ability to act as a global leader and to ‘name and shame’ for its crimes in Xinjiang.3132

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24 G7 UK 2021, Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, para 49
25 Q43 [Fionnuala Ní Aoláin]
26 Q227 [Azeem Ibrahim]
27 Q219 [Charles Parton]
28 Q227 [Azeem Ibrahim]
29 The Rights Practice (XIN0064) para 6
30 Q47 [Nury Turkel]
31 Q220 [Charles Parton]
32 Adrian Gallagher (XIN0042) para 12
Asia, Nigel Adams MP, declined to give a view, suggesting that this was the competency of the British Olympic Association. Charles Parton, Associate Fellow at RUSI, suggested that an alternative to a boycott of the Winter Olympics would be to “make them cost” in terms of sponsorships, reputation, and prestige.

27. If the British Olympic Association and competing teams decide not to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the Government should not attend and should urge others not to do so. The Government should suggest the British Olympic Association does not participate in the opening or closing ceremonies, beyond one representative carrying the Union Flag. It should abstain from sending government officials to any ceremonies or functions, strongly discourage UK businesses from sponsoring or advertising at the Olympics, encourage fans and tourists to stay away, and discourage athletes from supporting or accepting the Chinese government’s propaganda efforts while in-country.

Sanctions

28. We welcome the Government’s decision in March 2021 to impose sanctions on those who bear responsibility for the atrocities in Xinjiang in coordination with the United States, EU, and Canada. Other countries have gone further with their sanctions—for example, through placing sanctions on Communist Party Secretary of the XUAR Chen Quanguo, who is widely regarded as the ‘architect’ of the atrocities. For sanctions to be effective, they must be used in full coordination with allies and against those with whom ultimate responsibility for the Xinjiang atrocities lies. We recommend that the Government intensify efforts to coordinate sanctions with allies to consistently sanction senior individuals and entities with the most responsibility for or connection to abuses in Xinjiang.

UNESCO

29. There is a need to act on the widespread cultural destruction in Xinjiang. According to Dr Simon Adams of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the Chinese government is “systematically destroying the cultural underpinnings of the Uyghur people”, for example through bulldozing and modifying mosques. This claim is supported by research from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), which found that thousands of mosques have been destroyed by the Chinese government. The preservation and protection of culture is the responsibility of UNESCO, which says it works to promote “cultural heritage and equal dignity of all cultures”.

30. From written correspondence, it became clear to us that UNESCO is failing to deliver on its mandate to safeguard cultural heritage in Xinjiang, where thousands of mosques have reportedly been demolished by the Chinese government. In a letter, the Committee Chair raised concerns about the widespread destruction of Uyghur and Islamic heritage.
and identity in Xinjiang. UNESCO’s Assistant Director-General for Culture, Ernesto Ottone Ramirez, said that UNESCO had “no reports of any damage to the inscribed World Heritage properties located in the Xinjiang Province [sic]”.41 In focusing only on World Heritage sites,42 this response deliberately sidesteps the widespread and credible reports of the destruction of thousands of mosques in Xinjiang and the active crackdown on Uyghur and Islamic cultural practices.

31. UNESCO’s response was wilfully disingenuous, showing complete disregard for the destruction of Uyghur culture and heritage. This casts serious doubt on the credibility of UNESCO. It also raises the question of how much influence illiberal states exert over UNESCO, its World Heritage Committee, and its coordinating Bureau, of which a senior Communist Party of China official is the Chairperson. Besides China, Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are World Heritage Committee Members.43 These countries have all publicly supported the Chinese government’s Xinjiang policies at the United Nations.44 The UK Government should push for an urgent, independent review of UNESCO’s investigatory powers and processes, and formally request that the organisation pursue its mandate with determination and commitment. The UK should adopt a policy of coordinating with allies to block and reduce the influence of the worst human rights-abusing countries on the UNESCO World Heritage Committee.

41 Correspondence with UNESCO, 18 February 2021 and 5 March 2021.
42 To be considered for inclusion in the World Heritage list, sites must meet certain criteria. UNESCO’s response indicated that, as no sites meeting these criteria are in danger in Xinjiang, they are not required to act.
44 The Diplomat, 2020 Edition: Which Countries Are For or Against China’s Xinjiang Policies?, 9 October 2020
3 Diaspora and culture

Box 6: Submission from a Uyghur relative

Unfortunately, my family members were unlawfully arrested for the sole reason that they have family members living abroad.

Source: Confidential

Like all the Uyghurs in the diaspora, I am an indirect victim and a genocide expert. They call us secondary survivors. We have suffered unbearable trauma for nearly four years.

—Dolkun Isa, President of the World Uyghur Congress

32. The persecution of minority ethnic groups reaches beyond China, to the extent that Uyghurs are harassed, watched, and monitored even in countries where they have claimed asylum or obtained citizenship. Uyghurs in the diaspora are often told their families will be detained if they do not return to China or do not cease dissident activities. Many Uyghurs who submitted evidence to us spoke of their fear of contacting relatives in case those relatives are punished with internment. Many who have sought asylum also live in fear of their host governments, as evidence of countries deporting Uyghurs back to China, either directly or via third countries, under pressure from the Chinese government is widespread. The deportation of refugees or asylum seekers to countries where they will face persecution—an act known as refoulement—is prohibited under international human rights law.

Box 7: Uyghur attorney Rayhan Asat on speaking out about her missing brother, Ekpar Asat

It took me four years to speak out, and it comes from a deep sense of fear that my family might face some form of retaliation. So far, I still maintain a deep connection with my family—I mean, I talk to them—but I cannot talk to them about my brother.

Source: Q206 [Rayhan Asat]

33. In oral evidence, the Minister for Asia, Nigel Adams MP, stated the Government’s opposition to forcibly returning people to a country where they may be in danger. He also voiced the Government’s support for the Uyghurs more specifically:

We want to send a clear message to the Uyghurs in the UK that we support their situation, their culture, their history and their religion, of course.

34. This rhetorical commitment to Uyghur culture is welcome but effectively worthless unless matched with action. Uyghurs living in the UK have a legitimate expectation of

45 Q0 [Dolkun Isa]
46 Q206 [Rushan Abbas]
47 Uyghur Human Rights Project (XIN0071) p 10
48 Q199 [Rayhan Asat]
49 Amnesty International, Nowhere Feels Safe, accessed 16 June 2021
51 Q303 [Nigel Adams MP]
52 Q302 [Nigel Adams MP]
adequate support when faced with harassment or persecution.\textsuperscript{53} It is unacceptable that members of Uyghur and Islamic communities in the UK are vulnerable to harassment from the Chinese government. \textit{The Government should conduct an urgent consultation with members of these communities in the UK to determine the extent of harassment they are facing and the type of support they require, offering support and protection as appropriate.} 

35. We welcome the Government’s recent decision to offer specific support to British National (Overseas) families relocating from Hong Kong to the UK.\textsuperscript{54} The goodwill behind this decision should be extended to all those who flee persecution and oppression in Xinjiang. A commitment to provide asylum for all Uyghurs would be a significant act of support.\textsuperscript{55} \textit{We recommend that the Government implement an asylum fast track for Uyghurs and members of other minority ethnic groups who are fleeing persecution in China.} 

36. The impact of this action will be amplified significantly if the UK coordinates with international partners to show they will not support the Chinese government’s demands for refoulement.\textsuperscript{56} \textit{The UK should form a coalition of ‘sanctuary states’ that will publicly recommit to the principle of non-refoulement.} Doing so will signal to members of persecuted minority groups such as the Uyghurs that they will be safe in these countries, and it will apply further diplomatic and reputational pressure on those states guilty of deporting Uyghurs to China. 

37. States that deport people back to face persecution in China must also be held accountable for their actions. Under Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT), states must not forcibly return individuals to a country where they would be at risk of torture.\textsuperscript{57} Uyghurs who are deported to Xinjiang almost certainly face such treatment, and those who conduct such deportations should be held accountable.\textsuperscript{58} Indeed, the Foreign Secretary has expressed the view that the crimes in Xinjiang “at their worst … amount to torture”.\textsuperscript{59} \textit{We recommend that, where there is credible evidence of a state party to the United Nations Convention against Torture deporting Uyghurs and members of other persecuted minority groups to China, the UK should raise a complaint against that state to the Committee against Torture.} 

38. It is important that efforts to support members of the Uyghur diaspora are matched by work to support the continued survival of Uyghur culture. The Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang represent a concerted effort to systematically target Uyghur and Islamic heritage and cultural practices in the region. Multilateral bodies such as UNESCO are failing to intervene in any meaningful way. In the absence of action from UNESCO, there is an opportunity for the UK to play a leading role in supporting the preservation of Uyghur culture. \textit{The British Council should prioritise cultural protection funding for the preservation and promotion of Uyghur tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The BBC World Service should broadcast in Uyghur in areas where substantial Uyghur communities live.} 

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} The Muslim Council of Britain (XIN0073) para 6
\item \textsuperscript{54} Gov.uk, \textit{National Welcome for Hong Kong arrivals}, accessed 2 June 2021
\item \textsuperscript{55} Q198 [Peter Irwin]
\item \textsuperscript{56} Uyghur Human Rights Project (XIN0071) p 5
\item \textsuperscript{57} United Nations Human Rights, \textit{Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment}, accessed 2 June 2021
\item \textsuperscript{58} Q199 [Rayhan Asat]
\item \textsuperscript{59} HC Deb, 12 January 2021, col 160, [Commons Chamber]
\end{itemize}
4 Forced labour and the private sector

Box 8: Submission from a Uyghur relative

What I am asking for are basic human rights for my family, and for all Uyghur families. How can China be allowed to get away with this?

Source: Confidential

39. Many people who ‘graduate’ from the internment camp system are coerced into state-organised forced labour programmes. Between 2017–19 alone, more than 80,000 Uyghurs were forcibly transferred out of Xinjiang to work in factories across China, under the Xinjiang Aid programme.60 More recent estimates suggest that at least 570,000 people from Xinjiang have been forced to pick cotton.61 Workers are typically paid little to nothing. Satellite imagery reveals factories surrounded by barbed wire fences, surveillance cameras, and guard towers.62 84% of China’s cotton comes from Xinjiang, and China provides a quarter of the world’s cotton products.6364

40. With these facts in mind, we are seriously concerned that products and materials made from Uyghur forced labour are making their way into UK value chains. We heard that “virtually the entire” UK textile and clothing industry is linked to the abuses in Xinjiang.65 Commissioner Nury Turkel of the United States Commission on Religious Freedom told us that there is a serious risk of consumers unknowingly buying products made from forced labour:

When you go to the store and reach out to the shelf, especially to the cotton products, don’t forget that a quarter—a fourth—of the world’s cotton products are made in China and sourced in the Uyghur region. When you reach out to the shelf to pick up a beauty item—a wig—you have a chance of buying a Uyghur prison woman’s hair … When you buy baby pyjamas, you have a chance of buying a product made by enslaved Uyghurs.66

Box 9: Advertisement for Uyghur workers

The Xinjiang Government has organised around 1,000 trainees from Xinjiang who have already passed political and medical examinations … The advantages of Xinjiang workers are: semi-military style management, can withstand hardship, no loss of personnel … Minimum order 100 workers!

Source: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Uyghurs for Sale, March 2020, p 17

41. In this chapter, we set out the measures we believe that the UK Government should take to extricate Uyghur forced labour from UK value chains. Doing so will send a powerful message to those running forced labour programmes that their products will not be accepted in UK markets.

60 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Uyghurs for Sale, March 2020, p 3
62 Justice for All (XIN0043) para 6
63 Anti-Slavery International and the CORE Coalition (XIN0063) para 2
64 Q41 [Nury Turkel]
65 Anti-Slavery International and the CORE Coalition (XIN0063) para 4
66 Q41 [Nury Turkel]
42. In January 2021, the Foreign Secretary announced a series of measures intended to prevent UK businesses from being part of supply chains which include Uyghur forced labour. These measures were:

- Guidance on the specific risks faced by businesses with links to Xinjiang, and the unique challenge of conducting due diligence there.
- The introduction of fines for businesses who do not comply with the transparency elements of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (MSA).
- Extending the MSA’s transparency requirements to the public sector, so that Government bodies exclude suppliers where there is “sufficient evidence” of human rights violations in their supply chains.
- An urgent review of export controls as they apply specifically to Xinjiang, to “prevent the export of any goods that could contribute directly or indirectly to human rights violations in that region”.

While any action on the Xinjiang atrocities is welcome, these measures, regrettably, will not go far enough. More than five months since the announcement, the Government has not made clear when the urgent export review will be concluded. The crisis in Xinjiang is far too urgent for delay. In its response to this report, we ask that the Government inform us of when the Department for International Trade will share the export review’s findings and actions with Parliament.

Box 10: Explainer: Transparency in Supply Chains, Modern Slavery Act 2015

The transparency in supply chains provision of the 2015 Modern Slavery Act “requires certain businesses to produce a statement setting out the steps they have taken to ensure there is no modern slavery in their own business and their supply chains. If an organisation has taken no steps to do this, their statement should say so.”

Businesses are only required to produce a statement if their total turnover reaches or exceeds £36 million.


43. As it stands, the transparency in supply chains provision of the MSA (see Box 9) only requires companies to report on their efforts to monitor the state of forced labour in their value chains; it does not compel them to remove the use of modern slavery when it is found. Likewise, we heard from Peter McAllister of the Ethical Trading Initiative that simply issuing guidance will be unlikely to change the behaviour of businesses who do use forced labour. We therefore reject the idea that Government guidance, as well as non-binding rules such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, will encourage businesses to do the right thing. As well as imposing punitive fines for non-compliance with the reporting elements of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, we recommend that the Government introduce new legislation that will create

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67 HC Deb, 12 January 2021, col 161–162 [Commons Chamber]
68 Q184 [Chloe Cranston]
69 Uyghur Human Rights Projects (XIN0071) p 2
70 Q97 [Peter McAllister]
71 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are a series of non-legally binding guidelines setting out the responsibility of businesses to promote and protect human rights.
a legal requirement for businesses and public sector bodies to take concrete measures to prevent and remove the use of forced labour in their value chains. This new duty should be backed up by meaningful sanctions and penalties for non-compliance.

44. Compliance with this new duty should be reported in companies’ Modern Slavery Statements. The criteria for producing these statements are also in need of reform. Civil society actors have previously called for the reporting threshold to be lower. We heard from Andrew Opie of the British Retail Consortium that the costs of improving due diligence for businesses operating in China would likely be “marginal”. In the Government’s own words, “no business can consider themselves immune from the risks of modern slavery”. As such, any business with international supply chains should be required to conduct appropriate due diligence and to demonstrate transparency. **We recommend that the Government review the £36m threshold for businesses to be required to produce Modern Slavery Statements, with a view to reducing it.**

45. Efforts to strengthen forced labour prevention in the private sector will require both political and bureaucratic resourcing to ensure all officials and staff are aware of the risks of doing business in certain countries, with comprehensive guidance around individual country labour standards provided by central Government. **Trade commissioners, envoys, and officers should be equipped with regularly updated toolkits and training to ensure they are fully informed of the forced labour risk associated with the countries in which they are working. This should be supported by a public Government-led grading system of countries’ adherence to global labour standards as set by institutions like the International Labour Organization.**

46. Throughout the course of this inquiry, we have heard that the issue of forced labour in Xinjiang is pervasive, widespread, and extremely difficult to monitor effectively. Outside auditors are regularly denied access to Xinjiang factories and forced labour workers are coerced into silence. Because of this, the United States announced a ban on cotton products from Xinjiang in January 2021. Certain businesses have taken similar measures.

47. Private companies such as ASOS, River Island, and NEXT told us they were taking steps to reduce the risk of using cotton sourced from Xinjiang, although NEXT disclosed at the time that it was “likely” that there was “some” Xinjiang cotton in their products. On the likelihood of Xinjiang produce being sourced from forced labour, Primark told us:

> Our initial response to the situation in Xinjiang began in October 2019, when we made the decision to end our relationship with the only factory

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72 Q185 [Chloe Cranston]
73 Q95 [Andrew Opie]
74 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Uyghur forced labour in Xinjiang and UK value chains: Government Response to the Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2019–21, HC 241, para 33
75 Q103 [Andrew Opie]
76 Q170 [Chloe Cranston]
77 Ethical Trading Initiative (XIN0057) p 2
78 Q100 [Andrew Opie]
79 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, USA bans all cotton products and tomatoes from Xinjiang over forced labour concerns, 14 January 2021
80 Correspondence with ASOS, 27 January 2021 and 11 February 2021
81 Correspondence with River Island, 1 March 2021 and 16 March 2021
82 Correspondence with NEXT, 28 January 2021 and 9 February 2021
from which we sourced finished goods in the XUAR … We believe our position is appropriate and proportionate given the reports which have emerged regarding alleged human rights abuses and the use of forced labour in Xinjiang, and because we are unable to undertake the due diligence or auditing that we would normally carry out when such claims emerge.83

48. Unless proven otherwise, the mass incarcerations and connected factories and farms mean it should be assumed that any product originating from Xinjiang is the product of forced labour. While much focus has been placed on the textile and apparel sector, other areas such as solar energy, agriculture, and electronics also bear a substantial risk of using forced labour.84 Until there can be definitive proof that products are not tainted by forced labour, UK companies and consumers should not be purchasing them.85 The Government should explore the possibility of banning the import of all cotton products known to be produced in whole or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, in line with WTO rules. While we primarily heard evidence on the cotton industry, we believe this ban should be extended to other industries.

49. We believe this measure to be necessary until more precise value chain analysis and scrutiny is possible. Technological solutions may prove invaluable in solving the challenge of assessing value chains for forced labour, as David Sävman, Head of Supply Chain at H&M Group, told the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee.86 The Government should issue guidance to business to implement modern means of traceability and product origin verification as part of their due diligence measures.

Box 11: Letter from Pippa Wicks, Partner and Executive Director, John Lewis

Cotton traceability is an industry-wide issue due to its long and complex global supply chain … We recognise that there are limitations to audits and certification programmes as they are often just a snapshot in time … We are investing in activities that go above and beyond audit and compliance to support supplier improvement and capacity building, which will make a tangible difference to on-the-ground working conditions.

Source: Correspondence with John Lewis, 18 December 2020 and 14 January 2021

50. Further measures should be taken with companies who do business in China more broadly. A number of the companies we wrote to reported that they worked with factories in China who had signed up to ethical guidelines, and due diligence processes.8889 However, we must also acknowledge that many factories throughout China make use of Uyghur forced labour. To ensure UK companies in China meet their ethical responsibilities, governments, and companies operating in China need to share knowledge of specific factories and companies in which forced labour is used, and of those where good due diligence practices are supported.9091 The Government should share Post-level
intelligence on specific risk areas and factors with UK companies operating in China when appropriate to do so, to ensure it contributes to and supports private sector due diligence within the country.

51. Additional information will help businesses to discontinue use of forced labour factories but will not compel all to do so. The Government has announced its plans to provide “guidance and support to UK Government bodies to exclude suppliers where there is sufficient evidence of human rights abuses in any of their supply chains.” 92 We reiterate our view that guidance alone will not be sufficiently effective. Stricter measures will be necessary. The Government should use information gained from local sources, Posts, and civil society to identify specific factories and companies that make use of forced labour and prohibit them from importing into the UK through the sanctions regime.

52. As with the other atrocities in Xinjiang, there is an urgent need for international investigation in order to ensure the possibility of future accountability. In correspondence with the Chair, the International Labour Organization (ILO) informed us of its intent to investigate allegations of forced labour in China in December 2021 and December 2022. 93 Given the wealth of already available evidence of egregious human rights abuses in Xinjiang, it is disappointing that the ILO is not acting more swiftly. The UK should press for the International Labour Organization to conduct a full investigation of the Xinjiang region in order to verify the extent of forced labour there as a matter of urgent priority.

93 Correspondence with the International Labour Organization, 19 April 2021 and 4 May 2021
5  Technology and research

Box 12: Letter from a ‘re-educated’ relative

I will always follow the Party, I will always listen to the Party, I will be grateful to the Party and will act in a way that is beneficial to ethnic harmony and social stability. I am extremely proud to be a citizen of the People’s Republic of China!

Source: Confidential

53. Under Chinese government policy, Xinjiang has become a modern police state where advanced technology is deployed to support an unprecedented level of surveillance, invasion of privacy, and repression. Systems such as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) and the ‘Big Brother App’ therein demonstrate the potentially Orwellian use of new technologies. These systems collect Uyghurs’ biometric information, such as blood type and height, and monitor their every move for suspicious activity, which may involve actions as vague as “unusual electricity consumption”.94 We are alarmed by the reports that Uyghurs in the camps are restrained in chairs and subjected to experimental technologies, such as “emotion detection software”.95

54. We were further concerned to discover that there are substantial research connections between the Chinese organisations responsible for these crimes and UK universities.96 While we will be addressing wider questions around tech governance in our inquiry into tech and the future of UK foreign policy, the role of advanced technologies in the use of oppression in Xinjiang cannot be ignored. We are of the view that no UK company should be partnering with or investing in Chinese firms that provide technology for repression, nor should any UK universities engage in research collaboration with Chinese institutions suspected of being involved with Xinjiang or the Chinese government’s wider civil-military fusion doctrine.

55. Given that many forms of technology have the potential for both innocuous use and coercive use, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which specific types of technology will be used for repression.97 We therefore believe that decisions about research collaborations should be made based on the history, affiliations, and independence of potential partner institutions. Where a Chinese institution possesses known or suspected links to repression in Xinjiang, or substantial connections to Chinese military research, UK universities should avoid any form of technological or research collaboration with them. They should also conduct urgent reviews of their current research partnerships, terminating them where involved parties are found or suspected to be complicit in the atrocities in Xinjiang.

56. We wrote to Manchester University to enquire about their research partnership with CETC, the Chinese firm largely responsible for developing the IJOP. We were surprised to learn that they were unaware of CETC’s reported complicity in the crimes in Xinjiang, despite the extensive and frequent reporting on this issue in the press and media. We

94  Human Rights Watch, How Mass Surveillance Works in Xinjiang, China, accessed 2 May 2019
95  AI emotion-detection software tested on Uyghurs, BBC News, 26 May 2021
96  Q137 [Radomir Tylecote]
97  Q142 [Samantha Hoffman]
welcomed the news that, following our interventions, Manchester University took steps to terminate its partnership with CETC. UK organisations—whether private companies or universities—should take much greater care in investigating those they work with.

Box 13: Letter from Martin Schröder, Vice President and Dean, University of Manchester

I also confirm that, as far as I am aware, the University had no prior knowledge of any credible reports stated in your letter, or from any other source, linking CETC's technology with the persecution of Uyghur Muslims. Your letter is the first to do so.

Source: Correspondence with the University of Manchester, 14 January 2021 and 29 January 2021

57. To do this effectively, universities and other organisations will need Government support and assistance, primarily through the provision and dissemination of intelligence concerning Chinese organisations. We recommend that the Government fund and manage the creation of a regularly-updated due diligence and intelligence database to provide universities with a directory of Chinese institutions and companies that possess strong or suspected connections to technology-aided human rights abuses. The FCDO should convene a panel to oversee and discuss due diligence, to include government officials and members of the academic community. This panel should use all means available to exert public pressure on institutions, ensuring compliance.

Box 14: Testimony from a Uyghur

Without any explanation at all, from 2015 onward, surveillance cameras were installed in our courtyard home’s gate and in its yard.

Source: Confidential

58. Cameras made by the Chinese firm Hikvision have been deployed throughout Xinjiang, and provide the primary camera technology used in the internment camps. Dr Samantha Hoffman of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and Dr Radomir Tylecote of Civitas shared their concern that facial recognition cameras made by companies such as Hikvision operating in the UK are collecting facial recognition data, which can then be used by the Chinese government. Dr Hoffman said that Hikvision cameras are operating “all over London”. Independent reports suggest that Hikvision cameras are operating throughout the UK in areas such as Kensington and Chelsea, Guildford, and Coventry, placed in leisure centres and even schools.

59. Equipment manufactured by companies such as Hikvision and Dahua should not be permitted to operate within the UK. We recommend that the Government prohibits organisations and individuals in the UK from doing business with any companies known to be associated with the Xinjiang atrocities through the sanctions regime. The Government should prohibit UK firms and public sector bodies from conducting business with, investing in, or entering into partnerships with such Chinese firms, to ensure that UK companies do not provide either blueprints or financing for further technology-enabled human rights abuses.

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98 Correspondence with the University of Manchester, 14 January 2021 and 29 January 2021
99 Q138 [Samantha Hoffman]
100 Correspondence with the Royal Society, 18 March 2021 and 31 March 2021
101 Uyghur Human Rights Project (XIN0071) p 6
102 Q143 [Samantha Hoffman], Q154 [Samantha Hoffman], Q155 [Radomir Tylecote]
103 The Guardian, Chinese cameras blacklisted by US being used in UK school toilets, 21 September 2020
6 The UK’s approach to atrocity prevention

60. When we began this inquiry, we believed that finding effective solutions to the crisis in Xinjiang also demanded an assessment of the Government’s broader approach to preventing mass atrocities. Through evidence taken from atrocity prevention experts, we heard that there are still major shortfalls in the Government’s approach in this area. The atrocities in Xinjiang are a salient example of the failure to predict and prevent atrocities in a non-armed conflict situation. While we welcome the fact that the recent Integrated Review placed greater emphasis on atrocity prevention, we remain concerned that the strategy and resourcing in this area remain unfocused and inadequate.

Box 15: Nicola Reindorp, CEO of Crisis Action, on non-conflict mass atrocities

There is that sense that it is in Britain’s interest to prevent atrocities. It is also core to our values and is part of our history, as with tackling the genocidal regime in the second world war. Let us remember that the worst of the atrocities, Kristallnacht, was outside of the context of an armed conflict at the time. The Rwandan genocide was kicked off not in the context of an armed conflict.

Source: Q54 [Nicola Reindorp]

61. Our predecessor Committees and a multitude of civil society actors have criticised the Government’s approach of conflating atrocity prevention with conflict prevention.\(^{104}\)^\(^{105}\) History tells us time and time again that these are distinct issues, demanding distinct approaches, each with a clear strategy.\(^{106}\)^\(^{107}\) We recommend that the Government introduce a national, cross-departmental strategy for atrocity prevention.

62. A clear strategy will require clear direction from across Government, developed by the newly announced Conflict Centre.\(^{108}\) Dr Kate Ferguson, Co-Executive Director of Protection Approaches, told us that various departments are required to be involved in atrocity prevention:

   The Treasury needs to be involved because of sanctions; the Home Office needs to be involved because of asylum applications; the Department for Education needs to be involved to ensure that the kids know how to approach material that denies genocide and spreads division.\(^{109}\)

*While the FCDO is the lead department for mass atrocity prevention, we recommend that the Government issue clear guidance and training to all relevant departments about their specific responsibilities for mass atrocity prevention. The departments involved should have senior staff members designated as atrocity prevention leads. The newly*

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105 The Jo Cox Foundation (XIN0070) para 2


107 Burma Campaign UK, XIN0065, para 7

108 The Conflict Centre will be based in the FCDO, and will “draw on expertise from across government and beyond to develop and lead a strategic conflict agenda”.


109 Q53 [Kate Ferguson]
announced Conflict Centre should coordinate these departmental leads and ensure it offers departments access to experts in international law, sanctions, multilateral coordination, intelligence, aid programming, and so on.

63. When running its global campaign to promote freedom of religion or belief (FoRB), the Government provided a ‘FoRB Toolkit’ to FCDO staff in the UK and in-Post. If atrocity prevention is to be a higher priority following the Integrated Review, then adequate training for staff is needed. The Government should provide atrocity prevention ‘toolkits’ and atrocity prevention training for FCDO staff, with a mandatory refresher course every three years for all staff in diplomatic, programming, or policy-related roles.

64. It is deeply regrettable that the UK Government, like others, failed to recognise and prevent the atrocities in Xinjiang before they reached the level we are currently seeing. The Government’s current early warning systems are too slow and in clear need of improvement. Having an effective, highly networked and reactive system of early warning mechanisms, using intelligence from allies and local entities, will be critical in preventing future atrocities of this scale. Likewise, the new Conflict Centre should also prioritise mass atrocities like Xinjiang, which take place outside the context of armed conflict. The Government should implement additional early warning tools specifically focused on predicting mass atrocities, and mainstream non-conflict atrocity prevention thinking in the newly announced Conflict Centre. The Conflict Centre should be renamed to the Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Centre, to ensure atrocity prevention thinking is prioritised in its operations.

65. Bureaucratic resourcing will be essential in improving the UK’s response to mass atrocities, but not in itself sufficient. There must be leadership at a political level to ensure atrocity prevention is prioritised in decision-making. The FCDO makes regular use of Special Envoys to demonstrate commitment to issues, including in relation to LGBT Rights, and Freedom of Religion or Belief. We recommend that the Government appoint a Special Envoy on Atrocity Prevention to ensure that the prevention of mass atrocities is consistently championed in Parliament and Government.

66. We were pleased to see that the Government has provided funding to organisations such as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute for their research into the atrocities in Xinjiang. This research is invaluable in exposing the Chinese government’s human rights abuses to the wider world. The Government should commit to funding further such research, which is doing vital work to expose those injustices which the Communist Party of China is eager to hide.

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110 Q60 [Nicola Reindorp]
111 The Jo Cox Foundation (XIN0070) para 4
112 Q54 [Nicola Reindorp]
113 Gov.uk, Prime Minister appoints new Special Envoy on LGBT rights: 16 May 2021, 16 May 2021
114 Gov.uk, Fiona Bruce MP, accessed 16 June 2021
115 Q238 [Nigel Adams]
7 Conclusion

Box 16: Letter from a ‘re-educated’ relative

After all, didn’t our great and generous Party say that they would, in their loving kindness, offer these training centres to quickly wash clean the poison that bad-intentioned people had planted in the victimised common folk, returning us to our families soon after?

Source: Confidential

67. In a wider context, when in 2001 the People’s Republic of China was accepted into the World Trade Organization (following its admission to the UN Security Council in 1971 and the recognition of its national Olympic Committee by the IOC in 1979), it was expected that this would lead to less repression within China and a general improvement in international relations. It has not. In recent years, the Chinese government has tested and challenged the way we trade and engage with each other to breaking point, undermining the fundamental principles that have ensured peace and stability, and which were written by those envoys from the states that had so suffered in the Second World War, including China. It is incumbent on all countries and governments that support this system to find innovative ways of working together to hold powerful nations to account for their actions. Xinjiang is one example of what happens when states are allowed to act with impunity. We must ensure that this does not set a dangerous precedent.

68. While we commend the ongoing work of the UK Government in speaking out and leading on the issue of Xinjiang at the United Nations, we are concerned that its actions do not match its rhetoric and have so far proved ineffective. A crisis of this scale requires a cross-government, cross-sectoral, international approach. In this report, we have made recommendations on multilateral action, private sector reforms, the support required for members of persecuted diaspora, and the Government’s approach to atrocity prevention. The implementation of these recommendations will provide a much more robust and comprehensive Government response to the Xinjiang crisis, ensuring that all support possible is given to the people suffering from identity-based persecution.
Conclusions and recommendations

The multilateral system

1. The Government should accept Parliament’s view that Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang are suffering genocide and crimes against humanity, and take action to bring these crimes to an end. (Paragraph 13)

2. The UK should call directly for the immediate disbandment of the internment camp system in Xinjiang, the cessation of forced sterilisation of women and separation of children, and an end to mass forced labour programmes such as Xinjiang Aid. (Paragraph 17)

3. The UK Government should increase pressure on the Chinese government to allow international observers access to Xinjiang, especially the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Government should use every opportunity it has at UN organs, summits, and treaty bodies to raise the issue. To do this, the UK should engage more closely with partners and those nations not currently taking action to ensure support on UN votes and statements. (Paragraph 18)

4. If the Chinese government continues to stall and prevent in-country investigations, the UK should propose a Human Rights Council motion that the High Commissioner for Human Rights conduct an investigation into the atrocities in Xinjiang from outside of China. The Government should also explore the prospect of a Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry. (Paragraph 19)

5. The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination provides a viable avenue through which the UK Government, with others, may hold the Chinese government accountable, and another forum through which likeminded countries can draw attention to and pursue accountability for human rights abuses in Xinjiang We recommend that the Government urgently raise a complaint against China to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (Paragraph 20)

6. We recommend that the UK moves for special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Human Rights Council to find solutions to the crisis in Xinjiang. (Paragraph 21)

7. We recommend that the Government engages in dialogue with the International Criminal Court about the feasibility of a proprio motu investigation into crimes committed against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and beyond. (Paragraph 22)

8. The collection and preservation of evidence will be essential for future accountability for these crimes. We recommend that the Government allocate funding for the creation of an international mechanism for collecting evidence on the crimes in Xinjiang, and provides further resources to help locate and record the details of those who have gone missing under the Chinese Communist Party’s internment system so that they do not remain nameless victims. (Paragraph 23)

9. The ‘D10’ model of democratic countries is a good starting point for coalition-building but cannot be the limit—significant diplomatic efforts should also be
focused on states in Africa, South America, Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. The Government should lead efforts to create a more consistent coalition of democratic countries to coordinate action on Xinjiang through the UN and other institutions. (Paragraph 24)

10. We recommend that the Government commits financial and bureaucratic resources to ensuring future Build Back Better World projects meet all internationally recognised standards, including on labour rights, environmental measures, and transparency. (Paragraph 25)

11. If the British Olympic Association and competing teams decide not to boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, the Government should not attend and should urge others not to do so. The Government should suggest the British Olympic Association does not participate in the opening or closing ceremonies, beyond one representative carrying the Union Flag. It should abstain from sending government officials to any ceremonies or functions, strongly discourage UK businesses from sponsoring or advertising at the Olympics, encourage fans and tourists to stay away, and discourage athletes from supporting or accepting the Chinese government’s propaganda efforts while in-country. (Paragraph 27)

12. For sanctions to be effective, they must be used in full coordination with allies and against those with whom ultimate responsibility for the Xinjiang atrocities lies. We recommend that the Government intensify efforts to coordinate sanctions with allies to consistently sanction senior individuals and entities with the most responsibility for or connection to abuses in Xinjiang. (Paragraph 28)

13. The UK Government should push for an urgent, independent review of UNESCO’s investigatory powers and processes, and formally request that the organisation pursue its mandate with determination and commitment. The UK should adopt a policy of coordinating with allies to block and reduce the influence of the worst human rights-abusing countries on the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. (Paragraph 31)

Diaspora and culture

14. The Government should conduct an urgent consultation with members of these communities in the UK to determine the extent of harassment they are facing and the type of support they require, offering support and protection as appropriate. (Paragraph 34)

15. We recommend that the Government implement an asylum fast track for Uyghurs and members of other minority ethnic groups who are fleeing persecution in China. (Paragraph 35)

16. The UK should form a coalition of ‘sanctuary states’ that will publicly recommit to the principles of non-refoulement. Doing so will signal to members of persecuted minority groups such as the Uyghurs that they will be safe in these countries, and it will apply further diplomatic and reputational pressure on those states guilty of deporting Uyghurs to China. (Paragraph 36)
17. We recommend that, where there is credible evidence of a state party to the United Nations Convention against Torture deporting Uyghurs and members of other persecuted minority groups to China, the UK should raise a complaint against that state to the Committee against Torture. (Paragraph 37)

18. The British Council should prioritise cultural protection funding for the preservation and promotion of Uyghur tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The BBC World Service should broadcast in Uyghur in areas where substantial Uyghur communities live. (Paragraph 38)

**Forced labour and the private sector**

19. In its response to this report, we ask that the Government inform us of when the Department for International Trade will share the export review’s findings and actions with Parliament. (Paragraph 42)

20. As well as imposing punitive fines for non-compliance with the reporting elements of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, we recommend that the Government introduce new legislation that will create a legal requirement for businesses and public sector bodies to take concrete measures to prevent and remove the use of forced labour in their value chains. This new duty should be backed up by meaningful sanctions and penalties for non-compliance. (Paragraph 43)

21. We recommend that the Government review the £36m threshold for businesses to be required to produce Modern Slavery Statements, with a view to reducing it. (Paragraph 44)

22. Trade commissioners, envoys, and officers should be equipped with regularly updated toolkits and training to ensure they are fully informed of the forced labour risk associated with the countries in which they are working. This should be supported by a public Government-led grading system of countries’ adherence to global labour standards as set by institutions like the International Labour Organization. (Paragraph 45)

23. The Government should explore the possibility of banning the import of all cotton products known to be produced in whole or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, in line with WTO rules. While we primarily heard evidence on the cotton industry, we believe this ban should be extended to other industries. (Paragraph 48)

24. The Government should issue guidance to business to implement modern means of traceability and product origin verification as part of their due diligence measures. (Paragraph 49)

25. The Government should share Post-level intelligence on specific risk areas and factors with UK companies operating in China when appropriate to do so, to ensure it contributes to and supports private sector due diligence within the country. (Paragraph 50)

26. The Government should use information gained from local sources, Posts, and civil society to identify specific factories and companies that make use of forced labour and prohibit them from importing to the UK through the sanctions regime. (Paragraph 51)
27. The UK should press for the International Labour Organization to conduct a full investigation of the Xinjiang region in order to verify the extent of forced labour there as a matter of urgent priority. (Paragraph 52)

Technology and research

28. Where a Chinese institution possesses known or suspected links to repression in Xinjiang, or substantial connections to Chinese military research, UK universities should avoid any form of technological or research collaboration with them. They should also conduct urgent reviews of their current research partnerships, terminating them where involved parties are found or suspected to be complicit in the atrocities in Xinjiang. (Paragraph 55)

29. We recommend that the Government fund and manage the creation of a regularly-updated due diligence and intelligence database to provide universities with a directory of Chinese institutions and companies that possess strong or suspected connections to technology-aided human rights abuses. The FCDO should convene a panel to oversee and discuss due diligence, to include government officials and members of the academic community. This panel should use all means available to exert public pressure on institutions, ensuring compliance. (Paragraph 57)

30. Equipment manufactured by companies such as Hikvision and Dahua should not be permitted to operate within the UK. We recommend that the Government prohibits organisations and individuals in the UK from doing business with any companies known to be associated with the Xinjiang atrocities through the sanctions regime. The Government should prohibit UK firms and public sector bodies from conducting business with, investing in, or entering into partnerships with such Chinese firms, to ensure that UK companies do not provide either blueprints or financing for further technology-enabled human rights abuses. (Paragraph 59)

The UK’s approach to atrocity prevention

31. We recommend that the Government introduce a national, cross-departmental strategy for atrocity prevention. (Paragraph 61)

32. While the FCDO is the lead department for mass atrocity prevention, we recommend that the Government issue clear guidance and training to all relevant departments about their specific responsibilities for mass atrocity prevention. The departments involved should have senior staff members designated as atrocity prevention leads. The newly announced Conflict Centre should coordinate these departmental leads and ensure it offers departments access to experts in international law, sanctions, multilateral coordination, intelligence, aid programming, and so on. (Paragraph 62)

33. The Government should provide atrocity prevention ‘toolkits’ and atrocity prevention training for FCDO staff, with a mandatory refresher course every three years for all staff in diplomatic, programming, or policy-related roles. (Paragraph 63)

34. The Government should implement additional early warning tools specifically focused on predicting mass atrocities, and mainstream non-conflict atrocity prevention
thinking in the newly announced Conflict Centre. The Conflict Centre should be renamed to the Conflict and Atrocity Prevention Centre, to ensure atrocity prevention thinking is prioritised in its operations. (Paragraph 64)

35. We recommend that the Government appoint a Special Envoy on Atrocity Prevention to ensure that the prevention of mass atrocities is consistently championed in Parliament and Government. (Paragraph 65)

36. The Government should commit to funding further such research, which is doing vital work to expose those injustices which the Communist Party of China is eager to hide. (Paragraph 66)

Conclusion

37. In a wider context, when in 2001 the People’s Republic of China was accepted into the World Trade Organization (following its admission to the UN Security Council in 1971 and the recognition of its national Olympic Committee by the IOC in 1979) it was expected that this would lead to less repression within China and a general improvement in international relations. It has not. In recent years, the Chinese government has tested and challenged the way we trade and engage with each other to breaking point, undermining the fundamental principles that have ensured peace and stability, and which were written by those envoys from the states that had so suffered in the Second World War, including China. It is incumbent on all countries and governments that support this system to find innovative ways of working together to hold powerful nations to account for their actions. Xinjiang is one example of what happens when states are allowed to act with impunity. We must ensure that this does not set a dangerous precedent. (Paragraph 67)

38. While we commend the ongoing work of the UK Government in speaking out and leading on the issue of Xinjiang at the United Nations, we are concerned that its actions do not match its rhetoric and have so far proved ineffective. A crisis of this scale requires a cross-government, cross-sectoral, international approach. In this report, we have made recommendations on multilateral action, private sector reforms, the support required for members of persecuted diaspora, and the Government’s approach to atrocity prevention. The implementation of these recommendations would provide a much more robust and comprehensive Government response to the Xinjiang crisis, ensuring that all support possible is given to the people suffering from identity-based persecution. (Paragraph 68)
Formal minutes

Tuesday 29 June 2021

Members present:

Tom Tugendhat, in the Chair

Chris Bryant  Royston Smith
Alicia Kearns  Graham Stringer
Andrew Rosindell  Claudia Webbe
Bob Seely

Draft Report (Never Again: The UK’s Responsibility to Act on Atrocities in Xinjiang and Beyond), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 68 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

[Adjourned till Tuesday 6 July at 1.45pm]
Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

Tuesday 15 December 2020

Dolkun Isa, President, World Uyghur Congress; Schona Jolly QC, Chair, Bar Human Rights Committee

Professor Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism; Nury Turkel, Commissioner, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom

Tuesday 12 January 2021

Dr Kate Ferguson, Chair of Policy at European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Co-Executive Director, Protection Approaches; Nicola Reindorp, Deputy Executive Director, Crisis Action

Dr Simon Adams, Executive Director, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect; Dr Gregory Stanton, Founding President and Chairman, Genocide Watch; Ambassador Stephen Rapp, Former United States Ambassador-at-Large, Office of Global Criminal Justice

Tuesday 09 February 2021

Peter McAllister, Executive Director, Ethical Trading Initiative; Andrew Opie, Director of Food and Sustainability, British Retail Consortium; Damien Sanfilippo, Director of Standards & Assurance, Better Cotton Initiative

Tuesday 02 March 2021

Dr Samantha Hoffman, Senior Analyst, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI); Dr Radomir Tylecote, Director, Defence and Security for Democracy Unit, Civitas

Chloe Cranston, Business and Human Rights Manager, Anti-slavery International; Sophie Richardson, China Director, Human Rights Watch

Tuesday 13 April 2021

Rushan Abbas, Founder and Executive Director, Campaign for Uyghurs; Rayhan Asat, Attorney, Yale World Fellow, President, American Turkic International Lawyers Association; Peter Irwin, Senior Program Officer for Advocacy and Communications, Uyghur Human Rights Project

Azeem Ibrahim, Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Director, Center for Global Policy; Charles Parton OBE, Senior Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Tuesday 27 April 2021

Nigel Adams MP, Minister for Asia, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Rupert Ainley, Interim Director North East Asia and China, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; Paul Williams, Director Open Societies and Human Rights, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office  Q231–338
Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee’s website.

XIN numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1. Ali, Shayida (Software Engineer, BNY Mellon) (XIN0035)
2. Amnesty International UK (XIN0046)
3. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0066)
4. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0032)
5. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0036)
6. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0042)
7. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0053)
8. Anonymous Submitter (XIN0079)
9. Anti-slavery International; and CORE Coalition (XIN0063)
10. Baker-Beall, Dr Christopher (Senior Lecturer, Bournemouth University); and Clark, Mr Robert (XIN0044)
11. Bar Human Rights Committee of England and Wales (XIN0083)
12. Bishop, Lord (The Bishop of St Albans, Lord Spiritual, Church of England, House of Lords) (XIN0029)
13. Burma Campaign UK (XIN0056)
14. CSW (XIN0060)
15. Chlo, Dr (Lecturer in Law, University of Lincoln) (XIN0055)
16. Coalition for Genocide Response (XIN0031)
17. Company, The Walt Disney (The Walt Disney Company) (XIN0033)
18. D’Alessandra, Federica (Executive Director, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.); and Sutherland, Kirsty (Visiting Fellow of Practice, Oxford Programme on International Peace and Security, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.) (XIN0074)
19. East Turkistan Government in Exile (XIN0078)
20. East Turkistan Government in Exile; and East Turkistan National Awakening Movement (XIN0081)
21. Ethical Trading Initiative (XIN0057)
22. European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (XIN0058)
23. Finley, Dr Joanne Smith (Reader in Chinese Studies, Newcastle University) (XIN0084)
24. Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (XIN0059)
25. Gifkins, Dr Jess (Lecturer in International Relations, The University of Manchester); and Jarvis, Dr Samuel (Lecturer in International Relations, York St John University) (XIN0061)
26. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (XIN0047)
27. Global Rights Compliance (XIN0065)
28 Human Rights Watch (XIN0062)
29 Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (UK) (XIN0082)
30 International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC) (XIN0076)
31 Justice For All (XIN0054)
32 Lawyers for Uyghur Rights (XIN0075)
33 Muslim Council of Britain (XIN0073)
34 Nygaard, Mr. Adil (Research Associate, Justice For All) (XIN0043)
35 Ozcan, Dr Gul Berna (Reader, Royal Holloway, University of London) (XIN0080)
36 Protection Approaches (XIN0067)
37 The Jo Cox Foundation (XIN0070)
38 The Rights Practice (XIN0064)
39 Tylecote, Dr Radomir (XIN0086)
40 Uyghur Human Rights Project (XIN0071)
41 Wells, Dr Audrey (Teaching Fellow (Retired), London University Royal Holloway College) (XIN0077)
42 Willis, Ben (PhD researcher, University of Leeds) (XIN0040)
## List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee’s website.

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